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Abstract 
This thesis presents an interdisciplinary study in certain aspects of biblical 
hermeneutics from the point of view of speech act theory. After an introduction 
indicating the possible scope of such a study in relation to well established 
hermeneutical issues within theological and biblical studies, the thesis falls into two 
parts. 
In part one, the philosophical claims of speech act theory are examined. A particular 
focus is the question of criteria for demarcating speech ac ts and for appropriating the 
theory for the case of written texts. A distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' speech 
acts is proposed, and it is argued that the notion of construal so central to speech act 
theory is also best viewed across a spectrum of strengths. These criteria suggest 
responses to certain prominent objections to the hermeneutical relevance of speech 
act theory. They also point away from any form of 'speech act criticism' and towards 
an eclectic approach to relevant biblical texts. Consideration is therefore given to 
determining which texts merit such a study. 
Part two of the thesis begins by reviewing major attempts to utilise speech act theory 
in this way, focusing in particular on the work of Donald Evans, and modifying his 
approach in order to articulate some central elements of a'hermeneutic of 
self-involvement'. The burden of part two is then to explore this hermeneutic with 
reference to three particular speech acts which occur in the New Testament, those of 
confession, of forgiveness, and of teaching. These chapters attempt to demonstrate in 
practice what it means to appropriate speech act theory for the task of biblical 
interpretation, showing in the process that the perspective involved is a 
multi-disciplinary one. 
Some of the implications of the development of such a hermeneutic are sketched out 
by way of conclusion. 
[293 words] 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 
Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation 
§1 Introduction 
'Speech act theory' is the name given to a type of enquiry brought into focus by the 
work of J. L. Austin in his 1955 William James lectures at Harvard, and later 
published as How to Do 7hings with Words. ' At heart, speech act theory concerns 
itself with the performative nature of language: with the topic of how language 
'utterances' are operative and have effects whether they occur in face-to-face personal 
conversation or in any communicative action. Typically, the subject is introduced by 
way of such examples as the uttering of 'I do' at the appropriate point in a marriage 
ceremony; the naming of a ship by an appointed celebrity who smashes the 
champagne bottle against the hull and says 'I name this ship the Titanic'; or the 
creation of obligation simply through the uttering of the words 'I'll be there at 10.00 
tomorrow morning'. In all these cases, an act is performed by, in and through the use 
of speech. 
Austin did not invent speech act theory, but as the subject currently stands, most of 
its pre-Austin development is of relatively minor significance. ' Of considerably 
I J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, edited by J. 0. Urmson & Marina Sbisa, Oxford: 
Oxford UP, '1975 (1962). Details of many of the works mentioned in these introductory paragraphs 
may be found in later discussions, particularly in chapter 2. 
21 trace that part of it specifically applicable to Austin's work in chapter 2. Alan White has 
written that'since the 1980's there has been a growing awareness of interesting anticipations [of 
speech-act theory] in the work of philosophers influenced by Brentano or Husserl., such as Anton 
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greater significance is the fact that Austin died before he was able to develop fully 
his account of 'performative utterances', with the result that at the very centre of the 
topic lies a debate concerning the direction in which his work should be developed. 
John Searle provides the most comprehensive statement of a full theory of speech 
acts. Another direction was explored most notably by Paul Grice, who developed a 
pragmatic approach focusing on the notion of 'conversational implicature. More 
recent writers offer a variety of ways forward, ranging from conciliatory approaches 
such as that of Frangois Recanati, to more partisan contributions such as the 
logico-linguistic emphasis of Daniel Vanderveken. Chapter 2 of this study presents a 
detailed survey of speech act theory and develops some particular lines of thought 
within it which shall prove useful in our enquiry. 
Beyond the arena of analytic philosophy of language, speech act theory has 
developed even gTeater diversity. Literary theorists have appealed to it both as a 
resource (following Grice), and as a governing paradigm, albeit without always 
agreeing on its nature. The work of Mary Louise Pratt and Richard Ohmann is 
prominent here, as well as the particular contribution of Shoshana Felman in looking 
at Austin's unique stylistic approach. ' In chapter 31 consider these various 
developments and applications, noting also the remarkable degree of attention 
afforded to speech act theory by such prominent writers as Jacques Derrida and 
Stanley Fish. 
One of Austin's own students, Donald Evans, produced an early study in applications 
of the ideas of speech act theory to biblical language, 4 and more recently there has 
been a growing literature involving the use of speech act theory in biblical and 
Marty (1847-1914) and Adolf Reinach (1883-1917)', 'Speech Acts', in Thomas Mautrier (ed. ), A 
Dictionary ofPhilosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996,403-404; here 404. For a helpful survey with a 
comprehensive bibliography see Brigitte Nerlich and David D. Clarke, 'Language, action and context. 
Linguistic pragmatics in Europe and America (1800-1950)', JPrag 22 (1994), 439-63. 
3 Shoshana Felman, The Literary Speech-Act: Don Juan with J. L. Austin, or seduction in two 
languages, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1983. Felman is concerned particularly with Austinian style and 
humour as components of his message. Her work is tangential to my own concerns and will not be 
explored here. 
4 Donald D. Evans, The Logic ofSelf-Involvement. A Philosophical Study ofEveryday 
Language with Special Reference to the Christian Use ofLanguage about God as Creator, London: 
SCM, 1963. 
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theological studies. However, in my judgment, there remains considerable confusion 
concerning what may or may not be expected of speech act theory and its insights in 
the area of biblical and theological studies. 
Firstly, appeals to 'Austin's idea of performative language' seem to be made by 
people with diametrically opposed points to make. Secondly, many biblical 
interpreters seem to suppose that speech act theory is constituted in its entirety by 
How to Do Things with Words, or at least that nothing is lost by adding to this only 
some footnoted appeals to the work of John Searle. Thirdly, the concerns of a 
Searlean type of Austin are sometimes assimilated to the pragrnatic stylistics of Paul 
Grice, all under the rubric of 'speech act criticism'. In the face of such varied 
appropriations of speech act theory in the biblical field, it seems best to take 
preliminary issues carefully in order to examine precisely what it is that speech act 
theory can achieve. 
My aim in this introduction is therefore to clarify what should and should not be 
expected of a study with a title such as 'Speech Act Theory and Biblical 
Interpretation', both with reference to the nature of speech act theory itself and with 
respect to its relationship with biblical hermeneutics. My subtitle, 'Toward a 
Hermeneutic of Self-Involvement', indicates my own conviction: that the direction 
suggested by Donald Evans remains the most fruitful for utilising speech act theory 
in a hermeneutical role in biblical interpretation. My various accounts of the work 
done in utilising speech act categories and concerns in biblical studies will 
demonstrate that this has not been the main area in which attention has been focused. 
I shall consider the relatively few exceptions to this judgment below, and in chapter 
51 will turn to a detailed examination of Evans' own unjustly neglected work. With 
the framework thus in place for a'hermeneutic of self-involvement', the remainder of 
part II of the thesis will then be given over to an exploration of various topics in New 
Testament interpretation which may be helpfully illuminated by a speech act 
approach. I conclude with some suggestions for various hermeneutical implications 
of this approach. 
Chapter 1- Page 4 
§2 The Philosophy ofLanguage and Biblical and Theological Hermeneutics 
It is not my intention to suggest either that speech act theory offers a comprehensive 
philosophy of language, or that it might serve as a panacea for all hermeneutical 
problems in biblical and theological studies. These two points are related, and in this 
section I propose to deal with them briefly. 
§2.1 Speech act theory is not a solution to the herm en eutical problem 
The story of the development of hermeneutics as its own distinctive field of enquiry 
has often been traced, and need not be repeated here. ' Perhaps most suggestively it 
has been seen as the path taken by the discipline of philosophy after it reached the 
limits of its own former approach with Kant. ' Without wishing to engage in a study 
of it here, I take it that one may talk of 'the hermeneutical problem', as formulated in 
the tradition reaching back to Schleiermacher, and developed in the thinking of 
Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur. ' This is the problem of arriving at understanding 
(be it of texts, of history, of events, or of people) in a world in which we always 
operate as a situated observer, relative to our own horizons and fallen short of a 
supposedly objective 'view from nowhere'! Hermeneutics, thus conceived, has 
engendered a variety of responses, ranging from the ardent defence of various forms 
of pre-hermeneutical objectivity through to doom-laden predictions of the end of the 
epistemological world as we knew it, with the collapse of all criteria except those of 
community predilection. 
5A helpful historically-orientated account is that of Jean Grondin, Introduction to 
Philosophical Hermeneutics (Trans. Joel Weinsheimer), New Haven & London: Yale UP, 1994 
(1991). 
6 On the 'closing of the philosophical canon' with Kant see Bruce Kuklick, 'Seven thinkers and 
how they grew: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz; Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Kant', in Richard Rorty, J. B. 
Schneewind & Quentin Skinner (eds. ), Philosophy in History. Essays on the historiography of 
philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984,125-39. 
71 am aware of course that there is fragmentation within the discipline of hermeneutics, but 
this need not concern us here. See Edward Tingley, 'Types of Hermeneutics, Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 36 (1998), 587-611; and Nicholas H. Smith, Strong Hermeneutics. Contingency and 
Moral Identity, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, especially 15-34, who characterises various 
hermeneutical traditions as 'strong', 'weak' and 'deep', partly as a way of evaluating their 'ontological 
commitment', a term which in hermeneutical as distinct from philosophical enquiry relates to the 
debate concerning the essential role of hermeneutical tradition in constituting human nature. This 
sense of 'ontology' thus contrasts primarily with 'contingency. 
8 To use the memorable phrase of Thomas Nagel, The Viewfrom Nowhere, New York: Oxford 
UP, 1986. 
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Hermeneutics in itself does not require us to adopt either of these extremes in 
response. In so far as the self has always been situated, and yet anything has ever 
been understood, then clearly it has proved possible to find resolution to 
hermeneutical difficulties. Hermeneutical theorising would then be the task of 
accounting for how this has happened. On the other hand, hermeneutics as a 
discipline has demonstrated that all knowledge is indeed contextual, and the self 
always is situated. A fOrtiori there must then be a way through the issues which, in 
the phrase of Richard Bernstein, moves'beyond objectivism and relativism. " 
The hermeneutical problem cannot be resolved simply by sharper a priori thinking. 
In fact 
, 
if hermeneutics has taught us anything then it is that one may not say in 
advance of any interpretive situation which method will be required in order to 
resolve interpretive difficulties. That is, there is no short-cut by which we may 
eliminate judgment from the interpretive process. Gadamer says of judgment that 
it cannot be taught in the abstract but only practised from case to 
case, and is therefore more an ability like the senses. It is 
something that cannot be learned, because no demonstration from 
concepts can guide the application of rules. " 
It cannot be learned, that is, in advance of the particularities of any given case. 
However, in the particular case, judgment will always be an act of seýflinvolvement. 
The concept of self-involvement is a central one to which we shall return many 
times. It occurs as part of the title of Evans' early work on speech act theory and 
creation language, but, from Evans onwards, is frequently left ambiguous in an 
unfortunate manner. To anticipate a major theme of this thesis, it will prove helpful 
always to bear in mind that there are degrees of self-involvement, and that we do 
well to distinguish between cases of strong and significant self-involvement, and 
more general cases where we might wish to say that all language is self-involving. 
The former is a primary concern of speech act theory. The latter only arises when 
9 Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Science, Hermeneutics, and 
Praxis, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983. 
10 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, London: Sheed & Ward, 'l 989 (German original 
1960), 31. 
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speech act theory is broadened in an attempt to develop it into an entire philosophy 
of language (on which see the next section). 
For example, the paradigm case of strong self-involvement in speech acts is the 
commitment of the person who says, 'I promise to be there tomorrow. ' The promise 
can only be understood and evaluated in connection with the commitments and 
intentions of the speaker. Very little can be said about this utterance short of 
investigating the speaker's degree of self-involvement in it. In contrast, a statement 
such as 'Karl Barth was born in 1886', while it may be said in a particular situation 
for any number of relevant reasons, is not intrinsically self-involving as a statement 
in any interesting manner. It may be evaluated or interpreted satisfactorily regardless 
of who says it. Of course no statement is entirely acontextual: the point is rather that 
its context may or may not be a particularly interesting aspect of it. 
The notion of self-involvement in reading the biblical text, therefore, is less a matter 
of logic (pace Evans) and more a fimction of certain hermeneutically interesting 
situations regarding how particular texts are read by particular readers. It is such 
particular cases which will be considered in part II of this study. In saying this, I am 
distancing myself from those who have argued that self-involvement is a feature of 
all reading of all texts, but who have not indicated whether this is to be taken as 
always equally significant. For example, I have considerable sympathy with Ben 
Meyer's Lonergan-inspired'critical realism', which emphasises how one must attain a 
stance towards the text in order to judge it. He writes that before judging 
one must have grasped the concrete data... This 'grasp' is the 
crucial antecedent of judgment... the act of committing oneself to 
the proposition... true judgment is paradoxical in being 
simultaneously impersonal and personal. " 
In Meyer's opinion, New Testament scholarship has never been so well served for 
insight, but all this insight is to no avail without concomitant judgment: 'a tower of 
insight can also be a house of cards, riven from top to bottom with structural faults 
the absence of grounded judgment. "' However, much as I am in agreement with this, 
Ben F. Meyer, Reality and Illusion in New Testament Scholarship. A Primer in Critical 
Realist Hermeneutics, Collegeville, Minnesota: Michael Glazier, Liturgical Press, 1994,27. 
12 Meyer, Reality and Illusion, 153. 
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I think it is important to realise that this is not the sense in which speech act theory 
proposes to handle the notion of self-involvement. While hermeneutics may indeed 
require of us a situated judgment in any and every case, it is only in certain types of 
case (which I have indicated that I will note as 'strongly self-involving') that speech 
act theory will prove relevant. 
A similar point must be made about Paul Ricoeur's use of the categories of speech 
acts as part of his general interpretation theory. He suggests that the difference 
between explanation (of propositional content) and understanding (of illocutionary 
force) may be thrown into relief by speech act theory to precisely the extent that the 
'grammar' of illocutions is encoded, or inscripturated, in the text. 13 To understand the 
text is to dwell in the world it opens up; whereas to explain it is to penetrate behind it 
to points of actual reference. This does not however make Ricoeur's hermeneutic 
se4flinvolving in anything like the sense in which that term is significant in speech 
act theory. It requires only a logic of 'possibility' which involves the self in the 
particular sense that T am part of the projected, possible world. " It seems less than 
coincidental that the particular biblical genres which capture Ricoeur's imagination 
are those of wisdom and narrative, where the gentler 'self-involvement' of 
world-projection is at work, rather than the stronger forms of directive prophecy or 
teaching, where questions of speaker agency come to the forefront. In so far, then, as 
Ricoeur raises the hermeneutical problem in terms of speech act theory, it is 
important to see why it is that speech act theory provides no 'solution' in general 
terms. 
§2.2 Speech act theory is not a comprehensive philosophy of language 
It is not necessary to demonstrate conclusively that the hermeneutical problem 
cannot be resolved by sharper a priori thinking for the purposes of this thesis,, 
because I also wish to claim that speech act theory will not in any case serve as a 
13 It would be a further debatable issue as to whether Ricoeur is right here to assimilate the 
well-known Erkldrung- Verstehen debate to the distinction between propositional content and 
illocutionary force. On this topic see Karl-Otto Apel, Understanding and Explanation. A 
Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective, Cambridge, Mass & London: MIT Press, 1984 (1979). 
14 See especially Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus ofMeaning, 
Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976,87-88, and, with reference to speech act theory, 
14-18. 
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comprehensive philosophy of language. This claim will be made in detail in chapter 
2, but can be sketched in outline here. 
Austin's original focus was on performative utterances: cases where a deed was done 
in or by the saying of the words. He went on to demonstrate that certain interesting 
characteristics of such utterances could be seen at work in all language use: degrees 
of felicity or infelicity, and the role of extra-linguistic conventions, for example. In 
his sketch-like writings he proposes ways of seeing these issues which have been 
taken up and systematised by subsequent philosophers, most notably John Searle. 
For all the structural clarity and explanatory power of Searle's speech act theory, a 
case can be made for saying that he has erred in attempting to press it into service as 
a full-scale philosophy of language. Much recent philosophical work on this topic 
has concentrated on exploring problems with Searle's approach, and developing his 
work in one of two ways: either seeking to deepen and extend its formal scope to 
make good perceived deficiencies (Vanderveken); or rethinking certain of his 
working hypotheses in order to reduce the theory to a humbler and more flexible 
level. " In chapter 21 shall argue that this latter path is the correct one. 
Without entering into the technicalities of speech act theory at this stage, the point 
can be made with reference to the work of the later Wittgenstein. By focusing 
insistently on the way language is actually used rather than imposing theories about 
how it 'should' be used, Wittgenstein demonstrated that the theoretical 
conceptualities we develop in discussing the philosophy of language are always 
relative to the particular goals of our discussion. As a particularly pertinent example, 
he considered the asymmetry of first-person and third-person usages of certain verbs 
such as 'to feel pain' or 'to believe falsely. "' While it makes perfect sense to say 'John 
believes falsely that phlogiston explains the concept of heat', it makes no sense to say 
'I believe it falsely too' since it is part of the grammar of 'believe' that the speaker is 
15 In particular is this true of several contributors to Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed. ), Foundations of 
Speech Act Theory. Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, London & New York: Routledge, 
1994. 
16 Ludwig Wittgenstem, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, '1967 (1953), 
pp. 18 7-92. References to Wittgenstein's works are usually given 
by § number. In cases such as this 
reference to the second part of the Investigations, which 
lacks § numbers, I make it explicit that a 
page reference is intended. 
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involved in the ascription of belief to himself when using it as a present-tense 
first-person verb, but not as a third person verb. However, Wittgenstein did not go on 
to claim that this indicated an entire field of philosophical enquiry concerning 
subject-asymmetry in verb uses. Instead it simply indicates that we must learn to be 
alert to this kind of possibility. His later philosophical work can be seen as the 
attempt to clarify what actually occurs in language use (amongst other topics) in the 
belief that in fact if philosophy were successfully to clear up the confusions 
surrounding ordinary usage then it would find that it had no subject matter of its own 
to pursue. Wittgenstein's vision for philosophy was that it would'leave everything as 
it is', and consist 'in assembling reminders for a particular purpose', viz whatever the 
task was to hand. " Philosophical ideas, rather like words themselves, are then best 
seen as tools to unlock certain problems. 
While much of this spirit pervades Austin's written work, it is notably absent from 
the approaches of Searle, who, for instance, sees system specifically in places where 
Wittgenstein saw limitless variety. " 
The field of philosophy of language continues to encompass detailed arguments 
about all aspects of speech act theory, and it is not my purpose to adjudicate them 
all. " Those germane to my own study will be considered in chapter 2. However, to 
state clearly my own conviction, I am sympathetic to certain negative conclusions 
concerning aspects of speech act theory especially where it has pursued reductive 
approaches concerned with logical calculus or depth grammar, but I believe that its 
main insights concerning certain types of strongly self-involving language survive 
these critiques and remain useful for certain purposes. 'O Primary among these 
17 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§ 124-128; §599. 
18 See John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of5peech Acts, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979,29, rejecting Wittgenstein's idea of'the limitless uses of language. '
19 See various articles in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds. ), A Companion to the Philosophy 
of Language (Blackwell companions to philosophy), Oxford: Blackwell, 1997; as well as articles in 
Tsohatzidis (ed. ), Foundations of Speech Act Theory. 
20 Primary among such critiques is the analysis of two prominent Wittgenstein commentators: 
G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker, Language, Sense and Nonsense. A Critical Investigation into Modern 
Theories of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984, with which I find myself in considerable agreement, 
although note James Bogen, 'An Unfavourable Review of Language, Sense and Nonsense', Inquiry 28 
(1985), 467-82. 
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purposes are the clarifying of presuppositions, implications and entailments of 
performative uses of language especially in cases of strong self-involvement. These 
purposes are sufficient to make speech act theory a worthwhile tool in the field of 
biblical and theological enquiry. 
One final comment is relevant here, concerning my frequent recourse to 
Wittgensteinian ways of thinking. Wittgenstein was not a speech act theorist, and it 
is well known that Austin was frequently unimpressed by him. " Some authors have 
specifically directed a Wittgensteinian critique against speech act theory. " 
Nevertheless, in my judgment, this is usually against certain formalisations of the 
theory rather than its central ideas. Wittgenstein's relationship with subsequent 
analytic philosophy remains debated, and I am inclined to agree with that stream of 
thought which sees fruitful if limited points of contact between his work and the 
more 'continental' tradition of hermeneutics: 'his work 
... 
provides much-needed 
arguments against the reductionist conceptions of human beings which the 
hermeneutic tradition rightly abhors. "' With respect to biblical interpretation, as 
against the philosophy of religion, 24 relatively few writers have explored 
Wittgensteinian resources, although those that have also indicate the relevant 
Icontinental' sympathies. 25 In short, my appeal to speech act theory is not to a 
comprehensive philosophy of language, but to a hermeneutical resource in the 
manner of the later Wittgenstein, although it stands or falls on its own independent 
merits. 
21 See further chapter 2, § 1.1 below. 
22 See G. C. Kerner, 'A WittgensteMiian Critique of Some Recent Developments in the Theory 
of Speech Acts', in Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl (eds. ), Language, Logic and Philosophy. 
Proceedings of the Fourth International Wittgenstein Symposium 28 Aug -2 Sep 1979, Kirchberg am 
Wechsel, Austria, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company and Vienna: H61der-Pichler-Tempsky, 
1980,423-25. 
23 Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996,29. More radical, 
but with some helpful points, is Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, Oxford: Blackwell, 1985, 
especially 64-108. 
24 See the helpful survey of Joseph M. Incandela, 'The Appropriation of Wittgenstein's Work 
by Philosophers of Religion: Towards a Re-Evaluation and an End', RelStud 21 (1985), 457-74. 
25 See in particular Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons. New Testament Hermeneutics 
and Philosophical Description, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans & Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1980, 
357-438, and also 33-40; Fergus Kerr, 'Language as Hermeneutic in the Later Wittgenstein', 
TUdschrifit voor Filosofie 27 (1965), 491-520; and more broadly idem, Theology After Wittgenstein, 
London: SPCK 
, 
21 997(1986). 
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§2.3 Speech act theory is not a variety of anti-foundationalism 
Finally, discussions of religious language and theological hermeneutics have been 
greatly preoccupied over the last twenty years by the question of Toundationalism' 
and its variant forms. This topic, fertile in American soil particularly, arises as a 
result of the disintegration of an alleged Enlightenment consensus about the nature of 
the given in intellectual enquiry. " As that consensus disappears, so scholars of all 
persuasions find themselves confronted with the issue of how to ground their beliefs, 
whether in rational absolutes, community traditions, personal preferences, or moral 
standards. 
This issue is perhaps so predominant in both philosophy and theology owing to the 
particular nature of American thought as a self-created discourse with no continuous 
tradition that can trace itself back beyond the revolution. This has led to pragmatism 
as the American philosophy par excellence, and to a great deal of soul-searching in 
the wake of the demise of a'modem' consensus. " Nancey Murphy is one 
representative American thinker who has attempted to map the epistemological 
possibilities of this demise, and to develop criteria by which post-'modem' schemes 
(in this anglo-american sense) may be evaluated. " One result of her approach is to 
classify Austin's speech act theory as postmodem, and as representative of the same 
kind of anti-foundational drift as George Lindbeck's prominent 'postliberal' proposal 
for understanding religion and doctrines. " 
26 See the survey of John E. Thiel, Nonfoundationalism (Guides to Theological Inquiry), 
Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1994. 
27 Positive and negative views respectively of this tradition are offered by Robert S. 
Corrington, The Community of Interpreters. On the Hermeneutics of Nature and the Bible in the 
2 
American Philosophical Tradition (StABH 3), Macon, GA: Mercer UP, 1995 (1987); and Roger 
Lundin, 'Reading America', unpublished paper at the Crossing the Boundaries conference, 
Gloucester, MA, 1998, forthcoming from Eerdmans, 2000. From the vast literature on this subject, an 
account which seeks to tie in theological with other issues is Jeffrey Stout, The Flightfrom Authority. 
Religion, Morality and the Questfor Autonomy, Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981. 
28 Her writings are now collected in Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity. 
Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, and Ethics, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. 
29 Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 2 (where she makes the link), and 23-25,131-151 
on Austin as 'postmodem. ' See also the influential article: Nancey Murphy and James Wm. 
McClendon, Jr, 'Distinguishing Modem and Postmodern Theologies', MTh 5 (1989), 191-214. 
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Lindbeck explicitly seeks a way between cognitive-propositional models of religious 
language and experiential-expressive models, which he characterises as typically 
conservative and liberal respectively. The one is bound to a restrictive theory of 
reference and fact; the other to the reporting of internal religious experience. " He 
appeals to a'cultural-linguistic' model as an alternative: religious language works in 
thickly descriptive terms, embodied in continuous traditions which give currency to 
the language. 
It is not my purpose to investigate Lindbeck's influential proposal, except to point 
out that it gets confused in the literature with certain speech-act approaches to 
language, apparently because it expresses a very similar dissatisfaction with the 
traditional options: both views propose that the familiar dichotomy between 
fact-stating language and the language of experience or 'effect' can be transcended by 
a third way, a kind of via media. But in place of Lindbeck's cultural traditions, 
speech act theory follows the path of looking at how a speaker invests himself or 
herself in an utterance in terms of personal backing and stance. Might one say that 
where Lindbeck posits a third axis as a way of making sense of the other two 
(propositional content and force), speech act theory contents itself with showing 
ways in which these first two are integrally linked. 
Thus in my view it is a mistake to see speech act theory as a variety of 
anti-foundationalism, and indeed it is a mistake to suppose that it even addresses this 
issue in particular. My use of speech act theory to address certain hermeneutical 
questions presupposes that there is no universal foundation to linguistic practice, but 
I am unpersuaded that this is a startling thesis worthy of epistemological 
soul-searching. Nevertheless, if one does wish to defend the view that the loss of a 
supposed absolute certainty need not entail incoherence in religious claims or 
religious uses of language, whether or not such a defence is self-consciously 
'non- foundational', then speech act theory provides one way of so doing. 
30 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine. Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 
London: SPCK, 1984,16. 
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For example, in his book Divine Discourse, Nicholas Wolterstorff proposes the 
framework of speech action theory, as he calls it, as a way of articulating how it can 
be that God speaks through the biblical text, or more precisely in the biblical text. " I 
would like to propose that we see his argument as a defensive polemic against a 
certain sort of philosophical argument, namely that it is incoherent to read the Bible 
in the belief that God may speak to the reader through that process. I am encouraged 
to think this way by a comment of McClendon and Smith concerning the so called 
'reformed epistemology' in which Wolterstorff has played such a role: the views of 
reformed episternologists 'are designed solely to negate or blunt the attack of 
foundationalist epistemological theories on religious belief"' For example, 
Plantinga's response to the charge that the reformed epistemologist might as well 
believe in the Great Pumpkin as in the Christian God is correct as a way of showing 
that holding one conviction does not entail holding any and every conviction. " 
However as McClendon and Smith point out, in a wider pluralist world, this falls far 
short of demonstrating why a particular belief might or might not be justified. To 
demonstrate precisely this, and to do so using speech act theory, in fact, is the burden 
of their book. 34 
My concern here is simply to propose a similar judgment concerning the purpose and 
achievement of Divine Discourse. In bald essence, this book mounts an argument 
that the locutions of the Bible may serve as the vehicles of divine illocutions, thus 
securing the literal claim that God speaks, since to speak is to engage in the 
production of illocutionary acts. This much is a successful argument. " 
31 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse. Philosophical reflections on the claim that God 
speaks, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995. 
32 James Wm. McClendon and James M. Smith, Convictions. - Defusing Religious Relativism, 
Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994,12; cf Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'What "Reformed 
Epistemology" Is Not', Perspectives (Nov 1992), 10-16. 
33 Cf Alvin Plantinga, 'Reason and Belief in God' in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(eds. ), Faith and Rationality. Reason and Religious Belief in God, Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1983,16-93, esp. 74-78. 
14 McClendon and Smith, Convictions, 12-13, and throughout. See below. 
35 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, e. g. 75-94 and, on God speaking, 95-129. The precise nature 
of an 'illocutionary act' need not concern us in this chapter, but will be examined in chapter 2. 
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What is considerably less clear in Wolterstorff s account is whether this claim 
enables us to make substantive progress towards elucidating what it is that God 
says. " My own view is that the general claim of God's speaking is secured at the 
expense of opening up a considerable gap between the textual locutions and the 
divine illocutions. Wolterstorff s claim is that what it is for a locution to count as a 
divine illocution is describable through a fairly tight set of rules which pose no 
significant interpretive problems. This is even more his view concerning the 
interpretation of discourse for human discourse. Yet in so arguing he makes points 
such as the following: 
Our interest as authorial-discourse interpreters is indeed in what 
the speaker said 
-not in what he intended to say, but in what he 
did say, if anything. But saying is an intentional action. And more 
importantly, we have to know how he was operating, or trying to 
operate, the system. 37 
This, however, is problematic, for how do we in fact know how the speaker was 
trying to operate the system? In his elaboration, Wolterstorff is content with 'in 
coming to know that, a crucial role is played by our beliefs as to which plan of action 
for saying something he probably implemented. ' In summary: 'interpreters cannot 
operate without beliefs about the discourser. 38 
The key word here is 'beliefs', and while Wolterstorff is surely right, what follows 
from this is simply the observation that the hermeneutical question (or problem) is 
recast in speech act terms, rather than solved by it. Stanley Fish, as we shall see in 
chapter 4, might wish to take this word 'beliefs' and argue that we are back at 
conu, nunity-relative conventions, but of course this is to make only one of the 
possible judgments open at this point. In chapter 41 shall argue that one need not 
follow Fish to his end of the spectrum. 
36 This may account for the cautious response to the book of biblical scholars, such as I. 
Howard Marshall, ' "To Find Out What God Is Saying": Reflections on the Authorizing of Scripture', 
in Roger Lundin (ed. ), Disciplining Her? neneutics. Interpretation in Christian Perspective, Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans & Leicester: Apollos, 1997,49-55. 
37 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 199. 
38 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 196. 
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The only moral I wish to draw from the discussion at this point is that speech act 
theory cannot be marshalled as anti-foundationalist evidence, since it is not in itself a 
mechanism for making judgments but rather it is concerned with clarifying 
presuppositions, entailments and implications in those judgments. " 
Conclusions 
The conclusions of this section are worth stating briefly, in order that we may keep 
in view the appropriate goals for this thesis. Speech act theory provides tools for 
analysing uses of language, in particular uses which are strongly self-involving. 
Although it has been used in attempts to provide a comprehensive philosophy of 
language, and although likewise claims have been made about the self-involving 
nature of all language, I judge these claims to be either mistaken or else true only in a 
weak sense. One particular use of speech act theory in theological work is thus both 
acknowledged and set to one side for the purposes of this study: the view that the 
coherence of religious language can be defended by removing the supposed sting 
from the anti-foundationalist charge by appeal to speech act theory. " I acknowledge 
the validity of this as a polemical counter-measure, but note that my own interest lies 
along a different path. 
39 On the prevalence of hermeneutical foreclosure as a result of pressing questions about the 
'anti-foundational' agenda see now Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Communicative Action and Promise in 
Interdisciplinary, Biblical, and Theological Hermeneutics', in Roger Lundin, Clarence Walhout, and 
Anthony C. Thiselton, The Promise ofHermeneutics, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans & Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 1999,133-239, especially 209-214. 
40 In the light of this, I make here a brief comment on the work, already mentioned, of 
McClendon and Smith, Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism. Their account has a formal 
similarity to mine: their view of how to analyse statements such as 'God led Israel across the Sea of 
Reeds' is that 'such assertions happily occur, can happily occur, only 111 connection with the rich 
involvement in stance, in commitment, and in appropriate effect 
... 
that make up the happiness of 
[such a statement]' (70) and in particular they are keen to focus on the idea that there is 'no 
nonconvictional road to the truths around which our convictions clustee (69). Their account, 
self-consciously 'nonfoundational' (9- 10), effectively suggests that beliefs and convictions must be 
judged as parts of whole traditions, and, in much the spirit of McIntyre (175-78), that the pressing 
question for a theologian is how to justify a set of convictions as a viable tradition. In my judgment, 
this is an excellent account of how self-involving claims work within a framework of what I will later 
call institutional facts, but it appears to suppose that the same degree of institutionality pervades all 
convictional utterances. While God-language and faith claims may indeed be helpfully explicated for 
certain purposes within such a perspective, I would insist, following Searle, that the philosophy of 
speech acts implies very clearly that brute facts must lie at the bottom of the institutional heirarchy. I 
take up this discussion in chapter 6 below regarding the 'truth' of confessional statements. 
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These preliminary points suggest that speech act theory, understood in the terms M 
which I shall describe it, will not offer any method of by-passing the hermeneutical 
issues of interpretation, or the need for judgment. As will become clear, I therefore 
offer it not as a hermeneutical method, but as a tool for investigating certain types of 
strongly self-involving biblical language. 
§3 Exegeting Texts or Reconceiving Exegesis? 
One further distinction is worth considering at this point. In the context of biblical 
interpretation, Martin Buss suggests that we might have two different goals with 
speech act theory: use it to refine our exegetical procedures or step back and utilise it 
in the theoretical reconceptualisation of exegesis. " In the first of these, we already 
know what exegesis is, and speech act theory helps us to do it better. In the second, 
more ambitiously, it changes our view of what is required of us as exegetes. I want to 
propose that although this distinction sounds clear, it in fact disguises the nature of 
the difference between the two tasks, which are not as different as they first appear. 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, I would propose that in the former case, 
where we are engaged in the process of exegesis, speech act theory will be of use in 
understanding texts which concern themselves with the kinds of language uses which 
are strongly self-involving. More generally, it may clarify the issues in certain texts 
where a point at issue is the existence or non-existence of, for example, essential 
preparatory conditions for the performing of felicitous speech acts. This has been 
done, within and without the world of biblical studies, without any necessary 
reconceptualisation of the task of exegesis itself. " 
The latter case sounds more ambitious: speech act theory may enable us to 
reconceive exegesis itself This is the program proposed and attempted by Dietmar 
Neufeld, in a book on 1 John significantly entitled Reconceiving Texts as Speech 
41 Martin J. Buss, 'Potential and Actual Interactions between Speech Act Theory and Biblical 
Studies', in Hugh C. White (ed. ), Speech Act Theory and Biblical Criticism (=Semeia 41), Decatur, 
GA: Scholars Press, 1988,125-34, here 125. 
42 ib Cf Anthony C. Thiselton, 'The Supposed Power of Words in the Bi 11cal Writings', JTS 25 
(1974), 283-99; Stanley Fish, 'How to do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech-Act Theory and 
Literary Criticism', MLN 91 (1976), 983-1025, reprinted in Stanley Fish, Is There A Text in This 
Class? The Authority ofInterpretive Communities, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1980,197-245. 
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Acts. " However, in a summary of Neufeld's purpose, which directly addresses the 
distinction we are considering, Duane Watson notes: 
Neufeld argues that the author of I John incorporates a number of 
speech-acts in boasts, denials, and confessions to create a literary 
world of an apocalyptic kind. This world delimits the boundaries 
of proper and improper confession and ethical behaviour and the 
apocalyptic consequences of each, often relying heavily upon 
antithesis for clarification. When entering this world the readers 
are encouraged to transform their understanding of God, Jesus, 
the world, their speech, and their conduct. They are challenged to 
create a proper confession and ethical behaviour rather than 
become alienated from God. ' 
In so saying Watson, whose view of speech act theory largely treats it as a variety of 
rhetorical criticism, appears to be representing Neufeld's achievement as a matter of 
elucidating the way in which correct understanding may lead to a transformed 
lifestyle. In fact Neufeld goes further, and wishes to use speech act theory to point up 
the ethical backing given to confessions of Christ as fundamentally the embodiment 
of Christian discipleship in counter-distinction to the inauthentic living (and not just 
teaching) which is indicated by the 'antichrist' in 1 John. " That this is a matter of 
'reconceiving texts', as Neufeld's study has it, is because the boasts, denials and 
confessions he considers are all examples of strongly self-involving language used in 
a document (be it a letter or church instruction (paraenesis)) which is directly 
communicative, i. e. where authorial agency is focused on eliciting a response. 
I suggest that it is this feature of 1 John which accounts for the apparent distinction 
between Neufeld's 'reconceiving' of texts, and what Buss considers as the refining of 
exegetical procedures which are already in place, where the prime examples, cited 
earlier, all occur in less directive texts (narrative, literary works generally) where 
authorial agency works less directly. Thus I propose recasting what seems like a fair 
suggestion in the following terms: the strongly self-involving language of the 
biblical text may be manifest in two distinct ways. Firstly, it may occur within some 
narrative world, for example in blessings or curses pronounced by characters in the 
43 Dietmar Neufeld, Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts. An Analysis of I John (Bib Int Ser 7), 
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994. 
44 Duane F. Watson, 'Rhetorical Criticism of Hebrews and the Catholic Epistles S mice 1978, 
CR: BS 5 (1997), 175-207; here 199. 
45 Netifeld's specific proposals are considered more fully "i chapter 5, §4.2 below. 
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biblical narrative, where the self-involvement is on the part of the characters in that 
biblical world. Secondly, it may occur as part of the communication between author 
and reader, as with a work such as 1 John, where the self-involvement at issue is 
raised in the discussion which takes place between the author and the real-world 
reader. This way of putting the matter seems to do better justice to the varieties of 
self-involvement relevant to this study. 
§4 Major Theorists in the Field 
I conclude this introduction with a brief review of the relevant work of Anthony 
Thiselton and Kevin Vanhoozer, the two authors who have most consistently 
proposed the suitability of speech act theory for the various tasks of biblical 
interpretation and theological hermeneutics, and whose work therefore stands most 
obviously in direct relationship to this thesis. " 
§4.1 Anthony C Thiselion 
Thiselton's conviction is that 'Speech-act theory has suffered undeserved neglect in 
biblical interpretation, in systematic theology, and in discussions of "religious 
language" in textbooks on the philosophy of religion'. " In a series of works over the 
last thirty years he has sought to indicate some of the appropriate resources offered 
by speech act theory for these various tasks. " 
In a 1970 article on the parables, Thiselton draws on some parallels suggested by 
Robert Funk between the language-event of continental hermeneutics and the 
performative-utterance approach of Austin. " Austin and Wittgenstein offer more 
46 Other authors will be considered at various points in later chapters. 
47 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Speech-Act Theory and the Claim that God Speaks: Nicholas 
Wolterstorff s Divine Discourse', SJT 50 (1997), 97-110; here 97. 
48 A convenient summary of his overall work is provided by Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Thirty 
Years of Hermeneutics: Retrospect and Prospects, in Joze Krasovec (ed. ), Interpretation of the Bible, 
Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti & Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998, 
1559-1574. See also Brian J. Walsh, 'Anthony Thiselton's Contribution to Biblical Hermeneutics', 
CSR 14 (1985), 224-35; C. G. Bartholomew, 'Three Horizons: Hermeneutics from the Other End 
- 
An 
Evaluation of Anthony Thiselton's Hermeneutic Proposals', EJTh 5 (1996), 121-35; and Dan R. 
Stiver, 'The Uneasy Alliance Between Evangelicalism and Postmodernism: A Reply to Anthony 
Thiselton', in David S. Dockery (ed. ), The Challenge ofPostmodernism. - An Evangelical Engagement, 
Wheaton: Bridgepoint, 1995,239-53. 
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nuanced tools for the task: 'the crux of the matter is that assertions themselves may 
function in various ways and with various effects. " Many of the ideas articulated in 
this article become part of the framework for Thiselton's later work, receiving clearer 
articulation in a general fashion in his progranu-natic 1973 article: 'The Use of 
Philosophical Categories in New Testament Hermeneutics', which sets out 
essentially the program of his later Yhe Two Horizons. " 
A clear example of the exegetical relevance of such an approach is provided by his 
analysis of 'The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings' in which he 
subjects to critique the view that Old Testament curses and blessings operated by 
virtue of a primitive view of language where the speakers believed (mistakenly) that 
their words had brute causal power (an image often expounded with reference to 
analogies drawn from military weaponry). " Drawing again on Austin, Thiselton 
suggests that such performative utterances rely on social institutions which create the 
conditions for institutional processes such as blessing, and therefore the question of 
why a blessing was seen as efficacious, or why it could not be withdrawn (as, for 
example, in the case of Isaac and Jacob in Genesis 27), was a matter of the existence 
or non-existence of social conventions rather than a magical view of language. " 
Further studies have worked both in exegetical and in more obviously theological 
areas. In the case of the latter, Thiselton's work has ranged over the performative 
nature of liturgy; " the inadequately grounded nature of functional hermeneutical 
approaches such as reader-response theory; 5 the pastoral insights available from 
49 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'The Parables as Language-Event: Some Comments on Fuchs's 
Hermeneutics in the Light of Linguistic Philosophy', SJT23 (1970), 437-68. 
so Thiselton, 'Parables', 439. 
51 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories in New Testament 
Hermeneutics', Churchman 87 (1973), 87-100. 
52 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings', JTS 25 
(1974), 283-99, here 283-86. 
53 Thiselton, 'Supposed Power of Words', 293-94. 
54 Anthony C. Thiselton, Language, Liturgy and Meaning (Grove Liturgical Study 2), 
Bramcote: Grove Books 
, 
21 986(1975). 
55 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Reader-Response Hermeneutics, Action Models, and the Parables of 
Jesus', in Roger Lundin, Anthony C. Thiselton and Clarence Walhout, The Responsibility of 
Hermeneutics, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans & Exeter: Paternoster, 1985,79-113. 
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speech act theory's linking of effect with presupposed states of affairs; ` and the 
suggestion that speech act theory offers a way out of the impasse between 
conservative and functionalist approaches to biblical authority. " This last 
contribution starts from Tyndale's view of speech acts in the Bible itself, " and then 
draws parallels between hermeneutical debates and debates concerning authority. 
Thiselton notes the crucial nature of the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction so 
central to speech act theory yet which lies beyond the reach of the purely functional 
approach to the effects of language on readers: 'The authority of the Bible, then, 
derives from the operative statutory or institutional validity of transforming 
speech-acts in Scripture', corrigible in the light of what has not yet happened, but 
inviting us forward as a believing community 'towards those verdicts and 
corroboration of promises and pledges which will become public and revealed as 
definitive at the last judgement. "' This emphasis, drawn from Pannenberg, also 
invites a critique of the view that all interpretation is self-interested power-play, 
60 
again drawing on the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary force. 
More specifically exegetical studies have attempted to bring the insights of speech 
act theory to bear on particular interpretive issues. In his New Horizons in 
Hermeneutics, Thiselton combines a wide-ranging agenda concerning the various 
paths of hen-neneutics in its post-Gadamer forms, with a particular argument that the 
recognition of words as belonging to different illocutionary categories leads us to see 
that 'The biblical texts abound in examples of occurrences of these verbs in 
institutional, situational, and inter-personal contexts which render them performative 
speech-acts. "' In particular he applies this framework to E. P. Sanders' claims about 
56 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Address and Understanding: Some Goals and Models of Biblical 
Interpretation as Principles of Vocational Traininýg', Anvil 3 (1986), 101-18; especially 116-18. 
57 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Authority and Hermeneutics: Some Proposals for a More Creative 
Agenda', in Philip E. Satterthwaite & David F. Wright (eds. ), A Pathway into the Holy Scripture, 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994,107-41. 
58 The article appears in a book celebrating, inter alia, the 500 year anniversary of Tyndale's 
birffi. 
59 Thiselton, 'Authority and Henneneutics', 137. 
60 Thiselton, 'Authority and Hermeneutics, 137-4 1; cf also Part I of idem, Interpreting God 
and the Postmodern Self. On Meaning, Manipulation and Promise, Edinburgh: T. &T. Clark, 1995, 
3-43. 
61 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics. The Themy and Practice of 
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the Pauline language of the power of the cross, arguing that Sanders has over-reacted 
against 'atonement' language in favour of 'participatory' language, whereas speech act 
theory suggests that participatory language necessarily presupposes certain 
inter-personal states of affairs. " Similar concerns are evident in Thiselton's later 
article about synoptic Christology: 'The Synoptic Gospels make promissory language 
explicit, leaving the possibility of christological assertion to lie hidden implicitly 
behind the overt speech-acts of Jesus. "' He again draws out the significance of the 
illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction by showing how it is institutional status and 
not causal force which informs Jesus' words and deeds: 'their respective significance 
for christology is one of almost complete opposition and contrast, '64 since 
perlocutionary force relies on self-assertiveness, which would undo the very point of 
Jesus' sacrificial messiahship; and hence the illocutionary aspect of his Christological 
claims is required by the nature of his mission. Finally, a 1993 article which 
restricted its observations more to exegetical clarification focused on the way in 
which first-person utterances in their self-involving way differ from logico-linguistic 
reflections on the nature of language, and suggested that this throws light on the liar 
paradox of Titus 1: 12-13 
." 
In particular, one should see Titus 1: 12-13 not as a 
historically contingent proposition, but as making a logical point: 'the aim is to 
demonstrate that, anchored to an inappropriate behaviour context, first-person 
utterances can become seý(Idefeating v. 66 
Thiselton's most recent work focuses on the significance of the category of 
communicative action in various biblical and theological pursuits, with speech act 
theory being one prominent way of articulating this category. This work contains 
many points of contact with my own thesis, which will be noted at appropriate 
Transforming Biblical Reading, London: HarperCollins, 1992,298-99. 
62 Thiselton, New Horizons, 300-304. In chapter 6 below I will be considering more closely 
this kind of argument and suggesting possible modifications to it. 
63 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Christology in Luke, Speech-Act Theory, and the Problem of 
Dualism in Christology after Kant', in Joel B. Green & Max Turner (eds. ), Jesus ofNazareth. Lord 
and Christ, Carlisle: Paternoster & Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994,453-472; here 466. 
64 Thiselton, 'Christology in Luke', 462-63. Quote from 463, originally in italics. 
65 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'The Logical Role of the Liar Paradox in Titus 1: 12,13: A Dissent 
from the Commentaries in the Light of Philosophical and Logical Analysis', BibInt 2 (1994), 207-23. 
66 Thiselton, 'Liar Paradox', 219. 
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67 points. 
In brief, I suggest that one of Thiselton's major interests has been the conceptual 
clarification of the philosophical issues involved in biblical interpretation. " Speech 
act theory has been a major tool to this end, although not the only one. Secondly, 
exegetical insight has followed with regard to certain types of texts, and in particular 
to texts which concern themselves with such speech acts as promising, blessing or 
commanding. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, he persistently demonstrates 
that false dichotomies have bedevilled the hermeneutical. models brought to bear on 
biblical interpretation, and he uses speech act theory to bring together what has been 
unnecessarily separated. By consistently relating texts to the streams of life which 
produce them, and insisting on this in the reading process too, he attempts to strike a 
balance which some hermeneutical approaches fail to achieve. Perhaps the most 
helpful way of expressing these points is to say that Thiselton uses speech act theory 
as a powerful resource for refining and clarifying the varied tasks of hermeneutics. 
§4.2 Kevin J. Vanhoozer 
Kevin Vanhoozer's continuing interest in speech act theory and its implications has 
been a persistent feature of his writings from his earliest 1986 article, through to his 
comprehensive 'theology of interpretation', Is There a Meaning in this Text? 69 In his 
earliest work, his concern is with the question: 'how does the diversity of Scripture's 
literary forrns affect the way we take biblical propositions and understand scriptural 
truth? "' He argues that defenders of conservative views of biblical inspiration, 
wanting to affirm the truth of the Bible against what they see as liberal and/or 
Barthian conceptions of 'existential' truth, have been led into spurious claims 
67 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Communicative Action and Promise in Interdisciplinary, Biblical, 
and Theological Hermeneutics', in Roger Lundin, Clarence Walhout, and Anthony C. Thiselton, The 
Promise of Hermeneutics, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans & Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999,133-239, 
especially 144-50 and 223-39. 
68 See explicitly Thiselton, Two Horizons, 3-10. 
69 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the 
Morality of Literary Knowledge, Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998. 
70 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 'The Semantics of Biblical Literature: Truth and Scripture's Diverse 
Literary Forms', in D. A. Carson & John D. Woodbridge (eds. ) Hermeneutics, Authority and Canon, 
Leicester: IVP, 1986,53-104; here 
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concerning the role of propositions in the Bible, even to 'the heresy of propositional 
paraphrase'. " Drawing on Mary Louise Pratt and Susan Lanser, Vanhoozer suggests 
that 'there is a correlation between a text's genre, or literary form, and a text's 
illocutionary point and force"' As a result, 'the propositional content is intended to 
function or count as something in the communicative act'. " I shall be taking up these 
various emphases in later chapters. In fact, Vanhoozer's article turns aside at this 
point to explore ways in which his approach rehabilitates the concept of 'infallibility' 
since he here introduces a presupposed doctrine of inerrancy. It seems fair to 
conclude that this is a concern drawn from elsewhere rather than from speech act 
theory. 
Vanhoozer has also written of the need for philosophical sensitivity in hermeneutics; 
of biblical theology as a'poetics of revelation', based around an understanding of 
speech acts in their biblical genres, which form the bridge between the canon and the 
concepts of theology; and of the particular epistemological role of the speech act of 
testimony in John's gospel. " Many of these concerns are drawn together in his 1994 
contribution to the volume mentioned earlier celebrating 500 years since Tyndale's 
birth. " Here he considers the issues surrounding a doctrine of Scripture by noting 
that speech-act theory 'allows us to transcend the debilitating dichotomy between 
revelation as "God saying" and "God doing", ' and, reminiscent of his 1986 article, he 
urges that instead of a narrow focus on truth-telling, we should see 'Scripture [as] 
rather composed of divine-human speech-acts which, through what they say, 
71 Vanhoozer, 'Semantics of Biblical Literature', 56-75; cf the quoted title on 67. 
72 Vanhoozer, 'Semantics of Biblical Literature', 9 1. On the work of Pratt and Lanser see 
chapter 3 below. 
73 Vanhoozer, 'Semantics of Biblical Literature', 92. 
74 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 'Christ and Concept: Doing Theology and the "Ministry" of 
Philosophy', in John D. Woodbridge & Thomas Edward McComiskey (eds. ), Doing Theology in 
Today's World. Essays in Honor ofKenneth S. Kantzer, Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991,99-145; 
idem, 'From Canon to Concept: "Same" and "Other" in the Relation Between Biblical and Systematic 
Theology', SBET 12 (1994), 96-124, especially 111- 12; idem, 'The Hermeneutics of I-Witness 
Testimony: John 21.20-24 and the "Death" of the "Author"', in A. Graeme Auld (ed. ), Understanding 
Poets and Prophets. Essays in Honour of George Wishart Anderson (JSOTS 152), Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1993,366-87. 
75 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech-Acts: The Doctrine of Scripture Today', in Philip 
E. Satterthwaite & David F. Wright (eds. ), A Pathway into the Holy Scripture, Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1994,143-81. 
Chapter I- Page 24 
accomplish several authoritative cognitive, spiritual and social functions. "' This, and 
indeed many of his reflections here concerning the functional-propositional divide in 
views of Scripture, mirror Thiselton's comments in the same volume. 
In Is There a Meaning in this Text? Vanhoozer offers speech act theory as an 
approach which focuses our attention on the irreducibly communicative role of texts: 
'A text 
... 
is communicative action fixed by writing. "' He provides a comprehensive 
review of Searle's work and adopts and adapts it to his own ends, to develop a 
theological understanding of text and to restore to its rightful place the authorial 
prerogative to determine what a text means, not in locutionary or perlocutionary 
terms, but in illocutionary terms: 'what the author was doing in writing, in tending to 
his words in such and such a fashion. "' This argument is mounted against the 
backdrop of a claim that the postmodern displacement of 'meaning' is a theological 
phenomenon, where the 'death of God' lies directly behind the 'death of the author'. 79 
Powerful and suggestive as his analysis is, it remains largely at this level of 
theological conceptualisation and does not engage with particular interpretive issues 
in biblical texts. Not all will be persuaded that 'Speech act theory serves as a 
handmaiden to a trinitarian theology of communication', 80 and nor is it entirely 
evident that there need be a clear correlation between the Father and the locution; the 
Son and the illocution; and the Spirit and the perlocution, as is suggested both here 
and elsewhere. " 
Vanhoozer's approach most notably differs from Thiselton's in its appeal to 
speech-act theory as an over-arching perspective within which different genres are at 
work. " As such it is more obviously a doctrinal framework than a hermeneutical one, 
76 Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech Acts', 147; 148. 
77 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text?, 229; cf especially 207-14 and 226-29. 
78 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text?, 253. 
79 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text?, 30; 198-200, and passim. He consciously 
follows here George Steiner, Real Presences. Is there anything in what we say?, London: Faber and 
Faber, 1990. It is perhaps debatable whether Steiner's 'theological' reading of deconstruction is 
entirely conducive to Vanhoozer's own specifically Trinitarian concerns. 
80 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text?, 457. 
81 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text?, 455-57; cf Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech 
Acts', 169-80. 
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in contrast to Thiselton's view that even without a vantage point exterior to the 
hermeneutical debate one may still make good use of speech act theory in cases 
where it addresses issues appropriate to the texts at hand. " My own approach will 
tend towards this more eclectic view, but this is perhaps more a difference of 
agendas than of estimation of value. In his repeated calls for philosophical clarity in 
the work of theological interpretation, Vanhoozer has rightly drawn attention to the 
various ways in which speech act theory may serve as an important conceptual 
framework. 
Before moving on to the biblical investigations of part II of this thesis, I spend the 
next three chapters exploring the precise nature of the resources of speech act theory, 
looking in particular at the various questions which arise concerning criteria. I shall 
take in turn the issues of criteria for speech acts themselves; for speech acts as they 
relate to texts; and finally for construal, an issue which is placed on our agenda 
precisely by considering how to appropriate speech act theory for questions 
concerning texts. 
82 Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech Acts', 180. 
83 This distinction between the approaches of Vanhoozer and of Thiselton is noted by 
Bartholomew, 'Three Horizons', 134, n. 55. 
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PART ONE 
SPEECH ACTS, TEXTS AND CONSTRUAIL: 
THE PROBLEM OF CRITERIA 
Chapter 2 
Speech Act Theory: Past Forms and Present Functions 
To understand a text as a communicative action is an appealing move in broad terms; 
apparently straightforward and a useful corrective to overly dominant models of texts 
as representational, or to borrow Janet Martin Soskice's term, 'reality-depicting. " The 
philosophical field of enquiry to develop out of this basic insight is speech act 
theory, and its foundational text is J. L. Austin's engagingly titled How to Do Yhings 
with Words. ' However in moving beyond the simple observation captured in Austin's 
title, that when we speak we do other things too, one encounters considerable debate 
concerning the criteria which exist for understanding the different dimensions of 
speech acts. The further claim that texts may be read as speech acts will occupy us in 
chapter 3. Before one can examine that claim, speech act theory itself needs to be 
understood. 
I Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, 
97. For Vincent BrUmmer also, speech act theory offers us a way of moving from reality being 
depicted by language to reality serving as a constituting context for effective speech acts: Vincent 
Brammer, Theology & Philosophical Inquiry. An Introduction, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1982,9-33; 228-48. 
2 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, edited by J. 0. Umason & Manna Sbisa, Oxford: 
Oxford jjpý 21 975 (1962); hereafter abbreviated as HDTW. 
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In this chapter I shall be examining in particular the concept of the illocutionary act, 
perhaps the major analytical tool of speech act theory, along with its associated 
concepts such as brute and institutionalfacts. I suggest that speech act theory offers 
some helpful resources for the interpretive task, but that attempts to use these tools 
are hampered by a lack of clarity concerning many of the major theoretical ideas 
pertinent to speech acts, including indeed the very idea of the illocutionary act itself 
My solution to this lack of clarity is to retrace the development of speech act theory 
and examine its various ideas in context, in the hope that a coherent set of criteria for 
speech acts may emerge. Such a proposal involves looking at the different forms of 
speech act theory developed by Austin, Searle and others; and then also examining 
the particular functions of speech act theory once it is gTasped and, to a certain 
extent, rearticulated as a current live option, independently of the functions its 
constituent parts may have had when originally introduced. 
§1 Speech Act Theory: Background and Introduction 
The period after 1945 was a major creative phase of British philosophy and earned a 
variety of generic names: 'ordinary language' philosophy; Wittgensteinian 
philosophy; Oxford philosophy; and perhaps most generally 'analytic philosophy'. 
Despite the loose usage of these terms it is worth noting that none of them are 
interchangeable: all represent particular emphases? Peter Strawson has suggested 
fconnective' analysis as the most helpful term to cover the variety of emphases 
included. 4 
These approaches were characterised by concentration on careful elucidation of 
concepts; a study of language and its uses; and a general aversion towards 
3A survey and analysis of them all is the subject of P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place in 
Twentieth- Century Analytic Thought, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. He notes major variations within the 
various 'traditions' these labels represent; e. g. 148-61, especially 158-59. Source material from this 
period is collected in Richard Rorty (ed. ), The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical 
Method, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Contemporary surveys may be 
found in John Passmore, A Hundred Years ofPhilosophy, Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, '1966 
(1957), 424-65; G. J. Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1900, London: Oxford UP, '1969 (1958). 
4 P. F. Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics. - An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 1992,2 1. 
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theory-building on the grand scale. ' Austin's work in particular falls into this 
charactensation, as does that of the later Wittgenstein. Austin himself was neither 
particularly influenced nor impressed by Wittgenstein, but practised philosophy in a 
way which was certainly congruent with his main emphases. ' As David Pears has 
observed, 'they both thought that there was something wrong with the methods of 
earlier philosophers, and they both thought that the right method would involve the 
study of language. 7 
Austin and Method 
Austin did not believe that ordinary language was the sole interesting subject matter 
of philosophy, and his aversion to theory-building did not mean that he was 
unwilling to introduce any technical vocabulary when he felt it was necessary, as his 
terms illocutionary and perlocutionary amply demonstrate. That such views have 
been attributed to him is in part due to his overall reluctance to offer any wider 
thoughts on philosophical matters than his piecemeal papers, of which only seven 
were published in his lifetime; and the fact that on the one occasion where he 
obviously did offer such reflections, in the introduction to his 1956 presidential 
address to the Aristotelian Society ('A Plea for Excuses') he evidently laid himself 
open to misinterpretation! He observed that in the study of excuses there was plenty 
of material available in ordinary language for'field work', as he called it, which, 
while not the 'last word' in philosophy, was at least the 'first word'. He also famously 
suggested that 'our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have 
found worth drawing' in explicit contrast to those words thought up by philosophers 
in their am-i-chairs. 9 
As Geoffrey Warnock has observed, this was intended as a commendation of his 
subject of the time (excuses), rather than his method. The method was simply there if 
5 Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place, 159-60. 
6 Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place, 172-75. 
7 David Pears, 'Wittgenstein and Austin' in Bernard Williams & Alan Montefiore (eds. ), 
British Analytical Philosophy, London: RKP, 1966,17-39; here 17. 
8 J. L. Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses', in his Philosophical Papers, edited by J. 0. Urmson & G. J. 
Warnock, Oxford: Oxford UP, '1979 (1961), 175-204; here 177-86. 
9 Austin, Philosophical Papers, 182-85. 
ChaDter 2- Page 29 
one chose to follow it. " For better or for worse, Austin described his method as 
'linguistic phenomenology', by which he meant the procedure of examining 'what we 
should say when, and so why and what we should mean by W. " In his study of this 
aspect of Austin's work, Joseph DiGiovanna makes the point that the study of 
language itself is not an example of a field of inquiry in which people naturally draw 
up their own terms and discussions, and concludes that Austin's work on speech acts 
should not be viewed as an example of his linguistic phenomenology. " I would 
rather say that Digiovanna's helpful observation explains why a linguistic 
phenomenologist can be at one and the same time so attentive to ordinary language 
use while also capable of bringing such a weight of technical vocabulary to bear on 
it. This is an important point and an important distinction, for want of which some 
influential streams of contemporary philosophy have found it apparently easy to 
dismiss 'ordinary language philosophy. "' 
What was characteristic of Austin was his belief that ordinary language as it stood 
was not flawed, and neither did it require the philosopher to abandon it and replace it 
(or reduce it to) some form of logical calculus. In this, connective analysis 
represented a reaction against the early twentieth century work of Russell, Frege and, 
to some extent, Moore; as well as a considerable redirection of the focus of 
Wittgenstein's earliest work, the Tractatus. " As Wittgenstein himself came to 
10 G. J. Warnock, JL. Austin, London: RKP, '1991, (1989) 5. 
11 Austin, Philosophical Papers, 182,18 1. 
12 Joseph J. DiGiovanna, Linguistic Phenomenology. Philosophical Method in JL. Austin 
(American University Studies, Series V, Philosophy, Vol. 63), New York: Peter Lang, 1989, 
especially 189-94. 
13 In particular see the discussion of the so-called 'paradox of analysis: if a philosophical 
analysis catches the meaning of the original 'ordinary' expression then it is pointless; if it does not 
then it is false. A thorough and penetrating critique of 'ordinary language philosophy' which mentions 
this point, but which appears to exempt speech act theory from it, is provided by Jonathan R6e, 
'English Philosophy in the Fifties', Radical Philosophy, 65 (1993), 3-2 1; cf 17 and n. 139 with 16 and 
n. 136. For a good example of the view that ordinary language carries no philosophical privilege, see 
W. V. 0. Quine, 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory', Mind 62 (1953), no. 248,433-51, reprinted in idem, 
The Ways of Paradox, New York: Random House, 1966,135-55. 
14 Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place, 1-3 8; R6e, 'English Philosophy'. The Tractatus 
Logico-Ph ilosoph icus was Wittgenstein's only published book in his lifetime: London: RKP, 196 1, 
translated by D 
-F . Pears 
& B. F. McGuinness (192 1). 
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express it in his later work: 'Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use 
of language; it can in the end only describe it... It leaves everything as it is. "' 
Although these roots are still visible in speech act theory today, there is also a strong 
tradition of allying its concerns with a formal logico-syntactic approach. Certainly 
Chomsky's work on syntactic structures was contemporary with early speech act 
theory and may have been a contributing factor to this development. " Equally John 
Searle's programmatic recasting of Austin's ideas has lent itself to more formal 
approaches, as we shall see. Thirdly, as Stanley Fish has pointed out, Austin's own 
work is possessed of a peculiar double structure whereby proposed terms are adapted 
out of all recognition, and frequently abandoned. He cites the 'double structure' of 
Austin's text as being 
responsible for the fact that the book has given rise to two 
versions of speech-act theory, one committed to reabsorbing 
illocutionary force into a formal theory of the Chomsky type... 
and the other committed to making illocutionary force a function 
of pragmatic- that is, unformalizable 
-circumstances. " 
He cites Katz on one side; writers like H. P. Grice and Mary Louise Pratt on the 
other. A third stream is represented by those like Searle who have tried to 'reconcile 
the formal and the pragmatic', and he observes that for Austin it was never possible 
to reduce the workings of language to 'the operation of a formal mechanism', making 
a project like Searle's an uneasy marriage at best. " Fish's observation is astute, and 
will in large part be borne out in what follows. 
§1.1 Wittgenstein, Prichard and Austin's Early Work 
In the Philosophical Investigations, in the context of examining first-person 
utterances, Wittgenstein considered how we express fear, and began to ask about the 
different purposes we have in speaking. He pointed out the differences between, for 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, '1967 (1953), § 124. 
16 See, inter alia, N. Chornsky, Syntactic Structures, The Hague: Mouton, 1957. 
17 Stanley Fish, 'With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida', 
Critical Inquiry 8 (1982), 693-72 1, reprinted in Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally. Change, 
Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 
37-67. 
is Fish, 'With the Compliments of the Author', 67. 
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example, using the same words as an expression of mourning or as a description or a 
prayer. 19 He also considered expressions of the form 'I believe... ', observing that 'If 
there were a verb meaning "to believe falsely", it would not have any significant first 
person present indicative 
., 
20 To say 'I believe' highlights the investment made by the 
speaker in the utterance: it is not a depiction of some mental state revealed by the 
speaker's words. 21 
The particular role of first-person verbs like this would also be a feature considered 
by Austin. For Wittgenstein, the fact that'My own relation to my words is wholly 
different from other people' S, 22 was partly what enabled him to get away from the 
false picture of words operating out of mental states as translations of mental 
concepts which existed pre-linguistically. To anticipate, the speech act, here, is a 
personal, self-involving act which must be considered within the'forms of life'where 
it takes place. Although many of the key elements of speech act theory are in place 
here, nevertheless, 'for better or for worse, there is barely a mention of speech-act 
analysis in the whole of Wittgenstein's oeuvre. 2' Hacker, for his part, notes only 
some unpublished references to greetings and thankings not being statements; a line 
of thought mentioned without further elaboration in the Investigations, at §489.24 
Perhaps this is less significant than it might appear: in due course I shall be arguing 
that the kinds of concern most helpfully illuminated by speech act theory are best 
viewed in what might be termed a'Wittgensteinian perspective'. 25 
Austin himself was White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford from 1952, a 
chair which had been held earlier by H. A Prichard. Prichard's influence on Austin is 
19 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, especially pp. 187-89ff. See also the 'preliminary 
sketches' of these ideas in idem, The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: Blackwell, 
2 1969 (1958), 
143-48. 
20 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 190. 
21 As if, perhaps, one would have to listen to oneself speak in order to know what one believed. 
Cf Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 191-92. 
22 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 192. 
23 Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place, 245. 
24 Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place, 328, n. 33 referring to two different unpublished Wittgenstein 
manuscripts. 
25 See also §3.4 below where I discuss how Searle relates his own work to that of Wittgenstem. 
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evident from the latter's first written (although unpublished) paper, " and it seems 
probable that in the background of his work on speech acts is Prichard's article, 
dating from around 1940, 'The Obligation to Keep a Promise'. " 
Prichard considers how it is that 'In promising, agreeing, or undertaking to do some 
action we seem to be creating or bringing into existence the obligation to do it, so 
much so that promising seems just to be binding ourselves... to do it. "' His own 
article pursues the line of arguing that one makes some kind of general prior promise 
not to utter certain noises without also intending to be bound by certain obligations, 
which in turn leads him to something like Searle's later notion of Background, with 
an appeal to general expectations required by inter-personal behaviour. Although 
hampered by the lack of any particular conceptual apparatus for expressing his ideas, 
Prichard's article clearly envisages an enquiry along the lines which Austin would 
take up. Indeed, the act of promising remains the great archetypal speech act, even if 
the degree to which 'creating an obligation' is viewed as an intentional act remains 
debated. " 
In Austin's work itself, two of the papers collected in his posthumous Philosophical 
Papers broach the topic of speech act theory, while a third, 'Other Minds', far from 
being about other minds, makes preliminary use of his thoughts on knowing, 
promising, and the 'descriptive fallacy'. 30 
'How to Talk 
- 
some simple ways' is his first full discussion of speech acts, although 
it is extremely unusual in his work by virtue of the fact that it confines itself to an 
imaginary ideal speech situation S,,, where only sentences of the form 'I is a T' are 
26 Now chapter I of Austin, Philosophical Papers, 1-3 1. 
27 Warnock, English Philosophy, 12; Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place 299, n. 86. The article is 
reprinted in H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation, Essays and Lectures, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949, 
169-79. On Prichard see the brief assessment of Warnock, English Philosophy, 9-12. 
28 Prichard, Moral Obligation, 169. 
29 A helpftil survey is provided by Jan Narveson, 'The Agreement to Keep our Agreements: 
Hume, Prichard, and Searle', Philosophical Papers 23 (1994), 75-87, with particular reference to 
John Searle's celebrated'How to Derive an "Ought" From an "Is"', Philosophical Review 73 (1964), 
43-58, which he adapts into a more comprehensive speech act perspective in his Speech Acts (see 
below), 175-98. 
30 See'Other Minds', in Austm, Philosophical Papers, 76-116; especially 98-103. 
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permissible (in a universe of items and types). 31 Within this framework he develops a 
4-fold schema of speech acts, to demonstrate that, for instance, we need care in 
understanding exactly what we mean by 'statement'. (His schema is placing; casting; 
stating and instancing. ) He also introduces the notion of direction offit, which is 
32 concerned with the difference between fitting names to items and items to names. 
He notes that the difference between speech acts often resides principally in the 
13 difference between envisaged speech situations. 
The other relevant paper represents a substantial step forward, and indeed presents in 
outline the structure of his later HDTW. 'Performative Utterances' was originally a 
BBC radio talk given in 1956, " and is parallelled in considerable measure by a paper 
given in 195 8: 'Performative-Constative'. " Indeed, where HDTW was difficult to 
reconstruct from Austin's manuscripts these articles were used instead. Both papers 
pursue the same path of setting up a distinction between statements on the one hand 
and performative utterances on the other, and then collapsing it. They then call for an 
analysis of explicit performative verbs and a study of the force with which an 
utterance is used. 
§2 J. L. Austin 's 'How to Do Things with Words' 
This unusual style of essentially proposing a series of distinctions and then 
abandoning and/or replacing them by others also forms the structure of How to Do 
Things with Words (HDTW). It is this feature of the work which has made such a 
variety of interpretations of it possible, and thus requires that one distinguish 
carefully between the examples Austin used, the point he was trying to make, and the 
basic ideas subsequently taken up by speech act theorists. 
31 Austin, Philosophical Papers, 134-53. Warnock judges it 'very strange' and 'extravagantly 
artificial', while suggesting that it formed a possible background to Austin's views on truth, where he 
espoused a correspondence theory, Warnock, Austin, 47. 
32 Austin, Philosophical Papers, 143. 
33 Austin, Philosophical Papers, 150-5 1. 
34 Austin, Philosophical Papers, 233-52. 
35 Printed in Charles E. Caton (ed. ), Philosophy and Ordinary Language, Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1963,22-33; with discussion 33-54. Reprinted, without the discussion, in John R. 
Searle (ed. ), The Philosophy ofLanguage, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1971,13-22. 
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The 'descriptive fallacy', that all statements are attempts to describe states of affairs 
and as such are either true or false, is in Austin's sights from the very beginning. It is 
clear, he argues, that a great many statements are trying to do something else 
altogether. He categorises sentences into performatives or constatives: statements 
used to perform certain acts, or to describe states of affairs, respectively. " 
No sooner is this distinction made than he sets about undermining it. At least four 
different approaches to the perfort-native-constative distinction ultimately suggest 
that it needs reconsidering. Firstly, there is the 'doctrine of the infelicities, or 'the 
things that can be and go wrong on the occasion of such utterances' (i. e. 
performatives). (14) These can be 'misfires', where for instance the act in question is 
only purported but does not properly occur (e. g. someone who is not entitled to name 
a ship does so); or they can be 'abuses' where the act is achieved but not properly 
(e. g. an insincere promise). But, significantly, these kinds of failings can also apply 
to constatives. (14-20) 
Secondly, with regard to perforinatives, Austin focuses on the issue of conventions: 
There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a 
certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering 
of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and 
... 
the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must 
be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure 
invoked. (14-15; cf discussion on 26-35) 
Thirdly there are the intentions which go along with the utterance. (15; cf discussion 
on 39-45) On both of these points Austin's conclusion is that philosophers have erred 
in saying that a statement can be considered true or false in isolation from the total 
speech act which is being performed. (52) This only adds to the drift of the argument 
that the distinction between performatives and constatives cannot be sustained in its 
original, simple form. 
His remaining approach to the problem is to look for a better clarification of the 
performative, by asking whether it has any distinguishing grammatical feature. He 
concludes that it does not. (55-66) At this point, still not quite ready to give up the 
36 Austin, HDTW, 1-4. Further page references to this book are in the text. 
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distinction, he embarks on what is perhaps an unfortunate attempt to argue that 
although 'utterances as they stand are 'hopeless' in terms of exhibiting grammatically 
significant signs of their performative status, perhaps it is the case that all 
performative utterances could be 'reduced' to what he calls explicit performatives, 
involving first person present tense singular indicative active verbs of the form 'I 
promise... ' or 'I baptise... ' etc.. (67-68) This discussion involves an attempt to find 
verbs which are themselves performative verbs, before coming to the conclusion that 
the project is not feasible. 
This occasions his celebrated remark, by now over half way through the book, that 'It 
is time then to make a fresh start on the problem. ' (91) More seriously, it seems 
likely that it is this part of his enquiry, albeit presented originally as a dead-end, 
which has given rise to some of the various 'readings' of his work as offering a 
rationale for the search for 'logical form' analysis of speech acts; replacing language 
as it stands with a form of language (a'reduction', or a'deep structure') which 
exhibits certain desired features. 
§2.1 Locution, Illocution and Perlocution 
The first step of Austin's fresh start is to discuss briefly some points concerning 
phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts, " but it seems that their sole function in his text is 
that taken together they comprise what he chooses to dub the locutionary act. (94) 
This is the normal sense of 'saying something. He then introduces the term 
illocutionaýy act: the 'performance of an act in saying something as opposed to 
performance of an act of saying something. ' (99-100) This, he points out, is not 
necessarily a clearly defined class of acts, but'to perform a locutionary act is in 
general, we may say, also and eo ipso to perfon-n an illocutionary act' (98); and the 
way in which the language functions in such a case is a question of its illocutionary 
force. 
37 He defines these as follows: a phonetic act is the act of uttering certain nolses; a phatic act is 
'the act of uttering certain vocables or words 
... 
in a certain construction 
... 
with a certain intonation, 
and a 7-hetic act is the act of using the pheme (of the phatic act) with a (more or less) defmite sense ltý 
and reference. Austin, HDTW, 95-98. 
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Force, for Austin here, is to be kept distinguished from meaning, where meaning is 
equivalent to sense and reference. (100) This fits with his notion that the locutionary 
act contains the rhetic (sense and reference) act, leaving force as the additional factor 
which defines the illocutionary act as a distinctive (though not separate) act. One 
upshot of this is that it may be possible to determine entirely the locutionary act on 
any given occasion, but not thereby understand which illocutionary act has been 
performed. (100- 1) The first is, in Austin's ternis a traditional question of meaning; 
while the second may concern whether an act of informing, or ordering, or warning, 
etc., took place. (109) 
The third type of act in Austin's schema at this point is introduced thus: 'Saying 
something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon 
the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other 
persons', and an act performed in this way (possibly intentionally) is a 
perlocutionary act. (101) 
The differences between the three forces as Austin envisages them are given by some 
examples: 
He said to me, 'Shoot her! ' 
He urged me to shoot her. 
He persuaded me to shoot her. 
-locutionary 
-illocutionary 
-perlocutionary. (102) 
Unfortunately these examples are problematic: 'urging' is a pafticularly unhelpful 
example of an illocution since it fails, for example, to be a matter of linguistic 
convention, and has no 'institutional' component. Urging is probably best seen as a 
perlocutionary act. Indeed in the ensuing discussion it also becomes apparent that 
Austin's ideas of the locutionary and illocutionary acts are confused. The remainder 
of the book is then given to clarifying the notion of illocutionary force in two ways: 
firstly, and mainly, by delineating more carefully the ways in which an illocutionary 
act differs from a locutionary or perlocutionary one; (103-47) and secondly by 
looking at the various types of illocutionary force. (148-64) 
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Three points may be made here. Firstly, Austin is working with approximate, and 
indeed abstract, classifications. What happens in HDTW is that an intuitive 
understanding of the various types of act under discussion, which he admits are not 
necessarily clearly defined, is approached from different angles each of which 
provide useful but not final insights. As a result the categories are working at 
occasional cross-purposes with earlier or later manifestations of themselves. This is 
undoubtedly a source of much of the subsequent debate in speech act theory. It also 
follows that these different types of act, as abstractions, need always to be viewed 
functionally, i. e. with regard to the longer-term role they may play in clarification of 
some other concept. It is this point which is in view when Austin remarks that'The 
total speech-act in the total speech-situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in 
the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating. ' (148) 
Secondly, Austin's classification of different types of illocutionary force is clearly a 
work in progress, which he did not live long enough to make satisfactory. Despite its 
appearance as the concluding chapter in the book, it does not represent the natural 
concluding stage of his argument, but is, I suggest, best seen as a separate but related 
inquiry undertaken for different reasons. " Austin's approach is to examine 
performative verbs which could be made to stand for paradigmatic performative 
utterances of different sorts. His categorisation of verdictives; exercitives; 
cominissives; behabitives and expositives is self-confessedly vague, far from 
definitive, and perhaps not even mutually exclusive. We shall take up Searle's 
development of this area below. 
Thirdly, and most significantly, Austin's definitions of locution and illocution do not 
match up either to the examples he gives or his subsequent discussion. Without a 
doubt, Searle's work in this area has superseded Austin's exploratory discussion, 
although certain features of Austin's presentation are worth noting. 
38 Warnock has suggested that Austin desired long-term collaborative and cumulative work in 
philosophy in order to build more substantial results than it had typically produced. Classification and 
cataloguing, in this perspective, may thus be seen as an essential first step towards longer-lasting 
philosophical work. See the interview with Warnock in Ved Mehta, Fly and the Fly-bottle. 
Encounters with British Intellectuals, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965,53-60, especially 
56-57. 
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He notes three particular contrasts between illocutions and perlocutions: the 
[successful] performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake; we 
say that the illocutionary act 'takes effect' rather than produces consequences; and 
finally illocutions invite by convention a response or sequel. (117)'9 Two other 
influential attempts to capture the distinction are as follows: 'Elocutionary acts are 
conventional acts: perlocutionary acts are not conventional'; (12 1) and secondly an 
illocutionary act is one performed in saying something, as against a perlocutionary 
act which is done by saying something. (122-32). Both of these criteria, especially 
the latter with its reversion to the hunt for hidden logical form in contrast to 'surface' 
manifestations, turn out to be, unsurprisingly, either inconclusive or equivocal. 
§2.2 Summary 
Because of the confiising structure of Austin's argument, it is important to summarise 
the major achievements of HDTW. Firstly, and in spite of the disputable nature of the 
definitions of key terms which he offers, his notion of the illocutionary act is 
enormously fruitful for analysing the functioning of utterances in social contexts. We 
take up the disputes below. 
Secondly, the idea that utterances are primarily concerned to state facts is 
challenged. HDTW does not propose a performative-constative distinction so much 
as show that fact-stating utterances are but one type of performative. Austin allows 
that certain types of simple 'archetype' sentences ("'The cat is on the mat", said for no 
conceivable reason', for example (146)) approximate to either the performative or 
constative case, but contends that in actual language use we rarely if ever encounter 
such abstractions. Rather: 'Once we realize that what we have to study is not the 
sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech-situation, there can hardly be any 
longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act. ' (139) 
Thirdly, Austin's putative discussion of different types of illocutionary force brings 
together the above two points. Performatives and constatives can be viewed as 
39 Austin's ornission of 'successful' here seems to falsify the distinction he actually makes 'in 
this very paragraph. 
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similar in that they are both speech acts. They can be viewed as different in that they 
are speech acts with differing illocutionary force. 
Finally Austin's approach recovers the notion of agency in understanding an 
utterance, without polarising between what is intended in the uttering of a sentence 
and what is achieved by uttering it. This middle way is of particular relevance in 
cases of written texts viewed as speech acts. 
§3 John Searle's Theory of Speech Acts 
Although there are many writers who still appeal directly and solely to Austin when 
discussing speech acts, it is best to see Austin's work as laying a foundation which 
invited development. This has been achieved most notably in the work of John 
Searle, who studied under Austin himself. In a series of books and articles Searle has 
provided by far the most comprehensive account of speech act theory. " As his work 
has developed he has sought increasingly to ground his philosophy of language in an 
intentionality-based approach to the philosophy of mind. " 
Searle's major contributions to speech act theory may be considered here in four 
main categories: 
1) his clarification of Austin's locutionary-illocutionary distinction 
2) his classification of different types of illocutionary acts 
3) his distinction between brute and institutional facts; and between 
regulative and constitutive rules 
4) his development of the idea of the Background. 
40 His major contributions to the subject are John R. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1969; idem (ed. ), The Philosophy ofLanguage, 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 197 1; idem, Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of5peech Acts, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979; idem, Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy ofMind, 
Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1983; and with Daniel Vanderveken, Foundations offflocutionary Logic, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985. He also contributed to and co-edited John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer 
& Manfred Bierwisch (eds. ), Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics, Dordrecht Boston & London: D. 
Reidel, 1980; developed aspects of speech act theory further in his The Construction of Social 
Reality, London: Penguin, 1995; and offered various responses to critics in Ernest Lepore and Robert 
Van Gulick (eds. ), John Searle and His Critics, Cambridge, Mass & Oxford: Blackwell, 199 1. 
41 He offers an overview of his 'systematic philosophy' in John Searle, Mind, Language and 
Society. Philosophy in the Real World, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999, where, we may note, 
his account of 'how languace works' (13 5-6 1) places speech act theory as his sixth and final chapter 
after discussions of the nund, intentionality and social reality. 
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The first three of these, in various ways, provide valuable criteria for the notion of 
the illocutionary act. The fourth category, that of the Background, is his 
controversial but powerful contribution to the philosophy of mind which has most 
direct bearing on his speech act theory. 
§3.1 Isolating the Iflocution 
Austin predicted that'it is the distinction between illocutions and perlocutions which 
seems likeliest to give trouble', " but in fact the bulk of the initial response to his 
work concerned the question of how to separate the illocution from the locution. This 
is a direct result of his problematic definition of the locutionary act, and is an area 
where Searle's approach is much to be preferred. 
As early as 1963 Max Black was wondering whether Austin's notion of illocutionary 
force was any more stable a distinction than his abandoned performative/constative 
classification. 
43 Perhaps the most serious challenge to his notion of illocutionary 
force was mounted by Jonathan Cohen in a 1964 article entitled'Do Elocutionary 
Forces ExiSt? '44 It is Searle's response to Cohen which has become the standard 
account. 
45 
Black argued that Austin's conception of the locutionary act was incomplete as 'the 
normal sense' of saying something if it did not include illocutionary force; for what 
could it be to say something in the normal sense, fixing sense and reference, yet not 
42 Austin, HD TW, 110 
- 
43 Max Black, 'Austin on Performatives', Philosophy 38 (1963), 217-26, reprinted in K. T. Fann 
(ed. ), Symposium on J. L. Austin, London: RKP, 1969,401-11. 
44 L. Jonathan Cohen, 'Do Illocutionary Forces ExistT, PhQ 14 (1964), 118-37, reprinted in 
Fann (ed. ), Symposium on J. L. Austin, 420-44. 
45 John R. Searle, 'Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts', originally in Philosophical 
Review 77 (1968), and revised and reprinted in Isaiah Berlin et al., Essays on J. L. Austin, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973,141-59. Responses to Searle include L. W. Forguson, 'Locutionary and 
Illocutionary Acts', in Berlin et al., Essays, 160-85; and David Holdcroft, 'Doubts About the 
Locutionary/Illocutionary Distinction', International Studies in Philosophy (1974), 3-16. An 
alternative response to Cohen is Mats Furberg's major re-definition of Austin's views in 1969: 
'Meaning and Illocutionary Force, in Fann (ed. ), Symposium on JL. Austin, 445-67, with a I-page 
response by Cohen, 468. A helpfiil survey of these debates up to 1981 is provided by Graham Bird, 
'Austin's Theory of Elocutionary Force', in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr, & Howard K. 
Wettstein (eds. ), Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1981,345-69. 
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also (i. e. thereby) asserting, questioning, ordering, or whatever the speaker was 
doing. For Black, this demonstrated the limitations of analysing ordinary language 
for theories of how language works. In short, Austin's dismissal of the 
performative-constative distinction would also cause his concept of locutionary act 
to fail. (Intriguingly Black actually thought that the performative-constative 
distinction was salvageable by careful definition of 'performative', but that ultimately 
since all locutions were illocutions there was no valuable sense of two types of 
utterances after all. This point is incidental to his major criticism, but in itself seems 
to lack coherence 
. 
46) 
Black's article proved to set the scene for the ensuing debate. Jonathan Cohen, 
observing that Austin's account of meaning is particularly unclear, argued that'the 
concept of illocutionary force developed [in HDITP] is empty. "' Cohen notes that in 
cases of explicit performatives, what Austin calls illocutionary force 'cannot be 
distinguished from the meaning, ' and in fact it simply is that part of an utterance's 
meaning which could be (or is, if explicit) conveyed by the use of the utterance. " In 
short, Cohen proposed that it was more intuitive to see meaning as comprising of 
sense and force, both of which are intrinsic to the sentence; and then supplemented 
by reference on the occasion of utterance (and the reference may change every time). 
Austin, on the other hand, saw force as some extra component above and beyond 
sense and reference. " However, Cohen did not dispute the main thrust of Austin's 
analysis of performative meaning, indeed spending the majority of his article 
discussing eight reasons why Austin's overall framework is plausible even while 
arguing against the notion of illocutionary force. " 
46 This is the gist of L. W. Forguson's reply to Black, 'In Pursuit of Performatives', Philosophy 
41 (1966), 341-47, reprinted in Fann (ed. ), Symposium on JL. Austin, 412-19; especially 419. 
47 Cohen, 'Illocutionary Forces', 118. 
48 Cohen, 'Elocutionary Forces', 122,125. 
49 Cohen, 'Illocutionary Forces', 134. 
so Cohen later produced a constructive and sympathetic, if non-standard, survey of speech act 
theory: L. Jonathan Cohen, 'Speech Acts', in Thomas A. Sebeok (ed. ), Current Trends in Linguistics 
Vol. 12. Linguistics and Adjacent Arts and Sciences, The Hague: Mouton, 1974,173-208. 
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Thus we may say that the intuitive idea which Austin attempted to capture with his 
notion of illocutionary force is one with which Cohen had sympathy, but which to 
him did not require an additional category above and beyond meaning, which could 
be subsumed into the locutionary act in Austin's scheme. Once Cohen's point is put 
this way, it turns out to be methodologically similar to the reclassification proposed 
by Searle. 
Searle also found Austin's distinction unhelpful, but recognised a difference between 
the utterance per se and the illocutionary force. This led him to attack the distinction 
the other way round: leaving illocutionary force in place as a category but 
consequently reducing the scope of Austin's locutionary act. " Unlike Cohen's view, 
Searle's has had a major impact on the subsequent development of speech act theory. 
His basic contention is that although in theory one might see (Austin's) locutionary 
act as different from an illocutionary one, since they clearly represent different 
concepts, in practice they are never separate. This is because Austin's rhetic act is in 
fact illocutionary. Thus, as Cohen had argued, the locutionary act was always 
illocutionary in nature. Hence Searle proposed dropping the idea of the locutionary 
act, and instead insisted: 'We need to distinguish the illocutionary act from the 
propositional act 
-that is, the act of expressing the proposition (a phrase which is 
neutral as to illocutionary force). "' This modification has become the standard 
theory. It leaves Searle, when he restates it in his Speech Acts, with a framework of- 
utterance acts: including Austin's phonetic and phatic acts 
propositional acts: referring and predicating ('expressing the proposition') 
illocutionary acts: stating, questioning, commanding, etc 
perlocutionary acts: persuading, convincing, etc. " 
51 Searle, 'Austin on Locutionary and Elocutionary Acts'. Cf also his 'What is a Speech AUT in 
Max Black (ed. ), Philosophy in America, London: Allen & Unw1n, 1965,221-39. These earlier 
articles were essentially incorporated into his Speech Acts. 
52 Searle, Tocutionary and Illocutionary', 155. 
53 Searle, Speech Acts, 24-25; cf'Locutionary and Illocutionary', 159. 
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One should note, but many do not note, that the locutionary act has no place in 
Searle's scheme, and that, on the above account, it invites confusion to persist with 
the term if it is Austin's idea of 'locutionary' which is in view. Among 
non-philosophers appealing to speech act theory, I judge that Searle's 'propositional 
act' is viewed as a kind of limiting case of an illocution, and that his 'utterance act' is 
what is meant by talk of a 'locutionary act'. It is probably not necessary, for our 
purposes, to be more precise than this. " 
Canonical Notation and Truth-Functional Semantics 
A brief word is in order here about Searle's development of canonical notation for 
illocutionary acts, which follows directly from his above schema. By making the 
fundamental distinction that 'a proposition is to be sharply distinguishedftom an 
assertion or statement of it, '55 Searle is led to a loose form of canonical notation for 
an illocutionary act: 
F(p) or F(RP) 
with F being the indicator of illocutionary force; p the proposition in its most general 
form, and RP being his terms of reference and predication, i. e. the non-illocutionary 
parts of the statement. 56 
This move, in retrospect, has been something of a Trojan horse, opening up speech 
act theory to a whole ontology of truth functions, completeness theorems, sentence 
radicals and logical forms. " At precisely this point, speech act theory is poised 
54 Two helpful recent discussions of this issue are Jennifer Hornsby, 'Things Done With 
Words', in Jonathan Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik & C. C. W. Taylor (eds. ), Human Agency: Language, 
Duty and Value. Philosophical Essays in Honor ofJO. Urmson, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1988, 
27-46 and 283-88; and Frangois Recanati, Meaning and Force. The Pragmatics ofPerfonnative 
Utterances, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987,236-66. Hornsby argues that Austin equivocated 
between 'rhetic' and 'locutionary' for the same thing (i. e. 'rhetic'), and that Searle uses 'locutionary' 
only in the phonetic+phatic+rhetic sense (285 n. 17). She concludes that 'locutionary' pertains to a 
particular language (English; French; 
... 
) while illocutionary will serve for a general account of 
language per se (36-37), and that rhetic remains the best option for what Austin was after. For 
Recanati's view see n. 128 below. 
55 Searle, Speech Acts, 29. 
56 Searle, Speech Acts, 31-32; cf'Locutionary and Illocutionary', 156. 
57 The Trojan horse belongs, perhaps, to WN. O. Quine, for whorn'to be is to be the value of a 
variable', 'On What There Is', in his From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, '196 1, 
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between the natural language arena from whence it came and the truth functional 
semantics into which it has, on occasion, headed. 
One may grant that Austin's notion of locutionary act has proved unhelpful, since his 
rhetic act is already illocutionary. Searle, arguing the other way round from Cohen, 
has therefore isolated that part of the speech act which is not illocutionary, by 
definition. Where Cohen saw the illocutionary force irresistibly shifted over to the 
meaning of the utterance; Searle holds on to it by creating a new non-illocutionary 
entity: the propositional act. As with Austin's various acts this is an abstraction, and 
hence the question one must ask in evaluating it is not 'Is there such a thing? ' 
because, on Searle's account there is not, but 'What use would such an abstraction 
beT, i. e. what is itsfunction? 
In fact Searle equivocates between introducing his logical notation functionally: 
'Symbolically, we might represent the sentence as containing an illocutionary 
force-indicating device and a propositional content indicator, " and not so 
functionally: 'The general form of (very many kinds of) illocutionary acts is F(p) 
where the variable 'T" takes the illocutionary force indicating devices as values and 
'ýp " takes expressions for propositions. "' This latter rides on the back of the 
following assertion: 'In the deep structure we can often identify those elements that 
correspond to the indicator of illocutionary force quite separately from those that 
correspond to the indicator of propositional content. t6' He grants that on the 'surface' 
this is not quite so clear, but the 'thereness' (the 'ontological backing', we might say) 
of such elements in the language is unmistakeable. 
The potential problem is then that these abstract entities assume a life of their own, 
and start to dictate terms in future theoretical considerations. 61 1 suggest that it is just 
1- 19; here 15. For all their apparent similarities, the irreducible differences between Quine and 
'ordinary language philosophy' (cf n. 13 above) are brought out well by Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place, 
183-227. Somewhat bizarrely, Quinean 'eliminative paraphrase' casts its long shadow over biblical 
interpretation, as we shall discover in chapter 4. 
58 Searle, Tocutionary and Illocutionary', 156. 
59 Searle, Speech Acts, 3 1. 
60 Searle, Speech Acts, 30-3 1. 
61 A term for this kind of problem would be helpful. Perhaps, In the spirit of James Barr, one 
ChalDter 2- Page 45 
such an agenda which operates in Searle's (and Vanderveken's) subsequent work on 
classifying illocutionary acts, which will be considered below. 
This need not be a major problem with Searle's work, but it is relevant. What appears 
to happen is that Searle wants to use Wittgenstein's radically different notion of 
philosophy (a philosophy which 'leaves everything as it is' and 'only states what 
everyone admits"') to get away from the mistaken methods of syntactic-semantic 
approaches but without necessarily eschewing the goals of such theories. " Such a 
view is suggested by a comment in Bede Rundle's Wittgenstein & Contemporary 
Philosophy ofLanguage, which charts a course between what he calls formal 
semantics (following Frege) and Wittgenstein's 'meaning as use' paradigm. ' For 
Rundle the goals of a theory may be worth pursuing without accepting the 
methodologies in use for reaching them. Searle's view of Wittgenstein also seems to 
suggest this dual-level approach to abstract theory construction. 65 
§3.2 Classifying Illocution ary Acts 
Searle's work on classifying illocutionary acts takes up Austin's last chapter in 
HDTW, and is a significant advance on it which, again, has become the standard 
theory. " In this he seeks to show that there are basically 5 (possibly 6) types of 
speech act, arranged around the organising categories of directions of fit between 
could call it 'illegitimately transferred abstraction. ' 
62 Wittgenstem, Philosophical Investigations, § 124; §599. 
63 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 140, and perhaps as a subtext to much of Speech Acts 
(especially 146-49) and Expression and Meaning (e. g. 29). 
64 Bede Rundle, Wittgenstein & Contemporary Philosophy ofLanguage, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990, ix-x; 265-66, and passim. 
65 Rundle, Wittgenstein, x; for Searle on Wittgenstein see John R. Searle, 'Wittgenstein', in 
dialogue with Bryan Magee in Bryan Magee, The Great Philosophers. An Introduction to Western 
Philosophy, London: BBC Books, 1987,320-47. This more nuanced view mitigates some, though not 
all, of the punishing criticisms directed at speech act theory by G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker, 
Language, Sense and Nonsense. A Critical Investigation into Modern Theories ofLanguage, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1984. See James Bogen, 'An Unfavourable Review of Language, Sense and Nonsense', 
Inquiry 28 (1985), 467-82. A collection of essays indicating on-goMg tension over this issue is 
Searle, Kiefer & Bierwisch (eds. ), Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics. 
66 John R. Searle, 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts', 111 Keith Gunderson (ed. ), Language, 
Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1975; reprinted in Searle, Expression and Meaning, 1-29. 
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word and world. " The direction of fit distinguishes between, for instance, assertives 
where an attempt is made to match one's words to the world (e. g. 'We ate fish for 
dinner') and directives which attempt to match the world to the words spoken 
('Please could you open the window'). The idea, as we saw, goes back to a 1953 
Austin paper, and Searle draws on Elisabeth Anscombe's elucidation of it. " Based on 
the observation that there are fundamentally only 4 possible directions of fit 
(word-to-world; world-to-word; mutual fit or no fit) he argues that the 
Wittgensteinian notion of limitless uses of language must be mistaken since: 
If we adopt illocutionary point as the basic notion on which to 
classify uses of language, then there are a rather limited number 
of basic things we do with language: we tell people how things 
are, we try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to 
doing things, we express our feelings and attitudes and we bring 
about changes through our utterances. Often, we do more than 
one of these at once in the same utterance. 69 
Aside from direction of fit, the other major categories which facilitate his analysis 
are illocutionary point and psychological state (e. g. a belief or an intention); which 
correspond to the essential and sincerity conditions of speech act analysis 
respectively. " For the sake of convenience, and since it remains such an influential 
categorisation, I include here a tabulated summary of Searle's full discussion: 
67 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 3-4. Direction of fit is mentioned once, briefly, in Speech 
Acts, 124 n. 1 but is not developed there. 
68 G. E. M. Anscombe, Intentions, Oxford: Blackwell, 1957. 
69 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 29, with reference to Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, §23. 
70 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 2-5. 
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A Taxonomy of Illocutionary ACtS71 
Type of act Assertives Directives Commissives Expressives Declarations Assertive 
Declarations 
Logical 4, B (p) W (H CI (S E 11 (P) (S I D (p) Da Vý B (p) 
Notation does A) does A) H+ property) 
Elocution- Commits S S attempts to Commits S Expresses Brings about An assertive 
ary Point to something get H to do to some the psycho- correspondce with the 
being the something future course logical state between force of a 
case of action specified in prop. content declaration 
the sincerity and reality 
condition (when 
successful) 
Direction word to world to world to none both word to assertive is 
offit world word word world and word to 
world to world; declr. 
word is both ways 
Sincerity Belief (that Want (wish Intention varies M none: Belief (that 
Condition P) or desire) each case P) 
Proposit- any p H does some S does some ascription of any p any p 
ional future action future action some proper- 
Content A A ty to S or H 
Example It is raining. Open the I will come I thank you Tony Blair is You are 
sentence door. at 6.00. for coming. hereby guilty as 
elected. charged. 
Typical suggest, put ask, order, promise, thank, [linguistic [linguistic 
cases forward, beg, entreat, vow, pledge, congratulate, markers markers 
insist, boast, command, covenant, apologize, depend on depend on 
deduce, request, contract, condole, institutional institutional 
hypothesize.. plead, pray, swear, deplore, rules] rules] 
I invite, defy... I guarantee... I welcome... I 
Five points, of varying significance, may be made here about this classification, 
which has attained something of a canonical status in speech act theory. The first of 
these five points will suggest a different approach to this topic, which I shall explore 
briefly at the end of this section. 
Firstly, it is worth pausing to underline the final sentence in the quote from Searle's 
article above: 
71 Source: Searle, Expression and Meaning, Ch. I 'A taxonomy of illocutionary acts', 1-29 
especially 12-20; with some clarificatory notes from Austin, HDTW, 8-12. Key to symbols used: S 
speaker; H= hearer; A= an action; p=a proposition; (P) = Psychological state, fI= the empty set 
(null); arrows = direction of fit. Note: the sincerity condition for a successful speech act specifies a 
psychological state 
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(1) 'Often, we do more than one of these at once in the same utterance. "' 
This is undoubtedly true, and yet the all too common impression given by Searle's 
taxonomy is that different speech acts fall into disjunctive categories. However, as is 
clear from the classification, the final category, of assertive declarations, is a hybrid 
one: for example a judge who says 'You are guilty' is both asserting and declaring. 
Other writers have suggested that other such hybrids may be possible, including, 
indeed, Searle himself in later work. " In fact, (1) should lead us to expect hybrids as 
the normal occurrence. Rather than a taxonomy of illocutionary acts, we do better to 
read Searle as providing a classification of major illocutionary points. I shall 
consider other aspects of Searle's approach before returning to this theme below. 
Secondly, such a consideration raises again the issue of the link between a working 
scheme and its canonical notation. Direction of fit, like illocutionary force, is again 
an abstraction, which must be judged to be useful in terms of whether it provides any 
analytical help. To observe that there are only four fundamental directions of fit does 
not say anything about the kinds of speech acts one might be performing within any 
one of them. Indeed, the existence of both directives and commissives in Searle's list 
indicates that direction of fit is not fully determinative of illocutionary point. What 
has been achieved is a certain form of notational classification, and there should be 
no surprises that there are 'blurred edges' to some of Searle's four fundamental 
categories. " 
The point is that such a'taxonomy'must of necessity be of functional use, and 
cannot, contra Searle, claim to be definitive. This is partly anticipated by Dieter 
Wunderlich's claim that 'There is no clear classification of speech acts. Neither 
Austin's, nor Searle's, nor anybody else's attempts are really convincing. "' He further 
72 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 29, as quoted in n. 69 above. 
73 E. g. Terrence W. Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy, Washington DC: Georgetown UP, 199 1, 
10- 15,29, n. 4, where he draws attention to Searle and Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary 
Logic, 175, which allows all types of illocutionary act to have hybrid declarative forms. 
'74 On the link between blurred edges and categories which are never-the-less distinguishable, 
see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §7 1. 
75 Dieter Wunderlich, 'Methodological Remarks on Speech Act Theory', *in Searle, Keifer & 
Bierwisch (eds. ), Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics, 291-312; here 297. 
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observes that the question of which speech-act classification is given priority will 
depend on the purpose of the theory, " and he offers various possible functional 
criteria of organisation. What he does not make explicit, though, is the reason why 
this kind of classification must be dependent on purpose (or fimction): it is simply 
because we are dealing with abstractions made only for a particular purpose, and not 
with entities which can invite classification on their own (or objective) terrns. 
Thirdly, this challenge to the privileged position claimed for Searle's classification 
will also challenge his assertion that, contra Wittgenstein, there are a small number 
of uses of language. The number of uses one envisages can only be assessed relative 
to some conceptual scheme. I incline to the view that Wittgenstein is right on this 
point, but that the issues at stake are more terminological than substantive. " 
Fourthly, we need to consider the reasons put forward by Searle to explain his claim 
that his categories are privileged, and this necessitates a brief detour into his 
philosophy of mind. He draws on the idea of 'intentionality', loosely defmed as 'that 
property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or 
of objects and states of affairs in the world. "' This notion of 'directedness' leads him 
on to say that the ability of the speaking subject to perform speech acts is 'an 
extension of the more biologically fundamental capacities of the mind (or brain) to 
relate the organism to the world by way of such mental states as belief and desire. 79 
Once mental states are held to underlie speech acts in this way then a variety of 
mental processes needs to be hypothesised and then explained in order to account for 
how we can 'do' such things as 'move' from a literal to a non-literal meaning of an 
utterance, or understand a metaphor, or even, most basically, perform a speech act 
76 Wunderlich, 'Methodological Remarks', 297. 
7 7, As Recanati notes, classifications depend on prioritising certain features of utterances, and 
thus 'if we refuse to favor particular criteria, we must conclude, with Wittgenstein, that any treelike 
classification of illocutionary acts is illusory', Recanati, Meaning and Force, 152. In other words: 
actual classifications presuppose the favoring of particular criteria. For a critique of Wittgenstein's 
view here see P. F. Strawson, 'Critical Notice of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations', 'in 
Harold Morick (ed. ), Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967, 
3-42, especially 6-7. 
78 Searle, Intentionality, 1; cf William Lyons, Approaches to Intentionality, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995,1, who defines it 111 terms of mental activities with a perspectival content and attitude. 
79 Searle, Intentionality, vil. 
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with a certain intention. " 
The intentionality-based, 'mental states' philosophy of mind which Searle develops is 
not, however, the only possible approach to such questions. Consider, for example, 
the supposed problem of how we are able to understand sentences that we have never 
heard before. " This 'problem' presupposes that understanding is something like a 
mental state that is attained through some processing of data, and hence that one 
must account for how this mental state is reached. Once accepted, this picture is 
likely to hold us captive. " 
A different picture suggests a different approach. Understanding is less a mental state 
than something like an ability, or a competency. " The 'problem' of understanding 
new sentences turns out to be exactly analogous to the 'problem' of how it is that a 
painter can paint a totally new picture: i. e. no problem at all. " 
Not only does this account find its expression in Wittgenstein's work, including the 
very aspects of it which we analysed earlier (§ 1.1 above), but the same conception of 
speech acts as actions which are not inherently tied to mental states is made explicit 
by Austin in a brisk but significant passage at the beginning of HDTW- 
we are apt to have a feeling that [words being spoken seriously] 
consists in their being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible 
sign, for convenience or other record or for information, of an 
inward and spiritual act. " 
so All of these examples are discussed at length by Searle, e. g. Expression and Meaning, 30-57 
(on'indirect speech acts' and moving from literal to non-literal meaning); 76-116 (on'metaphor'). 
81 This account draws on Baker & Hacker, Language, Sense and Nonsense, 316-21; 345-56. 
82 Cf Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 115. 
83 Baker & Hacker, Language, Sense and Nonsense, 349. They develop their Wittgensteinian 
account of understanding in idem, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume I of an 
Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980,595-620 in a 
section entitled 'Understanding and Ability' on Investigations § 143-184; see especially 617-20. For 
some empirical support for such a thesis see Hans Ramge, 'Language Acquisition as the Acquisition 
of Speech Act Competence', JPrag 1 (1977), 155-64. Competency has proved a fruitful category in 
literary theory, cf Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics. Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of 
Literature, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1975,113-30, on'Literary Competence'. 
84 Baker & Hacker, Language, Sense and Nonsense, 3 54. 
85 Austin, HDTW, 9. 
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This invites, of course, a version of the descriptive fallacy: utterances are true or 
false in that they either do or do not accurately report a state of (internal) affairs. 
Austin dismisses one who holds such a theory as 'surveying the invisible depths of 
ethical space, with all the distinction of a specialist in the sui generis. '(! )" 
Searle's philosophy of mind continues to remain controversial. " In my judgement it 
is possible to utilise the insights of his philosophy of language without necessarily 
adopting his framework of intentionality and mental states, even accepting that this 
directly contradicts Searle's own view: 'If there really are the five basic types [of 
speech acts], there must be some deeper reason for that... these five must derive from 
some fundamental features of the mind. "' The logical connection here is elusive. In 
fact, his claim rests on his own theory that the conditions of satisfaction for speech 
acts and intentional states are identical by virtue of the requirements of direction of 
fit. 89 In response, Karl Otto Apel has argued that it is Searle's own earlier philosophy 
of language which offers a critique of his theory of intentionality. " We shall need to 
consider a further aspect of Searle's philosophy of mind in the discussion below of 
his theory of Background. 
A fifth, and final, point arising from Searle's classification is the nature of the link 
between illocutionary acts and vocabulary markers for them. I defer discussion of 
86 Austin, HDTW, 10. Stanley Cavell underlines the significance of these brief comments in his 
helpful reading of the passage, in his Philosophical Passages. - Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, 
Derrida, Cambridge, Mass & Oxford: Blackwell, 1995,52-65. 
87 He develops his views in John R. Searle, Minds, Brains and Science. The 1984 Reith 
Lectures, London: Penguin, 1991 (1984); The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Mass & London, 
England: MIT Press, 1992; The Mystery of Consciousness, London: Granta Books, 1997; and he 
explores their role as basic to his overall approach in Mind, Language and Society, 3 9-110. It is fair 
to say that his position on intentionality is not widely followed. For surveys see Lyons, Approaches to 
Intentionality, and, briefer but more entertaining, John Haugeland, 'The Intentionality All-Stars', in 
Philosophical Perspectives 4. 
- 
Action Theory and Philosophy ofMind, ed. James E. Tornberlin, 
Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1990,383-427. Both writers locate Searle at one 
end of the spectrum (or in Haugeland's case, deep in the outfield). For critique see Daniel C. Dennett, 
The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, Mass & London: MIT Press, 1987; and on whether Searle's view 
reduces to behaviourism: Ilham Dilman, Mind, Brain and Behaviour. - Discussions ofB. F Skinner and 
J. R. Searle, London: Routledge, 1988. 
88 Searle, Intentionality, 166. 
89 Searle, Intentionality, 10- 11 
- 
90 Karl Otto Apel, 'Is Intentionality more Basic than Linguistic Meaning? ', in Lepore and Van 
Gulick (eds. ), John Searle and His Critics, 31-55. Apel develops a view of the 'intersubjective 
validity of meaning, rather than intentionality, as grounding pragmatics (i. e. speech acts). 
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this point until chapter 3, in the context of applying speech act theory to texts, and of 
Searle and Vanderveken's further work on classification 
An A Itern ative A roach 
Before leaving this much-contested subject, I wish to draw out the implications of 
the first of these five points of critique, that in general more than one illocutionary 
point is operative in a speech act. Several writers have noted this, as indeed I have 
shown that Searle himself notes it. " In my judgment, the most compelling alternative 
is provided in a short review of Austin's and Searle's taxonomies and their theoretical 
rationales offered by Jerrold Sadock. " 
Sadock takes a step back from the standard picture, and considers Searle's three 
important dimensions (namely illocutionary point; direction of fit; and expressed 
psychological state) with their five, four and five possible values respectively, and 
observes that it is odd that only 5 of the possible 100 combinations of these 
parameters are adduced as actual illocutionary categories. " Further, the various 
accounts provided by Searle differ in terms of details about which dimensions of 
analysis are significant for demarcating types of illocutionary utterance. Thus Sadock 
suggests that in fact the major motivation of Searle's final 5-fold listing is a desire to 
remain close to the tentative taxonomy provided by Austin at the end of HDTW, 
which also had 5 categories. There are detail problems too: declarations are not a 
different sentence type but have to be carried out by means of assertives, hence 
Searle's hybrid sixth category; while equally some common distinctions such as that 
between making statements and asking questions are not captured by the 
classification. " 
91 See in particular the approach of Brammer, Yheology and Philosophical Inquiry, 16 and 
26-31. 
92 Jerrold M. Sadock, 'Toward a grammatically realistic typology of speech acts', in Savas L. 
Tsohatzidis (ed. ), Foundations ofSpeech Act Theory. Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, 
London & New York: Routledge, 1994,393-406. 
93 Sadock, 'Toward a grammatically realistic typology', 395. 
94 Sadock, 'Toward a grammatically realistic typology', 404. 
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Sadock's proposal, instead, is to deduce the basic dimensions of analysis from 
investigating how languages do in fact mark the significant differences between 
types of speech act, and the ground work for this approach is laid out in an earlier 
article in which twenty-three languages are surveyed and natural distinctions noted. 95 
Sadock's conclusion from this study, and his programmatic proposal, is as follows: 
Acts of speech, I suggest, ordinarily have three separate 
communicative aspects, namely: 
1 an informational, representational aspect 
... 2 an effective, social aspect 
... 3 an affective, emotive aspect. 
96 
He labels these INF, AF and EF, and proceeds to demonstrate how various of 
Austin's insights into the peculiarities of performative utterance work out in this 
schema, as well as providing sample analyses of stating, requesting, promising, 
apologizing, asking, accusing and criticizing. " Each speech act can be primarily any 
one of these three types of act, with aspects of the other dimensions also possibly 
present. In considering any particular speech act, therefore, a key question is: which 
dimension is primary? 
Although Sadock's proposal seems to me to be a helpful one which has the particular 
ment of being built on a broad basis of observed languages, I do not propose to 
follow it in detail in this work, for the simple reason that it effectively requires a 
reorganisation of all the established terminology of speech act theory. However, I do 
propose to accept its demonstration of the point, widely mooted but rarely followed 
through with such rigour, that the different (illocutionary) points of a speech act are 
not mutually exclusive, but rather coexist with one point usually being primary. For 
practical reasons, therefore, I shall retain Searle's scheme of illocutionary points, but 
not some of the standard ways in which it has been used in the literature. Further 
95 Jerold M. Sadock & Arnold M. Zwicky, 'Speech act distinctions in syntax', in Timothy 
Shopen (ed. ), Language Typology and Syntactic Description. Volume I Clause Structure, Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1985,155-96. This article is helpfully reviewed by William Croft, 'Speech act 
classification, language typology and cognition', In Tsohatzidis (ed. ), Foundations of Speech Act 
Theory, 460-77, especially 465-70. 
96 Sadock, 'Toward a grammatically realistic typology', 397. 
97 Sadock, 'Toward a grammatically realistic typology, 40 1. 
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justification for this move will become clear in the discussion of vocabulary markers 
in chapter 3. 
§3.3 Brute and Institutional Facts; Regulative and Constitutive Rules 
One of the basic arguments of Searle's work is that 
the semantic structure of a language may be regarded as a 
conventional realization of a series of sets of underlying 
constitutive rules, and that speech acts are acts characteristically 
performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these sets 
of constitutive rules. " 
Thus we come to his powerful distinction between constitutive and regulative rules: 
some rules regulate a pre-existing activity, e. g. rules of etiquette; while other rules 
actually define the activity which they regulate, e. g what counts as checkmate in 
chess. We may say, therefore, that a constitutive rule 'creates the possibility of new 
forms of behaviourby saying that a certain activity X will (as a result of this rule) 
count as activity Y in a context C, or to use Searle's concise formulation, X counts 
as Y in context C. " 
This distinction in turn enables another one. Searle draws on Elisabeth Anscombe's 
notion of 'brute fact', which comes in essence from the natural sciences and concerns 
facts about physical states of affairs, regardless of what anyone thinks about them. "' 
In contrast to this, Searle proposes the notion of institutional facts, which'are indeed 
facts; but their existence, unlike the existence of brute facts, presupposes the 
existence of certain human institutions' (e. g. marriage, or the rules of baseball). 'O' 
The particular sense of 'Institution' which Searle has in mind here is 'system of 
constitutive rules', and it follows from this that 'the fact that a man performed a 
certain speech act, e. g., made a promise, is an institutional fact. "" 
98 Searle, Speech Acts, 37. 
99 Searle, Speech Acts, 33-35. 
100 G. E. M. Anscombe, 'On Brute Facts, Analysis 18 (1958), 69-72. 
101 Searle, Speech Acts, 51. 
102 Searle, Speech Acts, 52. By'speech acthere Searle means what he later calls 'illocutionary 
act. ' 
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This feature of Searle's account is both powerful and, at times, problematic. It 
underlies his subsequent work on the construction of social reality, and is certainly in 
itself a helpful analytical tool for assessing the extent to which certain facts may be 
'objective' (brute) while others can be subjective and yet not, therefore, devoid of 
criteria of assessment. The significance of this distinction will become apparent in 
later chapters where I shall appeal to it for help in various interpretive issues. 
However, it is fair to say that Searle does not clearly explain why it is that 'X counts 
as Y in context C. We shall have cause to return to this issue more than once. For 
now it suffices to notice that the question devolves quickly on to questions of 
morality, or ethical obligation. For instance Wolterstorff proposes that 'The relation 
[between uttering a sentence and counting it as a speech action] is that speaker and 
audience ought to count it as that- ought to acknowledge it as that in their relations 
with each other... To institute an arrangement for the performance of speech actions 
is to institute a way of acquiring rights and responsibilities. ' 103 
Searle's more recent extended account of institutional facts also allows for rights and 
responsibilities to be conferred by X counting as Y. He speaks of the imposition of 
status functions on humans, and argues that institutional facts create and regulate 
deontic powers: 'The point of having deontic powers is to regulate relations between 
people. In this category, we impose rights, responsibilities, obligations, duties, 
privileges... '. 104 Symbolic powers, honour, and procedural steps towards power are 
also, for Searle, functions of institutional rules. 
Nevertheless, the view that the counting of X as Y is inevitably some bid for power, 
and that X is better seen as Z. is a familiar one, and questions of the criteria for 
counting, or for construal as it may be better termed, shall occupy us in chapter 4. In 
the meantime it is important not to let that discussion obscure the significance of 
Searle's clarification of 'institutional fact. An alternative view of illocutionary acts 
103 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse. Philosophical reflections on the claim that God 
speaks, Cambridge: Carnbndge UP, 1995,84; see also idem, Works and Worlds ofArt, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980,205-11. Recanati's work, discussed below in §5, is also relevant to the 
question of grounds for saying that x is counted as y In any particular case. 
104 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 100. 
19 
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which allows this question to be settled in some, but emphatically not all, cases by 
way of a look at meaning will be considered in §4 below. 
§3.4 The Background 
Searle's idea of the Background has developed through his various writings until it is 
now a full-scale contribution to a theory about the physiology of the human mind. I 
draw on it in particular for its role in explaining speech acts and institutional facts. "' 
The Background first appears as 'a set of background assumptions about the contexts 
in which [a] sentence could be appropriately uttered. "O' This becomes more than just 
a theory about language when Searle goes on to develop a view of meaning as 
derived intentionality: different assumptions behind an utterance give different truth 
conditions for the utterance, and hence the meaning of a sentence is a function of the 
speaker's intentionality. 107 
In Intentionality, and in later works, this develops into a full theory of mind. The 
Background is the unspoken, even unarticulatable, support framework for one's 
mental states. It does not contain mental states itself and is non-representational. The 
Background supports a'Network'of intentional mental states where it does make 
sense to talk of rule following. But as rules are followed, and behaviour learned, so 
the body 'takes over', developing abilities which it did not previously possess. It is 
not the case that skills are a matter of rules being followed unconsciously. Rather, 
says Searle, the body learns an alternative way of achieving those goals for which the 
the rule following was initially designed. For Searle, this is ultimately a matter of 
developing physical capacities along neurological pathways. "' 
105 The major sources in Searle's writings are 'Literal Meaning, now reprinted in Expression 
and Meaning, 117-3 6; 'The Background of Meaning', M Searle, Kiefer and Bierwisch (eds. ), 
Speech-Act Theory and Pragmatics, 221-32; Intentionality, ch. 5 'The Background', 141-59; and 
Construction of Social Reality, ch. 6'Background Abilities and the Explanation of Social Phenomena', 
127-47. 
106 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 117. 
107 Searle, 'The Background of Meaning', in Searle, Kiefer and Bierwisch (eds. ), Speech-Act 
Theory and Pragmatics, 230-3 1. 
108 This account is summansed from Searle, Intentionality, 141-53. 
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In The Construction of Social Reality Searle locates this approach between the two 
more established avenues of rule-governed understandings of intentionality (and 
mind in general) and behaviourism. "' In the former, to speak a language is to engage 
in a highly-complex rule-governed form of behaviour (as Searle's own speech act 
theory has it); in the latter, humans work on a behaviouristic model where 'brute 
physical causation' is the only explanation we have for what takes place. " 0 Neither 
alternative is satisfactory, because although we follow principles which can be 
articulated as rules, we do not do so as rule-following. Thus: 
we should not say that the man who is at home in his society is 
at home because he has mastered the rules of the society, but 
rather that the man has developed a set of capacities and abilities 
that render him at home in the society; and he has developed 
those abilities because those are the rules of his society. "' 
Searle sees that'much of Wittgenstein's later work is about what I call the 
Background', in particular Wittgenstein's attempt to elucidate the necessary 
conditions for meaningful statements in On Certainty. "' Indeed this account tallies 
with our earlier comments about understanding as an ability. For Searle, the 
Background is the essential facilitator of all intentional states: linguistic and 
perceptual interpretation take place against it; consciousness is structured by it; 
certain kinds of readiness are facilitated by it; and certain sorts of behaviour are 
made more or less likely by it. "' The model is clearly a Wittgensteinian one of 
competencies: 'One develops skills and abilities that are, so to speak, functionally 
equivalent to the system of rules, without actually containing any representations or 
internalizations of those rules. "" But in the 'Network', the foregrounded 
intentionalities and rules which we follow, then competency is no longer an adequate 
model. 
109 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 127-47. 
110 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 14 1. 
III Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 147. The label offered by Searle for his position is 
'biological naturalism'; Searle, Mind, Language and Society, 54. 
112 Searle, Construction ofSocial Reality, 132; Searle, Mind, Language and Society, 169. 
113 These are the distinguishing characteristics noted in Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 
132-37. 
114 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 142. 
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Critics have argued that there is insufficient justification for this divide in Searle's 
scheme. "' in the course of a comparison between Searle's theory and Gricean 
pragmatics, Marcelo Dascal claims that 'Those aspects of use that do not readily fit 
the institutional mould, the rule-based treatment, are either left to be handled by a 
complementary theory of use a' la Grice, or else dumped in the ever present 
Background', thus rendering speech act theory incomplete as a theory of use. "' Barry 
Stroud argues that there is a dilemma concerning how to speak of the Background: it 
is non-intentional, but must explain intentional states, and thus there is no language 
left in which to describe it. On the one hand, if we use intentional language, then we 
are talking about something that is not in it, but then if we use non-intentional 
language we appear to be unable to explain the enabling of mental states. "' But for 
Searle the mental and the intentional are not the same, and the distinction is justified 
by his argument about competencies taking over from rules at a certain point. "' 
Pursuing Searle's idea of the Background requires us to revise Searle's pivotal early 
text, 'Speaking a language is engaging in a (highly-complex) rule-governed form of 
behavior', "' to rather saying that speaking a language is engaging in highly complex 
behaviour which can in general be described by rules, and which on occasion is not 
just governed by but constituted by rules. 
With Austin and Searle's work in hand, we are now in a position to offer a general 
overview of the key ideas of speech act theory. In fact, I propose that a helpful point 
of departure for such an overview is provided by just this issue: the question of the 
varying degrees of strength which such a constituting rule for language use might 
possess. 
115 See the earlier criticisms of Searle's views on intentionality, although the argument here is 
less concerned with basing speech act theory on a view of mind. 
116 Marcelo Dascal, 'Speech act theory and Gricean pragmatics. Some differences of detail that 
make a difference', in Tsohatzidis (ed. ), Foundations of Speech Act Theory, 323-334; especially 330, 
333. 
117 This is one of the points raised by Barry Stroud, 'The Background of Thought' in Lepore and 
Van Gulick (eds. ), John Searle and His Critics, 245-5 8. 
Hs Searle, 'Response: The Background of Intentionality and Action', in Lepore and Van Gulick 
(eds. ), John Searle and His Critics, 289-99. Searle addresses here explicitly the extent to which he 
follows Wittgenstem. (292-93) 
119 Searle, Speech Acts, 12. 
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§4 The Key Ideas of Speech Act Theory 
§4.1 Strong and Weak Illocutions 
With the work of Searle, Austin's performative-constative distinction recedes further 
into the background, and all utterances are viewed as illocutionary acts. The 
inevitable question arising is thus whether we have lost the initial significance of the 
idea of an illocutionary act by broadening it out so much that everything is included. 
One might ask: are all illocutionary acts equal, or are some more significant than 
others? Furthermore: what criteria would one have for such a judgment? 
My claim here is that it is helpful to consider illocutionary acts (or forces) in a 
spectrum ranging from strong to weak. In the weak sense we may say that almost 
any utterance is an illocutionary act. However, we shall want to reserve most of our 
attention for 'strong' acts, where the illocutionary force plays a significant role in the 
utterance. Something close to this view is proposed by one of Austin's 'co-workers', 
Geofftey Warnock. "' 
Warnock observes that when Austin proposed his notion ofperformative utterance, 
it referred to the way in which saying something is sometimes to do something, and 
that 'Austin... was not at first thinking particularly, or even at all, of (as one might 
say, Searlean) linguistic aCtS. v121 
Warnock allows that one can change the topic to 'speech acts' (general) by noting 
that there is indeed a sense in which all utterances are performative, but he insists 
that the original delineation of performatives need not be lost by admitting this wider 
class. Performative utterances were originally the cases where to issue them 'is to do 
something, in virtue of conventions to the effect that to say those things counts as, or 
constitutes, doing whatever it may be. "" There is no such convention in the general 
case of speech acts. Warnock's example of a general speech act is of warning you 
120 G. J. Warnock, 'Some Types of Performative Utterance' In Isaiah Berlin et al., Essays on 
Austin, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973,69-89. 
121 Warnock, Terformative Utterance', 70. 
122 Warnock, Terformative Utterance', 7 1. 
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that the train will leave at three, and hence you should eat lunch quickly. There is no 
convention which makes this utterance an act of warning. 
We may thus conclude that 'illocutionary forces... are not in general convention- 
constituted. "" This point allows Warnock to disentangle what he perceives as two 
kinds of special case which occupy Austin: the original 'perfom-lative' sense 
(convention-based) which Austin came to reject on the basis that all utterances are 
performative; and the explicit-performative (e. g. 'I warn you not to come') which has 
at times wrongly been taken as the same special case. Warnock argues that in this 
latter case it is not convention at all, but in fact the meaning of the sentence which 
makes the warning a warning-"' 
We may grant that all linguistic meanings are in a sense conventional, but this is a 
different, weaker use of the word 'conventional' compared to that envisaged by 
Austin for the original performative utterance. Although Warnock does not use this 
terminology, it invites a distinction between strong and weak senses of 'illocutionary 
force'. I wish to make that distinction, and in so doing suggest that illocutionary 
force operates across a spectrum of strengths. This idea will play a central role in 
what follows. It is, I suggest, a refinement which allows us to capture a broad range 
of positions in speech act theory as permissible variations on the spectrum, and, most 
importantly of all, allows us to avoid the problematic tendency to polarise options 
and insist that, if one apparently common-sense position is mistaken, its opposite, 
typically extravagant, position must be right. 
To reiterate, I shall call a strong illocution one which relies on a non-linguistic 
convention. This class, following Warnock, overlaps with but is not identical to 
Austin's explicit performative, and will include the Queen's saying 'I name this 
ship... ' not because it is an explicit performative, although it is, but because the 
conventions in place are not simply linguistic ones. I shall call a weak illocution one 
123 Wamock, 'Performative Utterance', 76. 
124 As indeed does P. F. Strawson, 'Intention and Convention in Speech Acts', Philosophical 
Review, 73 (1964), 439-60, reprinted in Searle (ed. ), Philosophy ofLanguage, 23-38. He argues that 
'there are many cases in which the illocutionary force of an utterance, though not exhausted by its 
meaning, is not owed to any conventions other than those which help to give it meaning. ' (26) 
A 
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where the linguistic meaning itself is the only or only significant convention in view 
'The lamp is on the table' is a weak illocution, as is the explicit 'I state that the lamp 
is on the table. ' Austin's performative-constative distinction is thus retained on one 
level (strong against weak illocutions) while collapsed in Austin's own manner on 
another level (both are illocutions). Two examples of how this idea relates to other 
discussions of speech acts may be briefly considered. 
§4.2 Performative Utterances 
One of the basic confusions which arises in any attempt to articulate a speech act 
theory which draws on both Austin and Searle is that commentators find themselves 
discussing the significance of 'the performative' and illustrate this with reference to 
the illocutionary act. It is fair to say that the relation between the two ideas is a point 
of debate. 
Searle and Vanderveken define aperformative utterance as the utterance of a 
sentence consisting of 'a performative verb used in the first person present tense of 
the indicative mood with an appropriate complement cause. "" For them, Austin's 
examples such as 'I promise to attend the meeting', or 
-in the context of a wedding 
ceremony- 'I do' are indeed performative utterances. J. 0. Urmson, on the other hand, 
urged that performatives should not be classed as speech acts at all, "' since he 
regarded the proper study of speech acts to be the field of enquiry of language use 
alone, and performatives clearly rely on non-linguistic conventions. Either view may 
have its merits, but Warnock's approach seems to provide a middle ground. We note 
that Searle and Vanderveken's solution is to define performative utterances as 
'declarations whose propositional content is that the speaker performs the 
illocutionary act named by the performative verb' and thus as having the 
illocutionary force of a declarative and, derivatively, of whatever the performative 
verb is. 12' This indicates how a strong-weak approach might be taken up, if required, 
into Searle's taxonomical approach. 
125 Searle & Vanderveken, Foundations offflocutionary Logic, 2-3. 
126 J. 0. Urmson, Terformative Utterances', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977), 120-27, 
reprinted in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein (eds), Contemporary Perspectives in 
the Philosophy ofLanguage, Minneapolis, 1979,260-67; here 267. 
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Thus we may still talk of performatives and illocutions. In the former case, we are 
talking about illocutions which are primarily concerned with the performance of 
other illocutions. 'Strong' and 'weak' are more complex categories in this case, but 
they still apply. 121 
§4.3 Illocution Defined 
Jennifer Hornsby uses something like our above account to provide a more focused 
study of illocution, arguing that 'the division between illocutionary and 
perlocutionary marks a distinction between speech acts which are of proprietary 
concern to an account of language and speech acts which are not. "" She follows 
Strawson and Warnock in arguing that Austin thought that convention basically 
served as a covering term to distinguish illocutions, and that as a result of this he 'had 
nothing to say about illocution as such. "" 
Hornsby's basic idea is that an illocutionary act is one which is successfully 
performed regardless of what response it evokes. It can, in this sense, be considered 
independently of any response. The only refinement to this basic idea required to 
make it work is to accept that the act must be performed in a context where it is 
understood. For this she uses the notion of 'reciprocity: 
It seems that the speaker relies only on a certain receptiveness on 
her audience's part for her utterance to work for her as 
illocutionarily meant: the audience takes her to have done what 
she meant to... When reciprocity obtains between people, they are 
such as to recognize one another's speech as it is meant to be 
taken. "' 
127 Searle & Vanderveken, Foundations offflocutionary Logic, 3. 
128 Recanati makes a similar claim, also agreeing with Warnock, but rather than talking of 
strong and weak illocutions he suggests that in the case of performative utterances, the locution 
'stages' the illocution, and that this is precisely the distinction Austin originally had in mind between 
locution and illocution. Recanati, Meaning and Force, 236-66. Note his anticipation of this claim 111 
'Some Remarks on Explicit Performatives, Indirect Speech Acts, Locutionary Meaning and 
Truth-Value', in Searle, Kiefer and Bierwisch (eds. ), Speech-Act Theory and Pragmatics, 205-20. See 
also my own n. 54 above. 
129 Jennifer Hornsby, 'Illocution and its significance' in Tsohatzidis (ed. ), Foundations of 
Speech Act Theory, 187-207; here 189. 
130 Homsby, 'Illocution', 192. This might also explain why Austin's initial example of an 
illocutionary act, 'He urged me to shoot her'(HDTW, 102) is a'weak'one. 
131 Homsby, 'Illocution', 192. 
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Beyond this, an illocutionary act is effective regardless of response. In contrast, 
perlocutionary acts require more than just reciprocity to have their proper 
consequences. 
Hornsby criticises Austin, and Searle and Vanderveken, for their attempt to locate 
the defining characteristics of illocution in convention. As we have seen with 
Warnock, such an attempt is ultimately insufficiently precise. Further, examples such 
as 'He urged her' or 'He warned her' make it clear that the notion of intended effect is 
not in itself a sharp enough tool to distinguish between illocution and perlocution, as 
is reflected in whether we choose to say'She warned him but he never realized the 
danger'or saying'She tried in vain to warn him'. "' 
In terms of our discussion, Hornsby indicates that conventions operate across both 
illocutions and perlocutions, but that the notion of reciprocity underlies the type of 
convention which is invoked when weak illocutions are in view. To put the point the 
other way around: where the non-linguistic conventions are in place (e. g. it is in fact 
the Queen naming the ship and not me), then the further convention required for a 
successful illocution simply is that of reciprocity. 
The significance of her study may be illustrated by her own example. Focusing on 
the social conditions surrounding the speech act leads her to conclude: 'Just as it is 
more or less automatic that an attempt at an illocutionary act is fully successful when 
certain socially defined conditions obtain; so, when certain conditions do not obtain, 
there cannot be a fully successful performance. "" These socially defined conditions 
include the question of whose voices are authorised by any given community in 
terms of what can or cannot be 'heard' by members of that community. Thus, in a 
celebrated case, a man accused of raping a woman who had said 'No' is acquitted 
because, as the judge expressed it, 'it is not just a question of saying no. ' The social 
conditions determine which illocutionary acts may be possible. "' 
§4.4 Summary 
132 Homsby, 'Illocution', 197. 
133 Homsby, 'Illocution', 198. 
134 Homsby, 'Illocution, 199-200. 
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In this section I have argued for an idea of 'illocution' which includes a spectrum 
ranging from strong to weak illocutionary acts depending on the extent to which the 
operative conventions are either non-linguistic or linguistic. A performative 
utterance is a certain kind of 'multiple' illocutionary act, and explicit performatives 
are not the same special case in Austin's original thinking as strong illocutions. An 
illocutionary act is successfully performed regardless of the response it provokes if 
its non-linguistic conventions are in place, and with the single further requirement of 
'reciprocity': mutual understanding of the utterance. 
§5 Further Developments in Speech Act Theory 
In this chapter 1 have developed an account of speech act theory which seeks to 
understand its key ideas and terms in their appropriate contexts, as a necessary 
preliminary to my study of speech act theory and its role in interpretation, and 
specifically biblical interpretation. I have based my account around the major works 
of J. L. Austin and John Searle, which could hardly be called a controversial 
choice. "' However, it is appropriate at least to acknowledge the various other 
prominent strands of thought in speech act theory, as well as offering the briefest of 
overviews of more recent developments. 
The most obvious figure omitted thus far is H. P. Grice, whose articles 'Logic and 
Conversation' and 'Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word Meaning'were 
significant early contributions to the whole topic. "' His emphasis on intention in 
contrast to Searle's emphasis on convention led to a lively debate in the 1960's 
135 1 have not had space to consider the various wholesale critiques of speech act theory, usually 
as part of blanket condemnations of 'ordinary language' concerns. For an excellent introduction to this 
kind of debate see R6e, 'English Philosophy in the Fifties. The angry denunciations of Ernest Gellner, 
Words and Things: a critical account of linguistic philosophy and a study in ideology (with an 
introduction by Bertrand Russell), London: Gollancz, 1959; Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional 
Man: Studies in the Ideology ofAdvanced Industrial Society, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1964,170-99; and Perry Anderson, 'Components of the National Culture', NLR 50 (July-August 
1968), 3-57, especially 21-25 and 43-46, tell us more, it seems to me, about their authors than about 
the philosophy concerned. On the refusal of Ryle to review Gellner's book, and the remarkable fuss it 
created, particularly with Russell, see the suitably deflationary account of Mehta, Fly and the 
Fly-Bottle, 11-21. 
136 H. P. Grice, 'Utterer's Meaning, sentence mearang and word meaning, Foundations of 
Language 4 (1968), 225-42; and reprinted in Searle (ed. ), Philosophy ofLanguage, 54-70; idem, 
'Logic and Conversation', in P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (eds. ), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, Speech . t> 
Acts, New York: Academic Press, 1975,41-58. See next note. 
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which, in my judgment, is now subsumed into the broader frameworks of speech act 
theory described above, as for instance in the recent work of Recanati. Grice's overall 
approach to pragmatics, his 1967 Harvard lectures on'Logic and Conversation' 
which, like HDTW, were given as William James lectures, were not finally published 
until the year after his death, ' 37 but the piecemeal earlier versions of his work have 
been widely followed. His focus on so-called 'conversational implicature' leads to a 
variety of insights concerning the style and structure of discourse, and I shall refer 
briefly to this approach in chapter 3, on speech act theory and texts, where it seems 
most appropriately treated. 
Another fundamental issue which is to some extent prejudged in my presentation is 
the debate between those who, like Searle, see speech act theory as syternatising 
sentence meaning into an overall theory of language use without remainder, 138 and 
those for whom there remains an irreducibly pragmatic element which renders such a 
program impossible. 13' The former emphasis, implicit in much of Searle's work, 
becomes explicit with the developments of it made by Daniel Vanderveken, who 
seeks as the rationale for his own 2-volume work, to 'construct a general formal 
semantics for natural languages capable of characterizing the conditions of success 
as well as the truth conditions of literal utterances. This is necessary in order to 
interpret adequately sentences of any syntactic type (whether declarative or not) 
which express elementary speech acts with any possible force. "" Although 
Vanderveken has provided several helpful studies of particular types of logical 
relation between speakers' commitments and self-involving speech acts, 141 his 
137 Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1989. The articles 
from the above note are included at 117-37 and 22-40 respectively. For helpful overviews of the key 
differences between Grice's approach and that of Austin and Searle, see Dascal, 'Speech act theory 
and Gricean pragmatics; and more generally Anita Avramides, Meaning and Mind An Examination 
of a Gricean Account ofLanguage, Cambridge, Mass & London: MIT Press, 1989. 
138 See, for example, Jerrold J. Katz, Propositional Structure and fllocutionary Force. A Study 
of the Contribution ofSentence Meaning to Speech Acts, New York: Crowell & Sussex: Harvester 
Press, 1977. 
139 At the risk of over-simplification, one may cite here K. Bach & R. M. Harnish, Linguistic 
Communication and Speech Acts, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1979; D. Sperber & D. Wilson, 
Relevance: Communication and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. 
140 Daniel Vanderveken, Meaning and Speech Acts, Vol. 1, Principles ofLanguage Use, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990,2. 
141 In particular his 'Illocutionary Logic and Self-Defeating Speech Acts' in Searle, Kiefer and 
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attempt to extend such formal considerations to the whole of language must be 
considered as a different kind of enterprise with limited interest for those who remain 
unconvinced by his claim that 'there is no important theoretical difference between 
natural and formal languages. '142 Further, despite the different agendas, it remains 
debatable just how far the approach of Vanderveken diverges in practice from the 
more pragmatic concerns of writers like Sperber and Wilson, "' and in the work of 
Frangois Recanati there is something of an attempt to draw together both traditions 
in the interests of finding a way forward for speech act theory. 
Frangois Recanati's Meaning and Force is a major contribution to the subject which 
is especially valuable for its thorough analysis of Austin and Searle's work in the 
light of more pragmatically inclined perspectives. He begins the book with a 
discussion of the difference between semantics and pragmatics, and contrasts his 
own approach with that of Searle, in that he does not see that utterance interpretation 
potentially reduces to sentence interpretation because there is an irreducible 
pragmatic content to meaning. Thus, 'it is impossible to make a sharp separation 
between the meaning of a sentence and the illocutionary force conveyed by an 
utterance of the sentence in a given context. "" Holding a view similar to William 
Alston's well known idea of 'illocutionary act potential', he argues that the meaning 
of an utterance 'includes a "projection" of the utterance's illocutionary force, not the 
force itself, which must be inferred by the hearer on the basis of the supposed 
intentions of the speaker. "" Thus even explicit performatives may be misleading as 
to their illocutionary force, if, for instance, they are insincere. 
Bierwisch (eds. ), Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics, 247-72. 
142 Daniel Vanderveken, Meaning and Speech Acts, Vol. H, Formal Semantics ofSuccess and 
Satisfaction, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991,2. One notes, for instance, that he finds natural 
language inadequate for his purposes, and feels compelled to replace the 'defects' of natural 
expression with'an ideal unambiguous andperspicuous object-language L'; Vanderveken, Meaning 
and Speech Acts, Vol. 1,35-36. In chapter 3, however, I shall draw extensively on his thorough work 
in this volume concerning the illocutionary logic of particular verbs, which again escapes criticisms 
levelled at his insistent formalist agenda. 
143 See the mediating survey of Graham H. Bird, 'Relevance theory and speech acts', in 
Tsohatzidis (ed. ), Foundations of Speech Act Theory, 292-311. 
144 Recanati, Meaning and Force, 14 (and see also 17). 
145 Recanati, Meaning and Force, 25-27; here 27; cf William P. Alston, Philosophy of 
Language, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964,36-39. 
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Recanati also argues, similarly to Warnock, that Austin was mistaken to collapse the 
performative-constative distinction. He notes other ways, in addition to that 
demonstrated by Warnock, in which the distinction may be maintained: for instance 
in terms of demarcation between word to world and world to word directions of 
fit. 146 
Meaning and Force touches on many other issues which I have covered in this 
chapter. I have already discussed his comments about classification of illocutions 
being functional, and noted his argument about double-level illocutions in the case of 
explicit performative utterances: if I say 'I state that the earth is flat', then I assert that 
the earth is flat, but I also record the fact that that is my assertion. This, for Recanati, 
is the heart of what Austin had in mind with his illocutionary/locutionary 
distinction. "' What happens in (Austin's sense of) an illocutionary act is that a 
speaker who performs some locutionary act xpresents himseýf as perfonning the 
illocutionary act x. v 148 In other words an illocutionary act is staged by the locutionary 
act. Recanati concludes that 'one had better look behind the scenes' of this staging for 
a real understanding of the pragmatics of an utterance, which again is his thesis that 
intention must be as much a factor as convention in a full speech act theory. 149 
The publication, in 1994, of a major collection of papers on speech act theory, 
Foundations of Speech Act Theory. Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, 150 
represents the latest major development of new directions in the subject. Several of 
its papers have been referred to in this chapter, and although there are many 
conflicting viewpoints in the book, taken together its contributions indicate both the 
ongoing creative investigations in speech act theory and at the same time the 
pervasive significance of the contributions of Austin and Searle in setting the agenda 
146 Recanati, Meaning and Force, 70-72 (cf 20 n. 9). Recanati's classification of illocutionary 
acts according to direction of fit is at 154-63. He also endorses Warnocles argument, 72-74. 
147 See note 128 above. 
148 Recanati, Meaning and Force, 259. 
149 Recanati, Meaning and Force, 266. He develops an important implication of this main thesis 
in his defence of 'contextualism' in 'Contextualism and anti-contextualism in the philosophy of 
language' in Tsohatzidis (ed. ), Foundations of Speech Act Theory, 15 6-66. 
150 Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed. ), Foundations of Speech Act Theory. Philosophical and Linguistic 
Perspectives, London & New York: Routledge, 1994, running to 500 pages and including 22 papers 
from 21 different authors in three sections: 'Speech Acts and Semantic Theory'; 'Speech Acts and 
Pragmatic Theory', and'Speech Acts and Grammatical Structure. '
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for the subject. "' It has been the intention of this chapter to enable us to have a clear 
view of their work and of the speech act theory which finally emerges from it, in 
order that we may now progress to ask questions about how speech act theory may 
illuminate questions of textual interpretation. 
151 For a full critical review see Edda Weigand, 'The State of the Art *in Speech Act T'heory 
(Review article of Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed. ), Foundations ofSpeech Act Theory. - Philosophical and 
Linguistic Perspectives, London & New York: Routledge, 1994)', Pragmatics & Cognition 4 (1996), 
367-406. Weigand is impatient with the book, and notes the predominance of specifically 
anglo-American concerns to the exclusion of any awareness of German traditions of pragmatics, 
which is fair comment, although perhaps it risks judging the contributors by inappropriate standards. 
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Chapter 3 
Speech Acts and Texts 
It appears to me that literary theorists are at present looking for 
philosophical foundations of their theories. Derrida offered 
something to them, which some literary theorists found attractive, 
while analytic philosophers have hitherto offered very little in this 
respect. Here lies an important challenge to us analytic 
philosophers. ' 
In the preceding chapter we have looked at many issues of criteria in speech act 
theory, surveying the development of different approaches to ten-ninological and 
classificatory issues, with our focus remaining within the broad tradition of analytic 
philosophy. However, when all is said and done, or in this case done by being said, 
one may rightly ask whether a philosophy which concerns itself with acts of speech 
is appropriate to acts performed by texts. Are textual acts the same as, similar to, or 
different from speech acts, and in what ways? In taking up this subject, we enter the 
wider philosophical and literary-critical arena, encountering in particular two of the 
most significant voices to be raised in discussions of speech act theory, those of 
Jacques Derrida and Stanley Fish. 
In his recent theological analysis of philosophical issues in interpretation theory, 
Kevin Vanhoozer distinguishes 'two kinds of "postmodern" thinker: the 
deconstructor or Undoer and the pragmatist or User'. ' He suggests that they 'evince a 
common distrust of modernity's faith in scientific objectivity, reason, and morality': 
,3 they are the 'unbelievers' who 'insist on the non-naturalness of all systems. 
I Dagfin Follesdal, 'Analytic Philosophy: What is it and why should one engage in iff, in 
Hans-Johann Glock (ed. ), The Rise ofAnalytic Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997,1-16; here 14. 
2 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the 
Morality of Literary Knowledge, Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998,38. 
Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text?, 38 and 40 n. 5, also citing Rorty's comment 
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Vanhoozer, as we have seen, appeals to speech act theory in his approach, and in this 
case he attempts to chart a middle way between the undoer and the user. Although 
his concerns lie with a'theology of interpretation' rather than with biblical 
interpretation as such, ' his framework certainly highlights the apparent oddity that it 
should be Derrida and Fish who have had such an impact on the reception of speech 
act theory in literary circles. Sandy Petrey's useful introductory text, Speech Acts and 
Literary Theory, for example, discusses them more than any other authors except 
Austin and Searle. ' 
Furthermore, if one of our long term goals is to harness some of the insights of 
speech act theory for biblical interpretation, then it is worth asking to what extent 
speech act theory has been adopted in broader literary circles. Alternatively, if 
literary critics have tried speech act theory and found it wanting, then what might 
this say to biblical critics? ' 
In this chapter, therefore, I intend to examine what happens when speech act theory 
is brought to bear on the task of reading texts. Derrida's point of entry here is the 
problematical issue of authorial 'presence' in the written case, and the implications of 
this absence for the spoken case. His exchange with Searle is thus an appropriate 
focus for a discussion of the issues raised by speech act theory in relation to texts, 
not least because of its remarkably high profile. After Derrida's challenge, it also 
seems appropriate to turn to that branch of general literary theory which concerns 
itself with speech act theory, and see what in fact has been done and is typically 
claimed. This will raise a variety of questions about so-called 'speech act criticism' 
and the differences between texts in general and 'literary' texts. Since my overall 
interest is actually in biblical texts, this will in turn raise questions of how one may 
assess which biblical texts are likely to be interesting candidates for a speech act 
analysis, which I thus take up as the third section of this chapter. In a concluding 
that 'Pragmatists and Derrideans are, indeed, natural allies. ' 
4 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text?, 9. 
5 Sandy Petrey, Speech Acts and Literary Theory, New York & London: Routledge, 1990. 
Only Shoshana Felman gets comparable coverage. 
61 am indebted to Mary Hesse for pressing this point with me during a consultation on 
'Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation'. 
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section I discuss some applications of speech act theory to biblical studies in the light 
of the criteria developed thus far. In the meantime, the appeal to Fish raises issues of 
the nature of texts themselves, and what kind of activity reading a text might be. I 
will attempt to bring some speech act insights to bear on this in chapter 4. 
§1 Speech and Writing: Derrida's Challenge 
Text, Speech and Agency 
'Text has become the terminological football of recent criticism', writes Valentine 
Cunningham, noting that pre-occupation with textuality and the nature of texts has 
dominated recent critical discussion. ' In theological circles, Werner Jeanrond has 
appealed to the need for a theory of text in developing any kind of theological 
hermeneutic. In this he hopes to escape from over-concentration on the verse or 
sentence as an out-of-context foundation for dogmatism, as well as make sense of 
what it could mean for Christian faith to be based on the textual phenomenon of the 
Bible! He notes approvingly that Austin and Searle's work in pragmatics highlights 
'the important role played by the communicative situation for the constitution of 
meaning and its transparency. 9 
Jeanrond's comments highlight the issue of agency: text as communication 
presupposes an agent of communication, even if literary theory has repeatedly and 
successfully underlined the role of the readers of a text in regulating and/or, to 
whatever extent, constituting its significant features. Indeed, theories of textuality 
today span a wide range, from pre-critical views of the given-ness of the text as 
'other' through to more post-modem (constructivist) views. The former invite a 
subject-object conceptualisation of the interpretive process. " The latter lend 
7 Valentine Cunningham, In the Reading Gaol. Postmodernity, texts, and history, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1994,4. 
8 Werner G. Jeanrond, Text and Interpretation as Categories of Theological Thinking, Dublmi: 
Gill & Macmillan, 1988 (1986), 73-75. 
9 Jeanrond, Text and Interpretation, 76. 
10 Most famously E. D. Hirsch jr., Validity in Interpretation, New Haven & London: Yale UP, 
1967, although see now the considerable nuancing of his position in idem, 'Meaning and Significance 
Reinterpreted', Critical Inquiry II (1984), 202-25; and his rejection of formalism, written in the 
context of literacy education but with implications for his interpretive theory, in idem, 'Reading, 
Writing, and Cultural Literacy', in Winifred Bryan Homer (ed. ), Composition and Literature. 
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themselves to more or less radical forms of contextual relativism, as adopted in the 
proliferation of reader response theories developed in literary theory. " 
The notion that reader and text interact in the interpretive process is an influential 
one which, once free from a pre-critical view of textual otherness and objectivity, 
appears to be something of a common sense position. The question before us, then, is 
whether the criteria of speech act theory, which has its focus on communicative 
action between a speaker and a hearer, can be used in the case of communicative acts 
embodied in texts which pass from writer to reader. The locus of this discussion is 
widely acknowledged as being the so-called 'Derrida-Searle' debate, to which we 
now turn. 
§1.1 Derrida on Austin: 'Signature Event Context I 
At a 1971 conference Derrida gave a paper in which, in the course of reflecting on 
the nature of writing and its possible communicative dimensions, he drew on the 
work of Austin. " Translated into English in 1977, it came to the attention of Searle, 
who wrote a brief response concerning its use of Austin's ideas. " This in turn 
engendered a lengthy reply from Derrida, " later republished together with a 
substantial additional 'afterword. " Much discussed and heavily analysed, this 
remarkable debate briefly thrust speech act theory centre stage in wider critical 
Bridging the Gap, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1983,141-47. 
11 For an incisive survey see Jane P. Tompkins, 'An Introduction to Reader-Response 
Criticism', in idem (ed. ), Reader-Response Criticism. From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, 
Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1980, ix-xxvi; as well as the various essays collected M the 
book. 
12 Published as Jacques Derrida, 'signature 6v6nement contexte', in Jacques Derrida, Marges de 
la philosophie, Pans: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972,365-93. 
13 John R. Searle, 'Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida', Glyph 1 (1977), 198-208; 
responding to the translated article Jacques Derrida, 'Signature Event Context', Glyph 1 (1977), 
172-97. 
14 Jacques Derrida, 'Limited Inc abc Glyph 2 (1977), 162-254. 
15 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (ed. Gerald Graff), Evanston, II: Northwestern University 
Press, 198 8, including Derrida's 'Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion', 111-60. Page references 
to Derrida's first two articles are given from this reprint, 1-23 and 29-110 respectively. Searle's article 
is surnmarised (25-27) but I shall refer to its full version in Glyph. 
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circles. Derrida has not followed it up apart from his 'afterword'; while Searle's 
subsequent contributions have been trenchant and piecemeal. " 
Derrida's basic theme in'Signature Event Context'is communication and its various 
senses, most generally: 'are the conditions [les requisits] of a context ever absolutely 
determinable? 
... 
Is there a rigorous and scientific concept of context? "' In the first 
half of the article, 'Writing and Telecommunication', Derrida begins by pursuing the 
implications of the absence of a fully determined communicative context in the case 
of writing. He develops the key notion of 'iterability: 'A writing that is not 
structurally readable 
-iterable- beyond the death of the addressee would not be 
writing. ' (7) One of the consequences of this distancing of writing from 
communicative (spoken) context is 'the disqualification or the limiting of the concept 
of context, whether "real" or "linguistic", inasmuch as its rigorous theoretical 
determination as well as its empirical saturation is rendered impossible or 
insufficient by writing. ' (9) 
However, in typical Derridean fashion, the characteristics which thus mark off 
writing as an etiolated form of speech are now shown to inhere in the very nature of 
all language. In particular, written signs 'subsist' beyond their moment of inscription; 
they are 'ruptured' from their originating context; and they emerge as themselves in 
their 'spacing' both from other signs and from other attempts to fix their present 
reference. Subsistence, rupture and spacing, to paraphrase baldly, delineate the 
iterability which makes a mark a mark, in whatever code or system it operates. 
Derrida insists on this 'possibility of disengagement and citational graft which 
belongs to the structure of every mark, spoken or written, and which constitutes 
every mark in writing before and outside of every horizon of sernio-linguistic 
communication. ' (12) 
Thus far this is Derrida's oft-noted concern with the 'deconstructive' possibilities 
inherent in language, and in particular his desire to overturn an established hierarchy 
16 See John R. Searle, 'The World Turned Upside Down [A review of Jonathan Culler's On 
Deconstruction]', New York Review ofBooks 30.16 (Oct 1983), 74-79; idem, 'Literary Theory and Its 
Discontents', NLH 25 (1994), 637-67. 
17 Derrida, Limited Inc, 2-3. Further page references are in the text. 
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which structures, in this case, speech and writing. The particular interest of the 
article, and the cause of its subsequent high profile, is that in the second section of it 
he turns to Austin's HD TW and proceeds to examine Austin's 
performative-constative distinction as an attempt to order language by way of 
supplying 'total contexts'within which, and only within which, speech acts may be 
understood. (13-19) Austin's category of 'performative', he suggests, which seems to 
promise so much, ultimately fails to secure its own domain because the whole 
opposition of performative-constative presupposes the availability of the kind of 
saturated context which Derrida has considered earlier: 
Austin has not taken account of what 
-in the structure of locution (thus before any illocutory or perlocutory determination)- already 
entails that system of predicates I call graphematic in general and 
consequently blurs [brouille] all the oppositions which follow, 
oppositions whose pertinence, purity, and rigor Austin has 
unsuccessfully attempted to establish. (14) 
The 'total context', be it in the form of consciousness, or the 'conscious presence of 
speakers', 'implies teleologically that no residue [reste] escapes the present 
totalization. ' (14) Austin acknowledges all the various possible infelicities of the 
performative, but immediately excludes them in the name of ideal regulation. (15)" 
On Derrida's reading, this is 'all the more curious': Austin has come so close to 
seeing the untenability of such idealised regulation, and has lapsed back into it at the 
last minute. Stage-utterances were excluded by Austin as parasitic upon the serious 
use of language. For Derrida, this is the problem of philosophical privileging in a 
nutshell: the quality of 'risk' admitted by (and then banished by) Austin is not a 
surrounding problem which careful usage can avoid, but rather it is 'its internal and 
positive condition of possibility'. Derrida's conclusion on Austin is therefore as 
follows: 
For, ultimately, isn't it true that what Austin excludes as anomaly, 
exception, "non-serious, " citation (on stage, in a poem, or a 
soliloquy) is the determined modification of a general 
citationality 
-or rather, a general iterability- without which there 
would not even be a "successful" performative? So that 
-a 
paradoxical but unavoidable conclusion- a successful 
performative is necessarily an "Impure" performative. (17) 
is This is a key passage, referring to the second lecture of Austin, HDTW, particularly 20-24. 
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In other words, Austin notes the obvious cases (the 'determined modification') but 
fails to note the 'general citationality' which underlies it, and which would thus, by 
implication, be equally banished if Austin's exclusion clauses are allowed. Derrida's 
preferred name for this 'general citationality' is iterability (18), and it is iterability 
which is presupposed by any successful performative such as 'I open the meeting': 
the performative works because it conforms to an iterable model. He allows for 
successful performatives (indeed he claims to account for them) and even for relative 
degrees of their 'purity'. Even these most 'event-ridden' of utterances fall short of 
saturated context: diffýrance prevails, and in so doing makes communication 
possible. (19) 
Derrida concludes with a brief discussion of the signature, an example noted by 
Austin in passing as a way of countering the absence of the author of a written text as 
against the presence of a speaker. Signatures too, says Derrida, only fanction because 
of their iterability. He closes with a printed signature, challenging the assumed idea 
that he was, at some point, present himself to write it, and underlining its iterable 
nature. 
'Signature Event Context' is perhaps one of the clearest examples of Derrida's 
philosophical approach. His discussion of iterability sets out the framework within 
which deconstruction attains purchase. Writing is not simply a distant form of 
speech, and neither are the possible demarcations between serious and non-serious 
speech sufficiently unambiguous to allow the certainty of successful communication. 
Austin's appearance in this post-structuralist landscape is, in one sense at least, more 
as an example of a philosopher close to unmasking, but still ultimately inattentive to, 
diffýrance, rather than as a support or foil. Derrida characterises Austin's HDTW as 
patient, open, aporetical 
, 
in constant transformation, often more fruitful in the 
acknowledgment of its impasses than in its positions' (14); and in his subsequent 
rejoinder also remarks: 'I consider myself to be in many respects quite close to 
Austin, both interested in and indebted to his problematic. "' Nevertheless, Derrida's 
goal in the article is neither to mimic the performative-constative synthesis of Austin 
nor to exegete Austin, but rather to show that despite Austin's best efforts, he failed 
19 Derrida, Limited Inc, 38. 
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to grasp the 'graphematic' requirement of iterability which grounds all successful 
performatives. A blurring of these distinctions characterises the subsequent debate. I 
shall suggest that one need not agree with Derrida's argument in order to evaluate the 
extent to which he is or is not right about Austin. 
§1.2 The Searle-Derrida Exchange 
What then is one to make of Searle's 'reply'9 Of his three contributions to this 
would-be correspondence it is I think by far the weakest, and for all that one may 
agree with his frustration about the role played by Austin in Derrida's article, it is 
hard not to sympathise with Derrida's subsequent comment about it as 'something 
identifying itself so much with Austin that it can only read Sec feverishly, unable to 
support the fact that questions might be posed serenely concerning the limits or the 
presuppositions of Austin's theory. 20 1 Reiterating the Differences' makes several 
valid points about such issues as the role of intentionality in speech acts, and the 
nature of iterability. Where it fails is in its attempt to describe and sustain a clear 
dividing line between Derrida on the one hand and Searle and Austin on the other. 
Such a demarcation is immediately complicated by Searle's own self-distancing from 
Austin, 2' but is most completely destroyed by his unusual predilection for making 
precisely the point Derrida has in mind while presenting it as a disagreement with 
Derrida. 
Firstly, evidence for such a claim should be presented, and is done so at somewhat 
inordinate length by Derrida himself in his reply. " One example must suffice: Searle 
looks at the criteria for distinguishing writing from speaking, and notes that neither 
iterability nor absence will do. This is done 'in order to get at what is wrong with 
these [Derrida's] arguments. ' Of course, that neither iterability nor absence will 
20 Derrida, Limited Inc, 42. 'Sec' is Derrida's favoured abbreviation for 'Signature Event 
Context'. 
21 Searle, 'Reiterating the Differences', 204 and n. 3. 
22 Derrida, 'Limited Inc abc Derrida famously cites almost the whole of Searle's reply In 
this article, a typical example of his energetic attempt to disrupt the confidence of Searle's views on 
citation, iterability and intention. With style and substance so patently inseparable, any summary of 
'Limited Inc abc 
... 
'must necessarily be inadequate, even the unusually lengthy summary provided by 
erstwhile Derrida translator Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Revolutions that as yet have no model: 
Derrida's Limited Inc', Diacritics 10.4 (1980), 29-49. 
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demarcate writing from speaking is just one aspect of Derrida's whole point. Searle's 
conclusion: it is permanence which will do the distinguishing work, and he charges 
Derrida with confusing permanence and iterability. However, one cannot doubt that 
the work Searle intends 'permanent' to do is not the same as the work envisaged by 
Derrida with'iterable'. For one it is the on-going availability of a token of a 
communicative type, which in itself is not (as Searle would agree) a particularly 
interesting metaphysical claim. For the other, it is the irreducible immersion of any 
token in the interconnecting play of presence and absence; of trace and supplement, 
in short of diffýrance, without which communication could not even get started. The 
conclusion: Searle's discussion of permanence is not what is at issue in'Signature 
Event Context', and it is hard therefore to take it as a pointed objection to Derrida's 
article. " 
Secondly, I judge that Searle does not indeed read Derrida's text closely. His 
discussion of Derrida's remarks on agrammaticality, for all that Derrida typically 
outruns patient definition here, are simply mistaken. " Searle mistakenly talks of 
lungrammaticality' and (untypically) misreads Derrida's 'signifie' as 'means, and ends 
up highlighting clear nonsense, but alas not any nonsense drawn from 'Signature 
Event Context. ' 
It would take too long to discuss the debate in detail, and not least to examine its 
potentially more interesting development into the wider field of the ethics of 
discussion, which grows out of the reflections of both Searle and Derrida on the 
'tone' (for want of a better word) which it exhibits, as characterised in its various 
examples of uncharitable reading or obfuscation. " Searle should not be above 
23 For Derrida's discussion of this very point, see Limited Inc, 50-54. 
24 Searle, 'Reiterating the Differences', 203; discussing Derrida, Limited Inc, 12. 
25 This develops particularly in Searle, 'The World Turned Upside Down' where, in his 
aggrieved analysis of Derrida's style, he betrays a somewhat brutal dismissiveness himself; taken up 
in detail by Derrida, 'Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion. ' Certainly the debate has focused a 
dispute about the logical standards inherent in Derrida's work. His 'Afterword' is one of his clearest 
protestations of the need for logical rigour in one's deconstructive claims, see e. g. Limited Inc, 
114-3 1. Christopher Norris repeatedly uses Derrida's various contributions to Limited Inc to defend 
just such a thesis concerning deconstruction: Christopher Norris, Deconstruction. Theory and 
Practice, London: RKP, '1991 (1982), 143-58; idem, 'Lin-iited Think: how not to read Derrida', in 
idem, What's Wrong with Postmodernism. Critical Theory and the Ends ofPhilosophy, New York & 
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990,134-63. 
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criticism for his attempt to pass off speech act theory as unproblematic and 
implacably opposed to 'Signature Event Context', most notably in his urbane 
reference to 'a detailed answer to the question' of the status of parasitic (in this case 
fictional) discourse from a speech act perspective, wherein he notes his own 'The 
Logical Status of Fictional Discourse'which itself concludes with the disclaimer that 
'there is as yet no general theory of the mechanisms by which such serious 
illocutionary intentions are conveyed by pretended illocutions. "' Derrida is right to 
point this out, for all that he does so in the most extraordinary way. " On the other 
hand, although in general Derrida substantiates his claim that he has been misread, 
there are occasions when this comes extremely close to special pleading. " There is a 
considerable literature discussing these and various other aspects of the debate. " 
However, the particular issue which I suggest all this raises for our own concerns is 
less to do with the relative merits of the Derrida-Searle exchange, and more 
concerned with the way in which either side of the exchange does or does not 
contribute to the possibility of using speech act theory in the context of addressing 
written texts. 
26 Searle, 'Reiterating the Differences', 205 and 208 n. 4; referring to his 'The Logical Status of 
Fictional Discourse', NLH 6 (1975), 319-32, reprinted in John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning. 
Studies in the Theory ofSpeech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979,58-75; here 75. 
27 Derrida, Limited Inc, 94-96. 
28 This rn1ght lead us into the vexed territory of why Derrida feels so persistently misread, and 
whether he may in some sense be responsible for this. This is part of the subject matter of the 'ethics' 
debate (see n. 25 above, and in particular Limited Inc, 146). 1 must content myself here with the 
observation that, for example, Limited Inc, section Y, 60-77, appears to take Searle's disagreement 
with 'Signature Event Context' (or perhaps better, its grammatological project) as evidence of 
misreading; or that when Derrida clarifies his comments about Austin one can both see what he 
means but also why he was misunderstood (e. g. on whether he said that Austin thought parasitic 
discourse was not part of ordinary language: 'the parasite is part of so-called ordinary language, and it 
is part of it as parasite', Limited Inc, 97). 
29 In addition to Norris and Spivak, mentioned above, see Jonathan Culler, 'Meaning and 
Iterability', in idem, On Deconstruction. Theory and Criticism after Structuralism, London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1983,110-34; the works of Stanley Cavell noted below; and Petrey, Speech Acts and 
Literary Theory, 131-46. Stanley Fish, 'With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on Austin 
and Demda', Critical Inquiry 8 (1982), 693-72 1, reprinted in Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes 
Naturally. Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989,37-67, is a most remarkable tour deforce which reduces both Derrida and 
Austin to mimicking the standard Fishian complaint that there is no such thing as transcontextual 
criteria because interpretive conventions are always revisable and local; while Gordon C. F. Beam, 
'Derrida Dry: Iterating Iterability Analytically', Diacritics 25.3 (1995), 3-25, is helpful on the outline 
of the debate, but pursues the unique thesis that Derrida's view is that 'no linguistic corrimunication is 
ever successful. ' (3) 
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§1.3 Consequences of the Derrida-Searle Debate 
The major point to make here is one that follows from the above discussion about the 
blurring of the boundary lines between Derrida on the one hand and Austin and 
Searle on the other. Commentators like to polarise this issue: either Derrida is a 
misreader and Searle vindicates Austin, or Searle is the villain of the piece and 
Derrida is the speech act prodigal now revealed as Austin's true heir. " However, this 
seems to be yet another case where a predilection for mapping out positions distorts 
the very issues at stake. 
Stanley Cavell's discussion of the issue suggests various significant ways in which 
Derrida misreads Austin, or at least too quickly assimilates Austin's voice to his own, 
but at the same time he clearly does not portray Austin as simply a pale precursor of 
Searle's later philosophy. " In particular, Cavell addresses the central issue noted 
above about the status of Austin's 'exclusions': are they the metaphysical stumbling 
block which Derrida uncovers or the methodological reasonableness which Searle 
champions? Neither, says Cavell, for they are in fact references made by Austin to 
work published elsewhere on 'etiolations' (excuses) and 'pretending'. 32 Derrida, 
always one to suggest that critics should'read a little further', falls foul of this advice 
with respect to Austin; Cavell's surmise here perhaps vindicated by Derrida's 
comments on Austin'sThree Ways of Spilling Ink'which in many ways does 
support DeMda's approach to various issues of classification, but which was clearly 
33 
not known to Derrida when he wrote about Austin. The significance of this is not to 
discuss who had read what, but to lay the foundation for Cavell's main claim, that 
Derrida did not let Austin's distinctive philosophical voice (or'pitch') set its own 
30 Something of this latter perspective marks out the contributions of Fish, Beam and Petrey 
(see above note). Petrey's opposing of Austin and Searle is a ma or theme of his book, with relevance 
to the literary concerns discussed later in this chapter. 
31 Stanley Cavell, Philosophical Passages. 
- 
Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida, 
Cambridge, Mass & Oxford: Blackwell, 1995,42-90; idem, A Pitch ofPhilosophy. Autobiographical 
Exercises, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1994,53-127. These are parallel treatments. I cite from the 
first only. 
32 Cavell, Philosophical Passages, 52. The references are to works now gathered in J. L. 
Austin, Philosophical Papers, edited by J-0. Urmson & G. J. Warnock, Oxford: Oxford UP, 3 1979 
(1961). 
33 Cf Demda, Limited Inc, 109, n. 3. 
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agenda. Derrida comes so close to an appreciation of Austin, with his focus on the 
importance of signature, and the claim of the human voice. However, for Derrida, 
'even Austin succumbs to the lure of voice': 
That Derrida finds this claim [of the voice] to be something that 
pushes Austin back into the crowd of philosophers, ancient and 
modem, in his view of the economy of voice and writing, seems 
to me not to do Austin's originality justice. " 
Rather, in Cavell's view, Austin's opening discussion of Hippolytus, where he 
inveighs against the inward survey of 'the invisible depths of ethical space', indicates 
that Austin is very much aware of the dangers of metaphysical abstraction. Cavell's 
discussion of the Hippolytus passage" draws out the significance of this all too brief 
Austinian flourish, which I had cause to suggest in chapter 2 above sits uneasily with 
many Searle-like suggestions about the links between speech acts and intentional 
states. Here Cavell brings it to bear on the distinct sense in which Austin's aversion 
to metaphysics both separates him from the standard tradition in Derrida's sights, and 
also makes him very different from Derrida: 
I say that if Derrida had noticed the business about Hippolytus, it 
would have been harder for him to continue to insinuate that if, or 
when, we crave such a tie [to a metaphysically independent 
world], Austin would wish to satisfy that craving. 
... 
Derrida 
... 
takes metaphysics to have institutional and linguistic bases which 
cannot vanish at the touch of the ordinary; on the contrary, it is 
bound to swamp the ordinary, to take it under its own protection, 
or interpretation. Whereas for Austin, metaphysics is from its 
origin, from each individual current origin of itself, unnecessary, 
monitorable, correctible. " 
If this is correct, and Cavell's contribution seems to me to be uniquely well placed in 
separating three voices in the debate rather than two, then the question of the 
'consequences' of the Derrida-Searle debate for the applicability of speech act 
categories to written texts can no longer be framed in terms of whether Derrida's 
criticisms of Searle are successful. The vindication of either Derrida or Searle would, 
in neither case, prejudge the Austinian concepts of speech act theory. 
34 Cavell, Philosophical Passages, 73. 
35 Cavell, Philosophical Passages, 55-63. 
36 Cavell, Philosophical Passages, 75. 
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To be more specific, one practical result of the debate has been a certain re-emphas's 
on Searle's part of the necessary vagueness of various distinctions. His criticism of 
Derrida's philosophy as 'pre-Wittgensteinian, with the concomitant claim that he, 
Searle, takes the later works of Wittgensteinfor granted in everything he writes (his 
emphasis), reflects on one-level the bizarre on-going nature of the debate with its 
propensity for each writer to claim that they got there first while studiously opposing 
the other, but more significantly it brings out more clearly than has perhaps always 
been the case that Searle's taxonomic categories and'logic of illocutionary acts' 
reserves its clarity and precision for the purposes of accurately labelling vague 
concepts, and not for redefining all concepts into precise ones. " Despite the 
endeavours of the participants, the debate appears to have brought into common 
focus a helpful point here. " 
By way of conclusion, therefore, we may say that Derrida's analysis of Austin does 
not demonstrate that a theory of performative utterances and speech acts must 
ultimately be consigned to a tradition of presupposed metaphysical presence. The 
deconstructive possibilities of language sit alongside both written and spoken 
utterances, and neither in Derrida's critique nor in Searle's reply is there a 
fundamental difference between the two which must leave speech act categories in 
place for one but not the other. In terms of metaphysical commitment, Austin offers 
a third alternative beyond Derrida. or Searle, and thus speech act theory per se can be 
seen to refuse reduction to either so-called 'logocentrism' or to deconstruction as its 
essential nature. 
This discussion in itself could doubtless lead to many fruitful metaphysical 
developments, but it is debatable whether these must be settled prior to the process of 
39 
interpreting any particular text. My concerns here thus remain with specific 
37 See Searle, 'Literary Theory and its Discontents', 663-64 on Derrida as pre-Wittgensteinian; 
and 637-39 on clear and fuzzy concepts. See also Searle, 'The World Turned Upside Down', 78: 'it is 
a condition of the adequacy of a precise theory of an indeterminate phenomenon that it should 
precisely characterize that phenomenon as indeterminate. '
This is also the view of Petrey, Speech Acts and Literary Theory, 145, who provides other 
similar examples. 
39 Nicholas Wolterstorff, for one, debates it: 'I have not argued against the practice of Derrida's 
alternative. 
... 
There are a few texts, and passages III a fair number of texts, which call for exactly 
Derrida's style of interpretation. One doesn't have to repudiate ontotheology to say that. ' (Nicholas 
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questions of the applicability of speech act categories to written texts, and I have 
tried to deal with this question by way of a discussion of Derrida because of his 
pre-eminence in bringing into question the speech-writing hierarchy, and in 
particular his appeal to Austin in this very case. 40 In so doing I have attempted to 
grant many of the points Derrida makes without declaring my hand on 
deconstruction itself, which it seems to me need not be an issue forced upon a speech 
act theorist. Despite Petrey's claim that'there's no compelling reason why speech-act 
theory can't integrate basic deconstructive principles', 41 1 suggest that this is a path 
that need not be followed by those for whom an Austinian approach suffices, 42 and I 
also propose that this discussion has shown that one may continue to use Searle's 
work and thereby make use of an assumed post-Wittgensteinian framework 
sympathetic to Austin, which must, I submit, judge those comments of Searle and 
others which might reasonably be taken in other ways. In other words: Derrida! s 
voice of caution serves as a constant reminder that systematic elaborations of speech 
act theory do not and cannot entirely leave behind them the precise vagueness of 
Austin's work. 
§2 Speech Acts and Literary Theory 
If speech act theory can apply to texts, the next step is to ask what has happened 
when this has been done. What have literary critics made of speech act theory. It is 
not my intention here to provide a full review of this topic, " which would take us far 
Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse. Philosophical reflections on the claim that God speaks, Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1995,169; see his generous but circumspect appraisal of Derrida from the vantage 
point of a speech act approach to interpretation on 153-70). For a helpful argument that Derrida's 
metaphysics should not be taken to lead inevitably to a 'negative theology' see Rowan Williams, 
'Hegel and the gods of postmodernity', in Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick (eds. ), Shadow of 
Spirit. Postmodernism and Religion, London and New York: Routledge, 1992,72-80. 
40 1 am aware too that some attempts to incorporate speech act theory into theological concerns 
are rebuffed with a kind of 'but Derrida proved it couldn't be done' review, which I hope hereby to 
have rendered unsatisfactory. For a recent example see H. S. Pyper, review of Vanhoozer, Is There a 
Meaning in this Text?; in Lester L. Grabbe (ed. ), Societyfor Old Testament Study Book List 1999, 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999,119-20. Less specific but with a similar view is Stephen 
E. Fowl, review of Francis Watson, Text and Truth. Redefining Biblical Theology, Edinburgh: T. &T. 
Clark, 1997, in MTh 15 (1999), 94-96, especially 95. 
41 Petrey, Speech Acts and Literary Theory, 142. 
42 Wolterstorff s discussion (n. 39 above) reaches the same conclusion. 
43 For just such an overview see Petrey, Speech Acts and Literary Theory. 
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afield into debates concerning philosophical and other theoretical criteria for 
literanness. " Instead my goal is to determine whether a speech act approach to texts 
should result in some form or other of 'speech act criticism'. I shall argue that it 
should not. For this purpose I choose one particularly well known exposition of the 
possibilities of a speech act approach to a text, from the early work of Stanley Fish, 
and then discuss some of the issues this raises both in terms of its place within Fish's 
kind of rhetorical 'reader-response' theory, and of the relevance or otherwise of the 
'literanness' of the text in question. 
§2.1 Fish and Speech Act Criticism 
Fish provides one of the clearest examples of how to use speech act theory in literary 
criticism in a 1976 article entitled'How to do Things with Austin and Searle. "' Here 
he analyses Shakespeare's Coriolanus with a focus on how the title character is 
required by the conventions of the day to ask the citizens for the right to be named 
consul. The tribunes Brutus and Sicinius predict, accurately, as it turns out, that in 
the very performance of this (speech) act Coriolanus will undermine it in such a way 
that he falls to be elected. Following Austin and Searle, Fish observes: 
Simply by paying attention to the hero's illocutionary behaviour 
and then referring to the full dress accounts of the acts he 
performs, it is possible to produce a speech act "reading" of the 
play 
... 
To the extent that this reading is satisfying, it is because 
Coriolanus is a speech-act play. That is to say, it is about what 
the theory is "about". " 
One example may serve to illustrate that Fish does indeed accomplish what he 
describes in this summary. Coriolanus believes that he deserves to be made consul 
because of his own merit, not because he should need to ask for it. To ask is to accept 
a form of dependence on those less worthy than himself. Indeed Brutus and Sicinius 
44 See §2.3 below. For a survey of issues raised in this area see further Peter Lamarque and 
Stem Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature. - A Philosophical Perspective, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1994. In particular they are concerned to demarcate fiction and literature, while 
acknowledging a considerable overlap of relevant philosophical questions (e. g. 268-88). 
45 Stanley Fish, 'How to do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech-Act Theory and Literary 
Criticism', MLN 91 (1976), 983-1025; page references from its reprint in Stanley Fish, Is There A 
Text in This Class? The Authority ofInterpretive Communities, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1980, 
197-245. 
46 Fish, 'How to do Things with Austin and Searle', 220-2 1. 
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have heard him say more or less this: that he will not 'lower' himself to ask anything 
of the people who, according to tradition, he must ask in order to be chosen. Their 
strategy is thus to let Coriolanus go ahead and ask the people to choose him, 
predicting that in the perfon-nance of this speech act he will make it void. 
Fish points out that, according to Searle's analysis of the act of requesting, one of the 
preparatory conditions is that the speaker believes that the hearer is able to do the act 
requested. " But Coriolanus has only contempt for his hearers, not at all believing 
that they are capable of choosing him. Neither does he particularly want them to do 
so (the sincerity condition) and in particular, because he believes that he deserves the 
consulship, he assumes that the hearers will do the requested action of their own 
accord without his asking (thus failing in terms of the other preparatory condition 
listed by Searle). " The conclusion of the citizens, as 'they open their copy of Speech 
Acts and begin to analyze the infelicities of his performance', is that 'he did not ask, 
but mock' (Act II, scene iii, lines 163-68). " 
Fish's own view of why his analysis works so well forms the conclusion to his 
article, and bears quoting in full: 
Speech-act theory is an account of the conditions of intelligibility, 
of what it means to mean in a connnunity, of the procedures 
which must be instituted before one can even be said to be 
understood. In a great many texts those conditions and procedures 
are presupposed; they are not put before us for consideration, and 
the emphasis falls on what happens or can happen after they have 
been met and invoked. It follows that while a speech-act analysis 
of such texts will always be possible, it will also be trivial (a mere 
list of the occurrence or distribution of kinds of acts), because 
while it is the conditions of intelligibility that make all texts 
possible, not all texts are about those conditions. 'O 
In short: the analysis works because the play is about what speech act theory is 
about. It is significant here to note that when talking in these ternis Fish is working 
47 See John R. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy ofLanguage, Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1969,66, for a schematic analysis of requesting. 
48 Fish, 'How to do Things with Austin and Searle', 20 1, listing Searle's conditions; with his 
analysis at 200-1 and 212. 
49 Fish, 'How to do Things with Austin and Searle', 212. 
50 Fish, 'How to do Things with Austin and Searle', 245. 
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with what I have called a'strong' idea of speech acts. He is concerned with 
illocutions whose successful functioning is at issue in the narrative itself Where this 
strong criteria is lost, applications of speech act theory to literature may be little 
more than mundane. One further clarification: the point his analysis actually makes 
is that speech act theory will only shed light on (strong) speech acts and their 
workings. This is a little more broad than a text's being about'the conditions of 
intelligibility that make all texts possible', but it is certainly still very much restricted 
to texts which concern themselves in some sense with the workings of strong speech 
acts. In later chapters I shall adopt precisely this criterion for selecting biblical texts 
for speech act analysis, and in §3 below I shall discuss the practical question of how 
such texts may be located. 
§2.2 Speech Act Theory as Literary Criticism 
The article of Fish discussed above has not, it must be said, been widely followed. It 
represents a minority opinion within the literary critical world, and indeed it has not 
been followed by Fish, whose personal pilgrimage 'down the anti-fon-nalist road' 
requires that we label this piece as 'early Fish'. " What I have suggested will work as 
a prime criteria for speech act analysis of a written text is later called 'a large mistake' 
by Fish himself, who no longer believes that any text is (independently) about 
anything, but rather that certain interpretive conventions render certain interpretive 
categories applicable. 52 1 shall return to this issue in chapter 4. If we bracket for the 
moment the so-called 'neopragmatism' of Fish's later work, the more pressing 
question is why literary critics have tended to opt for the view that texts about 
(strong) speech acts are not necessary for the successful deployment of what we 
might call 'speech act criticism'. 
Petrey suggests that Fish, and one or two others who have advocated a siMilar line of 
araument simply cannot believe that a method which yields such results but has 4: ý 9 so 
51 See Stanley Fish, 'Introduction: Going Down the Anti-formalist Road', in his Doing What 
Comes Naturally. Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989,1-33. 
52 The essays collected in Is There a Text in this Class? are each prefaced by revisionary 
comments reflecting the later change. In this case see Fish, Is There a Text in this Class?, 197-200, 
especially 200. 
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few practitioners can be a generally applicable one: 'there must be something unique 
to the object of analysis' they say, but, in Petrey's view, this is a false modesty and 
will be dissipated as more such studies appear. 53 However, what this misses, in my 
view, is that the broadening out of speech act categories to encompass all texts 
effects a key change in the nature of the analysis, corresponding to my differentiation 
between strong and weak speech acts. 
Speech act criticism as a method necessarily presupposes that the object of enquiry, 
the text, can always be analysed in terms of illocution and perlocution: that there is 
what one might call a 'speech act structure' (or perhaps an 'illocutionary structure') in 
every text. Typically this is viewed as reflecting the Austinian insight that all 
would-be constatives are performative, and thus that textual effect can always be 
represented via the framework of illocution and perlocution. " Here I suggest that the 
careful analysis of chapter 2 above pays dividends, since it suggests that there is 
indeed a level on which this is true, but that it is not the level on which the 
interesting results of speech act theory follow. 
Fish himself, in his earlier guise, defends his view against just such attempts to 
broaden out the approach. Iser, he charges, confuses the idea of an illocutionary act 
operating by convention in the sense of the convention constituting the performance, 
and the broader literary use of convention which refers to the expectations one brings 
55 to a narrative rather than anything which constitutes narrative. Ohmann, says Fish, 
confuses the idea of Telicity': where speech act theory wants to say that an 
illocutionary act is felicitous if it'secures uptake, Ohmann uses the term in a 
perlocutionary sense, arguing that whether an act is felicitous depends on the effects 
which it has 
. 
5' Fundamentally, such approaches become more a matter of stylistics, 
once every sentence is viewed as a (weak) speech act. Although every text may 
53 Petrey, Speech Acts and Literary Theory, 10 1. 
54 Specific examples will be discussed in §2.3 below. 
55 Fish, 'How to do Things with Austin and Searle', 221-23; cf Wolfgang Iser, 'The Reality of 
Fiction', NLH 7 (1975), 7-38; reworked in idem, The Act ofReading. A Theory ofAesthetic Response, 
Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. 
56 Fish, 'How to do Things with Austin and Searle', 223 
-3 1; cf Richard Ohmann, 'Literature as 
Act', in Seymour Chatman (ed. ), Approaches to Poetics, New York: Columbia UP, 1973,81-108. 
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consist of assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declaratives, this 
information is worth very little in terms of interpreting an average text. To go 
through it and note how many assertives there are, or how many commissives, is not 
an indicator of 'illocutionary style', as Ohmann might suggest. In fact it tells us 
nothing of interest. 
Speech act criticism, therefore, seen in this light, does indeed tend to reduce to a 
form of stylistics, and in this guise it will not be the focus of my attention here. In the 
field of biblical studies,, however, it must be noted that such an approach is relatively 
prominent. " In my judgment this is in particular a result of the wish to have to hand 
a 'method of criticism' under the rubric of speech act theory, but this is to 
misunderstand the point of the enterprise. One may note the prevalence of Gricean 
models of speech act theory in many of these works. This is a direct result of Grice's 
focus on 'conversational implicature', which lends itself readily to stylistic analysis of 
the shape of a text's discourse. " It must suffice here simply to underline that this is 
not primarily what I have in mind when I talk of a speech act approach to biblical 
interpretation. 
In this section, therefore, I appropriate an argument made by (the early) Stanley Fish, 
albeit rearticulated in terms of my categories of strong and weak speech acts. As well 
as laying a constructive foundation for what follows, this view demonstrates that 
speech act theory cannot be a panacea for all one's hermeneutical problems: 'If 
speech-act theory is itself an interpretation, then it cannot possibly serve as an all 
purpose interpretive key. "' Indeed, I have argued that speech act theory will have 
little of interest to say about some kinds of text. However, in texts which concern 
themselves with particular speech acts, especially performative acts and strong 
illocutions, even if they do not particularly concern themselves with the conditions of 
intelligibility of these acts, we may expect to find worthwhile insights from a speech 
act perspective. 
57 For examples see §4 below. 
58 On Gnce see ch. 2, §5 above. 
59 Fish, 'How to do Things with Austin and Searle', 244. 
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§2.3 Other Implications 
Before proceeding to a discussion of how to decide which texts should thus be the 
focus of a speech act analysis, I wish briefly to note two other implications of this 
discussion of speech act theory and literary criticism in general which are of 
particular relevance to my concerns with the biblical text: those of the literariness of 
texts, and of rhetorical criticism. 
Literary and Non-literary Texts 
Firstly, one may pose the question of the literariness of the text in question. Is it that 
speech act criticism is appropriate to literary texts but not to texts in general, for 
instance? The standard range of answers to this question is as broad as the discussion 
of just what it is that characterises a text as 'literary'. Attempts have been made to 
ascribe 'literanness' to inherent properties of texts, which are thereby essentially 
marked out as distinct from non-literary texts 
. 
60 Alternatively, critics have argued 
that the notion of 'poetic language'per se is fallacious, and that literature is simply a 
context within which language works in all its ordinary forms. This view is most 
clearly defended by Mary Louise Pratt in her significant discussion of speech act 
theory and literary questions: 
With a context-dependent linguistics, the essence of literariness or 
poeticality can be said to reside not in the message but in a 
particular disposition of speaker and audience with regard to the 
message, one that is characteristic of the literary speech 
situation. 
61 
Pratt takes issue with the more common account which suggests that in literature the 
speech acts are in fact pretended speech acts; that it is pretended that sincerity 
conditions and relevant presuppositions and so forth are in place. This is the view 
made prevalent by Richard Ohmann's discussion of 'Speech Acts and the Definition 
of Literature': literature involves the suspension of illocutionary force and the 
performance of quasi-speech acts. " However, as Pratt notes, the idea that such 
60 This is perhaps most well-known in its various formalist guises, notably Russian formalism 
and the position of the 'Prague school'. 
61 Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory ofLiterary Discourse, Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1977,87. 
62 Richard Ohmann, 'Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature', Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 
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functions as reference are suspended in literature appears to confuse being literary 
with beingfictional, and these are not the same thing. Indeed, in some cases the 
dividing line between fictional and non-fictional may remain undefined without 
affecting the point of an utterance. She thus responds: 'The real lesson speech act 
theory has to offer is that literature is a context, too, not the absence of one. v63 
Pratt's discussion is perhaps the most thorough analysis of this whole area which 
explicitly addresses the question of 'literariness' in speech act terms. 641nevitably it 
has met with a mixed response. Petrey suggests that while Pratt successfully 
emphasises the role of the author in using ordinary language within a speaker/hearer 
framework; it is Ohmann who successfully addresses what happens after the 
production of the text when the author has left the scene and the text continues to be 
appropriated by readers anyway. For Petrey, each of these is a valuable, albeit 
61 distinct, emphasis. 
In an article-length review of Pratt's book, Michael Hancher contrasts Pratt's 
approach with that of Searle. " Searle, especially in his 'Logical Status of Fictional 
Discourse% takes 'literature' as a 'family-resemblance notion' and addresses instead 
(1971), 1-19; especially 13-14 for his definition (where he suggests that the illocutionary force of 
literature is 'mimetic', i. e. 'purportedly imitative). In a subsequent article Ohmann explores how this 
leads to a view that literature discloses imaginative worlds; and laments literary leanings in the media 
which distort all discourse into this imaginative mode; idem, 'Speech, Literature and the Space 
Between', NLH 4 (1972), 47-63. 
63 Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory ofLiterary Discourse, 99 (cf her discussion of Ohmann, 
89-99). Similarly cautious about Ohmann's literature-fiction confusion are Larnarque and Olsen, 
Truth, Fiction and Literature, 71-73. 
64 Her 1977 book remains her major statement of the issue. However, see also Mary Louise 
Pratt and Elizabeth Closs Traugott, 'Speech Acts and Speech Genres', in their Linguisticsfor Students 
of Literature, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980,226-7 1; and Mary Louise Pratt, 'The 
Ideology of Speech-Act Theory', Centrum n. s. 1: 1 (1981), 5-18, where she offers some qualifications 
concerning how far a standard Gricean model may apply across varieties of social interaction, as well 
as suggesting that the picture is complicated by taking more seriously the ways in which speech acts 
construct and constitute reality. I do not consider here the significant treatment of Susan Snaider 
Lanser, The Narrative Act. 
- 
Point of View in Prose Fiction, Princeton: Princeton UP, 198 1, which uses 
speech act theory to underline the interpretive moves necessary to link novelistic discourse with its 
context (see especially 7,64-107,226-45, and 277), and which agrees to a significant extent with 
Pratt concerning the role of ordinary language in literary works (280). Lanser has written in and been 
utilised in biblical studies; see §4 below. 
65 Petrey, Speech Acts and Literary Theory, 85. 
66 Michael Hancher, 'Beyond a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse', MLN 92 (1977), 
1081-98. 
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the question of fiction. Searle suggests that 'Roughly speaking, whether or not a 
work is literature is for the readers to decide, whether or not it is fiction is for the 
author to decide. 
6' As a result he ends up with an eclectic approach which considers 
a text utterance by utterance and is willing to allow real illocutions to be interspersed 
68 
with fictional (and thus pretended) ones. In Hancher's words, 'What Searle offers is 
not a theory of fictional discourse, but a theory of discrete fictional acts 
., 
6'He 
suggests that Pratt's broader emphasis here endears her approach to literary critics, 
who are looking for a less narrowly applicable criterion than that offered by Searle. 
However, he also suggests that one of the reasons for the divergence between Pratt's 
and Searle's models is that Pratt makes some fairly standard literary-critical 
assumptions, such as that the narrator is a fiction (or at least apersona), and thus that 
the broader literary model developed by Pratt, as a result, 'carries a strong a priori 
flavor', and that in making fewer assumptions, Searle's approach is less likely to 
engender distortions of the texts being analysed. " 
Different writers have suggested different ways of characterising the issues involved 
in a speech act analysis of fictional texts. As noted, Searle thinks it is for the author 
to decide whether something is fiction. Nicholas Wolterstorff, in his discussion of 
'world projection'particularly as it occurs through the medium of a written text, 
suggests that 'the stance characteristic of the fictioneer is that ofpresenting. The 
fictive stance consists ofpresenting, of offeringfor consideration, certain states of 
affairs', and that these are presented to edify us, delight us, or illumine us, for 
example, as we reflect on the presentation. " The 'fictive stance' therefore is, again, 
that of the author. An account which attempts to bridge the gap between 
author-orientated and reader-orientated approaches to the question is that of Robert 
67 Searle, 'The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse', 59. 
68 Searle, 'The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse', 73-74. 
69 Hancher, 'Beyond a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse', 1094. 
70 Hancher, 'Beyond a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse', 1094,1095; see 1092-95 for 
the full discussion. Searle's dislike of standard literary-critical assumptions is noted particularly by 
Petrey, Speech Acts and Literary Theory, 69, who nevertheless thinks Searle is right about the 
importance of readers' attitudes. For an example of a philosophical account which find Searle's 
approach here too restrictive concerning fiction, see Lamarque and Olsen, Truth, Fiction and 
Literature, 62-69. 
71 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds ofArt, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980,233. 
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Brown and Martin Steinmann, who suggest thatA discourse is fictional because its 
speaker or writer intends it to be so. But it is taken as fictional only because the 
hearer or reader decides to take it so. "' This introduces an important aspect of the 
discussion which I shall take up fully in chapter 4 below, but which, suffice it to say 
here, is problematic in its bald opposing of what something is with what it is taken 
as. Brown and Steinmann's article, in fact, is an analysis of fiction in response to the 
question 'What is literatureT This may be one reason why their focus differs from 
that of Searle and Wolterstorff, since it is an attempt to account for two different 
things under one rubric. It seems preferable to follow Pratt in separating the question 
of literanness from that of fiction, and then to follow Searle and Wolterstorff in 
affirming that 'the fictive stance' is that of the author. 
If we follow Pratt, then literary discourse is not a separate type of text from other 
texts but simply the deployment of ordinary language in a literary context. While the 
question of fiction has invited discussion of various degrees of the suspension of the 
illocutionary act, in my judgment Pratt is successful in demonstrating that no such 
suspension need be assumed for a text just because it is a literary text. In fact, since 
her entire argument is devoted to showing that literature works precisely through the 
mechanism of 'ordinary language', " it follows afortiori that all of the considerations 
we have adduced for the analysis of literature in the preceding sections of this 
chapter will also apply to texts in general. Speech act analyses of fiction may 
profitably follow Searle and Wolterstorff, but with specific regard to biblical texts 
my interest will not lie in this area. In any case, the stronger conclusion, that biblical 
texts are in general as susceptible as any others to speech act consideration, follows 
from Pratt's analysis. It should also be said that, where I have myself qualified my 
interests in terms of strong and weak speech acts in ordinary language, this 
distinction will also carry over into the analysis of biblical texts. 
Rhetorical Criticism 
72 Robert L. Brown, Jr., and Martin Steinmann, Jr., 'Native Readers of Fiction: A Speech-Act 
and Genre-Rule Approach to Defining Literature', in Paul Hernadi (ed. ), What Is Literature?, 
Bloomington, Indiana UP, 1978,141-60, here 149; also quoted approvingly by Petrey, Speech Acts 
and Literan,, Theory, 68. 
73 She intends the phrase in its literary situatedness, but is content to appeal to its 
logico-linguistic resonances also; Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse, 80, n. 1. I 
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Secondly, I suggest that, particularly with respect to biblical studies, the discussion 
of this chapter mitigates against a tendency to see speech act theory as a natural 
extension of rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism in biblical studies operates 
upon the twin pillars of its historical appropriateness in terms of the prevalence of 
classical rhetoric in the New Testament world, and its literary appropriateness in 
terms of its particular congruence with the dynamic of a text seeking to effect certain 
responses in the reader. " It is this latter point which seems to draw some writers into 
thinking that speech act theory is essentially the same approach simply recast in 
modem terminology. 
In my judgment this is mistaken. It is true that rhetoric as such finds its place within 
speech act theory as part of a consideration of perlocutionary effect, but this is not 
the area in which speech act theory makes its most prominent contributions. Indeed, 
one recent article suggests that significant discussions of perlocution are minimal in 
number. " in particular, one only has to recall that a strong illocutionary force 
involves an utterance counting as a non-linguistic action by virtue of conventions 
which are both linguistic and extra-linguistic, to note that this is an altogether 
different emphasis from that of rhetorical criticism, with its focus on persuasive and 
argumentative function. 
It seems inevitable that any attempt to subsume rhetorical interests into a speech act 
framework will involve some degree of distortion. One of the few attempts to do so 
in biblical studies is that of Lauri Thuren, who, focusing on the New Testament 
letters, makes the point that there are two kinds of context which need to be noted in 
understanding the author's ideological or theological system: the historical and the 
74 See G. A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism, Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina, 1984. A helpful and circumspect recent account of this huge area is 
given by Ian H. Henderson, 'A Defence of Rhetoric Against its Admirers' in his Jesus, Rhetoric and 
Law (Bib Int Ser 20), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996,37-7 1. See further Litfm (n. 82 below), and J. D. H. 
Amador, 'Where Could Rhetorical Criticism (Still) Take UsT, CR: BS 7 (1999), 195-222. 
75 Yueguo Gu, 'The Impasse of Perlocution', JPrag 20 (1993), 405-32, who calls for a new 
'transactional' approach to perlocution, not yet represented in the literature at all. This literature, he 
avers, comprises all of four papers, the most notable of which, in my judgment, (Ted Cohen, 
'Illocutions and Perlocutions', Foundations of Language 9 (1973), 492-503 and Steven Davis, 
'Perlocution' in John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer and Manfred Bierw1sch (eds. ), Speech-Act Theory and 
Pragmatics, Dordrecht, London & Boston: Reidel, 1980,37-55) clarify the importance of context for 
perlocution, but do not suggest that this can really be incorporated into illocutionary aspects of speech 
acttheory. 
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argumentative. " This latter is important because 'the author's goal has been to change 
or modify the addressees' attitudes and behaviour'. " For instance, 1 Peter 1: 6-9 
describes the addressees as persistent, and yet the rest of I Peter exhorts them to 
persistence. This, he argues, illustrates the need for the interpreter to look always to 
the rhetorical context. 78 
Thuren's article develops a schema of different kinds of argument and persuasion, 
beginning from the observation that the rhetorical context needs to be held in balance 
alongside the actual statements and ideas used. He argues that since 'rhetorical 
features in the New Testament are seen as general human communication' they 
'should be analysed with the best means available, whether ancient or modem. "' 
Having discussed possible rhetorical frameworks for the analysis of arguments, he 
then cites speech act theory in the Austin/Searle tradition as a way of illustrating his 
approach. " However he notes that Searle's focus on the communicative setting of 
speech acts resulted in his not paying attention to the argumentative and persuasive 
(or, in Thuren's terms: cognitive and volitional) contexts, with the result that 
although the article situates its approach within broad speech act concerns, and 
describes those concerns as 'most useful'. it does not offer any examples of how 
speech act categories provide any practical clarification. " In fact this must 
necessarily be a result of Thuren's perlocutionary focus, with its corresponding 
dislocation (self-confessed, no less) of Searle's focus on illocutionary force. The 
issue of theological significance in all of this is whether the notion of illocutionary 
force actually offers a challenge to the categories of rhetorical analysis, especially in 
12 the light of such passages as 1 Corinthians 1: 18-2: 13. 
76 Lauri Thur6n, 'On Study mig Ethical Argumentation and Persuasion in the New Testament, in 
Stanley E. Porter & Thomas H. Olbricht (eds. ), Rhetoric and the New Testament Essaysfrom the 
1992 Heidelberg Conference (JSNTS 90), Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993,464-78, here 
465. 
77 Thur6n, 'Ethical Argumentation', 465. 
78 Thur6n, 'Ethical Argumentation', 466, n. 5 and 465. 
79 Thur6n, 'Ethical Argumentation', 47 1. 
80 Thur6n, 'Ethical Argumentation', 469. 
81 Thur6n, 'Ethical Argumentation', 476. 
82 On this challenge see Duane Litfm, St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation. I Corinthians 1-4 
and Greco-Roman Rhetoric (SNTSMS 79), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994,247-52. Liffin also 
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Finally, one further reason why speech act concerns and rhetorical criticism do not 
promise a happy marriage must be simply that speech act criticism itself, as I have 
argued above, does not relate in any strong sense to the major insights of speech act 
theory. It follows, evidently, that speech act theory, since it does not lend itself to 
speech act criticism, must remain at the very least one step removed from rhetorical 
criticism as it is generally practised. 
§3 Criteriajor Illocutionary Acts in Texts: The Question of Vocabulary Markers 
Having assessed the various ways in which speech act theory may or may not be 
insightful for different kinds of text, it is time to focus on the practical question of 
how to assess the suitability of any particular text (and specifically a biblical text) for 
a speech act analysis. I have defended the view that speech act theory provides 
certain kinds of insights for certain texts and does not offer us a method of speech act 
criticism. In this section I intend to clarify how to proceed in practical terms. 
It is perhaps helpful here to pause and consider whether, in the process of reading a 
text, we think of ourselves as encountering a speech act inhering in a sentence; or 
rather whether we encounter a sentence and have to determine the speech act. This is 
an over- simplification, and I do not intend to suggest that any act of reading may be 
decomposed into these separable components. Nevertheless, particularly if we come 
across a difficult sentence where we do not simply comprehend and move on, I wish 
to ask which comes 'first': the speech act or the sentence? In such a case it seems 
clear that it is the sentence which is the given, and that it is the nature of the speech 
act which is to be determined. To put the manner in the way in which I shall be 
considering it in the next chapter: how shall we take the locution in illocutionary 
terms? This fact, that the illocution is not necessarily determined by knowing the 
locution, complicates the question of how to go about proposing some such criteria 
as a 'vocabulary marker' for any particular illocution. However, it is common for 
theorists to demonstrate a certain inconsistency here in both disavowing vocabulary 
criteria for illocutionary acts and then proceeding to offer them. " 
offers a detailed characterisation of the rhetorical backgrounds to the New Testament epistles 
(21-134). 
83 My argument of this section is now substantially followed by Anthony C. Thiselton, 
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We recall that one of the foundational insights of speech act theory is that sentences 
which on the surface look like assertives are in fact functioning in other ways. This is 
evident in the many discussions of such simple sentences as 'It's hot in here, which 
may be both an assertive about the temperature of the room, or equally a directive 
attempting to get someone to open a window. Theological examples raise the 
identical issue, such as Donald Evans' paradigmatic utterance 'God is my Creator, 
which he labels 'self-involving' (i. e. as containing a commissive element) at the same 
time as being an assertive. " In general, following Sadock's discussion noted in 
chapter 2, and recalling one particular emphasis of Searle, one speech act will 
operate with a variety of illocutionary points of various strengths. 
It thus seems to be the case that unless we know what kind of speech act we are 
looking for, then the kind of sentence we are confronted with will not settle the 
matter for us. In this over-simplified sense, the line of reasoning must be from 
illocution to sentence and not the other way around. 
This point does not appear to be widely noted in applications of speech act theory to 
texts, although it is anticipated in more recent theoretical work, notably by Daniel 
Vanderveken. " Here he observes that 'many speech act verbs have several uses and 
can name different illocutionary forces', giving the example of the verb 'swear'. Thus 
one can swear that a proposition is true (assertive) but one can also swear that one 
will perform some fature deed (a commissive use). " Indeed, he adds, 'some 
performative verbs are systematically ambiguous between several illocutionary 
points', and here he gives the example of 'alert, which is assertive and directive at the 
same time, since to alert is to assert the imminence of danger and to suggest, 
'Communicative Action and Promise in Interdisciplinary, Biblical, and Tbeological Hermeneutics', In 
Roger Lundin, Clarence Walhout, and Anthony C. Thiselton, The Promise ofHermeneutics, Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans & Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999,133-239, especially 223-24,229 and 233-34. 
84 Donald D. Evans, The Logic ofSelf-Involvement A Philosophical Study ofEveryday 
Language with Special Reference to the Christian Use ofLanguage about God as Creator, London: 
SCM, 1963,11-15,158-60, and passim. See the discussion of Evans in chapter 5 below. 
85 Daniel Vanderveken, 'Semantic Analysis of English Performative Verbs' in idem, Meaning 
and Speech Acts, Vol. 1, Principles ofLanguage Use, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990,166-219. 
86 Vanderveken, Meaning and Speech Acts, Vol. L, 168; cf also John R. Searle and Daniel 
Vanderveken, Foundations ofIllocutionary Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985,179-82. 
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directively, evasive action. " 
In the light of these observations it is at the very least potentially misleading that 
Vanderveken goes on to list something in the region of 270 performative verbs 
according to their illocutionary point, even if he is aware of the problem by 
appealing to 'paradigmatic central illocutionary meanings of speech act verbs' in 
'idealized' form. " Searle too criticises Austin for a mistaken reliance on vocabulary 
in classifying illocutions but goes on to offer various vocabulary criteria for 
illocutions. " 
Having said this, the point is not that there is no value in listing standard verbs of 
certain types of illocutionary force. If there were no value in such a practice then the 
notion of illocutionary force would seem to remain hopelessly vague. Rather, such 
listings indicate indirectly which kinds of possible illocutionary acts we are looking 
for in a text, regardless of whether the word itself appears in the text. 90 
To substantiate this claim, and to illustrate the difference between the two 
alternatives described here, let us consider a basic speech act verb such as 'commit', 
often taken as the paradigmatic commissive (rather than the more common 'promise') 
because 'promise' has some exceptional features. " Then if we wanted to examine a 
commissive illocutionary act based on the occurrence of the word 'commit', we 
would have to locate a sentence such as 
(1) '1 commit myself to helping at the hostel very Wednesday. ' 
(Let us ignore for a moment that this is, according to Searle and Vanderveken, a 
declarative with the additional force of a commissive. ") Evidently not every 
87 Vanderveken, Meaning and Speech Acts, Vol. 1,168. 
88 Vanderveken, Meaning and Speech Acts, Vol. 1,169. See further ch. 2 n. 142 above. 
89 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 9; cf 12-20. 
90 This is close to the claim of Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics. The 
Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading, London: HarperCollins, 1992,298-99; 
although his reference to a concordance for locating particular illocutions (299) strongly suggests that 
actual appearance of the word in the text is in mind. 
91 See Searle and Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, 192. 
92 Note their decision that'the illocutionary force of a performative sentence is always that of a 
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occurrence of'commit'will be a commissive. Consider: 'John committed a basic 
error in his driving test. ' This would beCOMM't2as compared to our commissive 
commit, if we adopt the Searle-Vanderveken convention for noting different 
illocutionary points pertaining to apparently similar words. " However this is not the 
substantive point at issue and may be passed over. 
However,, this 'analysis' of (1), which is perhaps not too far removed from the way in 
which speech act theory sometimes gets a passing mention in commentaries, in fact 
achieves very little. One already had to know that (1) was a commissive in order to 
spot it: the occurrence even of the basic word'commit'was not enough, since it 
might have beenComm't2. Further, if we now take back the permission to ignore that 
(1) is actually a declarative with additional co=issive force, we must note that (1) 
is not a commissive, pure and simple, after all. Indeed, on reflection, a pure 
commissive will most likely not use the vocabulary marker of commissive 
performative verbs at all, if it occurs in a text. Consider 
(2) 'As I was with Moses, so I will be with you. I will not fail you or forsake 
you. ' 
This is Yahweh talking to Joshua in Joshua 1: 5; and indeed performing a divine 
commissive. However this much can only be said if onefirst understands the 
illocutionary force of the sentence: it is a promise, the particular promise that 
Yahweh will 'be with' Joshua, and it has no vocabulary marker. The content may be 
vague (divine presence, after all, turns out to be a problematic idea in the Old 
Testament) but the act performed by Yahweh here, in the narrative, is that he 
commits himself to a future course of action. Indeed many interpretive disputes in 
biblical interpretation are concerned with precisely this question of how to take an 
uncontested locution and read it as an illocution. 
This small case study bears out my claim that what we are looking for in locating 
and analysing illocutionary acts is not the occurrence of any particular word markers, 
declaration, and then, derivatively, the utterance has the additional force named by the performative 
verb'; Searle and Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, 3. 
93 Searle and Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, 18 1. 
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nor even the paradigmatic cases for each type of illocutionary point, but rather we 
are lookingfor those acts which correspond to the verbs which can be used to 
indicate illocutionary point. It is in this sense that the standard lists of illocutionary 
verbs according to illocutionary point help us in identifying illocutionary acts in a 
discourse. Some examples perhaps make this clearer: 
Standard assertive verbs include suggest, hypothesize, assert, guess... 
The illocutionary acts we are looking for are thus suggestions, hypotheses, 
assertions, guesses 
Standard commissive verbs include pledge, threaten, vow, swear, promise 
Thus we are looking forpledges, threats, vows, oaths, promises 
The same could be said for any of the illocutionary points. In general, therefore, we 
shall not expect the word corresponding to the act (in this loose sense of 
'correspond') to occur in the text. In the particular case ofpromises in the Old 
Testament, to pursue the example above, this point is highlighted by the observation 
that the Hebrew word rendered 'promise' in English translation is either 'amar or 
dabar, i. e. someone said or spoke a word with a future orientation. Of course if God 
speaks such a word, and his word is dependable, then one may justifiably translate it 
'promise', but need not do so, as a comparison of Jeremiah 34: 4-5 in the NIV and 
NRSV indicates. 94 
The argument of this section might perhaps be represented as an updating of James 
Barr's Semantics ofBiblical Language, or perhaps the modulating of its central 
argument into the new key of speech act theory. It would be ironic if the adoption of 
a detailed pragmatic philosophy of language were to go hand in hand with the 
reintroduction of the kind of interpretative confusion between words and ideas which 
Barr so ably critiqued. " 
94 See, amongst others, P. S. Minear, 'Promise', IDB 3: 893-96: 'It was axiomatic to OT writers 
that God is absolutely faithful to every word he speaks. ' (8 93) In the NIV we find 'Hear the pronuise 
of Yahweh... This is what Yahweh says 
... 
I myself make this promise, declares Yahweh'; whereas 
the NRSV offers'Hear the word of Yahweh 
... 
Thus says Yahweh.. I have spoken the word, says 
Yahweh'. 
95 Cf James Barr, The Semantics ofBiblical Language, Oxford: Oxford UP, 196 1. 
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To summanse: in the sense elaborated in this section, it is the speech act which we 
are seeking in the text, and not the occurrence of particular words. However a 
knowledge of standard performative verbs and their general illocutionary force is a 
major clue to what kind of acts we are looking for, although not necessarily where 
we might find them. " 
§4 'Speech Act Criticism'in Biblical Studies 
My discussion in this chapter has analysed several problems of criteria, and 
developed a framework within which it will prove possible to read texts for 
illocutionary acts. In conclusion I turn to some examples of the issues raised in this 
discussion by looking at some of the highly varied applications of speech act theory 
to biblical texts which have been made to date. " 
My focus here is on those works which might fall broadly under the title of 'speech 
act criticism' rather than my more general focus on ways in which speech act theory 
can contribute to various aspects of the hermeneutical task. It is perhaps worth noting 
in this regard that many of the more substantial recent treatments of speech act 
theory in theological-biblical perspective do concern themselves with this latter 
question rather than with speech act theory as a form of criticism. " In chapter 11 
discussed Martin Buss's comment that, in the context of biblical interpretation, we 
might have two different goals with speech act theory: using it to refine our 
exegetical procedures or stepping back to utilise it in the theoretical 
reconceptualisation of exegesis. " At the risk of over-simplification, my argument 
here tends towards the view that more progress has been made with the latter than 
96 See further Thiselton, 'Communicative Action and Promise in Interdisciplinary, Biblical, and 
Theological Hermeneutics', in Lundin, Walhout, and Thiselton, The Promise ofHer7neneutics, 
223-39. 
97 1 attempt a more comprehensive survey of the literature in Richard Briggs, 'The Use of 
Speech Act Theory in Biblical Interpretation', CR: BS 8 (2000), forthcoming. 
98 Works such as Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics; Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in 
this Text?; and Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse. To some extent this is true also of the essays collected 
in Semeia 41 (Hugh C. White, (ed. ), Speech Act Theory and Biblical Criticism, Decatur, GA: Scholars 
Press, 1988), with the qualifications noted below. 
99 Martin J. Buss, 'Potential and Actual Interactions between Speech Act Tbeory and Biblical 
Studies', Semeia 41,125-34, here 125. 
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the fonner. Significant exceptions to this generalisation, notably the work of Donald 
Evans and Dietmar Neufeld, will be considered at greater length in chapter 5 below. 
First of all, this is the appropriate place to mention those works which have taken 
their speech-act bearings from the work of Grice rather than of Searle. For the 
reasons discussed in the last two chapters, what might be called 'Gricean pragmatics' 
offers an obvious set of criteria for a type of speech act criticism. This has been most 
thoroughly developed by several South African writers, most notably Johannes G. 
Du Plessis. "' In a 1991 article, Du Plessis calls for the use of speech act theory as 'an 
exciting approach to exegesis', 101 and argues that an attention to the theory allows the 
exegete to notice what he or she may otherwise miss. In particular, Grice's 
'conversational implicatures'; and their development by G. N. Leech into concepts 
such as a 'politeness principle' are, he avers, particularly sharp analytical tools for 
analysing the pragmatic force of communication (which he defines as the 
combination of the illocutionary and rhetorical force). 10' 
To give one example: Du Plessis uses this framework to analyse the parable of the 
vineyard and the tenants in Mark 12: 1-12. "' He shows how the politeness principle 
is consistently transgressed in the discussion between Jesus and the religious leaders 
about the parable, as Jesus systematically destroys every possible bridge between 
them. Since his tools of analysis are sharp, he is able to show with ease how Mark 
presents Jesus in a'provocative and outrageous way'rejecting and antagonising his 
opponents. "' The real strength of this analysis, which is perhaps one of the clearest 
100 See J. G. Du Plessis, 'Some Aspects of Extralingual Reality and the Interpretation of Texts, 
Neotestamentica 18 (1984), 80-93; idem, Clarity and Obscurity: A Study in Textual Communication 
of the Relation between Sender, Parable and Receiver in the Synoptic Gospels, Stellenbosch: 
University of Stellenbosch, unpublished D. Theol. dissertation, 1985; idem, 'Pragmatic Meaning in 
Matthew 13: 1-23', Neotestamentica 21 (1987), 42-56; idem, 'Why Did Peter Ask his Question and 
How Did Jesus Answer Him? Or: Implicature in Luke 12: 35-48', Neotestamentica 22 (1988), 311-24; 
and idem, 'Speech Act Theory and New Testament Interpretation with Special Reference to G. N. 
Leech's Pragmatic Principles', in P. J. Hartin & J. H. Petzer (eds. ), Text and Interpretation. New 
Approaches in the Criticism of the New Testament, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991,129-42. He offers a 
helpful summary of some other unpublished items from South African writers in 'Speech Act Theory 
and New Testament Interpretation', 136. 
101 Du Plessis, 'Speech Act Theory and New Testament Interpretation', 129. 
102 Du Plessis, 'Speech Act Theory and New Testament Interpretation', 134-5; cf G. N. Leech, 
Principles of Pragmatics, London: Longman, 19 8 3, developing Grice's ideas on 6- 10 and 3 0-34. 
103 Du Plessis, 'Speech Act Theory and New Testament Interpretation', 137-40. 
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examples of speech act criticism in biblical studies, is that it offers precise controls 
on what might otherwise be a vague and impressionistic reading of the passage: Du 
Plessis is able to show exactly how it is that Mark is provocative and outrageous, for 
instance. Indeed, at one point, he even manages to paraphrase his own argument 
'without the terminology' (i. e. the speech act terminology). "' Perhaps such a 
paraphrase is only to be expected when speech act theory is used in this kind of 
stylistic way. Amongst other things, it does suggest that speech act criticism is a tool 
for the clearer articulation arid more exact delineation of textual features which one 
already has in view without the aid of speech act theory. 
Two other recent examples of the application of Gricean categories to short New 
Testament texts may be mentioned briefly, to demonstrate that speech act criticism in 
this framework can quite naturally be allied to rhetorically orientated concerns. 
Andrew Wilson analyses Philemon in terms of its breaking and upholding Grice's 
conversational maxims; arguing that the letter 'shows a very wide range of politeness 
strategies with much evidence of indirectness. "" More directly linked to rhetoric, 
Stephan Joubert sees any persuasive text as a speech act, and offers an analysis of 
Jude in terms of intended perlocution. He suggests that the author is deliberately 
vilifying the readers' opponents and painting a positive picture of the readers in order 
to persuade them to adopt the letter's aim of seeing the intruders (who have 'stolen in 
among you', Jude 4) expelled from the congregation. "' 
To date the most extended analysis of a biblical text from this perspective, again 
from South Affica, is that of J. Eugene Botha, who pursues a'speech act reading' of 
John 4: 1-42. "' Botha works entirely with a weak notion of illocutionary force which 
does indeed (avowedly) reduce to stylistics. In fact, despite the title of his work, he is 
104 Du Plessis, 'Speech Act Theory and New Testament Interpretation', 139-40. 
105 Du Plessis, 'Speech Act Theory and New Testament Interpretation', 13 8. 
106 Andrew Wilson, 'The Pragmatics of Politeness and Pauline Epistolography: A Case Study of 
the Letter to Philemon', JSNT48 (1992), 107-19; here 118. 
107 Stephan J. Joubert, 'Persuasion in the Letter of Jude', JSNT 58 (1995), 75-87. Joubert 
represents another South African voice in the discussion. 
108 J. Eugene Botha, Jesus and the Samaritan Woman. - A Speech-Act Reading ofJohn 4: 1-42 zn 
(NovTSup LXV), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991. 
Chapter 3- Page 102 
essentially attempting to integrate insights from modem linguistics, semantics, 
literary analyses, reader-response criticism and sociolinguistics, all for the purpose of 
analysing Johannine style. "' 
Setting up his ensuing analysis of every speech act in John 4 into locutionary, 
illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects, he seems to suggest that he views the 
illocutionary act as a matter of expressed intention and the perlocutionary act as the 
pragmatic effect upon the readers. This appears to follow from his view that a text's 
having some purpose follows from attributing a specific context to it, in this case a 
religious one; rather than being a part of what the text actually is when existing as a 
real text (i. e. not, as Austin put it, uttered for no conceivable reason). As a result the 
essential difference between institutional states of affairs and perlocutionary or 
causal force is lost from view, and speech act theory appears to be reduced to little 
more than formalism on the one hand; and traditional historical-critical consideration 
of authorial intention on the other. 
This unpromising framework duly works itself out in a lengthy chapter entitled 'A 
Speech Act Reading of John 4: 1-42'. "' That Botha is working with a'weak'notion of 
illocutionary force is clear from the fact that out of the 50 utterances analysed in this 
chapter no fewer than 42 of them are described as 'constative'. Not only does such a 
notion of illocutionary style raise all the theoretical problems signalled by Fish, but it 
has to be said that even advocates of such a stylistics are unlikely to have learned a 
great deal from assessing that 84% of illocutions in this pencope are constatives. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Fish's point about restricting attention to texts 
where the workings of (strong) illocutions is itself part of the issue is followed by 
Jo-Ann Brandt in her study of oaths in Matthew's gospel. "' Her thesis is that 'when 
an oath parts from the lips of a character within Matthew's Gospel, the outcome is 
not good' and 'using the conceptual tools of speech-act theory makes explicit how the 
109 Botha, Jesus and the Samaritan Woman, 57. He considers this theme further Mi J. Eugene 
Botha, 'Style in the New Testament: The Need for Serious Reconsideration', JSNT 43 (1991), 71-87. 
110 Botha, Jesus and the Samaritan Woman, 96-187. 
III Jo-Ann A. Brandt, 'Infelicitous Oaths in the Gospel of Matthew', JSNT 63 (1996), 3-20; 
following Fish explicitly on 5, n. 6. 
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infelicity of these oaths helps to underscore that oaths are corrupt. "" Brandt works 
entirely within Matthew's narrative world, although one may not necessarily follow 
her in seeing speech act theory as justifying the bracketing of historical questions. "' 
In particular, she notes that within that world the standard conventions of speech acts 
are now modified by Jesus' prohibition of oaths in the Sermon on the Mount. 
In this she sees a theological point at issue: Matthew is arguing that 'in the context of 
Jesus' ministry, that is at the outbreak of the eschaton, evil does not have its way. ' 114 
Through her analysis of four oaths recorded by Matthew (14: 7; 26: 63; 26: 72 and 
26: 74) she shows how the consequences of uttering an oath are always negative, and 
in contrast Jesus' word is shown to be true. The whole gospel thus demonstrates that 
'while oaths are counter to God's will, they cannot be used to counter God's will. "" 
We may note also that the texts she considers are not about the 'conditions of 
intelligibility' of oaths, as such, but, slightly more broadly, about the role that oaths 
play in the text, which suggests again that Fish's point about the speech act analysis 
of texts need not be circumscribed quite as tightly as he expressed it. 
The works of Brandt and Botha discussed here amply illustrate the divergent paths 
which may be taken by those in biblical studies attempting to utilise speech act 
theory in the interpretation of biblical texts. I propose that their specific divergence 
over whether one should concentrate on strong speech acts or be willing to read 
everything through a stylistic 'speech act grid' captures precisely some of the 
theoretical issues discussed thus far; and ffirthermore provides a good illustration of 
why Fish's view, with its implicit appeal to a notion of strong illocutions, is to be 
preferred. 
112 Brandt, 'Infelicitous Oaths in the Gospel of Matthew', 3-4. 
113 In fact, concurrent with the publication of Brandt's article, Colin Brown addressed an 
overlapping set of passages using speech act theory with the precise focus of examining issues of 
word-to-world and world-to-word fit, thus demonstrating that Brandt's view of the narrative world as 
the setting for Matthean speech acts is not the only context within which speech act theory can be 
illuminating. See Colin Brown, 'The Hermeneutics of Confession and Accusation', CTJ 30 (1995), 
460-71. 
114 Brandt, 'Infelicitous Oaths in the Gospel of Matthew', 4. 
115 Brandt, 'Infelicitous Oaths in the Gospel of Matthew', 20. 
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The issue of strong and weak illocutions 's not the only one which is relevant to the 
usefulness or otherwise of speech act criticism in biblical studies. The 
illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction has also been deployed with varying degrees 
of clarity. In a study of the prophets, Walter Houston uses it to consider the question 
of whether an unacknowledged prophecy could be considered 'successful' or not (in 
Austin's sense of 'felicitous'). "' Arguing that 'the power of the prophetic word could 
be understood as due to its illocutionary force', he appeals to the institutional nature 
of illocutionary force: 
as long as the prophets' hearers understood that they were 
warning them, calling for repentance or whatever the particular 
speech act might be, and understood the content of the warning or 
whatever it might be, then the prophets had done what they set 
out to do, even if they had not achieved the effect they had hoped 
for. ' 17 
Houston effectively distinguishes between the illocutionary act of the oracle of 
judgment as being the placing underjudgment of the hearers (effective in the 
performance of the illocution, requiring therefore the 'institution', which in this case 
is the understanding that the prophet speaks the will of Yahweh, regardless of 
whether this understanding turns out to be right or not); and the perlocutionary act 
which may or may not result in an act of repentance or admission of guilt. "' The 
different perlocutionary effects (the awareness of inexorable doom or the mercy 
evoked by repentance, as he phrases it) are the natural consequences of the 
illocutionary act ofplacing under Yahweh's judgment. Hence the prophet discharged 
his service by the performance of the illocutionary act, regardless of the 
perlocutionary effect. 
Houston also notes that the distinction between illocution and perlocution makes 
sense of Jonah's ftustration about divine mercy following his proclamation of doom 
116 Walter Houston, 'What did the Prophets think they were doing? Speech Acts and Prophetic 
Discourse in the Old Testament', BibInt 1 (1993), 167-88. He first suggested applying speech act 
theory to prophetic discourse in Walter Houston, "'Today, in Your Very Hearing": Some Comments 
on the Christological Use of the Old Testament', in L. D. Hurst and N. T. Wright (eds. ), The Glory of 
Christ in the New Testament. Studies in Christology in Memory of George Bradford Caird, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987,37-47; see 41. 
117 Houston, 'Speech Acts and Prophetic Discourse', 175; 177. 
118 Houston, 'Speech Acts and Prophetic Discourse', 180-87. 
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for Nineveh. Here Houston distances himself from Terry Eagleton's determinedly 
post-modem 'application' of speech act theory to the book of Jonah, which had 
delighted in arguing that the particular performatives which a prophet issues 'produce 
a state of affairs in which the state of affairs they describe won't be the case. "" 
Not all writers have used the illocution-perlocution distinction so helpfully. J. W. 
Voelz assimilates the categories to ideas more familiar from studies of rhetoric, in 
defining an illocutionary act as one that 'tells how we feel and seeks to change 
another's attitudes. "" He also holds that despite the variety of things we can do with 
linguistic utterances, 'only one means of achieving a goal with a linguistic utterance 
exists, and that is the conveying of information. "" It is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that this is almost a complete misreading of the point of speech act theory. Further, 
as he works through more substantial engagements with particular biblical texts, it 
becomes clear that when he is talking of illocutionary forces, as he does when he 
looks at defending, encouraging and praising in 1 Thessalonians, he has them in 
mind as categories of rhetorical analysis. "' The merits of Voelz' discussion, one 
might say, are independent of his singular co-option of the terminology of speech act 
theory. 
The most concentrated attempt by biblical critics to engage with the possibilities of 
speech act theory as a form of biblical criticism remains the collection of articles in 
Semeia 41 
, 
to which reference has been made several times. "' A few words are in 
order about the merits and demerits of this attempt. The obvious point to be made is 
that most of the contributors remain very much on the sidelines making suggestions 
about the subject's potential rather than demonstrating any particular features of 
speech act analysis, as noted both within the volume itself by Martin Buss ('one 
119 Terry Eagleton, 'J. L. Austin and the Book of Jonah, in Regina Schwartz (ed. ), The Book and 
the Text. The Bible and Literary Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990,231-36; here 233. 
120 James W. Voelz, What Does This Mean? Principles ofBiblical Interpretation in the 
Post-Modern World, St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1995,275-321; here 278. 
121 Voelz, What Does This Mean?, 279. 
: 22 Voelz, What Does This Mean?, 282. 
123 Hugh C. White, (ed. ), Speech Act Theory and Biblical Criticism (=Semeia 4 1), Decatur, GA: 
Scholars Press, 1988. 
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might have liked to see a practical application') and elsewhere by Amthony Thiselton 
('like an orchestra tuning up for a concert which was never played'). "' 
Many of the methodological points, even when well-made, were not new, such as 
Hugh White's observation that 
speech act theory offers the means to orient literature away from 
various formalisms which detach the text from its historical and 
social matrix, toward its concrete context, without engulfing it 
once again in the psychological, social and historical conditions 
of its production. "' 
Elsewhere entire articles did little more than clarify misconceptions about certain 
aspects of the reception history of Austin's ideas, 126 or offered reasons why, in spite 
of one's better judgments, speech act theory was not to be feared! "' 
The one particularly incisive article in the collection is Susan Lanser's critique of the 
works of Phyllis Trible and Mieke Bal on Genesis 2-3.128 It is perhaps indicative of 
the whole issue of Semeia that its major contribution should occur in an essentially 
negative review of other approaches; rather than offering any substantial positive 
applications itself It is also notable that Lanser is not a biblical critic herself, but 
rather a literary critic who has written elsewhere on the use of speech act theory in 
literary studies. 129 
Lanser uses speech act theory to critique two feminist readings of the Garden of 
Eden story, focusing more on the context rather than the content of them, which leads 
124 Buss, 'Potential and Actual Interactions Between Speech Act Theory and Biblical Studies', 
12 5; Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Speech-Act Theory and the Claim that God Speaks: Nicholas 
Wolterstorff s Divine Discourse', SJT 50 (1997), 97-110; here 97, n. 3. 
125 Hugh C. White, 'Introduction: Speech Act Theory and Literary Criticism', Semeia 41 (1988), 
1-24; here 2. 
126 Thus Michael Hancher's argument that the French have been led astray by unhelpful 
translations of Austin's work; Michael Hancher, 'Performative Utterance, The Word of God, and the 
Death of the Author', Semeia 41 (1988), 27-40. 
127 Thus Daniel Patte, negotiating with his own structuralist sympathies; Daniel Patte, 'Speech 
Act Theory and Biblical Exegesis', Semeia 41 (1988), 85-102. 
128 Susan S. Lanser, '(Feminist) Criticism in the Garden: Inferring Genesis 2-3', Semeia 41 
(1988), 67-84. 
129 See n. 64 above. 
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to the key word in the title of her article: inferring. 13' Her insight is that a speech act 
theory of language 'implies that meaning is created not only by decoding signs but by 
drawing on contextual assumptions to make inferences. "" This is a simple but 
powerful observation, since she uses it to cut through both Trible's and Bal's 
readings, which set out self-consciously to follow only where the text leads. This, 
Lanser demonstrates, is simply not possible: their arguments stress 'the formal 
properties of the text at the expense of the inferential context in which the structure 
appears' whereas 'conventional' readings exhibit 'a fairly standard process of 
inference. 13' The details of her analysis of the works of Trible and Bal need not 
detain us, but her observation that their 'readings break down... because they press a 
formal theory of language beyond its own possibilities' is a timely word of caution in 
the context of contemporary biblical studies. 133 
Lanser suggests specifics concerning the way in which speech act theory anchors the 
text in a life-world, or stream of life, by way of pragmatic implicature. Formalist (or 
'close') readings thus rest on a mistaken theory of language, but as she notes, 'the 
formal approach to language 
... 
has come to count as the "literary" approach both to 
biblical interpretation and to interpretation in general', with profound negative 
consequences for recent attempts to honour the Bible as literature. "' What should 
have been a positive move towards recognising certain literary qualities in the Bible 
has been waylaid by formalism. In contrast, Lanser demonstrates that inferred 
context is a key component of any reading: arguments concerning only what the text 
says are confused, since there is no such thing as only text, but there is always, 
necessarily, an inferred context. 
Daniel Patte follows up Lanser's insights with a clear summary: 
Since for speech act theory the [direction of] fit is "language to 
world", the rules governing concrete actions in the world are the 
focus of attention, and these rules are not inscribed in the text, 
130 Lanser, 'Inferring Genesis 2-3', 69. 
131 Lanser, 'Inferring Genesis 2-3', 70. 
132 Lanser, 'Inferring Genesis 2-3', 73; 72. 
133 Lanser, 'Inferring Genesis 2-3', 75-76. 
134 Lanser, 'Infernng Genesis 2-3', 78. 
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even though the text might provide markers pointing to them. 
These rules are extra-textual. Tlius studying a text as a speech act 
involves taking into account something which is not in the text, 
and yet is part of the communication of meaning by that text. "' 
This, he comments, means that we cannot really talk about analysis at all, since we 
find ourselves required to go outside the text to ground our reading, although he is 
perhaps incautious here in saying that this approach does not require a grounding in 
the text itself, since surely what it does is ground meaning both in and outside the 
text. "' Patte's interests, even in this short article, lie elsewhere; in particular with his 
wish to situate speech act theory with respect to various other forms of biblical 
criticism. However, I suggest that in the above quote, and in Lanser's article which 
draws out this line of reasoning with reference to specific interpretive examples, we 
encounter as clear an articulation as may be had of the precise benefits of utilising 
speech act theory in biblical interpretation. An emphasis on the details of the text is 
balanced by an appreciation of its necessarily extra-textual backing. The more 
popular alternatives of isolating and thus privileging either a reader, or author, or the 
text itself (autonomously') all collapse the communicative situation which actually 
presents itself in the acts of reading and writing. Again, one may acknowledge that 
the various contributions to Semeia 41 do not provide particular samples of biblical 
exegesis which draw on these insights, but nevertheless there are substantial points 
well made here. "' 
In this section I have sought to offer a representative survey of some of the varied 
achievements of 'speech act criticism', in order to illustrate the theoretical issues 
discussed earlier in the chapter concerning the applicability of the criteria of speech 
act theory as a philosophy to the particular issues raised in interpreting texts. In the 
135 Patte, 'Speech Act Theory and Biblical Exegesis', 90. 
136 Patte, 'Speech Act Theory and Biblical Exegesis', 90. 
137 Hugh White, the editor of the Semeia volume, does proceed to more substantial engagement 
with biblical texts (drawn from throughout the book of Genesis) 'in Hugh C. White, Narration and 
Discourse in the Book of Genesis, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Here he draws upon Pratt's work 
on speech act theory (7-9) as well as various other literary critical emphases to discuss the divine 
Voice, notable in Genesis for its lack of specific social location. (101) In particular he seeks to show 
that the unique structure of these Genesis narratives can be traced to the particular literary form of the 
disembodied divine voice acting through the reading of the text. The book is a good example of 
speech act criticism, and indeed draws upon an eclectic critical model, rather than primarily speech 
acttheory. 
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course of discussing how a text is to be read in illocutionary terms, and not least in 
appealing to the work of Stanley Fish in the development of criteria for reading 
strong illocutions, I have consciously postponed a discussion of the nature of the 
'counting as' operation by which a sentence is counted as an illocution. To what 
extent does such an operation place the work of textual interpretation at the mercy of 
those doing the counting? The questions of criteria which concern us in this first part 
of the thesis must now be focused on this topic of construal. 
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Chapter 4 
Construal: Construction without Reduction 
Open a copy of the New Testament, leaf through its pages. What 
do we see?... All that we see is a set of black marks on white 
paper. What does one do with a set of black marks on white 
paper? 
... 
a moment's reflection suggests that, for different kinds 
of text, different kinds of activity count as what we might call the 
primary or fundamental form of their interpretation. ' 
The key Searlean formula for the constitutive rule by which an illocutionary act 
creates an institutional fact is 'X counts as Y in context C. ' This simple analytical 
building block lies at the heart of Searle's whole account, and especially his account 
of social reality. As noted in chapter 2, however, the difficulty in being clear about 
precisely how to understand this formulation is directly proportional to the weight 
invested in it by Searle. An obvious response to it, and one which has gained 
remarkably wide currency in recent years, is to account for constitutive rules as 
entirely generated by the community of interpreters. I shall be calling this the 
'neopragmatist' position, and its most articulate champions are Stanley Fish in the 
field of literary theory, and Richard Rorty in philosophy. My aim in this chapter is to 
draw out the similarities between a speech act approach to texts and the 
neopragmatist view, with the aim of then going on to clarify the differences. To do 
this I will develop an account of construal: the mechanism which I propose stands at 
the heart of reading a text for its illocutionary acts. I shall argue that construal 
operates across a variety of strengths which precludes appealing to it as a uniform 
phenomenon either in an objectivist or pragmatist manner. If construal is indeed so 
Nicholas Lash, 'Performing the Scriptures' in Nicholas Lash, Theology on the Way to 
Emmaus, London: SCM Press, 1986,37-46, here 37. 
2 John R. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy ofLanguage, Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1969,33-35. See ch. 2, §33 above for the background to this discussion. 
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important in a speech act account, then it also seems appropriate to sketch out how I 
see such a constructively orientated epistemology in comparison with various other 
well-known construction-based approaches, in particular the extraordinarily 
influential socal-construction models which have followed in the wake of Peter 
Berger's sociology of knowledge. Thus in the last section of this chapter I attempt to 
show how one may appropriate the idea of construal non-reductively, for which I 
propose the phrase, used as part of the chapter title, 'construction without reduction'. 
This will conclude the discussion of criteria which has occupied the first half of this 
thesis. 
§1 The Neopragmatist Challenge 
§1.1 Stanley Fish: The Strange Case of the Disappearing Te-xt 
In his book Is There A Text in this Class?, Fish collects together his major critical 
essays from the period 1970-80, charting his shifting concerns from'affective 
stylistics' (how the text constrains the reader by guiding her response to each 
successive word or line) to his concluding position that 
the text as an entity independent of interpretation and (ideally) 
responsible for its career drops out and is replaced by the texts 
that emerge as the consequence of our interpretive activities. ' 
The key change occurs in his 1976 article, 'Interpreting the Variorum, " written in 
response to the publication of the initial volumes of the Milton Variorum, which 
surveys the critical history of Milton's works and analyses textual variants. Here, as 
he reflects on how he had been characterising his own reading of disputed lines in 
the light of widely disparate critical views, Fish encounters his Damascus Road: 
I did what critics always do: I "saw" what my interpretive 
principles permitted or directed me to see, and I then turned 
around and attributed what I had "seen" to a text and an intention. 
(163) 
3 Stanley Fish, Is There A Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1980,13. Further page references in the text. 
4 Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, 147-73; originally in Critical Inquiry 2 (1976), 465-85. 
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As a result, Fish urges that 'formal units are always a function of the interpretative 
model one brings to bear'; that 'the critic who confidently rests his analyses on the 
bedrock of syntactic descriptions is resting on an interpretation'; and that 'meanings 
are not extracted but made and made not by encoded forms but by interpretive 
strategies that call forms into being. ' (164; 167; 172-73) 
How else, Fish suggests, can one account for such wide agreement and yet at the 
same time such principled disagreement, between interpretations? Even such 
apparently formal features as line-endings, he argues, are the results of interpretive 
conventions whose significance only becomes apparent within certain communal 
assumptions. (165-66) In short, Fish arrives at the view that all the phenomena of 
agreement and disagreement in interpretation can be traced to the basic issue of one's 
location in an interpretive community: 
Interpretive communities are made up of those who share 
interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) 
but for writing texts, for constituting their properties and 
assigning their intentions. (171) 
'Once again', he concludes, 'I have made the text disappear. ' (173) 
This position reaches full critical expression with the title essay of the book and its 
accompanying, infamous piece, 'How to Recognise a Poem when you see one. His 
well known opening example is of a colleague who was questioned by a student with 
the words 'Is there a text in this classT This turned out to be capably understood in 
two mutually exclusive ways, each of which was apparent in itself. either as a 
question about a set text, or about the teacher's position on Fish's own theory. (305) 
'Notice, ' he writes, 'that we do not have here a case of indeterminacy or 
undecidability but of a determinacy and decidability that do not always have the 
same shape and that can, and in this instance do, change. ' (3 06) Thus, further, 'the 
category of the normal... is not transcendental but institutional' (309), which also 
allows Fish to conclude that due to this institutional community which is always, 
though varyingly, present, the fears of solipsism and relativism are removed. (321). 
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The accompanying illustrative example, of how a list of names for a reading 
assignment was read as a poem by a keen class, is offered as typical of how one's 
conclusion about the meaning of a text is entirely a function of one's interpretive 
procedures. 
§1.2 Anti-foundationalism : Doing What Comes Naturally 
In Doing What Comes Naturally Fish explores the same issues over a wider field,, 
with particular reference to legal studies as well as broader philosophical issues, 
essentially doing little more than claiming that the same argument works in any 
situation one envisages. ' This follows from his view that there is an 'intimate 
relationship between formalism as a thesis in the philosophy of language and 
foundationalism as a thesis about the core constituents of human life. ' (5) Combining 
this with his key-note statement in the significant introductory essay, 'once you start 
down the anti-formalist road, there is no place to stop' (2), provides the framework 
for his repeated anti-foundationalist insistence throughout the volume. 
It is important to scrutinise this opening rhetorical flourish, since it contains almost 
the entire argument of the book. Clearly there are parallels between formalism and 
foundationalism, but it is too sweeping to suggest that any argument that works for 
one will work for the other. Fish offers 16 characterisations of this position in rapid 
fire list format, (6) but unless one accepts that they amount to a seamless package 
then most of his succeeding rhetorical strategy is undermined immediately. 
Briefly, I suggest that the thesis that 'anti-foundationalism' labels one coherent 
position with wide-ranging implications across the intellectual spectrum is a 
confused one. It trades on a Cartesian straw man: Western society since Descartes 
has thought that absolute certainty was the hallmark of knowledge, and that 
questions of rationality were always arid everywhere the same. Find one chink in this 
armour, which is of course not difficult, and voila: anti- foundationall sm 
-the new 
world view. ' 
5 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally. Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in 
Literary and Legal Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Further page references are in the text. 
6 Postmodernism, a species of anti-foundationalism, trades on the same confusion. For just 
one example of a more nuanced view of foundations, see the essays collected *in Alvffi Plantinga and 
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The key problem with Fish's account, therefore, is its failure to distinguish between 
'interesting' and 'non-interesting' cases of this phenomenon, as a direct result of the 
global scale of this opening rhetorical announcement. Thus one must note that Fish 
consistently and helpfully draws attention to some of the contingencies involved in 
the hermeneutical enterprise. He is unwilling to allow any theory to assume a 
supposed middle-ground, or should one say a moral high ground, without exposing it 
to rigourous analysis for its ideological and epistemological assumptions. Once 
uncovered, they are then characterised as local and yet inevitably in place. What is 
lacking is a willingness to question to what degree this insight is always an important 
one. 
For example, we drive on the left in Britain. This is our local convention, in place 
before any new driver begins to learn. The claim that this is a local convention, and 
thus 'contingent', is entirely true, but not altogether startling. Even a British driver 
emerging from the Channel Tunnel and driving into France does not experience 
epistemological soul-searching about the sudden relativisation of her ingrained 
driving habits. The important balance to strike here is therefore this: Fish may be 
right, but no significant consequences necessarily follow in any particular case. Of 
course many of his examples are interesting. His more recent discussions of issues 
such as free speech and minority-sensitive legislation are perceptive and challenging. 
There are cases where his thesis that "'Free speech" is just the name we give to verbal 
behaviour that serves the substantive agendas we wish to advance' is a good way of 
uncovering conventions in disputes precisely where the protagonists thought there 
were none. ' Further, there is ail important sense in which Fish is right that, correctly 
understood, his is neither a position of the right or the left, because his 
anti-foundationalism, as a theory, goes nowhere, i. e. it has no consequences! I would 
Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds. ), Faith and Rationality. Reason and Religious Belief in God, Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983. See now also the similar complaints about 
anti-foundationalism of Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Communicative Action and Promise 111 
Interdisciplinary, Biblical, and Theological Hermeneutics', in Roger Lundin, Clarence Walhout, and 
Anthony C. Thiselton, The Promise ofHermeneutics, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans & Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 1999,133-239, especially 209-14. 
7 Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and it's a Good Thing Too, New York 
& Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994,102 (drawn from the powerful title essay, 102-19). 
8 Most eloquently argued in'Anti-Foundationalism, Theory Hope, and the Teaching of 
Composition', in Doing What Comes Naturally, 342-55 (originally 1987); see especially 350; 355. 
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suggest that this follows from the fact that, once Fish's position is articulated M its 
acceptable form, it is best seen as providing an alternative vocabulary for simply 
describing what is the case. It changes nothing, except possibly it dissuades us from 
vain 'theory hope. 9 
It is therefore a mistake to attempt to argue, as many are wont to do, that there is 
some kind of inherent logical implausibility concerning Fish's position. " Critics 
persistently charge that anti-foundationalism is the thesis that there are no 
foundations, and that this is self-contradictory since it is a foundation itself In 
literary critical terms, the charge is the familiar one that Fish reserves the right to 
have his theory read correctly but denies such a possibility in his theory itself Of 
course since Fish is only arguing that any foundation (or meaning or interpretation) 
is local and contingent, he has little difficulty in dispensing with this view. " In any 
case, as Stephen Moore has observed, Fish's view is in many ways best seen as a 
literary corollary of the broader philosophical position that so-called naYve 
empiricism (sometimes simply naYve realism) is untenable, and in philosophical 
terms this is a broadly accepted view-" The debate is less over whether it is correct, 
but in what sense it is best understood. 
§1.3 Fish in the Context of Neopragmatism 
This is not the place for a fall discussion of neopragmatism, nor even an attempt to 
define it clearly. Its typically American blend of thinking, seeking to incorporate the 
pragmatic insights of Peirce, James and Dewey, is characterised by Cornel West as 
9 This is a contested evaluation of Fish. It is Fish's own view (see above note) but most of 
those who follow him believe that the abandonment of theory hope is a substantive achievement with 
various political ramifications. See the discussion below. 
10 A recent article by Paul Noble attempts to show up various illogicalities in Fish's position, 
but achieves this by making explicit assumptions which prejudge the substantive issues raised; Paul 
R. Noble, 'Hermeneutics and Post-Modernism: Can We Have a Radical Reader-Response TheoryT, 
RelStud 30 (1994), 419-36 and 31 (1995), 1-22; especially Part 1: 423-24. 
11 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 29-30. 
12 Stephen D. Moore, Literary Criticism and the Gospels. The Theoretical Challenge, London 
& New Haven: Yale UP, 1989,116. See 113-28 for Moore's reflections on Fish vis-i-vis biblical 
studies. On 116 Moore quotes Frank Lentricchia's claim that it is telling that common sense 
philosophical positions are asserted but not defended (Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980,146). 1 suggest that Searle's work should now be seen as 
something of a counter-example to this. 
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antifoundationalist without necessarily being anti-realist; anti-theory although not 
always to such Fish-like lengths; ` and committed to epistemic pluralism without, as 
West has it, 'epistemic promiscuity', a reference to the besetting obsession with how 
neopragmatism avoids the bogey of 'relativism' (whatever such a term might mean in 
an anti-foundational context). " The predominance of neopragmatism today is 
probably fairly attributed to the influence of Richard Rorty, whose Philosophy and 
the Mirror ofNature represents something of a manifesto in the form of a revisionist 
account of Western philosophy as 'an episode in the history of European culture'. " 
Fish and Rorty do not always agree, " but in setting Fish's interpretive approach into 
a wider philosophical perspective Rorty's work provides a helpful focus for 
discussion. 
Rorty himself has more than once commended a Fish-ian vision of interpretive 
understanding, making the connections between textual interpretation and a wider 
philosophical perspective in his articles 'Texts and Lumps' and 'The Pragmatist's 
Progress'. " For Rorty, pragmatism is all about making useful distinctions which 
enable us to clarify issues and argue persuasively with one another. Discussion and 
persuasion are all we have left since there is no court of appeal beyond our practices. 
Indeed,. when examined in detail, language, personhood and society turn out to have 
13 See the essays (including one by Fish) collected in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed. ), Against Theory: 
Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press 1985. 
14 Cornel West, 'The Limits of Neopragmatism', in Michael Brint & William Weaver (eds. ), 
Pragmatism in Law & Society, Boulder, CO & Oxford: Westview Press, 1991,121-26. For a good 
discussion of the shape of the 'relativism' issue in this context see Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism. Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1983,197-206 andpassim. 
Is Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1979, here 
390. A statement of his intent appears as'The World Well Lost', JP 69 (1972), 649-65, reprinted in 
Richard Rorty, Consequences ofPragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1982,3-18. 
16 In particular Fish is critical of Rorty's view that we are better off in any way for laying bare 
contingency in social mechanisms. See Stanley Fish, 'Almost Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence of 
Richard Posner, Richard Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin', originally in Brint & Weaver, Pragmatism in 
Law & Society, 47-8 1; reprinted in Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, 200-30; especially 
214-19. 
17 Richard Rorty, 'Texts and Lumps', NLH 17 (1985), 1-16; idem, 'The Pragmatist's Progress', 
in Umberto Eco, Interpretation and Over-Interpretation, ed. Stefan Collini, Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1992,89-108. He is responding here to Umberto Eco's attempt to delimit valid interpretation 
from over- interpretation ('Overinterpreting texts', Interpretation and Over-Interpretation, 45-66). 
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no essential nature. In lieu of such essences, Rorty's vision is of a radically 
contingent world where liberal pluralism offers the best way forward yet discovered, 
and solidarity with one's fellow travellers the most helpful ethical and moral 
guideline for coping with life as we live it. To expect more from philosophy is to live 
in vain hope, according to Rorty. " 
The particular point which concerns us here is the implications of this neopragmatic 
position for questions of interpretation. Rorty's non-essentialism results in a 
hermeneutic predicated upon the notion that 'all anybody ever does with anything is 
use it. "' Thus: 
the coherence of the text is not something it has before it is 
described... It's coherence is no more than the fact that somebody 
has found something interesting to say about a group of marks or 
noises... a text just has whatever coherence it happened to acquire 
during the last roll of the hermeneutic wheel. " 
On this non-essentialist view, the interpreter must avoid trying 'to make an invidious 
distinction between getting it right and making it useful. "' This philosophical 
framework for textual interpretation finds its definitive statement in Jeffrey Stout's 
'What Is the Meaning of a Text? "' 
Stout urges that the root of our disputes over meaning is very simply that we are 
talking about different things when we discuss 'authorial intention', 'contextual 
significance' or the like. Which of our various enquiries should be classified as the 
investigation into 'the meaning' of a text is a matter of our interests and purposes, and 
in the limiting case of a classic text, our interests are sustained indefinitely which is 
why no amount of commentary exhausts the classic. Stout takes his lead from 
Quine's view that 'explication is elimination', viz that a problematic term can be 
These implications of his Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature are. expounded with what one 
might term passionate irony in Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1989. 
19 Rorty, 'Pragmatist's Progress', 93. 
20 Rorty, 'Pragmatist's Progress', 97. 
21 Rorty, 'Pragmatist's Progress', 108. 
22 Jeffrey Stout, 'What Is the Meaning of a Text? ', NLH 14 (1982), 1-12, cf Rorty, 'Pragmatist's 
Progress', 93 n-2. 
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clarified by being replaced with a more clearly delimited term. 23 What happens with 
'meaning', argues Stout, is that in general usage it is always in a sufficiently clear 
context, but we then lose that context in such questions as 'What is meaning? '. 'The 
meaning of a text' is likewise an abstraction to the point where 'meaning' is no longer 
necessarily univocal. Better, then, to talk of whatever it is that does interest us. 
Indeed, on this account, even if God should one day reveal that meaning is authorial 
intention after all, that still would not guarantee that it was the interesting thing about 
texts. It could then be the case that we knew exactly what meaning was and were no 
longer interested in it. Stout appeals to the work of Fish as the ablest exponent of this 
approach to interpretation, as indeed does Rorty. " 
This then is the neopragmatist challenge as it pertains to my own thesis concerning 
speech act theory. Texts are interpreted with reference to the interpretive interest of 
the reader(s). These interests determine what counts as what in interpretation. Speech 
act theory, like any other approach to language, can be subsumed into this 
framework. Not only has it been, by Fish himself indeed, " but it seems positively to 
invite itself in since it postulates 'counting as' as its fundamental mechanism for 
illocutionary acts. Later I shall seek to show that some writers who appeal to speech 
act theory fail to guard against this possibility, but in the next section I propose that a 
sufficiently nuanced approach to speech act theory does offer a way forward. 
§1.4 Neopragm atism an d Speech A ct Th eory: A Differen ce of Criteria 
In my judgment, the question raised by Fish's approach is not whether he is right, but 
more subtly, what criteria are available for discerning the extent to which his thesis is 
interesting in any particular case. It is here that I shall suggest the surface similarities 
of a neopragmatist and a speech act account give way to different approaches. 
In the first place it should be clear that an appeal to speech act theory to evaluate the 
work of Fish cannot lead to a simple affirmation or repudiation of his views. This 
23 Cf W. V. 0. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1960,260. 
24 Stout, 'What Is the Meaning, 8 (and n. 6); Rorty, 'Pragmatist's Progress', 106. 
25 Stanley Fish, 'Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, 
the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying, and Other Special Cases', originally In 
Critical Inquiry 4 (1978), 625-44; reprinted in Fish, Is There A Text in This Class?, 268-92. 
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reflects not only on the various degrees of contextual pragmatism admitted into 
speech act theory by different authors, but also from the fact that Fish himself, 
besides being a former colleague of Searle's, has notedI've been very much 
influenced by J. L. Austin in my thinking about a great many things. "' It is worth 
recalling also that Austin has been thought by some to stand closer to Derrida than to 
Searle. " Others have described Austin's philosophy of language as 'post-modem'; " 
while elsewhere there has been considerable debate about the extent to which 
Wittgenstein's later work may be appropriated both for and against the neopragmatist 
position. One major recent interpretation, that of Saul Kripke, produced an almost 
Fish-like view of community norms for understanding out of the so-called 'private 
language' argument of the Investigations, and although now widely felt to be a 
misreading of Wittgenstein it does indicate a certain spectrum of views on the nature 
of interpretive constraints 
. 
2' Against this background, it is only to be expected that 
there is no such thing as a 'speech act refutation' of the neopragmatic position. 
Fish and Searle 
Fish and Searle were contemporaries at the University of California in Berkeley in 
the 1960's, and it is illuminating to note some congruences between their 
approaches. " 
26 Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, 292 (from a 1992 interview). 
27 See chapter 3, §I above. 
2S See for example the assessment of Nancey Murphy and James Wm. McClendon, Jr, 
'DistMguishing Modem and Postmodern Theologies', MTh 5 (1989), 191-214, especially 201-3. 
29 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982, 
presents a Wittgenstein who looks a lot like Stanley Fish. Vigorous responses include G. P. Baker & 
P. M. S. Hacker, Scepticism, Rules and Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984; and Coli McGinn, 
Wittgenstein on Meaning: An Interpretation and Evaluation, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984, widely 
thought to be conclusive. A recent survey is provided by Marie McGinn, Routledge Philosophy 
Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, London: Routledge, 1997,73-112. 
30 Fish explicitly notes his debt to Searle in Is There a Text in This Class?, vii. Perhaps Searle's 
bemused reference to 'a few whose opinions I respect' (John R. Searle, The Construction of Social 
Reality, London: Penguin, 1995,2), includes Fish. 
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John Searle Stanley Fish 
'the notion of the literal meaning of a 'all speech acts are understood by 
sentence only has application relative way of relying on mutually shared 
to a set of contextual or background background information. ' 
assumptions' 
'there is no constant set of 'There will always be a normal 
assumptions that determine the context, but it will not always be 
applicability of the notion of literal the same one' 
meaning' 
'the notion of absolutely context free 'There always is a literal meaning 
literal meaning does not have general because in any situation there is 
application to sentences... [but] always a meaning that seems 
Literal meaning, though relative, is obvious in the sense that it is there 
still literal meaning' independently of anything we 
might do. But that only means that 
we have already done it. ' 
Despite the widely divergent end results of their respective theories, these quotations, 
drawn in each case from just one 1978 article, appear to indicate definite 
cross-fertilisation of ideas. In each case the quotations represent a substantial part of 
the point being made in the article, not withstanding which Searle and Fish are in 
fact in disagreement over some aspects of the idea of 'literal meaning'. 31 
In fact the Fish quotations here are largely in the context of his rejection of Searle's 
account of indirect speech acts, but clearly the articulation of any point of substantive 
disagreement between them will have to be cautious. It is thus worth underlining the 
fact that, for Searle, speech act theory goes on to underpin a robust account of the 
institutional nature of our constructed social reality, while for Fish, speech act theory 
illustrates the radically contingent nature of interpretation, by showing that all 
meaning is relative to some context: an interpretive convention held by some 
interpretive community. 
Although Searle has never explicitly addressed Fish's point here, I suggest that he 
might respond as follows. Where Fish writes 'all speech acts are understood by way 
of relying on mutually shared background information', Searle would want to 
capitalise 'Background' and thus argue that for certain basic issues of linguistic 
31 The quotations are from John R. Searle, 'Literal Meaning, originally in Erkenntnis 13 (1978) 
and reprinted in idem, Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory ofSpeech Acts, Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1979, ch. 5,117-36; quotes from 117,125, and 132; and Fish, 'Normal Circumstances, 
... 
and Other Special Cases', in Is There A Text in This Class?, 268-92, quotes from 291,287 and 276. 
_ 
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competence there is a common 'Background' which exists as a set of pre-theoretic 
intentional states which are partly constitutive of what it means to be a human being 
and a member of the linguistic community. In any case, for neither Searle nor Fish 
does the contextual nature of meaning and the impossibility of literal meaning pose 
much of a threat to felicitous communication. It simply drives them to differing 
accounts of how such communication takes place. 
If we may speak then of Searle's 'response' to Fish we might characterise it as 
follows: Searle would allow the idea that texts are understood against community 
assumptions, but would insist that for a significant proportion of cases the 
community is large enough to include anybody who speaks the language. " 
In true Austininan style, then, I propose that here is 'the bit where you say it and the 
bit where you take it back': " Fish lays bare the role of the reader or of the reading 
community in counting a text as a certain type of speech act. However, he fails to 
provide any criteria for this 'counting as', and concludes that it is always uniformly 
rhetorical. Searle's approach holds out much greater hope of criteria, through his 
distinction between a Background and what he elsewhere calls the 'network'. " 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that in Searle's writings, the criteria for'counting as' 
are often unexplored. As Sandy Petrey notes, albeit with a different agenda: 
Searle's emphasis on what an utterance counts as over the 
conventions through which it comes to count has the effect of 
devaluing the Austinian dialectic between illocutionary force and 
social identity. This change in emphasis leads to curious instances 
of completely asocial performatives. " 
32 In this connection one might also note that Wittgenstein also frequently takes humankind as 
a reference point, but is also willing to 'imagine a form of life' where localised conventions are M 
place. Note, for example: 'What determines our judgment, our concepts and reactions, is not what 
one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions(Ludwig 
Wittgenstem, Zettel, Oxford: Blackwell, '1981 (1967), §567) as well as his well-known discussions of 
forms of life (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 'l 967 (1953), 
§§7,19 and p. 226). 
33 J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1962,2. Or, as Eco put it to Rorty, 
'OK, all interpreters are equal, but some of them are more equal than others', Umberto Eco, 'Reply', M 
Eco (ed. Collim), Interpretation and Overinterpretation, 13 9-5 1; here 13 9. 
34 For a fall account see ch. 2, §3.4 above. 
35 Sandy Petrey, Speech Acts and Literary Theory, New York & London: Routledge, 1990,63. 
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It is time therefore to attempt to provide a fuller account of this operation of 
'counting as' or, to use a slightly more elegant formulation, of construal. 
Before turning to this, perhaps one final comment on Fish's approach is worth 
making. There is one line of thought in Fish which I think offers something of a 
counterargument to his more usual position. His view that there is no such entity as a 
'text' clearly problematizes the notion of 'interpretive constraint', and with it makes 
one wonder what it is that accounts for a change in interpretation. " Fish's response is 
to note that 'beliefs are not all held at the same level or operative at the same time. 67 
However this suggests the possibility that we can achieve critical distance, or 
perspective, on a text within Fish's model precisely because we are not people who 
have only one idea at a time and only exist within one interpretive community at a 
time. In the survey essay which introduces Doing What Comes Naturally, Fish offers 
the following refinements of this thesis: 
each of us is a member of not one but innumerable interpretive 
communities in relation to which different kinds of belief are 
operating with different weight and force... 
One is often "conflictually" constrained, that is, held in place by a 
sense of a situation as requiring negotiation between conflicting 
demands that seem equally legitimate... 
constraints are themselves relational and shifting and... in the act 
of organizing and assimilating contingent experience constraints 
are forever bringing about their own modification. " 
These points are perhaps under-rated in general in evaluations of Fish's stance, and 
certainly in appropriations of his work in biblical studies and theological discourse, 
whether in support of him or in dismissal of his 'relativism'. They lend themselves to 
the epithet 'inter- subjective' in contrast to either subjectivism or objectivism. What 
they still do not do, of course, is provide any actual criteria as to how one's 
36 This charge is well made by Steven Rendall, 'Fish vs. Fish', Diacritics 12.4 (1982), 49-57; 
who observed that 'Changes in our beliefs about "what is out there" are for Fish always Kuhnian 
paradigm changes, never gradual or partial (with respect to the point at issue) but sudden and 
complete... he is forced to adopt this model largely because he refuses to allow for differences of level 
or degree. ' (54) 
37 Fish, 'Change', in Doing What Comes Naturally, 141-60; here 146. This article is partly a 
response to Rendall. 
38 Fish, 'Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road'M Doing What Comes Naturally, 30,31,32. 
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inter-subjective community commitments can be constrained by texts, since Fish is 
denying that texts exist to do any such thing. 39 However, in these passages, Fish does 
seem to be moving away from a monolithic account of 'counting as'with all the 
problems which that entails, not least elsewhere in his own writings. 40 
§2 Different Degrees of Construal 
If the neopragmatists are right, then it is illocutions which vary according to 
community conventions, while locutions remain more or less stable across 
community boundaries. However, the fact that illocutions are relative to a 
community's conventions (i. e. to what it is that makes x count as y) does not tell us 
anything about how widespread such conventions may be. In one sense, a text may 
indeed mean anything at all; but this observation is of neither interest nor import. In 
his discussion of literal meaning, Searle himself demonstrates that it will always be 
possible to articulate ftulher imaginable construals of any utterance, without limit. " 
The appropriate question is rather to ask what it does in fact mean, i. e. in what ways 
is the text taken, construed or read? To phrase this point differently: a given locution 
is counted as an illocution. The question to ask is then: what counting operations are 
in place which produce this construal? 
The problem of criteria which occupies this chapter is thus simple to state: what 
makes a construal a good one? or, what is the same thing, when is a construal 
acceptable? This question is familiar enough in terms of political or ideological 
readings of texts. My proposal is that it is in fact the basic question which speech act 
theory forces upon us for all reading, and thus need not have any specific political or 
ideological motivation at all. 
39 This is the point highlighted by Stefan Collini against Rorty in his 'Introduction: 
Interpretation terniinable and interrmnable', in Eco (ed. Collini), Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation, 1-21; here 12. 
40 That this point itself has implications against much of what Fish writes is clear in that it was 
anticipated by a prominent line of criticism of his work. Mary Louise Pratt suggests that the multiple 
and variously formed nature of our community commitments complicates irredeemably Fish's model 
of the interpretive community as a community fundamentally predicated on interpretive predilection. 
See Mary Louise Pratt, 'Interpretive Strategies/Strategic Interpretations: On Anglo-American Reader 
Response Criticism', Boundary 2 11 (1982), 201-3 1, especially 228. 
41 Searle, 'Literal Meaning', 128. 
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§2.1 A Minimal Position 
If our view of language is representational, i. e. the purpose of language is simply to 
represent states of affairs, or describe facts, or however we might wish to 
characterise Wittgenstein's idea of 'the Augustinian view of language', then the 
process of reading a text can be seen in very straightforward terms. Basically, on this 
view, we just read X, where X is a locution. If we are pressed to greater 
sophistication within this view, we might say that we read X as meaning Y. 
However, Y here will be another locution, or an alternative way of describing what X 
describes. 
This view of language is widespread in discussions of biblical interpretation. 
Preoccupation with whether the states of affairs reported by X were in fact as stated 
is common across the theological spectrum. 'It didn't happen', says one critic, 
concluding that the Bible is unreliable or untrustworthy; whereas another replies that 
it did indeed happen, and hence the Bible is historically reliable and authoritative. 
The authority here, it must be said, derives from another source, traditionally a view 
of the status of the Bible as the Word of God, inspired by God himself Hence, when 
Paul writes to the Corinthians that they should set aside money on the first day of the 
week for a collection for when he comes, this is read simply as a statement of what 
Paul instructed the Corinthians. Any relevance it may have to today's reader, or any 
seýflinvolvement of the reader with this text, derives from elsewhere, such as from a 
belief that some kind of principle is enunciated here which the Christian believer 
should follow. The significance of the locution, following Hirsch, is not its meaning. 
This view is best seen as a minimal position on construal. The construal is, we might 
say, empty, and although technically one might still say X is construed as meaning X 
(or Y)', this is nothing more than an elaborate way of saying that X simply does 
mean such-and-such. 
§2-2 A Different Basic Formulation 
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Our discussion of speech act theory in chapter 2 however, gave us a different basic 
formulation: 
in reading we construe locutions (X) as illocutions (Y) 
If this is so then the minimal position described above must be capable of being 
articulated according to this different view, and of course it is. The minimal position 
can indeed be characterised thus: in reading, we construe a locution (X) as the 
illocution (Y) which simply is the asserting of X. This is in general not especially 
interesting, nor perhaps very helpful. " It casts all language into Donald Evans'flat 
constative' mode. " However, one must not lose sight of the fact that, in certain cases, 
and indeed quite common cases, fact-stating is a perfectly respectable illocution. 
That our basic interpretive move is that of reading locutions as illocutions is a 
proposal which has only recently been taken up in theological circles. Francis 
Watson offers a speech-act 'defence of some unfashionable concepts'which includes 
the following claim: 
To be understood at all, a series of words must be construed as a 
communicative action which intends a determinate meaning 
together with its particular illocutionary and perlocutionary 
force. " 
The way in which Watson develops this claim will be considered later, " but it does 
not lead him in the same direction as a similar way of articulating the interpretive 
task offered by Nicholas Wolterstorff When he approaches his specific 
hermeneutical proposals in Divine Discourse we find him saying: 
The essence of discourse lies not in the relation of expression 
holding between inner life and outer signs, but M the relation of 
counting as holding between a generating act performed in a 
42 However it might be possible to draw out the implications of such a formulation for the 
status of the speaker-author in the reader's community, which would be far from trivial. In biblical 
studies this could be relevant to the various kinds of canon or canonical criticism. 
43 Donald D. Evans, The Logic of Self-Involvement A Philosophical Study ofEveryday 
Language with Special Reference to the Christian Use ofLanguage about God as Creator, London: 
SCM, 1963,56. For'constative'we would more likely now read 'assertive'. 
44 Francis Watson, Text and Truth. Redefining Biblical Theology, Edinburgh: T. &T. Clark, 
1997,103. 
45 See chapter 8, §3.1 below. 
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certain situation, and the speech act generated by that act 
performed in that situation. The goal of interpretation, 
correspondingly, is to discover what counts as what. 46 
Wolterstorff s discussion of what he terms 'count-generation', although helpful in its 
clarification of the public-domain issues involved, does not consider the issues raised 
by the 'neopragmatist challenge'. 47 He offers a discussion of what it is to speak in 
which he suggests that what it is for X to count as Y is that the 'speaker and audience 
ought to count it as that 
- 
ought to acknowledge it as that in their relations with each 
other. "' Counting is a question of the moral relationship between a speaker and a 
hearer: 'To institute an arrangement for the performance of speech actions is to 
institute a way of acquinng rights and responsibilities', and to speak is 'to take up a 
normative stance in the public domain. 49 
This is clearly a more subtle framework than the 'flat-assertive view'. However, it is 
perhaps susceptible to being seen as equally monolithic, and thus equally 
problematic. As a polemical response to a world of fact-stating discourse 
Wolterstorff s view is successful. The problem is that it appears to move all discourse 
over to the constructivist position advocated by the likes of Fish: it leaves every 
illocution at the mercy of the interpretive community. In particular, if the Bible is to 
be interpreted for God's voice, which is Wolterstorff s governing thesis, then the 
proposal offered in Divine Discourse might give rather too much comfort to sectarian 
readings which will feel free to justify themselves with the argument that they are 
indeed counting textual locutions as various divine illocutions. The spectre of 
pietistic relativism, that most authoritarian of all relativisms, looms large. I wish to 
propose, as an alternative, a middle way. 
§2-3 A Mediating Proposal 
46 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse. Philosophical reflections on the claim that God 
speaks, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995,183, bold emphasis added. 
47 In addition to the discussion in Divine Discourse, 75-94, see also Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
Works and Worlds ofArt, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980,202-15. 
48 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 84. 
49 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 84; 93. 
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It is a mistake to recognise only two options: fact-stating flat assertives and locutions 
which are counted as illocutions. Rather these two options represent widely 
divergent and perhaps extreme positions across a spectrum of interpretive construals. 
As an initial characterisation, we may say that the idea of construal varies across a 
spectrum of strengths. Consider the following varieties of construal: 
we read X as Y 
... 
in context C 
we see / look on X as Y it 
we take / count X as Y it 
we construe / interpret X as Y if 
we consider X as Y it 
we conclude that X must be Y It 
we declare (arbitrarily? ) X to be Y if 
we read X as if it were Y it 
These possible formulations are not offered as a definitive list, nor even as being all 
mutually exclusive. The list moves approximately from what I shall call 'weak' 
construal, where the deliberative aspect involved in construing X as Y is minimal or 
non-existent, through to 'stronger', i. e. more deliberative construals. Often, in the 
process of reading a familiar text, there is no deliberative element at all, and indeed 
we would, if pressed, probably adopt the minimal position of §2.1 above in saying 
that X simply is Y. 
Acknowledging the idea that the notion of construal. is not monolithic does raise 
certain questions for an interpreter. For instance, one may consider to what extent 
onels construal is an arbitrary choice, or a reasonable judgment, or required by the 
facts of the situation. That this varies in different situations does not mean that the 
question is in principle impossible to answer in any given situation, and it follows 
that admitting the idea of construal. into the interpretive process does not in itself 
foreclose any particular interpretive position on how a textual locution is to be read. 
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Seen in these terrns, the problem with choosing to articulate the notion of interpretive 
construal in the manner of Fish is that a confusion takes place between the idea that a 
text is construed and the degree of difference that this might make in any particular 
case. Evidence that locutions are construed as illocutions, which is not necessarily a 
problematic idea, may then be marshalled for the extreme position that there is no 
point of appeal above and beyond the reading community's decision to count X as Y. 
In other words, construal is seen (monolithically) as counting as, and counting as in 
turn is seen as a constructive operation, and it is then said to follow that the meaning 
of a text is purely a product of one's reading strategy. This argument fails at the first 
step: accepting that all reading involves construal does not foreclose the question of 
constructivism. 
Two related observations may be made here. The first is that construal in this sense 
of reading X as Y has a long and honourable hermeneutical history, particularly in 
biblical interpretation. It is at the heart of Bultmann's hermeneutical programme for 
demythologising the New Testament. Language about the second coming of Christ, 
to take the obvious example, is construed as the language of existential address: be 
prepared! There is not a problem with this provided that it is recognised that the 
notion of construal operating here is a strong, constructive one. Thenapouala 
language is being taken as address, or counted as address, and in itself it is not 
address, but appears to present itself as fact-stating discourse. The fact that one must 
construe the language in order to read it does not in itself demonstrate that Bultmann 
is right. One can, and indeed perhaps should, accept his methodology without 
accepting his substantive exegetical conclusions, and whether one accepts his 
conclusions is ultimately a judgment about the propriety, or more pragmatically the 
usefulness, of locating the point of existential address in such language. " 
Secondly, given the particular preoccupation with historical questions which has 
been so prominent in biblical studies, it is perhaps inevitable that a call to recognise 
50 A thorough discussion of Bultmann's hermeneutical approach, with examples, and which 
also suggests that it is insufficiently nuanced, is given by Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons. 
New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans & Carlisle: 
Paternoster Press, 1980,205-92; and with specific reference to the approach of Donald Evans by way 
of contrast; 268-69. 
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the workings of construal in reading will sound, at first, like an anti-historical 
polemic. Thus it is, I would venture to suggest, that speech act theory is allied to 
postmodern concerns, or seen as vindicating an anti-foundationalist epistemology, or 
simply as one more variety of reader-response criticism. That one can envisage 
Wolterstorff and Bultmann standing at the same end of the hermeneutical spectrum 
should indicate that this would be a mistaken analysis. Again, to reiterate the point, 
admitting the notion of construal into one's interpretive investigation does not 
foreclose questions of historical commitment, fact-stating language, existential 
address or reception history. Rather it foregrounds them and insists that illocutionary 
force must be considered appropriately in each case. 
§2.4 A Spectrum of Construal 
I have suggested above that construal operates across a spectrum of strengths. A 
preliminary characterisation of this spectrum might be broadly as follows: 
*- Strong Spectrum of Weak 
-+ 
Strong Construals construals Weak Construals 
constructive; constructivist; impressed upon us; 'flat 
deliberative; (pragmatic) assertives'; universally held 
taking X as Y 
-Characteristically- seeing X as Y 
Fish, Rorty (arbitrary); 
-e. g. - a more 'traditional' position; 
Bultmann (existential) (e. g. representational; 
conservative) 
The notion of a spectrum of strengths of construal. is not a familiar one in the 
literature of speech act theory, nor in appropriations of speech act theory in biblical 
and theological work, but it does have some precedent in other discussions which 
concern themselves with construal. In particular, in hermeneutical. discussion, one 
encounters the notion of construal in considerations of the role of imagination. I will 
touch briefly on this area below, " but here I acknowledge the helpful insight of 
Walter Brueggemann, attributed in turn to the work of his former research student 
Tod Linafelt, that the notion of construal operates across a range of criteria from 
constructivist positions ('We choose to count X as Y siMply because we do') through 
51 See §3-1 below. 
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to receptive (or passive) positions ('X simply is Y and it is not a question of our 
choice'). " I judge that this insight can be utilised in this different area of reading 
locutions for illocutions. 
On one level it is not new to propose using the notion of construal in interpretation. 
Indeed the category plays a significant role in David Kelsey's discussion of 'the uses 
of scripture in recent theology', which begins its analysis of what it might mean to 
'prove doctrine' from Scripture by observing that 
theologians... do not appeal to some objective text-in-itself but 
rather to a text construed as a certain kind of whole having a 
certain kind of logical force. " 
Using this insight as his framework, Kelsey spends the first half of his book 
analysing the work of seven different theologians, ranging from B. B. Warfield to 
Karl Barth, and including Tillich and Bultmann, to look at what kinds of construal. of 
the text authorise their specific theological proposals. " It is however debatable 
whether Kelsey does succeed in offering particular criteria for assessing one's 
construal, or rather whether his own proposal will work without some such notion as 
varying degrees of construal. " I suggest in fact that speech act theory offers a way of 
refining the kind of account which Kelsey sought to provide. " 
52 Walter Brueggemann, Texts Under Negotiation. The Bible and Postmodern Imagination, 
Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1993,16. 
53 David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975, 
14. 
54 Kelsey, Uses of Scripture, 17-88, with the program set out on 14-17. 
55 He seems to equivocate between saying that'once the imaginative judgment is made, it is 
open to reasoned assessment' (17 1) and that exegesis 'depends on a prior decision about how to 
construe and use the texts' which 'is not itself corrigible by the results of any kind of biblical study' 
(197-20 1). Some steps towards looking for a theological demarcation of the merits of different 
construals are present in David H. Kelsey, 'The Bible and Christian Theology', JAAR 48 (1980), 
385 
-402, which is more helpful in this regard but perhaps still hampered by its singular notion of 
construal. 
56 A similar view is expressed by Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech-Acts: The 
Doctrine of Scripture Today', in Philip E. Satterthwalte & David F. Wright (eds. ), A Pathway into the 
Holy Scripture, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994,143-8 1; here 161-62, describing Kelsey's book as 
'magisterial'. Vanhoozer does not have the particular point about strength of construal in mind, but 
rather the broader appeal to speech act theory. 
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Thus, although construal is not a new category, it has not in general been a category 
used with sufficient precision. Perhaps because of the apparent polarisation between 
fact-stating approaches and self-involving approaches to biblical language, 
discussions of construal have not in general made use of the idea of a specifically 
institutional fact created by a constitutive rule. It is in exploring the congruence 
between these two approaches that I shall suggest that we are enabled to answer such 
questions as how far such a rule can operate independently of the interpretive 
community's choice to adopt it. 
Could one, in the limiting case, create a constitutive rule by fiat, for example? In 
certain institutional settings this is precisely what happens. The cricket umpire calls 
'no ball' and the illocution is the declaration that the batsman cannot be out this 
delivery. New situations require new rules: what, for instance, is to count as the 
declaration of '5 runs for the ball hitting a safety helmet'; an unforeseen occurrence 
when cricket's laws were originally composed. In such cases the locution is counted 
as a certain, specified illocution. 
In many cases, and perhaps more interesting cases, there is no such deliberate rule 
put forward. Jonathan Culler, in the course of discussing how limit setting in 
language always leads to the possibility of those limits being (deconstructively) 
over-turned, notes that 
Wittgenstein's suggestion that one cannot say "bububu" and mean 
"if it does not rain I shall go out for a walk, " has, paradoxically, 
made it possible to do just that. 57 
In such a case, the remark is taken as a certain, assumed illocution. We say that a 
locution is taken as an illocution when there is still a certain amount of deliberative 
judgment involved, but when, in general, there has not been an explicit stipulation to 
this effect beforehand. 
Thus a student's semi-literate grunts during a tutorial are taken as the illocution 
'Please continue your explanation (since I'm following you so far). 'The locution'I'm 
57 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction. Theory and Criticism after Structuralism, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983,124; referring here to the remark of Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, p. 18. 
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cold' may be taken as the illocution of requesting another person to open a window. 
'I would love to buy this book off you but cannot afford it' is taken as a request to 
lower the price. These, of course, are some of the very examples often used to 
illustrate the point of introducing a category such as performative language. I am 
suggesting that we have arrived at them here by way of more precise criteria. 
As the deliberative step involved in construal becomes smaller so it becomes more 
appropriate to say rather that a locution is seen as (or read as) an illocution. " The 
dividing line, of course, is blurred, and I do not intend to suggest that there need be 
any straightforward linguistic delineation of strong and weak construals. 
Nevertheless, different construing phrases do give clues about different strengths of 
construal, in particular when we are confronted with a phrase which is clearly 
in-appropriate. 
Wittgenstein's discussion of 'seeing as', in which he develops his idea of the dawning 
of an 'aspect', focuses at one point on how we talk about our experience of such 
objects as Jastrow's duck-rabbit. " What if, he asks, we only see it as a picture of a 
rabbit, unaware of any ambiguity? Then: 
I should not have answered the question "What do you see here? " 
by saying: "Now I am seeing it as a picture-rabbit". I should 
simply have described my perception... It would have made as 
little sense for me to say "Now I am seeing it as... " as to say at the 
sight of a knife and fork "Now I am seeing this as a knife and 
fork". 
... 
One doesn't 'take'what one knows as the cutlery at a 
mealfor cutiery. 'o 
This captures my point about the deliberative step involved in more constructive 
approaches such as 'taking as', and allows that as we come to the 'weak' end of the 
spectrum, the notion of construal finally becomes empty, even if one could in theory 
use it to explain the interpretive step: 'I construe your locution I am going for a 
58 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Pt. IL § 11 (esp. p. 193-208) for the classic 
discussion of 'seeing as. A recent survey is provided by McGinn, Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the 
Philosophical Investigations, 177-204. 
59 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 194. 
60 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 194-95. Wittgenstein and Heldegger agree here, 
although Heidegger emphasises functionality with his idea of something being ready-to-hand. See 
Stephen Mulhall, On Being in the World Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects, London: 
Routledge, 1990. 
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walk" as the assertion that you are going for a walk. ' We find it more natural to say 
here that the meaning of the sentence is apparent, and no construal is necessary 
It is worth noting, briefly, that there is no obvious correlation between strong 
illocutions 
, 
in the sense I defined it in chapter 2, and strong construals. An explicit 
strong illocution such as 'I promise to be there' requires minimal construal. A weak 
illocution such as 'John sat down' may be read as an assertion; taken as an indication 
of John's protest; counted as the end of his speech, and so on. Strength of construal is 
an additional variable to strength of illocution, not a correlated one. 
§2.5 Interpretive Interests Revisited 
In the light of this discussion it is now possible to return to the Fish-Rorty- Stout 
argument about preferred vocabularies, and their claim that disputes about the 
meaning of sentences are really disguised arguments about reading conventions and 
their relative strength. 
In cases of strong construal it would seem that this might be a sustainable thesis. 
However, as the degree of construal involved becomes weaker it becomes harder to 
argue that it can support the weight of being dubbed a'reading strategy'. If a reading 
strategy is a conscious, foregrounded interpretive decision, such as the decision say 
to read the Song of Songs as an allegory about Christ and the church, then one can 
allow that differences of opinion about the 'meaning' of a particular text in the Song 
of Songs can all be expressed, without remainder, as differences between how one 
and the same locution (X) is being taken as or counted as different illocutions (Yl, 
Y2 
... 
). 
Weaker construals, however, do not draw upon any such interpretive 'strategy'. 
Rather they proceed in terms of seeing X as Y, and if two contesting voices are 
arguing about the relative merits of Yl and Y2, then their debate is most likely about 
the meaning of X, rather than the construal of X as an illocution. 
In short, we want to accept, with Stout, that disputes over meaning do indeed on 
occasion devolve on to disputes about interpretive interests; and we can accept, With 
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Fish, that these interests are community-relative; and we can perhaps even agree with 
Rorty that much of the time what is most interesting in disputes about meaning and 
truth is the pragmatic question of what difference it makes in promoting certain 
values and courses of action today. But these arguments all rely at some crucial point 
on the notion of construal, and they all go on to assume that construal is uniformly 
strong; indeed that is strongly constructive. 
We can now see clearly why this creates the tension noted above in Fish's later work, 
where he does allow that interpretive interests shift in intensity, and that one interest 
now upholds, now displaces another. " This amounts to the view that construal is a 
variable, but once admitted, this will undermine the 'neopragmatist position'. 
The neopragmatist assumption of uniformly strong construal is in fact a sustainable 
assumption if and only if the interpretive constraint on the Y term provided by the X 
term is unifom-i. Uniform constraint requires one of two positions: either construal. is 
uniformly empty, which is the 'traditional' view of language as representation, where 
X simply is Y; or construal is everything. It seems to me that the rhetorical move 
made by Fish and others at this point is without merit. Fish et al correctly reject the 
former, and indeed win friends in so doing. But the counter-intuitive position that 
construal is everything ultimately leads to the view that the act of counting as 
involved in the construal. is so strong that the locution (X) involved plays no role at 
all in determining what the Y shall be. It then follows, of course, that there is really 
nothing essential (or enduring) in the X term, except the conventionally perceived 
interpretive construct. X has no essence; it is whatever we make it. Thus, should one 
want to defend the position that interpretive dispute is solely the product of 
competing reading strategies, one will find that textual constraint on interpretation 
has dropped out, and while this does indeed happen often (and sometimes 
interestingly), the claim that it happens always and everywhere simply is the claim 
that there is no text there to constrain us in the first place. Uniform construal and 
non-essentialism are, then, the same claim; the opposite sides of the same coin. It 
seems confused, therefore, to offer either one as evidence for the other, but this 
appears to be one of the gambits of the neopragmatist argument. 
61 See n. 40 above. 
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One other consideration should be brought to bear on the position articulated by 
Stout's 'What is the Meaning of a TextT. In an apparently neglected article, Austin 
himself argued, much as Stout seeks to do, that a question like 'what is the meaning 
of a wordT is hopelessly confused, since it involves unwarrantable generalisation 
away from perfectly good questions like'what is the meaning of "rat"T" For Austin 
the generalisation leads to nonsense. For Stout, however, although he thinks 'what is 
the meaning of a textT does not deserve an answer, this is not because it is nonsense 
but because, following Quine, we can paraphrase it eliminatively to reveal that it was 
really a question about something else, namely whatever interested us about the 
text. 63 But, as Austin might put it, 'what is the meaning of a textT is not referring to 
any text, but rather to no text at all, and is therefore inevitably confused. ' 
Nevertheless, on Austin's account, one can still ask the meaningful question 'What 
does'Love your neighbour' meanT, whereas on Stout's account the meaningful is 
dispensed with along with the nonsense. It seems to me that this is a particular case 
of the problems of following Quine down the road of logical paraphrase into what is 
sometimes called 'post-positivism'. It must suffice here to suggest that all sorts of 
counter-intuitive results lie down this path, and that despite protests to the contrary, 
this should give one pause for thought before embarking upon it. 61 
Conclusions 
On the one hand I have sought to demonstrate why an approach such as that of Fish 
can be seen to make so many telling points in particular cases. Fish's studies of 
particular interpretive issues can be illuminating because he generally focuses on 
cases of strong construal. " His argument is less strong where he extends without 
62 J. L. Austin, 'The Meaning of a Word' in his Philosophical Papers, edited by J. 0. Urmson & 
G. J. Warnock, Oxford: Oxford UP, '1979 (1961), 55-75, especially 56-62. 
63 Stout, 'What is the Meaning of a TextT, 1-2. 
64 Austin, 'The Meaning of a Word', 5 8. 
65 On Quine's subtle but far-reaching divergence from ordinary language or analytical 
philosophy see P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth- Century Analytic Thought, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996,183-227; cf ch. 2 n. 57 above. The most obvious example I have in mind in this 
paragraph is Donald Davidson, 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs', in Ernest Lepore (ed. ), Truth and 
Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy ofDonald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, 
433-46: J conclude that there is no such thing as a language' (446). This conclusion is, we should 
note, welcomed by Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 14-20. 
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warrant the assumption of strong construal into cases where it is not at home. " 
Thus, in order to encompass both the insights of such an approach, and to explain 
accurately its limitations, I have pursued a more broadly based and nuanced 
understanding of construal. which attempts to do justice to the wide variety of ways 
in which we do in fact read and interpret texts. This has involved the idea of a 
spectrum of strengths of construals, which must be considered case by case. It is 
within such a framework that I appeal to speech act theory in interpretation without 
thereby committing myself to a neopragmatist position, and I suggest that it is in 
such a way that other appeals to speech act theory should also be understood. 
In the remainder of this chapter I explore briefly some issues arising from this 
account. Firstly, I look at some of the ways in which this discussion of construal 
offers tools for evaluating various approaches to theology and biblical interpretation. 
Secondly, I try to clarify the way in which construal, which will go on to play an 
important role in part 2 of this thesis, can be seen as a constructive element of a 
hermeneutical or epistemological framework without being necessarily theologically 
reductive; i. e without reducing theology to mere constructivism. This will clear the 
way for the use of the various criteria developed thus far to be taken up in the actual 
practice of biblical interpretation in later chapters. 
§3 Construal and Theological and Biblical Studies 
§3.1 The Theology of the Imagination 
I have already noted that the idea of construal may be found in discussions of the 
imagination. " Although often derided in the Western philosophical tradition as mere 
fantasy or speculation, imagination has a strong tradition as a serious mode of 
philosophical enquiry. " In particular, imaginative construal occupies a significant 
66 Especially of various Milton passages, in his Is There a Text in this Class? 
67 As with'How to Recognize a Poem When You See One'where he reportsI told them [the 
class] that what they saw on the blackboard was a religious poem'. In so saying he carries over a 
strong construal into a situation (a recommended reading list) which invites a weaker one; Fish, Is 
There a Text M this Class?, 323. 
68 See n. 51 above. 
69 See Mary Wamock, Imagination, Berkeley: UnIversIty of Califorma Press, 1976. 
Chapter 4- Page 137 
place in modem philosophical debate, particularly concerning the nature of 
perception. Peter Strawson expounds and defends the Kantian line that imagination 
is a fundamental part of perception. " In contrast Roger Scruton draws a distinction 
between imagination as mental representation on the one hand, or as creative 
thinking on the other, noting the confusion that arises when these two are not kept 
distinct. " 
Here already is much the same contrast as I have drawn between strong and weak 
construal. To use the word 'imaginative' as an adjective appropriate to all perception 
does not prejudge the issue of how strong a construal is involved in the perception. It 
does not, to be precise, imply that perception involves a forceful creative 
interpretation which shapes our perceptions into hitherto non-existent configurations. 
What Scruton notes as imagination as mental representation would correspond to my 
idea of weak construal, while what he calls creative thinking would move to varying 
degrees across the spectrum towards strong construal. 
A'theology of the imagination' needs to take this spectrum into account. As noted 
above, Walter Brueggemann offers an analysis of several works in this area which 
relates them to each other precisely in these terms, while developing his own view 
that 'all knowing 
... 
is imaginative construal, even if disguised or thought to be 
something else'. " Brueggemann himself develops the category of imaginative 
construal in a variety of works, although one may feel that his own work does not 
always avoid a unifon-nly strong view of construal. " 
Of the works surveyed by Brueggemann, " the most specific on the topic of construal 
is Garrett Green's Imagining God" Green's book is a powerful account of how 
70 P. F. Strawson, 'Imagination and Perception', in P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and 
Other Essays, London: Methuen, 1974,45-65 (1970). 
71 Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy. A Survey, London: S111clair-Stevenson, 1994,341-54. 
72 Brueggernann, Texts Under Negotiation, 1-25; here 12. 
73 See in particular Walter Brueggemann, Israel's Praise. Doxology against 1dolat7yand 
Ideology, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988, especially 12-26 on the constitutive or world-making 
power of praise; idem, 'The Third World of Evangelical Imagination', HBTh 8 (1986), 61-84; 
reprinted in his Interpretation and Obedience. From Faithful Reading to Faithful Living, 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991,9-27; and idem, 'Imagination as a Mode of Fidelity', in James T. 
Butler, Edgar W. Conrad & Ben C. Ollenburger (eds. ), Understanding the Word. Essays in Honor of 
Bernhard W. Anderson (JSOTS 37), Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985,13-36. 
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imagination can be harnessed to theological concerns, without adopting a 
constructivist position towards the reality which is being imaginatively construed. Of 
particular value is his discussion of the varying significances of 'as', 'as if and 'is, 
and his explicit consideration of imagination in relation to interpretation. 76 There is, 
Green notes, frequently no deliberate act of imagination in the 'seeing'. Even to say 'I 
see it as... ' is to note the possibility of alternative perception. Thus: 
The paradigmatic imagination is the ability to see one thing as 
another. Kant called "is" the copula of judgement; I take "as" to 
be the "copula of imagination". " 
He contrasts his position with that of Hans Vaihinger, who argued that'as if is the 
key move in religious discourse. " Others have argued for'useful fictions': we live as 
if such-and-such were true even though it is not. " But this downplays the reliability 
of imagination as a method for unlocking ways of seeing what is really there, not 
what we would like to think might be there. Thus 'as' is better than 'as if : it sees the 
possibility of looking at something another way but stakes its claim on this way. 
Green's primary concern is to defend the priority of construal in terms of'as'rather 
than more constructive positions ('take as') or views which downplay the 
truth-stating element of religious language ('as if). He stops short of articulating the 
idea of a spectrum of positions, but in a sense his entire argument is that it is a 
mistake to suppose that a recognition of the significance of construal forecloses the 
74 His spectrum ranges from the 'constructivist' position of Gordon Kauftnann, The Theological 
Imagination, Westminster: Philadelphia, 1981; through the active/constructive 'take as' view of 
construal present in David Bryant, Faith and the Play ofImagination. On the Role of1magination in 
Religion (StABH 5), Macon, GA: Mercer UP, 1989; to the 'receptive' view of Garrett Green (next 
note). The labels are Brueggemann's, Texts Under Negotiation, 12-17. 
75 Garrett Green, Imagining God Theology and the Religious Imagination, San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1989. 
76 Green, Imagining God, especially 70-74. 
77 Green, Imagining God, 73. 
78 Hans Vaihiger, The Philosophy of "As If': A System of the Theoretical, Practical, and 
Religious Fictions ofMankind, 2nd ed, trans C. K. Ogden, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935; 
reprint: Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965. 
79 Notably, for example, Richard B. Braithwaite, An Empiricist's View of the Nature of 
Religious Belief, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1955. 
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strength of construal involved. This is therefore a strong parallel to my argument 
av 
-'-out construal in biblical interpretation. 
§3.2 Construal in Biblical Studies 
Stanley Porter has noted that it is all too easy for biblical critics to appropriate 
critical models or methods whose implications are not fully understood. " In my 
judgment, this has certainly happened with appeals to the later work of Fish to 
support the notion of a theological or ecclesiological reading of scripture. Thus, for 
instance, one finds Scott Saye championing a Fishian interpretive-community 
approach as the recovery of a long-lost ecclesiological insight: 'I am suggesting that 
we find in Fish, and especially in his readings of Augustine and Andrewes, a 
reminder of certain practices of the church that have been largely forgotten. "' For 
Saye, a Christian will understand Fish's general theory'as an attempt to extend 
analogously that which has been found to be true of the paradigmatic interpretive 
community 
-the church. "' Saye even suggests that Barth is a special case of Fish: 
both are antifoundationalists and one happens to be a Christian. " Likewise, Stanley 
Hauerwas attempts to 'unleash the Scripture' in the context of today's American 
individualist society, and entitles a key chapter of his manifesto 'Stanley Fish, the 
Pope, and the Bible': 'While Fish's and Stout's views strike many as dangerous, their 
, 84 ideas in fact share much with traditional Christian presuppositions. 
This is surely precisely the wrong way to articulate what is good about Fish's insights 
for those interested in interpreting the Bible as Christians. What Fish and Stout share 
with traditional Christian presuppositions is basically only that who we are makes a 
difference to how we read; but this point would be shared widely. What distinguishes 
Fish and Stout from all those who would accept this wider point is the denial of the 
80 S. E. Porter, 'Why Hasn't Reader-Response Criticism Caught on in New Testament Studies? ', 
LT4 (1990), 278-92; here 290. 
81 Scott C. Saye, 'The Wild and Crooked Tree: Barth, Fish, and Interpretive Communities', 
MTh 12 (1996), 435-58; here 458, n. 56. 
82 Saye, 'The Wild and Crooked Tree', 442. 
83 Saye, 'The Wild and Crooked Tree', 45 1. 
84 Stanley Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture. - Freeing the Biblefrom Captivity to America, 
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993,19-28; here 2 1. 
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text and the radical contingency of interpretation (or the uniform strength of 
construal). This offers only a bleak vision for Bible readers who would like to see 
themselves as in any sort of continuity with historic Christianity, a point which can 
be made regardless of one's own view of that historic position. " 
Only slightly less willing to follow Fish is A. K. M. Adam's Semeia article on the sign 
of Jonah. " Adam traces the history of the interpretation of 'the sip of Jonah' in order 
to urge that historical criticism is mistaken in its desire to isolate the one correct 
meaning of the text. Fish, of course, would prove much more, and thus it is 
interesting that Adam makes a small attempt to distance himself from the full Fishian 
position: 
I would suggest, however, that a more useful approach would be 
to concede the (possible) objective existence of the text, while 
denying it anyfunctional efficacy... while the text as objective 
entity presumably exists apart from interpretation, it cannot 
function as a restraint on interpretation. " 
With regard to his treatment of the biblical text, it is perhaps relevant to note that he 
is concerned with a selection of very short passages which are certainly obscure 
enough to invite varied interpretive interests to engage fruitfully with them. The 
result is that, short of a strong construal of some kind, these logia would remain dead 
locutions on the page. We are thus unsurprised, but not perhaps much enlightened, to 
see a'Fish-eye' approach pay dividends. 
Adam has also produced a powerful plea for 'nonmodern' approaches to New 
Testament theology, which includes a Fish-like appeal to the idea that 'all 
interpretation is allegorical interpretation'. " His call for a nonmodem approach to 
New Testament theology is based around the idea that all reading is construal and 
hence interpretive interest is the guiding key to biblical theology. " Here he draws 
95 A similar judgement on Hauerwas is made by Alan Jacobs, 'A Tale of Two Stanleys', First 
Th ings 44 (19 94), 18 
-2 1. 
86 A. K. M. Adam, 'The Sign of Jonah: A Fish-Eye View', Semeia 51 (1990), 177-91. 
87 Adam, 'The Sign of Jonah', 179. 
88 A. K. M. Adam, Making Sense ofNew Testament Theology. "Modern " Problems and 
Prospects (StABH 11), Macon, GA: Mercer UP, 1995,175. 
89 Adam, Making Sense ofNew Testament Theology, specIfically 170-8 1. 
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freely, and confidently, on Rorty and Stout, as well as Fish, and makes the link, 
which has rhetorical force even if it plays no formal role in his argument, that his 
nonmodern approach returns us to the kinds of approach characteristic of the early 
church. His position is well captured in this extended quotation, where we should 
remember that'modem'is a polemical term: 
Modem readers will lament the anachronistic tendentiousness 
with which Matthew might be made into an evangelist of 
women's liberation, or the Revelation represented as an archetypal 
journey to individuation. They will accuse nonmodern 
interpreters of importing agendas that are alien to the disciplinary 
role of New Testament studies, especially if those interpreters 
have interests and purposes oriented toward dogmatic theology. 
They will wam that, if the constraints on interpretation are social 
rather than disciplinary, then just anyone can propound legitimate 
New Testament theology. These ominous consequences do not, 
however, show the necessity of modem New Testament theology; 
instead they mark out the intellectual and social limits of the 
jurisdiction of the rules of modem New Testament theology. If 
-as I have argued here- there are not transcendent criteria for 
interpretation, but only local customs and guild rules, the 
reluctance modem New Testament theologians express about 
admitting the possible legitimacy of other appropriations of the 
New Testament is an expression of cultural imperialism and 
intellectual xenophobia. " 
I quote Adam at length because his case is powerful, well articulated and 
increasingly gaining ground among disaffected biblical interpreters tired of 
modernism dominating the discipline through historical critical method. This 
approach finds something of a manifesto in a recent collection of essays (themselves 
not all recent) edited by Stephen Fowl, who has himself been a prominent voice in 
the call to appropriate for biblical studies, apparently without qualms, Jeffrey Stout's 
position on interpretation. " What distinguishes Fowl and Adam from the more 
extreme position of Hauerwas is that they want to appeal to the 'interpretive interests' 
argument without following it all the way through to non-essentialism. Even to the 
90 Adam, Making Sense ofNew Testament Theology, 179. 
91 See Stephen E. Fowl (ed. ), The Theological Interpretation of Scripture. Classic and 
Contemporary Readings (Blackwell Readings in Modem Tleology), Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, 
including his own 'Introduction' as a survey (xii-xxx). On appropriating Stout see also Stephen E. 
Fowl, 'The Ethics of Interpretation; or, What's Left Over after the Elimination of Meaning? ', in David 
J. A. Clines, Stephen E. Fowl & Stanley E. Porter (eds. ), The Bible in Three Dimensions. Essays in 
Celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Department ofBiblical Studies, University of Sheffield 
(JSOTS 87), Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990,379-98; and now taken up, somewhat problematically, into 
his Engaging Scripture. A Modelfor Theological Interpretation, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998,32-61. 
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extent that this may be right in principle, it requires a rather excessive amount of 
polemic against chimerical relativism precisely because it does not appeal to a 
sufficiently nuanced notion of construal. This would explain the two-pronged 
polemic of Adam's quoted passage (and elsewhere): firstly those who disagree are 
imperialist and xenophobic; and secondly, this non-modem option simply is 
traditional Christianity. Neither of these claims is sustainable; and nor is Fowl's 
desire to use such a non-essentialist view of meaning if he would also like to believe 
that as a Christian he might hear from a God who dwells beyond the text. 12 This is 
not to say that the concerns of this 'theological reading' are not valid, or important. 
Rather it is to say that disaffection with modernity is not itself a coherent interpretive 
position. 
It can be seen, therefore, that a better understanding of what construal is, and the 
various ways in which it might operate as we read the Bible with an awareness of its 
various illocutionary acts, will lead us away from such broad attempts to locate the 
perforniative force of the text entirely in the domain of the reader. Construal has its 
key role to play, but it is one role in a wider picture. 
§3.3 Are Construction-Based Approaches Necessarily Theologically Reductive? 
There is not space here to compare the way in which my speech act account of 
construal compares with other construction-orientated approaches to epistemological 
and hen-neneutical issues. In particular, the work of sociologist of religion Peter 
Berger is relevant here, as he has sought to explore how socially constructed models 
of reality inhabit a'sacred canopy': 'religion has been the historically most 
widespread and effective instrumentality of legitimation 
... 
it relates the precarious 
reality constructions of empirical societies with ultimate reality. "' Berger's work 
draws on the remarkably influential book he co-authored with Thomas Luckmann, 
The Social Construction ofReality, 94 and it is worth noting that Berger himself does 
92 Fowl does appear to believe this, which makes Engaging Scripture a somewhat uneven 
book. 
93 See Peter Berger, The Social Reality ofReligion, London: Pengum, 1973,41 (= The Sacred 
Canopy, New York: Doubleday, 1967). See also idem, A Rumor ofAngels. Modern Society and the 
Rediscovei7, of the Supernatural, New York: Doubleday, expanded edition, 1990 (1969); idem, The 
Heretical Imperative. Contemporary Possibilities ofReligious Affirmation, London: Collmis, 1980. 
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not see his approach as theologically reductive. Jh A Rumor ofAngels he argues that 
the relativising perspective of sociology can itself be relativised, and that appeal to 
the ever-present possibility of transcendence (the rumoured 'angels' of the title) 
reminds us that 'secularized consciousness is not the absolute it presents itself as. "' 
Berger's work has been discussed and utilised across a wide range of disciplines. " 
However, the only point I wish to make here is that 'social construction' is not the 
same as the kind of project envisaged by Searle; that of laying bare the logical 
building blocks with which social reality is constructed. In a recent survey of 
theories of 'social reality', Finn Collin pursues essentially a Searlean critique of 
Berger and Luckmann's work along the lines of challenging the notion that social 
reality can be constructed without reference to basic/brute facts. 97 He notes that 
Berger and Luckmann attempt to set up their discussion in broadly 
phenomenological terms where their concern is simply what passesfor knowledge, " 
but goes on to note that in the development of their argument they subscribe to the 
far more interesting and controversial position that it is actually social fact and not 
just Tact'which is their topic: i. e. real facts are created by societal consent. 99 Berger 
and Luckmann are thus reduced to a kind of Quinean 'ontological relativism' and 
Collin explores how it might be that the laws of sociology of knowledge themselves 
escape from this constructivist claim. Short of arbitrary decree, he notes, they do not, 
and thus 
, 
in almost Searlean terms, Collin concludes that 'no brute social facts would 
exist to set in train the process of social construction. '100 
94 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction ofReality. A Treatise in the 
Sociology ofKnowledge, London: Penguin, 1967 (originally 1966 in the USA, with different page 
numbering). 
95 Berger, Rumor ofAngels, 180. 
96 Of particular relevance are the comments of John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. 
Be ond Secular Reason, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990,133-36, in a section entitled 'Policing the y 
Sublime: A Critique of the Sociology of Religion'. There is also a massive literature in biblical 
studies, ever since Wayne A. Meeks, 'The Man From Heaven in Johannine Sectarianism, JBL 91 
(1972), 44-72; see especially 69-72. 
97 Finn Collin, Social Reality (The Problems of Philosophy), London & New York: Routledge, 
1997,64-79. 
98 Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction ofReality, 13; cited also by Collin, Social 
Reality, 67. 
99 Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction ofReality, 197-98; with commentary by Collin, 
Social Reality, 68. 
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Somewhat disarmingly, Searle himself disposes of any possible direct links between 
his own work and that of Berger and Luckmann as follows: 
I was not M fact responding to nor was I inspired by Berger and 
Luckmann's book The Social Construction ofReality. In fact I 
never heard of their book until the first draft of my book was 
done. After my Kant lectures in Stanford, various people pointed 
out to me that there already was a book with a related title. I 
looked at that book, but found it so totally different from what I 
was attempting to do that I neitlier made use of it nor referred to 
it. 101 
In so saying Searle is not averse to aphilosophy of society' or'culture, and indeed 
suggests in the same article that this would be a profitable line of enquiry for 
academic philosophy. "' (Although I have been unable to trace any link in the 
literature, I suggest further that the kinds of concern in Searle's view here are 
consonant with his analysis of student unrest on university campuses in the late 
1960's wherein he provided an'anatomy of student revolts'which included a logical 
decomposition of the stages of 'creation of the issue', 'creation of a rhetorical climate' 
and'the collapse of authority', amongst other things. Here would be philosophical 
analysis in the service of understanding social structures, with the benefit that the 
issue is a recent and testable field of events. "') Searle's well known antipathy 
towards the tradition of continental philosophy perhaps helps to clarify just what is 
in view here: not a hermeneutical or phenomenological approach to issues such as 
truth, but rather the laying bare of logical mechanisms such as those of 'institutions' 
in their various broad manifestations in the modem (and analytical) world. "' 
With 'construction' being such a broad and controversial academic category across a 
wide range of disciplines, it is helpful to have to hand the concise survey of its 
various fon-ns from a philosophical perspective very much akin to Searle's, in Finn 
Collin's book on Social Reality. Collin's argument is simple to state, and has already 
100 Collin, Social Reality, 75. 
101 John R. Searle, 'Replies to Critics of The Construction ofSocial Reality', HHS 10.4 (1997), 
103- 10, here 106-7. Searle's book developed out of the Kant lectures of 1992. 
102 Searle, 'Replies to Critics', 103. 
103 John Searle, The Campus War. A Sympathetic Look at the University in Agony, 
Hannondsworth, Middx: Pelican Books, 1972, especially 11-43. 
104 Searle, 'Replies to Critics', 110. 
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been sampled above in his treatment of Berger and Luckmann: social construction 
arguments may be grouped heuristically into two distinct categories, the 'broad' and 
the 'narrow'. The broad ones which attempt a form of global constructivism fail 
logically since they lack the means to begin the process of fact creation while the 
narrow ones, which limit their constructivist sights to certain kinds of well-defined 
social facts, are both sustainable and useful analytical tools (a la Searle) for 
examining the nature and function of concepts of Social Reality. "' 
Thus, following Searle and Collin, it is clear that one may adopt the language of 
construction and explore models of constructed reality (in certain aspects) without 
being committed to any form ofphilosophical reductionism. I want to suggest that it 
is only a short step from here to showing that one need also not be committed to 
theological reductionism. 
It would be disingenuous not to allow that the reductive use of 'construction' 
terminology is widespread and indeed perhaps even the most prominent way in 
which it is used. A recent work which makes explicit appeal to speech act theory as 
one of its construction mechanisms, and which is reductive through and through, is 
Jonathan Potter's Representing Reality. "' Appealing to both Austin and Berger and 
Luckmann as precursors, Potter's fundamental move is to take discourse not as 
representational but as rhetorical (the influence of Rorty being both evident and 
acknowledged here). 10' Thus through a careful examination of the tropes of ordinary 
discourse one may learn to appreciate how it is that 'real' objects have their reality 
constructed. Potter's view of Austin is that he began the process of isolating the 
rhetorically constructed nature of reality but restricted himself to artificial example 
sentences. 108 It was thus left to Derrida's critique of Searle to broaden out the 
105 The structure of Collin's book follows this argument: part one on 'Broad Arguments' (23-99) 
and part two on 'Narrow Arguments' (10 1 
-219). 
106 Jonathan Potter, Representing Reality. Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction, 
London: Sage Publications, 1996,11-12; 202-4.1 take this work as a particularly clear example of 
social constructivism, or, as Collin describes it by way of contrast, 'science constructivism' (cf Collin, 
Social Reality, 13-14). Representative works In this area include Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, 
Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979 
and the remarkable work of Malcolm Ashmore, The Reflexive Thesis: Wrighting Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. 
107 Potter, Representing Reality, 6. 
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implications to the whole area of written and oral discourse without any artificial 
'serious/playful' divide (or 'hierarchy' as Derrida has it). "' In the previous chapter I 
suggested that such a view misunderstands the relevance of the Derrida-Searle 
exchange to speech act concerns. 
Potter's account is on the one hand willing to adopt the idea of a spectrum of 
different strengths of construal (although he phrases his discussion less as X 
construed as Y' and more as the degrees of modalization of some X such as 'I know 
that X or 'I think that X or 'I guess that X. ') "' However the conclusion he draws 
from this is that, while the mechanisms of construction vary, the reality being 
represented is always rhetorically constructed. The way is open to him, therefore, to 
criticise Austin (or perhaps Austin's followers) for not following through on the 
initial insight that descriptions are not mere descriptions but are always established 
in some context by some procedure. "' 
It is important to recognise here that one can agree in broad outline with this view 
but still raise questions concerning the scope of its significance. I have argued that 
even if this 'rhetorical construction' can be universalized, it will in some cases be a 
trivial phenomenon. Again, as with Fish, there are all kinds of interesting examples 
where it is a good and valuable thesis, but examples must be taken case by case. "' 
Constructivist authors clearly tend to believe that theology is to be taken as simply a 
somewhat dim-witted rhetorical ploy, namely the protection of religious truths by 
safeguarding them from enquiry. "' But this does not follow in any necessarily 
interesting sense from their approach, precisely because the all-inclusive view of 
speech acts here must of necessity be including weak (and trivial) speech acts as well 
108 Potter, Representing Reality, 11. 
109 Potter, Representing Reality, 80-85. 
110 Potter, Representing Reality, 112. 
III Potter, Representing Reality, 204. 
112 Some particularly good examples are found in Derek Edwards, Malcolm Ashmore and 
Jonathan Potter, 'Death and Furniture: the rhetoric, politics and theology of bottom line arguments 
against relativism', HHS 8.2 (1995), 25-49. Even death and furniture, they avow, are always 
introduced into the discourse in some specific way to some particular end. 
113 Edwards, Ashmore and Potter, 'Death and Furniture', 40. 
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as strong ones. Since not all illocutionary acts are equally strong, and therefore not 
all constructed reality is constructed in the same sense, one may not make a 
substantive point simply by describing all reality as constructed, even if technically 
one may be entitled to do so. It follows, I suggest, that construction-based 
epistemologies need not be theologically reductive, regardless of the depressing 
extent to which they are regularly pressed into anti-theological service. 
The unique and unjustly neglected joint work of Michael Arbib and Mary Hesse, 
based on their 1983 joint Gifford lectures, offers a perspective on precisely the issue 
of how construction may be utilised without being theologically reductive. "' They 
develop a sophisticated schema-theory approach within the context of a ubiquitous 
theory of metaphor (drawing respectively on Arbib and Hesse's individual work) to 
argue that there may be links between the type of construction processes involved in 
apprehending spatio-temporal reality and those involved in the irreducibly symbolic 
world of religious faith. Most simply, they observe that 'cosmological theories about 
the beginning and end of the universe are distant extrapolations from the evidence, 
and they contain a high proportion of theoretical construction of unobservable 
entities and processes. "" They develop the way in which 'construction' is thus at 
work in both science and religion, and carefully break down supposed barriers 
between them. A key step in their argument is to develop schema theory as a 
non-reductive response to mind-brain questions (63-72), predicated on the 
observation that the old dualisms of mind/body; mind/brain; subject/object, and 
others are all challenged by the notion of the 'essentially embodied subj ect' (3 8). A 
schema is 'a unit of representation of a person's world' and schema theory argues that 
'all human mental phenomena reduce to (complex) patterns of schema activation' 
(12). S chemas are 'in heads and in the social relations between heads. ' (13 0) They 
then generallse schema theory from an individual to society as a whole by way of a 
'network model of language' (where metaphor operates throughout to varying 
degrees) and of the socio-cultural hermeneutical approach of Gadamer (chapters 8 
and 9 respectively). This allows a subtle approach to the question of 'reality': one can 
114 Michael A. Arbib and Mary B. Hesse, The Construction ofReality, Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 19 8 6. 
115 Arbib and Hesse, Construction of Reality, IT Further page references are in the text, 
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charactense a grand schema by analysing what it is that people assent to while 
accepting that the question of criteria for judging schemas will differ depending on 
what kind of extTa-spatio-temporal claims they make. "' 
Partly because the book comes from the Gifford lectures, it stops short at the point of 
addressing the reliability of Christianity's actual claims about the transcendent, and 
its need for a revelation from beyond the spatio-temporal world, suggesting only a 
Kantian argument along the lines of 'What must reality be like for a God schema to 
have developed in human mindsT (243) Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Arbib and 
Hesse have demonstrated that there is no philosophical reason why 
construction-based epistemologies should settle theological questions in favour of 
adopting non-realist or projectionist (e. g. Feuerbachian) theological positions. 
§3.4 Conclusion: The Logical Spacefor a Hermeneutic of Self-Involvement 
Within the scope of a construction-based epistemology which need not be 
theologically reductionist, we may be free to pursue a hermeneutic of 
self-involvement with respect to the biblical text. Strong illocutions create social 
reality which is thus sustained above and beyond the power of the individual to make 
arbitrary declarations about the world around him or her. The 'institutions' thus 
created and maintained, in Searle's sense of constructed institution, are thus accessed 
only via a hermeneutic of self-involvement. Our discussion to this point has 
demonstrated that locating the idea of construal at the heart of speech act theory need 
not invite reductionism, whether philosophical or theological. This is, I shall now go 
on to argue, a vindication of Donald Evans' work on self-involvement, and offers 
suggestions towards clarifying aspects of the logical grammar of Christian belief. 
The next step will then be to demonstrate actual examples of how self-involvement 
operates as a speech act category in the reading of the New Testament. 
116 Hesse is an Anglican and Arbib an atheist (cf ix-x1i), and they each conclude with a chapter 
on overall schemas which give shape to life: Hesse on the Bible as 'The Great Schema' partly 
following Northrop Frye's The Great Code (ch. 11); and Arbib on'Secular schemas' (ch. 12). 
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PART TWO 
ASPECTS OF SELF-INVOLVEMENT IN 
INTERYRETING NEW TESTAMENT SPEECH ACTS 
Chapter 5 
Exploring a Hermeneutic of Self-Involvement: The 
work of Donald Evans 
In all discussions in the philosophy of language and the 
philosophy of mind, it is absolutely essential at some point to 
remind oneself of the first-person case. ' 
§1 Introduction 
Having set out the stall of speech act theory in part I of this thesis, it is now time to 
harness its resources towards the development of a hermeneutic for reading the Bible 
in this second, and more overtly theological, part II. Although I have touched briefly 
at various points on the work done in this area, ' I have left until now an examination 
of the work of Donald Evans, widely acknowledged as the single most important 
contribution in the field, in order that we may consider it with a full range of critical 
tools to hand. Where Evans writes of the 'logic of self-involvement', my purpose here 
is to draw on his work; combine it with my own discussion of speech act theory, and 
I John R. Searle, 'Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person', JP 84 (1987), 123-46; 
here 126. 
2 See the brief discussion of selected writers 'in chapter I and the survey of 'speech act 
criticism' in chapter 3, §4. 
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thus develop a 'hermeneutic of self-involvement'. The remainder of part H of the 
thesis will then explore the ways in which this hermeneutic may help us in the task of 
interpreting certain types of New Testament text. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore threefold: to clarify the concept of 
'self-involvement', as discussed by Donald Evans; to examine significant uses of this 
concept in biblical studies; and to establish the guidelines for my subsequent use of 
'self-involvement' as a hermeneutical tool in specific examples of biblical 
interpretation. This task is simplified by the observation that the insights of Evans' 
work have not been overly exploited in the field. Indeed, in my judgment, while 
several commentators have expounded it sympathetically and provided indications of 
new directions for it, ' there are only two major studies which have made comparable 
approaches to the exegetical task, those of Timothy Polk on Jeremiah and of Dietmar 
Neufeld on I John, which we shall consider below. ' Similarly, work in biblical 
studies has rarely utilised Evans' approach to anything like its full potential. Perhaps 
the one major area where some significant work has been done on the question of 
self-involvement is that of creeds and confessions. Not only has there been detailed 
investigation of the so-called homologia (or confessions) of the New Testament, such 
as 'Jesus is Lord' (attested for example in Romans 10: 9), but the investigation has 
moved beyond the elucidation of historical setting and considered the significance of 
the confessional form per se. ' In most other respects, however, self-involvement 
remains an under-explored aspect of biblical language. 
§2 Self-Involvement as a Speech Act Category: An Introduction 
The basic point about self-involvement is that the speaking subject invests him or 
herself in a state of affairs by adopting a stance towards that state of affairs. Where 
self-involvement is most interesting and significant is in cases where the stance is 
logically (or'gammatically") entailed by the utterance itself This is most obvious in 
3 Most notably G. B. Calrd, The Language and Imagery of the Bible, London: Duckworth, 
1980,7-36, and Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics. The Theory and Practice of 
Transforming Biblical Reading, London: HarperCollins, 1992,272-312. 
See §4 below. 
See chapter 6 for a full discussion. 
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cases where the language is present-tense first person language, although this is not a 
guarantee of an interesting case, but rather highlights the issues most clearly. 
Thus in one of Wittgenstein's well-known examples, 'I am in pain' carries a different 
kind of logical implication from'I love you': the first may fade away in a moment, 
but if one claimed that the love had faded away similarly it would call into question 
the original utterance. ' Equally, 'I assure you, I have a pain there now' functions quite 
differently from 'I assure you, I know that's a tree. " An example which brings out the 
particular relevance of first person utterances having logical implications is 'If there 
were a verb meaning "to believe falsely", it would not have any significant first 
person present indicative. " That someone else believes falsely is not logically 
remarkable; but if I believe something then the grammar of 'believe' implies (among 
other things) that I am convinced about it, or of its tTuth, and hence it makes no sense 
to commit myself equally to its falsehood. 
Since many biblical expressions are functionally equivalent to first person utterance, 
as indeed are many language uses in any case, this grammar of self-involvement 
suggests itself as a useful hermeneutical option. In later chapters we shall go on to 
explore how simple utterances such as 'Jesus is Lord', or 'I forgive you' stand equally 
as self-involving in certain respects. One could say that it makes no sense to say 'I 
confess Christ as Lord but I don't believe that he is. ' At the heart of self-involvement 
as a henneneutical tool is the observation that 
the speaker "stands behind" the words giving a pledge and 
personal backing that he or she is prepared to undertake 
corrunitments and responsibilities that are entailed in 
extra-1111guistic ternis by the proposition which is asserted. ' 
6 use 'grammar' here in Wittgenstein's sense of the logic of the use of a word, phrase or 
proposition, as a way of drawing attention to the rules and implications involved in language use; cf 
'Grammar' in Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996,150-5 5. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, Oxford: Blackwell, '1981 (1967), §504. 
8 Ludwig Wittgenstem, On Certainty, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969, §389. 
9 Ludwig Wittgenstem, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 3 1967 (1953), p. 190. 
10 Thiselton, New Horizons, 617, drawing here on both Wittgenstein and on the work of Dallas 
High, who was one of the first to explore the possibilities of WittgensteMian analysis for biblical 
language. I discuss High's work in chapter 6 below. 
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This fundamental point has not been widely understood, nor, where understood, 
widely utilised, in biblical interpretation. " To demonstrate its wider applicability will 
be one of my recurring themes in the following chapters. However, I immediately 
wish to go further, and to suggest that, in line with my proposals about strong and 
weak illocutions in earlier chapters, it is profitable to see self-involvement as 
operating across a spectrum of strengths ranging from strong to weak. As with any 
conceptual scheme, the justification for this is not in appealing to some property of 
the language, but the felicity or otherwise of this distinction in clarifying points of 
interest. Thus, to offer a simple introductory example: 
(1) '1 am six feet four inches tall. ' 
is self-involving only in a weak (trivial) sense, corresponding to the way in which 
'flat assertions' are classed as illocutionary. If I utter (1), then it is in fact true, and 
one could say that I enter into a commitment in the public domain to stand by the 
truth of this statement. One could of course imagine cases where this would be 
non-trivial: (1) may be more than a simple statement and have some further 
performative force, if, for example, I am applying for a job in the police force which 
has a certain height requirement of being over six feet, and I am hereby affirming 
that I qualify in this regard. Nevertheless, in general, in the same way that (1) is a 
weak illocution, it is not self-involving in a very interesting sense. Contrast: 
'I am a Christian. ' 
Although this looks grammatically similar to (1), its logical grammar is quite 
different, and is a function of the stance-commitment entailed by the self-description 
'Christian' in the public domain. Thus this is gTammatically identical to an utterance 
such as 'I am a Liverpool fan', which brings with it its own commitments (such as 
cheering when Liverpool score a goal and restraining oneself when their opponents 
do) with the difference being entirely a matter of the scope of the entailments. 
11 The main exception is the work of Anthony Thiselton, who has often advocated the use of 
logical grammar to aid biblical exegesis, although his work using speech act theory does not always 
focus on this precise area. For two good examples where he does make specific use of the idea, see 
his'The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings', JTS 25 (1974), 283-99; and'The Logical 
Role of the Liar Paradox in Titus 1: 12,13: A Dissent from the Commentaries in the Light of 
Philosophical and Logical Analysis', BibInt 2 (1994), 207-23. 
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Indeed, to utter (2) brings with it a variety of entailments, varying according to 
context. Sample entailments could easily be: 
(2 a) 'I am a regular church attender. ' 
(2b) 'I read the Bible for personal instruction. ' 
(2c) 'I take a stand against apartheid. ' 
(2d) 'I oppose the public ridiculing or cursing of Jesus. ' 
Of course one can supply instances of an enormous variety of entailments which 
have been understood to follow from (2), including 
(2c') 'I support apartheid' 12 
or commitments both for and against slavery, 13 and so forth, and this variety need not 
detain us here. The point is a methodological one: in uttering (2) 1 take a stance in the 
public domain which commits me to certain forms of (positive and negative) 
behaviour. In the language I wish to use: (2) is strongly self-involving. 
The form of (2) as a first person present tense verb highlights on the surface the level 
of personal investment in the utterance. However, as we shall see in a moment, for 
his discussion of self-involvement Donald Evans chose as his paradigmatic 
self-involving utterance 
(3) 'The Creator made the world. ' 
On the face of it this does not look self-involving at all, but Evans analysed the 
differences between this and statements such as 
(4) 'Jones built the house. '
to indicate that while their surface grammar is identical, their logical grammar is very 
different. 
12 Not always as bluntly as this, of course, but this claim can be substantiated with reference to, 
for example, the publication of the report of the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church M South 
Africa: Ras, Volk en Nasie en Volkverhoudinge in die Lig van die Skrif, Kaapstad: NG Kerk 
Uitgewers, 1974 (ET = Human Relations and the South African Scene in the Light of Scripture, 
Pretoria: Dutch Reformed Church Publishers, 1976). 1 owe this reference to Deryck Sheriffs. 
13 See Willard M. Swartley, Slavery, Sabbath, War and Women. Case Issues in Biblical 
Interpretation, Scottdale: Herald Press, 1983, especially 31-64. 
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The belief that speech act theory has much to contribute to biblical interpretation is, 
in my judgment, largely a consequence of this kind of investigation into logical 
grammar. Speech act theory is in particular helpful in clarifying the presuppositions, 
commitments and entailments of certain types of language game. 14 Among those 
language games which feature prominently in the biblical text, one could consider: 
confessing; forgiving; pardoning; repenting; 
proclaiming; teaching; preaching; praying; interceding; 
lamenting; rejoicing 
... 
" 
To understand the language used in all these circumstances is to elucidate the nature 
of the speech act involved and, in strongly self-involving cases, is to draw the 
speaking subject (or agent) into the text as an irreducible aspect of the process of 
understanding. In passing, one may note that this approach offers a very different 
perspective on ways of highlighting reader involvement in the interpretive process 
from that offered by postmodern varieties of reader-response theory. 
In this chapter I explore the possibility of such a hermeneutic of self-involvement. 
The next three chapters will investigate particular New Testament language games 
from this perspective. The final chapter will reflect briefly on some of the 
hermeneutical implications of a speech-act approach. 
§3 Donald Evans and the Logic ofSelf-Involvement 
Donald Evans was both a lecturer in theology in Montreal and later a professor of 
philosophy in Toronto. He began research under J. L. Austin in Oxford and 
completed it, after Austin's death, under I. T. Ramsey. Thus situated squarely at the 
birth of speech act theory as a discipline, and at the inter-disciplinary divide between 
philosophy and theology (and in particular religious and biblical language), he was 
14 
11 
it is important to remember to use this phrase in Wittgenstein's specific sense: processes 
consisting of language and actions woven together (Philosophical Investigations, §7) such as 'giving 
orders'; 'describing the appearance of an object'; 'asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying' (§23). 
The later, broader, inherently fideistic application of 'language game' to entire traditions unfortunately 
remains a major obstacle to understanding the significance of Wittgenstein for religious language. See 
Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, London: SPCK, '1997 (1986), 28-3 1. 
15 A convenient way of reviewing the variety of these kinds of language game Mi the New 
Testament is provided by consulting Johannes P. Louw and Eugene Nida (eds. ), Greek-English 
Lailcon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains. Vol. 1. Introduction & Domains (second 
edition), New York: United Bible Societies, 1989, §33 'Communication', 388-445. 
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well placed to produce the foundational work on the use of speech act theory in 
biblical interpretation: The Logic of Seýf-Involvement, published in 1963.16 Evans' 
subsequent work is less well known, although this has not stopped that most 
common of debates: did a key thinker (in this case the 'early Evans') change his 
mind? " Certainly the emphasis of his later work is different, and perhaps one can say 
that it is widely taken as constituting something of a non-cognitive disavowal of his 
Logic of Se4fllnvolvement position. The complications of following Evans' own line 
of thought, allied to the lack of detailed interaction with the original book itself, have 
not helped recognition of his important work on self-involvement. " 
§3.1 The Logic of Self-Involvement 
. 
The Logic of Seýfllnvolvement is a subtle and difficult book with a far-reaching 
agenda. In it Evans attempts to show that when one uses language such as 'God is my 
creator' in the biblical context, then, logically speaking, one makes certain 
self-involving commitments with respect to one's acknowledgement of status and 
role, as well as feelings and attitudes. Thus the use of biblical language draws the 
speaker logically in to a relationship of a certain kind with God and her fellow 
humans. This is an ambitious argument, and I shall have cause to argue that it is in 
fact only partially successful, but it merits close attention since it remains the most 
detailed attempt to articulate a speech-act view of construal in biblical interpretation, 
16 Donald D. Evans, The Logic ofSelf-Involvement. A Philosophical Study ofEveryday 
Language with Special Reference to the Christian Use ofLanguage about God as Creator, London: 
SCM, 1963. 
17 See Stanley Hauerwas and Richard Bondi, 'Language, Experience and the Life Well-Lived: 
A Review of the Work of Donald Evans', ReMev 9.1 (1983), 33-37; who argue that'the change from 
the early to the later Evans is not as great as many assume. ' (3 3) 
Is Aside from Caird and Thiselton (see n. 3 above), and the Hauerwas-Bondi review article (n. 17 above), works drawing on or substantially reviewing Evans' work include J. Gordon Campbell, 
'Are All Speech-Acts Self-Involving? ', RelStud 8 (1972), 161-64; P. Masterson, 'Self-Involvement 
and the Affirmation of God, in J. Walgrave, A. Vergote & B. Willaert (eds. ), Miscellanea Albert 
Dondeyne. Godsdiensýzilosofiie; Philosophie de la Religion, Gernbloux: Leuven UP, 1974,263-77; 
David Stagaman, S. J., "'God" in Analytic Philosophy', in Sebastian A. Matczak (ed. ), God in 
Contemporary Thought. A Philosophical Perspective (Philosophical Questions Series 10), New York: 
Learned Publications, 1977,813-49, especially 826-3 8; Jacques Poulam, 'Pragmatique de la 
Communication et Dynarnique de la Verit6. La fid6lite th6orique de D. Evans A la r6v6lation 
chr6tienne', RSR 69 (1981), 545-72; Dietmar Neufeld, Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts. An 
Analysis of I John (Bib Int Ser 7), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994,37-60. 
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which is all the more remarkable since the book pre-dates almost all the post-Austin 
development of speech act theory. 
Evans' main focus is set out in his introduction: 
In saying, 'The Creator made the world', does a man commit 
himself to any future conduct, or imply that he has a particular 
attitude or intention, or express a feeling or attitude? Or is the 
utterance a neutral, impersonal statement of fact, like saying, 
'Jones built the house'? (11)" 
In the course of the book he defends the first of these two alternatives, and in this 
sense, the language concerned is seýflinvolving. 
In the first of three chapters of philosophy he offers a recasting of Austin's analysis 
of performative utterances. He uses Austin's categories, save for replacing 
lexpositives' with 'constatives', a move which draws on Austin's rejection of the 
performative/constative distinction, even if it results in a less comprehensive 
classification. (3 8 n. 1) His twin aims here are an analysis of different types of 
implication; and, more significantly, a discussion of institutional and causal words. 
He defines 'flat constatives' as constatives which lack behabitive or commissive force 
(56), thus paving the way for his main argument: thatGod is my Creator'is not a flat 
constative in the biblical context. (64-6) 
This raises particularly the question of the nature of the institutional settings within 
which words gain their currency. Evans asserts that 'institutional-relation words 
include as part of their meaning some indication of conduct which is thought to be 
appropriate' (67) since social life depends on certain expectations. For the key force 
distinction which Austin characterised as illocutionary/perlocutionary, Evans uses 
the terms performative and causal. (70- 1) Causal force, he says, is not a part of 
utterance meaning. 'When words are used performatively, institutional relations are 
sometimes established and sometimes invoked. '(68) 
Chapters 2 and 3 analyse expressions of attitude and feeling respectively. Two 
significant points are made, which will eventually turn out to be incompatible. Firstly 
19 Further references to Evans, Logic of Self-Involvement, are given in the text. 
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he flags the significance of 'rapportive' language, where imaginative sympathy with 
the utterer is required if the utterance is to be understood. (110- 13) The implications 
of this observation remain unexplored in the book, and are only picked up in his later 
work. Secondly, he analyses attitudes as fundamentally relational: they involve a 
judgment of whether or not one is for or against something. Having an attitude about 
x thus involves taking up a position in relation to x (123), which Evans calls an 
lonlook': 'I have coined the word "onlook" as a substantive for what it is to "look on x 
as y". ' (125) 
Onlooks 
Onlooks typically involve a commissive element (a personal involvement with the x 
which motivates the seeing of x as y); a verdictive element (which places x within 
some structure or scheme) and other elements such as autobiographical or expressive 
ones. (126-7) Of the different kinds of onlooks considered by Evans (including literal 
and metaphorical where the x is in some sense y) the two he concentrates on are 
parabolic and analogical. The former concern cases where the appropriate attitudes 
for x are similar to those for y (e. g. 'I look on Henry as a brother'). The latter are 
similar but invite some independent point of comparison between x and y above and 
beyond the attitude suggested (e. g. 'I look on music as a language'). 
Evans later calls onlooks 'the most important and most novel item in The Logic of 
Seýf-Involvement% 20 and the following observations may be made at this point. 
Firstly, there is a slight ambiguity about Evans' use of the word 'logic' in the first half 
of the book. If he has in mind the Wittgensteinian sense of 'logical grammar'then it 
is unobjectionable, but at times one is left wondering if a claim such as 'some 
attitude-words 
... 
have an intrinsic logical connection with feelings' (87) can be 
substantiated, or indeed whether it needs to be. The discussion of onlooks does not 
seem to depend entirely on the preceding analyses of feelings and attitudes, which 
appear more as ground-clearing exercises for the section on onlooks, perhaps to 
avoid the charge that 'seeing x as y' is merely a feeling or groundless opinion 
(perhaps reducible to attitude). In view of his later discussion, Evans'point is 
20 Donald Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, Edinburgh: The Handsel Press, 1980,10. 
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probably that attitude-words gain their currency only through experiencing 
('rapportively') the attitudes involved; but this is not the sarne as saying that 
whenever one uses such a word the connection with the Mood concerned is a matter 
of logical grammar, still less of logical deduction. Rather, it is the context of the 
utterance which is the primary indication of how well the word is ever linked with 
the mood. My point is that the apparent ambiguity of the idea of 'logic' might give 
the appearance of a specifically logical weight behind an argument which actually 
stands or falls on other grounds, namely the correct delineation of the context of the 
utterance. (It is in view of this, also, that I prefer the phrase 'a hermeneutic of 
self-involvement' in the title of this chapter. ) 
This leads to a second observation, that the lack of a context in view during his 
philosophical discussion leaves Evans' claims in his chapter 3 lacking in any clear 
idea of the nature of or the rationale for (to use Searle's phrase) the 'institutional 
backing' which is invoked in any particular case of construal, or onlook. " Instead, his 
context is revealed piecemeal at points in this chapter where some such appeal is 
obviously needed. For instance, 'I accept the authoritative words of Jesus' is the 
reason why he believes God is like a Father. (134) There is also the strong indication 
that he believes that after death the parabolic onlooks will give way to literal ones. 
To make sense of these claims one must postulate something like the 'biblical 
context' which comes later: we look on people/events/actions in the context of 
biblical revelation, validated by Jesus' own authority in all he taught; and one day to 
be vindicated (after death) in literal terms. 
This onlook is certainly foundational to Christianity. Evans addresses briefly the 
different question of whether it is in some sense 'correct': 
Religious belief is the conviction (or hope) that one's onlook 
conforms to an authoritative onlook, a divine onlook... Christians 
believe that there is a divine onlook... an onlook which is 
authoritative: human onlooks are 'true' in so far as they 
approximate to the divine onlook. (140) 
21 A related point is made by Stagaman. in the only one of his cnticisms of Evans with which I 
agree: 'we must inquire why we should accept the word of Jesus', "'God" in Analytic Philosophy, 
835-36. 
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One can never be sure, he admits, that one's onlook conforms to the divine one, and 
indeed a page earlier he writes 
Onlooks are sometimes self-veritdng. That is, in so far as I 
actually look on x as y in my daily life, it becomes true that x is y. 
For example, if I look on my suffering as a means to moral 
growth, it is likely that my suffering will be a means of moral 
growth. 
... 
In general, people tend to conform to the roles which 
they see themselves as playing. (139) 
Whereas the first of these quotes invites us to see some kind of objective 
behind-the-scenes divine vindication of a particular world-view, the second is willing 
to be far more modest. For Evans, the second operates within the framework of the 
first, but it is not clear that he has, at this stage, any reasons for this. Indicating the 
path he would later take, he concludes the book with the far from logically 
self-involving claim: whether or not we accept the 'complex pattern of biblical 
onlooks' is a 'decision of faith'. (267) 
In fact, at this point in his argument something like an analysis of strong and weak 
onlooks in the manner we have described earlier for construals would appear to be 
exactly what Evans needs to account for these varying types of self-involvement. 
Strong construals are self-verifying (Evans' term) precisely because they create the 
institutional facts concerned. Weaker construals can be discussed in different terms, 
such as the success or otherwise of their correspondence to some pre-institutional 
('brute') fact. 
However, at least in outline, the idea of parabolic onlooks in religious language is a 
helpful one. Evans gives the example of 'looking on God as a Father' which, speaking 
parabolically, is a question of inculcating the same human attitudes toward God as 
we would have towards a human father. (133-4) It may be that Evans is actually 
being inconsistent in his terminology here: he appears to have no qualms about 
saying that after death we will understand God's revelation in literal terms (134) 
which would seem to imply that he sees some kind of independent point of contact 
between God and the human father which goes beyond just the attitude, and therefore 
on his own terms he should see this as an analogical onlook and not a parabolic one. 
He is adamant that 'it is not a matter of acting as if I believed that God is like a father' 
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(13 3) but rather 'God is like a father, but the nature of the likeness is obscure' (134). 
The difficulty in articulating this point convincingly leads Evans in his later work 
towards a more comprehensive theory of analogy which, in turn, calls into question 
this earlier account of onlooks as purely public-domain forms of linguistic 
self-involvement. 22 
Creation Language 
The second part of the book brings his linguistic analysis to bear on the biblical 
language of creation. Evans argues that the biblical idea of world-creation is 
inseparable from Israel's idea of nation-creation: they each involve the exercise of 
Yahweh's supernatural causal (i. e. perlocutionary) power at the same time as his 
institutional authority. For Israel this was seen in the miracle of the Exodus, and in 
the covenant whereby Yahweh ordained Israel into a subordinate role with a positive 
value. In this case it is clear that the covenant is the institution within which 
Yahweh's authority operates. 
In the case of world-creation, Evans perceives the same combination of 
perlocutionary force (God's creative word which speaks the world into being) and 
institutional authority: appointing humankind to its role on the earth, with a positive 
assessment of human value and work; and a clear command to continue to uphold the 
creation. Thus: 
The efficacious word of God in Creation has not only 
supernatural causal power but also Exercitive, Verdictive and 
Commissive force; and man's word concerning the Creator who is 
Lord, Appointer, Evaluator and Guarantor is a self-involving 
acknowledgement. In the biblical context, if I say, 'God is my 
Creator', I acknowledge my status as God's obedient servant and 
possession, I acknowledge my role as God's steward and 
worshipper, I acknowledge God's gift of existence, and I 
acknowledge God's self-commitment to me. This act of 
acknowledgement includes both Behabitive and Commissive 
elements. (158) 
22 See Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 10-24 and passim. (I discuss this in §3.2 
below. ) 
Chapter 5- Page 161 
Evans continues: biblical man 
... 
looks on Creation as a performative action. 
... 
In 
the biblical context, the utterance "God is my Creator" is profoundly self-involving. ' 
(159-60). This is his central example of the main thesis of his book. 
The crucial issue here, I suggest, is to determine what is meant by 'in the biblical 
context'. Evans argues that to speak in this context is to adopt the 
Traditional-Contextual implications of words which build up their meaning as the 
Bible is interpreted according to some theological tradition. (16 1) He accepts that 
this might be better stated as 'a biblical context', since obviously different traditions 
invest words with different meanings, but insists that he will continue to speak of the 
biblical context, meaning 'the biblical context which I am expounding. It would 
seem that what Evans is doing here is actually speaking of an ideal biblical context, 
or what would today be called the implied reader's understanding of the text. " In 
other words, there is an understanding of a term like 'Creator' which comes from 
carefully investigating its uses across the whole witness of biblical language. " We 
can put Evans point as a conditional: if one uses the word 'Creator' in an utterance 
like 'God is my Creator' in such a way that all the biblical connotations are intended, 
then one is actually doing much more than making a statement (uttering a flat 
constative) because one is thereby involved in a whole series of attitudinal and other 
self-involving speech acts. 
This differs from Evans in only one respect: his formulation of the conditional leaves 
the context outside, as an apparently simple condition of the rest of the conditional, 
i. e. 'assuming the biblical context, if one uses the word 'Creator' 
... 
then one is 
performing a self-involving utterance'. But to my mind Evans'version gives a false 
23 For this term see, for example, Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric ofFiction, London: Penguin 
Books 
, 
21 983 (196 1), especially 67-77; and Wolfgang Iser, The Act ofReading. A Theory ofAesthetic 
Response, Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1978. For a clear example of the idea in biblical 
studies see R. Alan Culpepper, Anatomy of the Fourth GospeL A Study in Literary Design, 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983,204-27. 
24 In passing we should note that some of the ways in which Evans expresses himself about 
'biblical context' are open to misunderstanding. For instance, do words build up meanings in the Bible 
as a whole? He makes the perhaps incautious assumption, outlined at the beginning of the book, that 
words have essential meanings, which seems to be a view he borrows uncritically from the 
then-prevalent biblical theology movement. Indeed he avers that a philosopher 'can only approach the 
words of the Bible via a biblical theology which is prescriptive and selective' (20) but this is far from 
self-evident. 
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impression, for it is at least possibly true that the majority of speakers who utter the 
words 'God is my Creator' do not acknowledge all that Evans says they do, simply 
because they do not speak 'in the biblical context'. 
This difference appears small at first sight, but it lies at the root of why Evans 
changes his mind in later books. The fundamental question raised is: how may we 
demarcate genuine self-involvement? Is it guaranteed by an idea of context which is 
as simple as saying 'when in the biblical context'9 Or is it more problematic for his 
analysis, in terms of an investigation of non-linguistic criteria located in the speaker? 
Evans takes this latter route in his later work, but in fact we shall see later that The 
Logic of Seýfllnvolvement itself offers hints that this is the way he would go. In its 
conclusion Evans notes: 'What is it to "mean what one says"'? And what is it to intend 
that the utterance have its meaning in the biblical context rather than some other 
context? These are questions which I have not answered. ' (262) It is his later attempts 
to answer them which we must now consider. 25 
§3.2 Evans'Later Work: Critique, Retraction and Reaffirmation 
Evans' later works clearly evince a personal pilgrimage away from the logical 
analysis of his first book and towards a multi-faceted position which seeks to 
combine and correlate philosophical and psychological insights on language and 
experience. " Although the changes of direction are evident, there are various ways of 
marking the continuities also. Hauerwas and Bondi note primarily the prominent 
strain of theological liberalism throughout his work: religious language interests him 
because it witnesses in whatever approximate ways to transformative religious 
25 Other earlier works from Evans which correspond in large measure to his 1963 position 
include Donald Evans, 'Differences Between Scientific and Religious Assertions', in Ian G. Barbour (ed. ), Science and Religion. New Perspectives on the Dialogue, London: SCM Press, 1968,101-33; 
'Barth on Talk about God, Canadian Journal of Theology 16 (1970), 175-92; and'Reply to J. Gordon 
Campbell', RelStud 9 (1973), 469-72. 
26 The essays which chart the heart of this pilgrimage are gathered together and substantially 
reworked in Donald Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, Edinburgh: The Handsel Press, 1980, 
which is best read in conjunction with its companion volume, Struggle and Fuýflllment. The Inner 
Dynamics of Religion and Morality, Cleveland: Collins 1979 (UK 1980), where the later position is 
more fully articulated. He also authored the published version of the United Church of Canada report 
on communism as Communist Faith and Christian Faith, London: SCM Press, 1965, which includes 
some early personal thoughts on self-involvement as a broader than philosophical category ( 13 9-47); 
and his later papers are helpfully collected together 111 Spirituality and Human Nature (Suny Series in Religious Studies), Albany: SUNY Press, 1993. 
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experience, and his concern is always to locate some universal dimension of that 
experience, be it logically/linguistically necessary or psychologically fundainental. 27 
Evans himself hints at this kind of agenda with his scattered remarks about his 
attempt to grapple with transcendence, from onlooks as the rudiments of a theory of 
analogy through to the existentialist sympathies of his later philosophical 
anthropology, 28 and perhaps most baldly with the statement: 'My own personal 
conviction is that a great deal of what Christians regard as revelation provides insight 
mainly concerning human nature and only indirectly and secondarily concerning the 
nature of God. v29 I will attempt to strike an appropriate balance between emphasising 
the differences and the continuities in Evans' thought here. 
Contexts: Linguistic and Prelinguistic? 
The primary issue to be considered, as suggested above, is whether philosophical 
concerns are adequate for demarcating significant forms of self-involvement, or 
whether they need supplementing with psychologically-orientated models. In 
particular, Evans contrasts his idea that self-involvement can be characterised as a 
logical entailment of linguistic usage with the implications, originally unexplored, of 
his point about rapportive language. He develops this latter idea into a theory of 
'existential belief: 'a belief where what is believed can only be understood to the 
extent that one has fulfilled certain existential conditions. "O Drawing in part on his 
own experience of psycho-therapy which uncovered prelinguistic experience, 31 he 
concludes that 'personal self-involvement is epistemologically (and to some extent 
32 temporally) prior to linguistic self-involvement'. In so saying he does not go back to 
a pre-Austin view of the performative utterance as reporting on an inner state, but 
rather urges that the public meaning of language is insufficient on its own for 
27 Hauerwas & Bondi, 'Language, Experience and the Life Well-Lived', 3 5. 
28 See especially Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 10-24: 'in The Logic of 
Seýf-Involvement I sketched the beginnings of an approach to the problem of divine transcendence. ' 
(11) Note also his unpublished University of Chicago lectures of 1967 under the title 'Religious 
Language and Divine Transcendence. ' (265, n. 2) 
29 Evans, Struggle and Fulfillment, 211, n. 25. 
. 
10 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 250. 
31 Noted in Evans, Struggle and FuUillment, 1. 
32 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 253. 
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evaluating genuine self-involvement. Linguistic analysis must be supplemented by 
'normative anthropology' and 'existentialist epistemology. 33 
Thus although Evans still sees covenant as important, for instance, it now holds only 
a secondary importance. " The foundation of Evans'work has instead shifted away 
from verbal self-involvement. By 1980 he characterises his 1963 book as a form of 
'modified empiricism'too impressed by what was observable and public, and instead 
defends his own foundation as 'a modified natural-law concerning human nature. 35 
Linguistic analysis can only judge between onlooks by fiat, but instead 'onlooks 
should be appraised primarily by reference to whether they facilitate discernments of 
the divine and contribute to human fulfilment. 66 In short, Evans finally locates a 
demarcation between strong and weak construal in terms of the level of the degree of 
existential authenticity. In certain key respects, and particularly in its appeal to the 
prelinguistic, this represents a different path from the one I have taken in earlier 
chapters, where I have suggested that we have a spectrum of construals which remain 
in the public (inter-subjective) arena. 
With this subsequent shift in emphasis in view it becomes possible to notice the 
tension between the avowedly logical analysis and an incipient existentialism already 
in The Logic of Se4f-Involvement. Evans himself traces the tension to his appeal to 
the idea of 'rapportive language', as we have seen. 17 There is further evidence of it in 
his 1963 work in chapter 6 on'Creation as a Causal Action'. (218-52) Thus, again on 
how statements about creation can be self-involving, particularly parabolic 
statements: 
33 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 25 1; 13. 
34 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 193. 
35 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 64; 195. 
36 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 247; 242 
37 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 249. This is not to say that 'rapportive language' 
cannot be a helpful idea when used appropriately. Evans, for example, makes successful use of it in 
Logic ofSe4f-Involvement in showing how God's work as Creator is closely linked to his glory and 
holiness, which terms can only be understood as the 'impressive observables' of an inner divine 
quality, which means that they evoke 'a correlative human feeling-Response and acknowledgement'. 
(174) 'In short, God's glory and holiness are impressive qualities, which I understand in so far as I am 
impressed. ' (184-85) See the similar approach here of O. R. Jones, The Concept ofHoliness, London: 
Allen& Unwin, 196 1. 
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To accept a parable is to adopt an attitude, an attitude by which 
one lives so as to be in rapport with God and thus be enabled to 
understand the parable better in one's own experience. That is, the 
language of parables is self-involving and rapportive. (223) 
Even if Evans is avoiding being motivated here by what one can and cannot believe 
today, but is rather aiming for the theological (attitudinal) point of the biblical text, it 
is clear that a demythologisation of the creation narratives is but a short step from 
this point. For example: 'breath of God' language invites us 'to take up an attitude, a 
parabolic onlook' (240) of continual dependence on God, rather than being a 
reference, in whatever attenuated form, to some actual characteristic of God. 
Likewise, he concludes his discussion by arguing that 'World-Creation is 
distinguished only in terms of onlook-attitudes' (25 1), since everything is created and 
therefore there is no separable 'core' factual element about which world-creation 
language is talking. This is clearly a change of tack from the rest of the book, and if 
one were to press this line of argument in isolation then the resulting position would 
be in large measure that of Willem Zurdeeg's idea of convictional language which is 
not subject to tests for veridical reference: 'It is not the analytical philosopher's 
business to decide whether the reality meant in a certain language is "really" there or 
not. The only thing he can do is to notice that if human beings speak either indicative 
or convictional language they refer to something which is "real" for them. "' Helpful 
in what it affirms, this view turns its back precisely on the benefits of a speech act 
analysis in what it denies. 
Adjustment or Over-Compensation? 
Evans' later work stands in a complex relation to The Logic of Se4fllnvolvement, 39 
and I propose that it is indeed too simplistic to see his subsequent writings as 
representing a disavowal of his early concerns. The particular point which needs to 
be established here is whether his subsequent critique and retraction of certain 
elements of his early work substantially compromises its basic insights concerning 
the logical grammar of self-involvement. 
38 Willem F. Zurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy ofReligion, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958, 
4-5 
39 See in particular Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 3-24; 193-96; 223-27 and 247-63. 
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The framework for his later enquiries which he develops out of his work on onlooks 
is that of analogy, and this may serve as a clear example of the position I wish to 
argue: that in broadening his work from its philosophical basis Evans 
over-compensates for aspects omitted from his earlier work. 
Evans suggests that an analysis of the specific ways in which thinkers navigate 
between the human and the divine lends itself to a charactensation in terms of three 
different kinds of analogy: 
1. Analogy of activity: divine activity is analogous to human activity 
2. Analogy of attitude: an attitude of worship is appropriate to God, and 
corresponds to inter-personal attitudes (in particular 'basic trust', rather than 
worship) 
3. Analogy of relation: the divine-human relation is analogous to human 
relations. " 
The second and third of these (although Evans does not rule out the first also) are 
explicitly existential in orientation. Evans comes to the conclusion that it is the 
inward attitude which is most significant, and in particular that his earlier work has 
neglected the idea of a 'person', treating this concept as a somewhat thin 'attitudinal 
description of a metaphysical entity'. 
The concomitant change in his view of self-involvement is clear in the next chapter, 
a reprint of a 1971 article with an updated postscript, discussing Ian Ramsey's idea of 
how qualifiers shift the meaning of terms applied to God, which refer analogically on 
different levels. " He now argues that there is an irreducibly existential component to 
understanding 'cosmic disclosures' which remains inaccessible to the viewpoint of 
simply a logic of self-involvement, and in a footnote he criticises his earlier view as 
relying on a fundamentally empiricist epistemology of 'flat constatives' such as 
scientific statements. " Elsewhere he allows his own approach to be characterised as 
40 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 14. On 'basic trust' see Evans, Struggle and 
Fuýflllment, 19-107. This paragraph draws from and summarises Faith, Authenticity & Morality, 
10-24. 
41 Evans, Faith, A uthen ticity and Morality, 25 
-72 (Ian Ramsey on Talk about God'). 
42 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 64, and 272 n. 28. See also Evans, 'Differences 
Between Scientific and Religious Assertions'. 
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one which has 'great difficulty in accepting God's redemptive presence in historical 
movements except as the sum of God's presence in the hearts of... people. "' 
There are many other indicators of Evans' desire to attach greater significance to 
existential depth of involvement than linguistic self-involvement. 44 However, 
reorientated and reinvigorated as he undoubtedly is in these later works, there remain 
signs that this signals primarily a change of agenda rather than a complete disavowal 
of his earlier position. For example, in his advocacy of pre-linguistic meaning he 
does allow that 'Private meaning can 
... 
be broadly shared by people who fulfil the 
requisite existentialist conditions for understanding. And the conditions are usually 
accessible, though in varying degrees, to all human beings. "' He also reserves 
specific roles for speech act analysis, as an 'illuminating reminder' of the mechanics 
of construal in any human judgment, and as a way of highlighting the difference 
between what convictions either should follow or must follow from any 
self-involving utterance. " Thus, his conclusion: 
Speech-act analysis is a way of groping towards a way of using 
language to get at what lies behind language in one's own most 
profound personal experience. 4' 
As a reaffirmation this falls far short of all that one might wish to see embraced. " At 
best it serves to demonstrate that Evans' later work does not completely retract his 
earlier work. However, at heart, it appears to confuse the discovery of new agendas 
and new areas of enquiry with a re-evaluation of old agendas. 
I suggest that at least part of the problem facing Evans was the confused nature of the 
illocution in Austin's work, which left Evans with inadequate means for isolating the 
illocutionary act from the perlocutionary in his original work. As a result, the way in 
43 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 277, n. 13. 
44 See especially Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 193-96 and 235-46. 
45 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 251-52. 
46 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 261. 
47 Evans, Faith, Authenticity and Morality, 262. 
48 Although, ironically, it is close to the changes urged by Stagaman in his review of Evans' 
earlier work, who wanted a more Heideggerian-style mysticism in his self-involvement; Stagaman, 
"'God" in Analytic Philosophy, 835-38. 
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which illocutions mark out self-involvement in a Wittgensteinian 'logical' sense 
becomes blurred with effective self-involvement in a perlocutionary sense. Wanting 
to stress the successful effect of a speech act as more important than its logical 
grammar, Evans may thus have mistakenly concluded that psychological concerns 
must over-rule linguistic ones rather than acknowledging their different spheres of 
relevance in the hermeneutical task. 
Finally Evans concedes too much, perhaps in part because he wishes to make his 
'modified empiricism' carry a hermeneutical burden it was not designed to bear. The 
kinds of clarification and explanation provided by self-involvement as a speech-act 
mechanism in the public domain remain significant and helpful even if they do not 
resolve all existential concerns, valid or invalid. Since in fact I do not think that the 
turn to the prelinguistic in Evans' work represents a sustainable step forward, for the 
various reasons discussed in earlier chapters concerning the nature of mental 
dispositions, a stronger conclusion may be maintained: that self-involvement as a 
hermeneutical category operating in inter-subjective illocutionary acts is not 
significantly compromised by Evans' advocacy of existentialist anthropology as a 
better way. 
§3.3 Conclusion: The Elements of a Hermeneutic of Self-Involvement 
The Logic of Seýfllnvolvement remains remarkable for the extent to which Evans was 
able to work with the new concepts of speech act theory and attempt a broad 
application of them to significant aspects of biblical language. Handicapped as he 
was by the fact that most of what would now be regarded as received wisdom in 
speech act theory was unavailable to him, in particular Searle's reorganisation of the 
illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction, he nevertheless grasped the nettle of 
providing an account of biblical language which was both cognitive and functional. 
The conceptual difficulties of articulating such a position are manifest in the various 
tensions running through his account, as I have shown. It is perhaps not entirely 
surprising then that his awareness of the problems of articulating a logical form of 
self-involvement finally drew him away from the idea that linguistic analysis really 
explains anything at all. '9 
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However, I have argued that while Evans' later work cannot be seen simply as a 
disavowal of his earlier position, it does represent an over-compensation for his 
earlier reliance on forms of self-involvement which could be demarcated entirely and 
adequately in logico-linguistic terms. Without suggesting that existential concerns 
are unimportant, I do argue that taking them on board represents a broadening of the 
inquiry which does not jeopardise the original idea of self-involvement as it arises in 
the performance of speech acts. If we read Evans' insights while keeping in view a 
spectrum of strong and weak construals, we can escape the potential polarisation 
between fact-stating and rapportive language. 
With this in mind, I judge that Evans'work on self-involvement can still be pursued 
with profit today, independently of his own later modifications and changes of 
emphasis. In particular, its elucidation of self-involvement as a speech act category, 
which draws on the multi-faceted nature of the speaking agent's investment in 
extra-linguistic states of affairs, models a non-reductive form of self-involvement 
which occurs in the inter-personal/public domain. In short, Evans provides us with 
the elements of a hermeneutic of self-involvement. 
§4 After Evans: Self-Involvement as a Hermeneutical Tool in Biblical 
Interpretation 
Donald Evans' work has been more honoured in the breach than in the observance. 
G. B. Caird was convinced that it had the potential to be an enormously fruitful 
analytical tool for tackling the essentially hermeneutical problem of unlocking 
central biblical ideas in a way which involves the Bible in the life of the reader, but 
he did not live long enough to do more than sketch out this view in his final book, 
The Language and Imagery of the Bible. " I have also noted above Anthony 
49 It would doubtless be of little interest to him to think that his approach could make some 
useful points about implied readers! 
so Cf. Caird, Language and Imagery of the Bible, ch. 1 (7-3 6). Caird's oral comments explicitly 
to this effect, and dating back to his teaching in the late 1960's, are recorded in Thiselton, New 
Horizons, 16. Evans shared with Caird both a Canada and an Oxford connection; credits him on Logic 
of Seý(-Involvement, 9; and contributed an article to the Caird Festschrift: 'Academic Scepticism, 
Spiritual Reality and Transfiguration', in L. D. Hurst and N. T. Wright (eds. ), The Glory of Christ in the 
New Testament. Studies in Christology in Memory of George Bradford Caird, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1987,175-86; reprinted as 'Spiritual Reality, Acadernic Skepticism, and Transfiguration' in 
Evans, Spirituality and Human Nature, 253-66. 
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Thiselton's use of Evans' ideas. To the limited extent that speech act theoiy has been 
utilised in biblical interpretation, The Logic of Seýfllnvolvement has at least been 
noted, but frequently with no substantial engagement with its ideas. 
Some recognition of self-involvement has been present in more general discussions 
of religious language; " and the idea of onlooks, or its later development into a full 
theory of analogy, finds obvious points of contact between self-involvement and 
works which self-consciously use the idea of construal, as noted in chapter 4 above. 
Here it is not my intention to provide a full catalogue of writers who have made use 
in some way of an idea of self-involvement. Rather I choose to focus on perhaps the 
only two book-length studies to have made significant use of the concept in biblical 
interpretation, in each case along with a broader appeal to speech act theory and its 
concerns: Timothy Polk on Jeremiah and Dietmar Neufeld on 1 John. 
§4.1 Timothy Polk: Self-Involvement and Self-Constitution 
Polk has authored two very different works, both of which make conscious use of a 
hermeneutic of self-involvement: his Yale PhD thesis, published in 1984 as The 
Prophetic Persona; ` and his more recent Yhe Biblical Kierkegaard. " The former is 
more exegetical, while the latter, although very different in disciplinary orientation, 
retains a strong exegetical interest. 
The particular contribution of Polk's study of Jeremiah's 'language of the self is in its 
attention to what I shall term the'non-referential "I" of self-involvement. ' Reflecting 
the book's origins as a Yale thesis, and in particular the influence of Paul Holmer, 
Polk seeks to demonstrate how the self which is constructed by Jeremiah's 
first-person language serves hermeneutically to mediate between the text and the 
reader, as a personal enactment of a corporate relationship between God and his 
people. Speaking of the textual self as a'persona', Polk argues that'The analysis of 
See, for instance, Dallas M. High, Language, Persons, and Belief. Studies in Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations and Religious Uses ofLanguage, New York: Oxford UP, 1967, which I 
discuss in chapter 6. 
52 Timothy Polk, The Prophetic Persona. Jeremiah and the Language of the Seýr(JSOTS 32), 
Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1984. 
53 Timothy Houston Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard. Reading by the Rule ofFaith, Macon, 
GA: Mercer UP, 1997. 
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the persona's first-person speech will show that "personal religion", in the sense of 
"individual fellowship with God". is assumed by the text, not argued or justified as 
something new and unheard of, and moreover.. the prophet's person is always 
depicted in terms of his vocation, which is fully corporate in orientation. "' 
The key to Polk's hermeneutic is in successive chapters with titles including the 
phrases'The Language of the Self and'The Enactment of Identity'. In the former he 
discusses the metaphor of the heart, and takes to task exegetes who have proposed a 
literally-orientated treatment of such language as reflecting contemporary thought of 
the physical 'heart' which literally grounds metaphors of the self. Rather, he argues 
for a sensitivity to 'the logic of certain kinds of self-referential language', by which 
he means that the 'I' in many significant first-person utterances is a subject which 
emerges out of commanding its responsible use and 'does not refer to, name, or 
identify something. "' He then puts this concept to work in an analysis of 'heart' 
language in Jeremiah 4. The appeal of 4: 4, for instance, he represents as the appeal 
for the people to return to Yhwh, make a fresh beginning with him, and'thereby 
participate in his purpose and promise, or 
... 
leave their hearts unaltered, permitting 
their humanity to wither and losing themselves in divine judgment. "' Language 
games such as pledging and lamenting'do not describe a condition so much as enact 
one. v57 In Polk's words, the text 'shows the self to be the achievement of the 
responsible, first-person use of the language of the heart' and suggests that the 
biblical text, 'by delineating a range of behaviour regarded as essential to a proper 
relation to God, 
... 
illustrates what it means to have a self "' 
54 Polk, Prophetic Persona, 13. 
S: 1 Polk, Prophetic Persona, 26 and 184 n. 12. He is following here Wittgenstem, Philosophical 
Investigations, § 13 8, and in particular the illuminating essay of Paul Holmer, 'Wittgenstein and the 
Self, in Richard H. Bell and Ronald E. Hustwit, Essays on Kierkegaard & Wittgenstein. On 
Understanding the Seýf, Wooster, Ohio: College of Wooster, 1978,10-3 1; who writes 'the "self ' is a 
logical concept; it plays a role in the logic of language and of world. 
... 
It is there necessarily, not in 
virtue of observation. ' (18) 
S6 Polk, Prophetic Persona, 45. 
57 Polk, Prophetic Persona, 46. 
58 Polk, Prophetic Persona, 47; 57. 
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Polk pursues this line of approach through lengthy exegeses of the so-called 
confessions of Jeremiah, and various other significant autobiographical passages, in 
order to show that the book of Jeremiah, by way of this prophetic self-involvement in 
the language of prayer and lament, 'intends its representation of the prophetic self "be 
used as an indirect route of insight for others" and that it eventuates in the rendering 
of a persona "molded by God". "' In a concluding chapter he offers suggestions for 
how his approach fits with a more general account of the role of scripture in the 
formation of identity; concerns which he takes up more fully in his next book. 
The Prophetic Persona is a helpful analysis of first-person language in biblical texts, 
and clearly demonstrates the difference it makes to interpret such texts within a 
coherent understanding of the self and self-involvement. Polk provides many useful 
insights concerning the way in which speech act texts such as oaths, and 
performative utterances such as 'Correct me, 0 Lord' and 'We set our hope in thee' 
operate on a self-involving level with lifestyle implications which underwrite the 
non-referential self of such texts. " Indeed his focus on the 'non-referential "I" of 
self-involvement' is perhaps the major hermeneutical contribution of the book. 
My reservation concerning his proposal derives from its eclectic philosophical 
orientation. Polk's account of the self is strongly Wittgensteinian, and he clearly 
combines this with a sure gasp of the relevant speech-act dynamics of performative 
utterances, making brief reference to both Austin and Evans in the process. " 
Nevertheless, his reading of Wittgenstein, perhaps reflecting something of the Yale 
provenance of the thesis, sees the non-referential 'self as constructed through 
successful performance of the speech acts: 'People come to be who they are through 
their actions, and by their actions they are known'. " The Jeremiah of the text is 
59 Polk, Prophetic Persona, 169, quoting here Sallie McFague TeSelle, Speaking in Parables. 
A Study in Metaphor and Theology, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975,169. 
60 Polk, Prophetic Persona, 39-40 on oaths (cf 191 n. 13: 'The persistence into our own day of 
oath-taking in various non-Semitic cultures would be evidence in favor of the temporally and 
culturally unbound quality of this conception of the self. '); and 167-69 on'Self-Constitution and the 
Languao, e of the Heart. 1ý 
61 Polk, Prophetic Persona, 22-24,26,30 and 184 n. 12 on Wittgensteinian ideas; Austin and 
Evans are noted at 179, n. 28, but'performafive'is a major category throughout. 
62 Polk, Prophetic Persona, 38, with reference to Hans W. Frei, The Identity ofJesus Christ. 
The Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975,42-44; 91-94. 
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therefore constructed as a'persona', a'literary-theological construct'who exists in the 
text's 'explicative sense' rather than its 'historical reference. "' From a speech act point 
of view, it does not seem to me necessary to go down this route, and the concept of 
Jeremiah's persona being a mediating presence between an actual Yhwh and actual 
readers may be one subtlety too many. Assuming, then, that one does not let this 
point detain us, Polk's work on self-constitution may profitably be transposed to the 
speech-act key of self-involvement and taken as a particularly clear example of the 
possibilities inherent in such a hermeneutic. 
A Speech-Act Hermeneutic 
In his later work, Polk examines how biblical texts draw readers into 
self-involvement by way of a study of Kierkegaard's reading of the Bible, before 
performing 'Kierkegaardian' readings of James and Job in the second half of the 
book. " In his introduction, he locates his study as being at the intersection of various 
theological disciplines (antifoundationalist approaches; ideas of performative 
language; and the notion of imaginative construal), with an over-riding focus on 
rehabilitating Kierkegaard's way of reading the Bible as a'canon-contextual' 
approach; thus in summary: 'His is a speech-act hermeneutic that grounds itself 
non-foundationally in the canon. 65 
Polk then filters this ambitious project through the grid of Fish's Is There a Text in 
this Class?. He sees in Fish (and takes from him) the requisite combination of 
anti- foundationalism, speech-act theory, a focus on 'the literal sense' of the text, and a 
view of the interpretive community as paradigmatic of the church; but most of all he 
appeals to the passage where Fish reads Augustine's rule of faith as a precursor of the 
'reading strategies' of today. " Polk's aim: 
At the very least, I hope to show that the readings Kierkegaard 
produces by following [the Rule of faith] are far from simplistic. 
Rather, they are challenging and true, true because they generate 
63 Polk, Prophetic Persona, 8- 10. Frei's influence is of course in, with and under such a claim. 
64 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 119-52 on James; 153-200 on Job. 
65 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 4. 
66 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 7- 10. 
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faithful vision. " 
Picking up on his concluding comments in The Prophetic Persona, Polk then adopts 
David Kelsey's idea of 'imaginative construal' and proceeds to attempt to articulate a 
'Kierkegaardian sola scriptura'. For Polk there is indeed a circularity about the rule 
of faith (as reading strategy), which fits with his willingness to articulate his 
approach in Fishian terms. We construe the biblical text as exhorting us to love, and 
we do so as an act of love itself. Is this a vicious circularity? No, replies Polk, there is 
a sense in which this act of will is self-confirming because it serves to ground our 
reading ethically in a radical love for God. In examining Jesus'words'the tTee is 
recognizable by its fruits' (Luke 6: 44) Polk follows a Kierkegaardian reading (where 
'it is the life of love which interprets the text') and concludes: 
Our task is not to "interpret" the ftuit, but to produce it. 
... 
The 
saying works exhortatively to motivate loving, not 
propositionally, to assert some objective norm that leaves us 
untouched while we apply it to someone else. " 
In short,, our construals are judged by the standard of love, which is the rule of faith 
transposed into a contemporary hermeneutical principle. Polk goes on to elaborate 
this in speech-act terms: 'A grasp of scripture's performative and self-involving logic 
requires reading it as more than a set of cognitive propositions". Rather, 'what needs 
stressing is the illocutionary force of the Rule and its world-constructive capacity. "' 
One example of how this approach works out exegetically may give a flavour of 
Polk's championing of Kierkegaard as 'a speech-act hermeneutician ahead of his 
time. "' He looks at James 1, with its 'mapping of moral equivalencies and 
oppositions in which receptivity and doubt head the chart. ' In vv. 5-8, James says that 
God gives (wisdom) generously to all who ask, but that doubters and the 
double-minded will not receive anything from the Lord. Polk observes: 'It is not that 
God does not give, but that the doubter is unreceptive. ' In other words, the one who 
doubts thereby puts himself (herself) into a position where the required construal 
67 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 9. 
68 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 37. 
69 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 56 n. 5 and 86. 
70 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 99. 
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which would enable one to 'see wisely' is beyond reach. The theme reappears in v. 17, 
where God is the 'Father of lights' giving every good and perfect gift: 
By calling for "heart enough to be confident" at the very 
centrepoint of the Discourse... Kierkegaard must be seeking to 
correct a heartsick misunderstanding of James 1: 17. Like James, 
he knows how meaning itself can be a function of the moral life, 
that it too is a matter of the heart. " 
Thus one finds here self-involvement; the construal of the text; and its ethical 
relevance all as part of the (avowedly circular) hermeneutical. rule of faith. In the 
process, Polk offers a lucid (Kierkegaardian) exposition of James 1 which illustrates 
precisely how the illocutionary force of the promise operates through a form of 
world-construction, with the necessary implicit constitutive rules made clear, such as 
'Seeing the divine purpose of God in one's situation counts as wisdom'. 
Polk offers other insights into the book of James, as well as pursuing a similar 
approach towards a'doxological' reading of the book of Job, in which he attempts to 
find a way of reading Job in accord with the rule of faith without embroiling himself 
in the various strategies of theodicy, which he characterises, as misguided precisely in 
that they are not self-involving. Construal again surfaces: 'what Abraham and Job 
illustrate faith to be is, essentially... receptivity', " in other words: faith is the ability 
to count as or construe according to the rule of faith. 
Once again, this is a helpful and sophisticated use of the categories of speech act 
theory, and a good example of a hermeneutic of self-involvement. In some senses it 
exemplifies my own proposals for a speech-act reading of the biblical text, although 
Polk locates at least some hermeneutical significance in calling this text 'Scripture' as 
a self-involving construal which puts the emphasis fairly on the reading community: 
'What is at stake is how to "literally see" the Bible as scripture. "' In turn this is 
simply another variation on the reservation I expressed above concerning his work 
on Jeremiah. Interestingly, it can be seen to follow in this case quite directly from the 
71 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 124. The discussion of this passage is at 123-24. 
72 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 172. His overall argument here is similar to that of Terrence 
W. Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy, Washington DC: Georgetown UP, 1991, especially chapter 4 
'Considering Job: Does Job Fear God for NaughtT, 89-112. 
73 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 10. 
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fact that Polk works throughout with an undifferentiated notion of construal. It is 
perhaps significant that his admittedly substantial exegetical work occurs with 
passages of Scripture (viz the wisdom sayings of Job and the wisdom-like ethical 
exhortation of James) which invite piecemeal construal rather than developing 
lengthy narrative or didactic passages. Strong construal is thus particularly 
appropriate to these texts. The various intratextual implications of uniformly strong 
construal, however, must again be acknowledged as problematic. 
Polk is evidently not unaware of the difficulties involved in a position where 
extra-textual reality depends on construal. His 'solution' is to argue that the 
circularity enjoined by such a reading strategy (i. e. God is beyond the text because 
we construe him there, and we do so because he teaches us how to read lovingly in 
the first place) is not a vicious circularity, but is ethically motivating: the community 
'tacitly acknowledges its extra-textual reality to be a textual construct, which to the 
natural eye, unschooled in the practices and norms of the Christian community, will 
appear to be a merely textual construct, to the extent that it appears at all. "' Such 
grand claims, as I have argued in earlier chapters, stretch important insights beyond 
breaking point: theological construction need not be pursued so reductively. 
Nevertheless, Polk offers a Kierkegaardian approach to scripture which works 
productively with the notion of imaginative construal, and which again demonstrates 
the exegetical significance of self-involvement as a hermeneutical category, even if it 
does tend towards an intratextuality engineered by his persistently strong conception 
of construal. As before, I propose that the benefits of his approach may be adopted 
without having to follow him down that particular path. 
The final speech act approach to exegesis which we shall consider raises similar 
questions. The prevalence of this issue in the available literature is just one indication 
74 Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, 66. Interestingly, a similar point is made by Francis Watson 
in his view that the claim for Christian truth in a theological approach to the Bible can be both 
trans-communal but not self-evident to all, since it requires disclosure to the inquiring (or believing) 
mind, within an overall framework of the claims of Christianity. Francis Watson, Text, Church and 
World. Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective, Edinburgh: T. &T. Clark, 1994,255-64 
(especially 260-61 and 263). 
Chapter 5- Page 177 
of why I have devoted so much attention to the Implications of speech act theory for 
construction-orientated approaches in earlier chapters. 
§4.2 Dietmar Neufeld. 
- 
'Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts' 
Dietmar Neufeld's work on I John represents the most thorough integration to date of 
exegetical questions with speech act insights, although as we shall see he views 
speech act theory, problematically, as providing a way of avoiding insoluble 
historical-critical questions. " Although his book may at first glance look like 
precisely the kind of 'speech act criticism' which I have suggested should be avoided, 
in fact he only reads certain passages of 1 John in terms of speech act theory (in 
particular the prologue; the 'slogans of the opponents'; the warnings about antichrists; 
and the 'confessions and denials'), and thus in practice he does restrict his focus to 
strong illocutions. " Indeed, Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts is in particular an 
exemplary display of the significance of self-involvement as a hermeneutical 
category. Even so, he makes the same move as Polk in blurring the line between 
self-involvement and self-constitution, although this time it is Derrida rather than any 
Yale intratextualist who is offered as support. 
Neufeld begins by noting that the traditional questions put to the text of 1 John have 
been historical, theological and literary-critical, all assuming that the text gains its 
currency from its historical setting. The problem with this, he argues, has been that 
so little is known about that historical setting that understanding of the book has been 
considerably handicapped, remaining at best 'tentative'. (36) In a survey of various 
views of the author and his opponents as they have been characterised in past 
research, he demonstrates that 'Commentators are preoccupied with the material 
extrinsic to the text' (6), from Brooke who believed that 1 John was not primarily 
polemical, but was rather written to edify and teach adherents; " through Bultmann's 
influential view that the text was combating gnosticism, with its Christology that 
75 Dietmar Neufeld, Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts. An Analysis of I John (Bib Int Ser 7), 
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994. 
76 Neufeld, Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts, 61-132. Further page references are given in 
the text. 
A. E. Brooke, The Johannine Epistles (ICC), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1912. 
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denied that Jesus had come in the flesh; " and on to R. E. Brown's ma . or work which 
saw the book as confronting the result of a schism brought about by a 
misunderstanding in the Johannine community of the Christology and ethical thrust 
of the fourth gospel. '9 As Neufeld concludes, historical reconstruction has been 
unable to agree on the nature of the supposed conflict, the identity of the opponents, 
or what they believed. (30) In contrast, he proposes to take seriously both the 
anonymity and the universal character of 1 John. (32) It is against this background 
that he develops his idea that speech act theory offers an alternative to the need to 
rely on historical reconstruction, while still doing justice to the directedness of the 
discourse. 
Neufeld's Methodology 
Neufeld argues that speech and writing are both ways in which people produce 
meaning and exist in a meaningful universe: 'This connection between linguistic 
activity (speech) and written discourse embodied in "text", permits viewing "text" as 
representative of one aspect of embodied communication. ' (4 1) In particular, in the 
case of I John: 'The christological confessions and ethical exhortations may be 
viewed as written effective acts intended to change the content of the readers' 
confessions in order to bring about a proper alignment of speech and conduct. ' (4 1) 
However, the specifics of his appeal to speech act theory, particularly in the work of 
Austin and Evans, are broadened out by way of the generalised hermeneutical 
considerations of Ricoeur (whom he follows in seeing the language of the text as 
'more than the sum total of the historical processes that brought it into existence' 
(43)) and 
, 
in particular, by his appeal to Derrida, for help in'exploring the constitutive 
function of language on the writing subject. ' (5 0) 
Derrida appears to appeal to Neufeld because, at least if read selectively, hepermits 
the perception of text as language and at the same time to recognize the act of writing 
as constitutive. ' (52, sic) However this appeal is confessedly a selective use of 
Derrida, whose broader deconstructive agenda it is to challenge the very possibilities 
78 Rudolf Bultmann, The Johannine Epistles (Hermenela), Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973 
(1967). 
79 Raymond E. Brown, S. S., The Epistles ofJohn (AB 30), London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1982. 
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of hearing from any'author' at all, or at least to challenge any supposed stability in 
the constituting of a present self. If Derrida's self is constituted in the text it is 
because for him textuality suffuses existence, and thus, in a certain sense, 'il nýa pas 
d'hors text. "' Neufeld claims to be fully aware of the dangers of appealing to Derrida 
at this point (51-52) but in my judgment his appeal still sits uneasily with his own 
intention of reading 1 John. 
It seems that Neufeld already has in his sights the conclusion he wants to reach: viz. 
that Austin's speech act theory will work well on 1 John if it can be adapted to allow 
for a text where the author is historically hidden; and Derrida has a view of textuality 
which fits hand-in-glove with a hidden author; and therefore he chooses to appeal to 
them both under the rubric of 'new understandings of textuality'. I have argued at 
length in earlier chapters that this is mistaken. Speech act theory is appropriate to 
certain kinds of self-involving texts. At the risk of over-simplification: it does not 
offer a new understanding of textuality, but clarifies what textuality always was. 
Where illocutions necessarily draw their currency from the extra-linguistic world, 
anonymity is actually a problem for Neufeld. However, I have my doubts that 
Netifeld's method is all that he claims it to be, for on turning to a careful reading of 
the exegesis of I John later in the book, one discovers the unavoidable postulation of 
some kind of (admittedly vague) historical context as a necessary presupposition of 
articulating just what illocutions are rendered in the text in the first place. In fact, 
since he does focus on precisely such texts as first-person pledges of witness or 
testifying, and does not in practice propose a speech act reading as a form of 
stylistics or'criticism', his claim to have appropriated a new understanding of 
textuality appears to play no actual role in his study. I therefore propose to leave it to 
its idle ways and offer a positive evaluation of Neufeld's work. " 
80 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (trans. Gayatri C. Spivak), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
UP, 1975,55; translated, perhaps TrUsleadingly, as 'there is nothing outside the text'. I am aware of the 
complexity of pressing this one phrase into service as any kind of summary of Derrida's thought (the 
'slogans M search of an author' approach rightly criticised by Christopher Norris, 'Of the Apoplectic 
Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy', in idem, Reclaiming Truth. Contributions to a critique of 
cultural relativism, Durham: Duke UP, 1996,222-53; especially 222-30) but whether it is read with 
or without sympathy it will serve to clarify the commitments of Neufeld's appeal to Derrida here. 
81 A further issue which could be discussed along similar lines (cf chapter 3 §2.3 above) is 
whether Neufeld subsumes speech act theory under the rubric of rhetorical criticism. For instance, he 
states that 'at the heart of this approach is the insight of the rhetorical character of historiography and 
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The Prologue (I John 1: 1-4) 
Neufeld's study of the prologue to 1 John reveals something of the gap between what 
he achieves and what he claims to achieve with speech act theory. Discussing the 
complex grammar and obscure terminology of the prologue, he concludes: 
The evocative language of the preface invites the reader to 
consider the complete work, including the apparently 
context-specific passages... from an aural, visual, and tactile 
perspective that is to engage the mouth and bring about 
appropriate confession and action. The language of the incipit 
with its profusion of sensory verbs shifts the focus away from the 
task of defining the specific content of the message proclaimed to 
determining the illocutionary forces involved in the act of 
proclaiming the message. (65) 
This argument occurs in the context of suggesting that 'it is not necessary to 
determine the historical referent before proceeding with interpretation. ' (65) 
However, Neufeld is not arguing against historical reconstruction in general, but 
against 'particularized reconstructions' (65) as they are proposed in the secondary 
literature; and he does so on the basis of the nature of the text before us, not the 
nature of texts per se. It is, in the above quote, the evocative language of the preface 
which invites us into a speech act approach. Further, having argued that the 
introduction to 1 John serves not as a negative reaction (e. g. against gnostics) but 
rather as a positive invitation 'to engage the reader in thoughtful action' (71), Neufeld 
goes on to show that the issue of authority lies at the heart of I John, noting that the 
writer does not possess authority already, but that the writing 'reflects the need to 
establish authority. ' (73) This consideration follows from, among other things, the 
use of 'we' in I John, which he sees as drawing the readers into association with the 
author's religious and ethical views. (73) Here Neufeld has in fact observed 
something about the historical context of 1 John; something supported by the 
self-involving nature of the speech acts which the prologue contains. The particular 
speech acts in question are the historical ones which John (for the sake of argument) 
has performed: illocutionary acts directed to his original, real listeners (or readers). 
the view that language is a form of action and power'. (vii) I do think that he could have more 
helpfully distinguished between illocutionary uptake as it produces linguistically demarcated forms of 
self- involvement, and perlocutionary effect, but in his actual exegesis I would say again that rhetoric 
does not turn out to be his primary category, and that therefore he does not in practice conflate the 
two approaches. 
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Establishing authority in the text like this is only an issue in the historical setting. 
Implied readers, or indeed today's real readers, have the issue of authority recast in 
terms of, for example, 1 John appearing as part of the biblical canon. It is only on 
historical grounds that we need to ask how it would have seemed as a document in its 
own right. Neufeld's analysis of the prologue of 1 John is successful in demonstrating 
that the author's aim is 'to create a world view wherein the cash value of theology is 
seen in the ethical conduct of the reader in the kosmos' (80) precisely because he is 
successful in showing what kinds of speech act the author actually performed. 
Indeed, one of the great merits of his study is to demonstrate how ethical issues are 
tied to lifestyle issues by using the speech act categories of stance and entailment to 
look at non-linguistic backing for successful speech acts. 
Other Sections of 1 John 
The general approach to the so-called 'slogans of the opponents' (1 John 1: 6,8,10; 
2: 4ý 6ý 9; 4: 20) is to see them as actual 'boasts' of identifiable opponents, even given 
that John does not identify them. Neufeld argues that they are hypothetical: that they 
are speech acts depicted in a literary context of shocking disjunction- claiming 
fellowship with God and yet matching this with a context of darkness. (chapter 5; 
82-95) Only in such a situation would such speech acts be possible, and hence it is 
best to see the author as inviting a certain response in terms of behaviour. (85) 
'Expressed as hypothetical speech acts, the author engages the audience, committing 
them to a confessional and ethical stance common to them both. ' (82) This view is 
supported, for Neufeld, by the considerations of speech act theory: 'The force of the 
antithetical assertions suggests that in the very act of writing, the author, rather than 
reporting something is attempting to bring about a state of affairs that represents his 
own religious and ethical stance. ' (89) 
In suggesting that the antithetical slogans represent the views of the author, and that 
his point is to draw out the ethical consequences involved in each, rather than to 
confront any sayings of his opponents, Neufeld is able to deal adequately with the 
fact that these sayings themselves are hardly objectionable. Since'the slogans 
enabled the author to make the world rather than simply mirror it' (95), the only 
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option left for readers unconvinced by the argument is to be out of fellowship with 
the author (cf 1 John 1: 3). Far from being a debate about doctrine alone, the issue is 
shown to be one of lifestyle and ethical stance. 
I John 2: 18-24 is considered by Neufeld under the heading 'The Last Hour and the 
Antichrist'. (chapter 6; 96-112) The basic thrust of his analysis is similar to the 
foregoing: the language is general, hypothetical (in this case couched in apocalyptic 
terms); and the historical questions are not of prime importance. This last point here 
involves quite a considerable challenge to the received way of reading 1 John, since 
2: 19 is the key verse in any reconstruction which sees the Johannine community 
persisting after the departure of the 'secessionists'. Neufeld argues instead that neither 
the error nor the secessionists are clearly defined, and that it is more to the point to 
notice the language of denial in 2: 22. It could hardly have been the case that the 
belief that Jesus was not the Christ was a confusing heresy which needed opposing. 
Rather, we should ask after the nature of the self-involvement required from the 
passage. 
Whereas I John 1: 1-4 offered a picture of involvement in the witnessing tradition, 
here the potential error is to separate from that tradition. 'The last hour' indicates 'the 
beginning of the end during which contradictions in speech and conduct appear 
acceptable. ' (104) In this apocalyptic setting: 'even though the enemies of God were 
to be present everywhere, it should not be difficult for Christians everywhere to 
recognize them on the basis of their speech. ' (103) 2: 20 seems to refer to an anointing 
which gives knowledge to be able to distinguish between truth and evil. A speech act 
reading suggests 'that the phrase simply sets apart two groups of people where what 
they confess and know stems from two different sources. ' (108) In conclusion, 
Neufeld urges that 
The main purpose of 2: 18-24 is to alert the reader to the 
dangerous theological and ethical consequences inherent in 
rejecting the apocalyptic speech circumstance the author 
delineates... the author reminds and encourages his audience that 
they cannot be part of a last hour as antichrists if indeed they have 
been re-constituted by a successful understanding of his speech 
acts. (I 10) 
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Again, it seems to me possible to follow this account without accepting that 2: 19 
does not refer to an historical event (a historical 'going out from us'). Speech act 
theory should suggest precisely that the function of the passage can be viewed in its 
historical context, not that the two should be set in opposition to each other. In a final 
study, Neufeld looks at the confessions and denials of I John 4: 1-4,16 and 5: 6 
(chapter 7; 113 
-3 2), which I shall mention briefly in chapter 6 below on the subject 
of confession as a speech act. 
Concluding Reflections 
In his conclusion, Neufeld writes: 
The power of the wntten word to transform the orientation of the 
readers does not lie in carefully argued theological propositions, 
but in acts of speech with the power to change the self of the 
speaker... I John is a communicative event that is written with 
dramatic sensitivity to reveal the author's religious and ethical 
stance, and his desire to bring about a change of world view in the 
reader. (134) 
Despite the fact that just a page before this he has reiterated his belief that it is a new 
approach to textuality which has opened up his analysis, I suggest that the success of 
what he does is secured otherwise. As he himself notes, the author's intention to 
produce a change in lifestyle (as indicated, that is, by this speech act analysis) 
coheres with the content of I John in terms of walking in the light, and this is, in the 
final analysis, more significant than Neufeld allows. The various passages considered 
benefit from a speech act approach precisely because it is not that false doctrine has 
been successfully refuted and exposed, but that readers, in the revealed light of God, 
have been challenged to live in a way that is suitable to being in that light. (136) 
As with the work of Polk on Jeremiah above, Neufeld offers ample demonstration of 
a hermeneutic of self-involvement at work, even allowing that he himself would 
argue for a stronger form of self-constitution than appears to me to be required. Both 
writers have produced works of methodological complexity, and again it must be 
said that in terms of book length studies there is little else that makes sustained use of 
speech act theory as a framework for a hermeneutic of self-involvement. The studies 
in this chapter on Evans, Polk and Neufeld have moved the discussion beyond the 
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level of clarifying speech act theory itself, and towards the task of utilising it in the 
interpretation of biblical texts. I now attempt to draw together their various 
emphases, before proceeding to further speech-act studies of New Testament texts. 
§5 Toward a Hermeneutic ofSelf-Involvement 
The discussion thus far suggests the following key elements of a hermeneutic of 
self-involvement: firstly, the usefulness of being able to distinguish between 
illocution and perlocution, with the resulting distinction between brute and 
institutional fact and its implications for constructive models of reality; secondly, the 
significance of construal and its mediating role between the subjective and the 
objective; thirdly, the nature of text as communicative act; fourthly the locating of 
significant personal characteristics such as 'mental states' as accessible by public 
criteria in terms of stance and entailed commitment in the public domain; and fifthly, 
linked to this, the value of understanding the 'P of self-involvement in various 
non-referential ways, without at the same time adopting a view of the self as simply 
constructed. All of these will recur in subsequent chapters. 
§5.1 Aspects of Self-Involvement in Interpreting New Testament Speech Acts 
The remainder of our study will be given over to the task of utilising the conceptual 
apparatus of speech act theory and self-involvement in addressing various issues of 
New Testament interpretation. In particular, I choose three different kinds of speech 
act for detailed consideration: the confessing of one's faith; the forgiving of another's 
sin; and the multi-valent speech act of teaching, which will raise in miniature many 
of the broader concerns of how speech act theory sheds light on the workings of 
religious language. Indeed I focus on teaching precisely in order to address some of 
the issues concerning institutional facts, and their creation and maintenance, as 
significant aspects of New Testament interpretation. Teaching proves to be one of the 
clearest speech acts for illuminating this approach to the construction of reality, and 
its significance. It remains here to add a few words about the choice of confession 
and forgiveness for the other studies. 
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It is Terrence Tilley who characterises confession and forgiveness as 'institutionally 
free' declarative speech acts. " We have seen that it is the declarative nature of certain 
speech acts which makes them particularly interesting for the biblical interpreter. 
While the self may not be constituted by the performance of declarative speech acts, 
I shall endeavour to show how the self (the speaking subject) is, to use Ricoeur's 
word, refigured in the process of performing such acts. The dynamics of 
self-involvement are therefore particularly in evidence in the cases of texts of 
confession and forgiveness. Where confession is one of the few topics to have been 
considered from such an angle, albeit largely independently of the expectations 
aroused by speech act theory, forgiveness remains relatively unexplored from this 
angle. Before turning to these two topics, both aspects of Tilley's characterisation 
require brief comment. 
Declarative Speech Acts 
In part I of this study I argued that we do well to follow Jerrold Sadock's approach to 
classification where 'declarative' speech acts are concerned. " Tilley's classification of 
confession as a 'declarative' rests on his use of the term to characterise the speech act 
of declaring one's own identity by way of declaring certain shaping autobiographical 
utterances (statements and commitments) particularly exemplified by Augustine's 
Confessions. " In contrast, my focus will be narrower, looking at specific utterances 
in the New Testament (such as 'Jesus is Lord') which, perhaps precisely because of 
their more specific nature, serve as much as commissive speech acts of public 
commitment as they do as declarative speech acts of self-definition. Whichever 
emphasis is chosen, the point here is that, following Sadock, the so-called 
'declarative illocutionary point' is of a different kind to Searle's other illocutionary 
points, and in fact what we find in these confessional speech acts is declarative 
aspects of commissive and assertive speech acts. Thus, in his 'doxological' work of 
systematics, Geoffrey Wainwright notes that creeds and hymns in the New 
Testament, which we shall explore as commissives, do indeed serve a similar 
82 Tilley, Evils of Theodicy, 72. 
83 See chapter 2, §3.2 above. 
84 Tilley, Evils of Theodicy, 72-76: 'Augustine is declaring himseýf to be who he is. ' (72). 
Chapter 5- Page 186 
'confessional' purpose to that of Augustine's confessions: 'As long as the believer 
goes on recapitulating his confession, he may be assured of his own identity in the 
identity of the Christian people. 85 As we shall see, this declarative purpose of 
confession need not be set against its commissive aspects. 
Thus while Tilley's remarks shape my discussion, I shall not hesitate to call 
confession and forgiveness commissive speech acts, without thereby intending to 
obscure their declarative nature. 
By way of clarification, I should also add that this broad sense of confession as 
'declaring one's own identity in the public domain' can encompass as a special case 
the act of confessing one's sin, whereby one takes a public stand of responsibility for 
sin in order to effect a change of identity with respect to it. Although I shall have 
occasion to mention this in what follows, it is not my primary interest, and the 
incidental juxtaposition of the terms 'confession' and 'forgiveness' in this study 
should not be taken to be implying simply the 'confession of sin' in contexts where 
forgiveness is also at issue. 
Institutionally Free Speech Acts 
In Tilley's terms, an institutionally free speech act is one whichcan be performed 
without regard to the person's institutional status or role', in contrast to some status or 
role requirement within an institution which is necessary for the performance of 
institutionally bound speech acts. " Tilley notes that within his own Catholic context 
only the pope is authorised to declare official dogma, which is a particularly clear 
case of an institutionally bound declaration. He analyses baptism as a slightly more 
widespread example of an institutionally bound performative. " 
A 'declarative' which has its world-creating or world-remaking capacity thrown open 
to all is evidently going to be a speech act of unusual interest: Not many of you 
85 Geoffrey Wainwright, Doxology. The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine and Life, London: 
Epworth Press, 1980,190 (cf the section entitledCreeds and Hymns', 182-217). 
86 Tilley, Evils of Theodicy, 33. 
87 Tilley, Evils of Theodicy, 47-50; cf also A. P. Martinich, 'Sacraments and Speech Acts', 
Heythrop Journal 16 (1975), 
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should become teachers, ' cautions James (James 3: 1) perhaps envisaging the chaos 
that inevitably follows when social (church) reality is opened up to private 
reconstruction. But while not all are teachers, all are invited to be confessors: 
confessing the Christian faith in self-involving acts of confession. Likewise, all are 
called to mutual forgiveness: declaring the sins of others forgiven and at the same 
time refiguring the forgiving self. 
These chapters are concerned, therefore, with the interpretation of those New 
Testament texts which indicate the occurrence ofjust such institutionally free speech 
acts of self-involvement. In the case of confession the self is situated in a 
worshipping form of life. With forgiveness, the occasion of the act is harder to 
define, although it would seem to correspond to an attitude of hope (indeed an 
eschatological hope, where our present forgiveness draws on the anticipation of 
future forgiven-ness), and we perhaps do well to remember that 'hoping' is the only 
form of life explicitly named as such by Wittgenstein. " Teaching, as just suggested, 
explicitly concerns itself with the constituting and reconstituting of the public 
domain itself, and presupposes to some (variable) extent the according of some 
measure of authority to perform such speech acts. 
My contention throughout is that the point of such New Testament language as 
confessing; forgiving or teaching may only be understood with reference to its 
self-involving nature. The point of such a study, again following Wittgenstein, is not 
to put forward a theory about confession or forgiveness, nor even to explain these 
practices, but rather to get into a position where we can see what it is that actually 
happens in such cases: 'Nothing is so difficult as doing justice to the facts. "' Austin, 
we recall, described himself as a1inguistic phenomenologist', " and it is my intention 
to use speech act theory in the same spirit in the chapters which follow. 
88 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 174. 
89 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough', now reprinted in idem, 
Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (eds. James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann), Indianapolis & 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993,115-55; here 129 (cf also 119 on theory and 
explanation). 
90 Cf J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, edited by J. 0. Urmson & G. J. Warnock, Oxford: 
Oxford UP, '1979 (1961), 182. 
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Chapter 6 
The Confession of Faith 
§1 Introduction 
Confession is one of the few topics to have been explored as a self-involving use of 
religious language. However, with very few exceptions, such studies have omitted 
specific consideration of speech act theory. ' One recent article entitled 'The 
Hermeneutics of Confessing Jesus as Lord' appeared to understand 'confess' as 
simply an alternative way of saying 'believe in', and focused entirely on the 
theological implications of confessional faith for biblical studies. ' It thus seems fair 
to say that even if confession has been discussed as a self-involving speech act, this 
is still not necessarily the natural understanding of it which occurs to readers of the 
New Testament. Indeed, one of the incidental purposes of this chapter will be to 
highlight the differing extents to which the speech-act dimension of confession has 
been understood in the literature. 
I propose to look at three major aspects of confession as a speech act in the New 
Testament. Firstly, the need to locate the New Testament examples of confessional 
speech acts will involve considering the question of the link between the form and 
the function of confessional utterances, and hence the link between confessional 
I One exception is Colm Brown, 'The Hermeneutics of Confession and Accusation', CTJ 30 
(1995), 460-7 1. Confession is also discussed as an aspect of religious language in the speech-act 
orientated account of James Win. McClendon, Jr and James M. Smith, Convictions: Defusing 
Religious Relativism, Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994,62-74. See the brief 
discussion in chapter 1 above. 
2 Scot McKnight, 'The Hermeneutics of Confessing Jesus as Lord', Ex Auditu 14 (1998), 1-17. 
Likewise the essays gathered in John H. Skilton (ed. ), Scripture and Confession. A Book about 
Confessions Old and New, Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1973, treat 
'confessing' in terms of adhering to a doctrinal standard. 
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speech acts and credal statements which may be used confessionally. Secondly I 
shall examine the dynamics of self-involvement in confessional speech acts. Thirdly, 
it will then be appropriate to discuss the question of how this speech-act approach 
bears on the question of the truth of what is confessed. Before turning to these topics, 
I begin the chapter with the particular example of the confession in 1 Corinthians 
12: 1-3, in order to highlight the kinds of issues involved in a speech-act analysis. 
§1.1 An Introductory Example: 1 Corinthians 12: 1-3 
1 Corinthians 12: 3 provides us with an example of what is often called the earliest 
Christian confession: 'Jesus is Lord'. ' This verse may serve here as an introductory 
example of the practical application of a hermeneutic of self-involvement to the task 
of biblical interpretation. ' Paul writes: 
I want you to understand that no one speaking by the Spirit of 
God ever says "Let Jesus be cursed! " and no one can say "Jesus is 
Lord" except by the Holy Spirit. (I Cor. 12: 3, NRSV) 
Debate around this verse has often focused on the possible situations in which such 
an utterance as 'Let Jesus be cursed' could have been made. Fee highlights the oddity 
of the situation: it is hard to imagine that a Christian would actually have cursed 
Jesus in a public Christian context, and yet if they had done so, it seems odd that 
5 Paul's 'response' here should be so casual and 'totally noncombative'. 
Despite the postulation of various historical contexts in which Paul's addressees 
might conceivably have cursed Jesus, including a gnostic separation between 
worshipping Christ and cursing the earthly Jesus; ' or the view that the curse was 
3 Cf Romans 10: 9-10; Philippians 2: 11 and Acts 2: 36. For brief introductions to early 
confessions see Ethelbert Stauffer, New Testament Theology (trans. John Marsh), London: SCM 
Press, 1955 (1941), 233-57 on'The Creeds of the Primitive Church'; John H. Leith, 'Creeds, Early 
Christian', 111 ABD (1992), L 1203-06; and Ralph P. Martin, New Testament Foundations. Volume 2, 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans & Carlisle: Paternoster, revised edition, 1986 (1978), 268-75. 
4 See the introductory use of this verse also in Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in 
Hermeneutics. The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading, London: HarperCollins, 
1992,283 (cf 283-91). 
5 Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT), Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1987,579. 
6 Notably W. Schmithals, Gnosticism in Corinth, An Investigation of the Letters to the 
Corinthians, Nashville: Abingdon, 1971 (1956). See the refutation of B. A. Pearson, The 
Pneumatikos-Psychikos Terminology in I Corinthians. A Study in the Theology of the Corinthian 
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uttered under duress in face of persecution and could be recanted later; 7 it seems right 
to follow the majority of commentators who urge that the context is that of Christian 
worship, and that the reference is either hypothetical, or is to curses uttered in the 
readers' pre-Christian pasts, with the point being that 'ecstasy alone is no criterion for 
the working of the spirit. " 
Of course other historical reconstructions lead to slightly different views of the 
issue. ' Thus Bassler, for instance, makes a case for saying that the historical enquiry, 
while valuable, is unable to settle the issues of primary interest, which revolve 
instead around the role of this verse in the literary and logical flow of the argument 
in I Cor 12-14. 'o She views v. 3 not as a test for genuine Christian confession, which 
might appear to remove it from the flow of the argument, but as an analogy to v. 2 
which speaks of the pagans being led astray: here in v. 3, says Bassler, Paul makes 
the analogous point that the Christian confession of faith is the work of the 
controlling presence of the Spirit, in contrast perhaps to Paul's own experience that 
the cursing of Jesus was a part of his pre-conversion life. Commentators divide on 
this possibility. " 
Opponents ofPaul and Its Relation to Gnosticism (SBLDS 12), Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1973, 
47-50; and his background work on gnosticism itself in idem, 'Did the Gnostic Curse JesusT, JBL 86 
(1967), 301-5. 
7 See here the works of Vernon Neufeld and Oscar Cullmann, both entitled The Earliest 
Christian Confessions, discussed later in the chapter. (see n. 36 below) 
8 Hans Conzelmann, I Corinthians (Hermeneia), Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975 (1969), 
206; similarly Fee, First Epistle to the Corinthians, 581; C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First 
Epistle to the Corinthians (BNTC), London: A. & C. Black, '1971 (1968), 279. 
9 Or indeed to wholly different views, such as Van Unnik's idea that anathema in v. 3 draws its 
meaning from passages like Romans 9: 3 and Deuteronomy 13: 13-18, and refers to the complete 
destruction of a cursed one in order to blot out the wrath of God; thus with a positive meaning when 
applied to Jesus. This must finally be judged intriguing but with insufficient evidence; W. C. Van 
Unnik, 'Jesus: Anathema or Kyrios (I Cor. 12: 3)', in Bamabas Lindars and Stephen Smalley (eds. ), 
Christ and Spirit in the New Testament (FS C. F. D. Moule), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1973, 
113-26. 
10 Jouette M. Bassler, 'I Cor 12: 3 
- 
Curse and Confession in Context, JBL 101 (1982), 415-18; 
here 415. 
11 'More ingenious than realistic' says Fee (First Epistle to the Corinthians, 58 1, n. 51 (e)); 
while Ben Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth. A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 
1 and 2 Corinthians, Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995,256, finds, it'quite plausible'. 
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Nevertheless, although one may overplay the point, Bassler's suggestion that 
historical reconstruction is not the whole story is relevant, but not because it needs to 
be contrasted with a literary approach, but rather because the key point in the passage 
is the difference between saying 'Jesus is Lord' and confessing 'Jesus is Lord'. That 
confession is a strongly self-involving speech act and thus must be understood 
differently from the weaker 'saying' is the key point at issue. Not all commentators 
observe this distinction, and even among those who do so, its significance is not 
necessarily noted. Thus Witherington, for instance, mentions this contrast but 
discusses it only long enough to demarcate confession as requiring 'the prompting of 
the Holy Spirit in the human heart'. " True as this may be, it misses the speech act 
concerned. 
The speech act of confession grounds the utterance of the words in the lifestyle 
which gives them backing. To confess Jesus is therefore to stake one's claim in the 
public domain as a follower of Jesus. Its criteria are public: 'Jesus is Lord' said by 
someone who never makes reference to Jesus in any other instance is an infelicitous 
confession. It is thinking along this line which leads Holtz to suggest that the idea 
represented by 'cursing Jesus' is that of living a life which rejects Jesus: the utterance 
is indicative of the lifestyle. " Helpful as this is, it perhaps goes too far in replacing 
entirely the speech act with its lifestyle implications. The notion that the utterance is 
self-involving was brought out by Weiss around the turn of the century, discussing 
the early development of 'The Christ-Faith'. His discussion of what it means to 
confess with one's mouth that Jesus is Lord suggests that 'What it means in a 
practical religious sense will best be made clear through the correlative concept of 
"servant" or "slave" of Christ. "' Weiss notes that such a confession of faith does not 
rely on any special 'Christian language': Paul 'takes over the language of the 
Hellenistic community'but it is the use to which it is put which marks out the speech 
act of Christian confession. " Although scholars do not necessarily follow Weiss 
12 Witherington, Conflict and Community in Corinth, 257. 
13 T. Holtz, 'Das Kennzeichen des Geistes (1 Kor. xii. 1-3)', NTS 18 (1971/72), 3 65-76. 
14 Johannes Weiss, Earliest Christianity. A History of the Period A. D. 30-150. Volume II, New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1959 (1937), 458. 
15 Weiss, Earliest Christianity, 458. 
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concerning the specific background of Kuptoq language, the point that normal 
language is taken over into a particular self-involving confession is well made, and 
the idea that confessing 'Jesus is Lord' carries with it the idea of attributing 
servanthood or slavehood to oneself is made by writers as diverse as Bultmann and 
Fitzmyer. '6 
The key question suggested by a speech act approach is whether such a confession is 
more than this. Does the point made by Weiss and Bultmann exhaust the significance 
of confessing Jesus as Lord? Here Fitzmyer is more helpful. On the one hand, as he 
AI notes, confessing Jesus as Lord (Romans 10: 9) is a part of the UTCaK011 TCIGTEWq 
(Romans 1: 5; 16: 26) which stands as the goal of God's work in the individual, and 
which Fitzmyer suggests is best translated as 'the commitment of faith'. Thus, 
'Involved in the affirmation that the Christian makes, Jesus is Lord, is the entire 
concept of Christian faith, as Paul sees it. "' On the other hand, Fitzmyer makes 
several points concerning the attribution of icl' )pioý to Jesus as a result of the early 
Christian understanding that Jesus was risen from the dead, noting for instance that 
in Philippians 2: 6-11, where Lordship language is explicitly set in parallel with 
bof)Xoq language, the attribution of the exalted name K15 )ptoq to Jesus follows on 
from certain events which have occurred concerning Jesus' death and resurrection. " 
Although Fitzmyer does not put the point this way, at issue are the non-linguistic 
states of affairs which underwrite the strong illocutionary act of confession. The self 
is involved with states of affairs, and not simply constituted by the adoption of some 
particular attitude. 
The grammar of confession, therefore, indicates that the self-involving commitment 
of confession cannot be denied under the influence ofthe Spirit of God', and indeed 
Paul's point in 1 Corinthians 12: 3 is precisely that one cannot make such a 
16 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Vol. 1, London: SCM Press, 1965 (1952), 
330-3-3); Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S. J., 'The Semitic Background of the New Testament Kyrios-Title', in his 
A Wandering Aramean. Collected Aramaic Essays (SBLMS 25), Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979, 
115-42; especially 130-32. 
17 Fitzmyer, 'The Semitic Background of the New Testament Kyrios-Title', 132. See also 
Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S. J., Romans (AB 33), London: Chapman, 1993,112-13. 
18 Fitzrnyer, 'The Semitic Background of the New Testament Kyrios-Title', 127-32. The 
Philippians 2 passage is considered more fully below. 
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self-involving commitment 'except by the Holy Spirit. Noting that the confession is 
a speech act combines an understanding of the content of the utterance with both the 
lifestyle implications of uttering it and the states of affairs which it presupposes. This 
is the dual focus of a hermeneutic of self-involvement which we shall be considering 
repeatedly in this and succeeding chapters, and the task of clarifying the kinds of 
states of affairs which are relevant for the speech act of confession will be one of the 
goals of this chapter. 
§2 Confession and Confessional Forms: Form and Function 
Non-nan Shepherd notes correctly that 'While it is necessary to distinguish between 
confession as confession of faith and as confessional document, it is at the same time 
true that confession of faith points the way to confessional documents. "' Indeed, 
from New Testament times onwards, confession has often been, as a matter of 
contingent historical fact, the adoption of a set form of words. Confession has often, 
therefore, taken the form of reciting a 'creed' or more generally a song or hymn, 
addressed to God or Christ. It is important to be clear about terminology here. Leith 
makes the point that 'Generally the word "creed" is given to the short and brief 
statements of the ancient catholic church... The comprehensive Reformed statements 
of faith are usually labelled confessions. However, there is no established 
terminology. "' As we shall see, confession as a speech act must be kept distinct from 
confession as a set form of words, not because there is no link between then, but 
because otherwise one risks blurring the important distinction between thefonn and 
thefunction of any particular passage. I shall attempt to demonstrate here that the 
criteria for identifying any particular literary form (creed, hymn, 
... 
) in the biblical 
text will overlap with, but not necessarily match, those for identifying confessional 
statements. 
In general terms this observation cuts at the root of form criticism with its 
preoccupation with locating literary forms in short segments of text, whether they be 
19 Norman Shepherd, 'Scripture and Confession', *in Skilton (ed. ), Scripture and Confession, 
1-30, here 13. 
20 Leith, 'Creeds, Early Christian', 1204; cf Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, with a 
history and critical notes. Vol. I The History of the Creeds, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983 (1931), 3-7. 
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preliterary (i. e. oral tradition) or simply taken over from earlier written sources. 
Form criticism has often seemed to suppose that knowing the form of a text settles 
the question of its function. In contrast, speech act theory suggests that the link, 
which it affirms to some extent, is more flexible. " 
On precisely this issue, Stephen Fowl has addressed the problems of assuming a 
direct link between form and function with respect to the so-called christological 
hymns in Philippians 2, Colossians 1 and I Timothy 3. The function of these 
passages is not simply settled by describing them as hymns, both because the literary 
category of 'NT hymn' might not be equated with our contemporary idea of 'hymn', 
and because an analysis of the content of these passages reveals their particular 
function as providing exemplars of the ethical life modelled in Jesus. In New 
Testament times, in contrast, the standard function of a u*4voq was as an expression 
of praise to a god, and this is clearly not the purpose of these Pauline passages. 22 
On the second of these two points, Fowl follows Thomas Kuhn's idea of an exemplar 
('a concrete formulation or experiment which is recognized and shared by all 
scientists') and applies it to the use made by Paul of the figure of Christ: 
Paul's aim is to present each community with a story of its 
founder 
-a story to which they are committed by virtue of their 
community membership 
- 
and then to spell out the implications of 
this story for their everyday faith and practice. " 
That one should choose to call such passages hymns is therefore a matter of 
convenience, but such a term may be misleading if it calls to mind our contemporary 
idea of a'hymn'. 
21 Studies of form criticism now generally recognise that it needs nuancing; e. g. John 
Muddiman, 'Form Criticism', M DBI (1990), 240-43. The literature on the need to move beyond form 
criticism is vast; cf the scepticism about scholarly confidence in form critical conclusions evinced by 
M. D. Hooker, 'On Using the Wrong Tool', Theology 75 (1972), 570-81 and G. N. Stanton, 'Form 
Criticism Revisited', in Moma Hooker & Colin Hickling (eds. ), nat about the New Testament?: 
essays in honour of Christopher Evans, London: SCM Press, 1975,13-27. Different directions are 
proposed by James Muilenburg, 'Form Criticism and Beyond', JBL 88 (1969), 1-18; and Erhardt 
Giittgemanns, Candid Questions Concerning Gospel Form Criticism: A methodological sketch of the 
fundamental problematics ofform and redaction criticism, Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1979. 
22 Stephen E. Fowl, The Story of Christ in the Ethics ofPaul. An Analysis of the Function of the 
Hymnic Material in the Pauline Corpus (JSNTS 36), Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990,31-32. 
23 Fowl, The Story of Christ, 93,199. 
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Thus regarding the first of his major claims, Fowl delimits his own study of the three 
Pauline passages mentioned not by a reconstruction of some supposedly pre-existent 
hymn, but by the recognition of common characteristics of the passages which justify 
taking them collectively. In each of these three cases he locates 'a distinctive passage 
poetically describing certain aspects of Christ's work, "' but denies that this entitles 
one to go beyond the formal observation to a characterisation of the passage as a 
hymn. 25 
Fowl's distinction between form and function, made with a passing appeal to 
precisely the consideration of speech act theory, " is successful in clarifýing what is 
at issue in looking for confessional statements in the biblical text. Although his own 
interests lie elsewhere, his analysis raises the question of much of thepurpose of 
work on hymnic and credal passages in the New Testament, to which we now turn. 
§2.1 The Significance of Confessional Forms 
Several writers have considered the question of the literary form of confessional 
materials in the New Testament, and all appear to have struggled with questions of 
preliterary existence and criteria for identifying literary forms. W. H. Gloer provides 
a survey of major writers who have given explicit criteria for their work on 
identifying hymnic forms. " He identifies up to 16 possible criteria for hymns and 
homologies, including amongst others: 
the presence of a quotation particle (e. g. O'-ri, as at 1 Corinthians 15: 3-5) 
the presence of certain introductory formulae (e. g. K(xO(jt)q yeypwr-rai at 
Romans 8: 36) 
syntactical disturbance (e. g. at 1 Timothy 3: 16) 
stylistic and linguistic differences (e. g. rare language, as at Romans 1: 3) 
24 Fowl, The Story of Christ, 25. 
25 Fowl, The Story of Christ, 16, and chapter 2, 'What is a HymnT, 31-45. 
26 Fowl, The Story of Christ, 42. 
27 Cf J. T. Sanders, The New Testament Christological Hymns (SNTSMS 15). Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 197 1; R. P. Martin, A Hymn of Christ: Philippians 2: 5-11 in Recent Interpretation 
and in the Setting ofEarly Christian Worship, Downers Grove: 111,1997 (= revised edition of idem, 
Carmen Christi: Philippians ii. 5-11 in..., Grand Rapids: Eerdrnans, 1983 (1967)); idem, Worship in 
the Early Church, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974 (1964); Stauffer, New Testament Theology, 233-57, 
R. H. Fuller, The Christology of the New Testament, London: Collins, 1965. 
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parallelism (e. g. Ephesians 2: 14-16) 
arrangement in strophes (e. g. Philippians 2: 5-1 1)28 
However, for all the value of Gloer's perceptive summary of different scholarly 
criteria, it is not at all apparent that one can reasonably talk about criteria for two 
quite different categories all at one level. If homologies and hymns overlap, as Gloer 
suggests they do, it is not because they have certain criteria in common and others 
not, but because hymns may be used confessionally, and confessions may be hymnic, 
but the criteria for each are operative on distinct levels. 
This confusion has various implications. Gloer begins his article by stating that the 
preliterary forms of Christian tradition provide valuable material for reconstruction 
of the worship of the early church, but it is evident that none of his criteria delineate 
preliterary tradition as such. " In a rather unfortunate but perhaps significant turn of 
phrase he actually suggests that his criteria are tools to help 'scholars wishing to 
remove the homologies and hymns 
... 
found in the literature of the NT. "' Discussion 
of the use to which Paul puts what may or may not be pre-Pauline traditions 
continues, but its significance must lie more in the realm of assessing how Paul 
argues and makes his case in the light of prior traditions, rather than any insight into 
the pre-Pauline settings of those prior traditions. " 
While the Sitz im Leben of an early Christian confession is a matter of some interest,, 
which I take up below, it does not follow that the Sitz im Leben of a hymn is either 
illuminating or ever recoverable. This is true especially where we grant Fowl's 
distinction between ancient and modem senses of 'hymn. ' In fact, I want to argue that 
hymns are significant precisely where they are confessional, because it is the stance 
of worship with its connotations of testimony and endorsement which bespeaks 
28 W. Hullitt Gloer, 'Homologies and Hymns in the New Testament: Form, Content and 
Criteria for Identification, PRS II (1984), 115-32; here 124-29. See the similar list gleaned from 
similar sources by Markus Barth, Ephesians 1-3 (AB 34), New York: Doubleday, 1974,7-8, in his 
section on 'Hymns and Traditional Material'. (6-10) 
29 Gloer, 'Homologies and Hymns', 115; and thus rejecting his claim on 130. 
30 Gloer, 'Homologies and Hymns', 130, emphasis added. He surely meant 'isolate' or 'locate'. 
31 See the recent work of Anders Eriksson, Traditions as Rhetorical Proof: Pauline 
Argumentation in I Corinthians (Coniectanea Biblica NT 29), Stockhohn: Ahnqvist & Wiksell, 1998; 
with particular reference to 1 Cor. 15: 3-5 (86-96); 8: 11 and 11: 23-25 (97-106); 12: 3 and the 
background of kyrios (110- 14) and 8: 6 (120-26). 
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self-involvement on the part of the author or the 'users' of the text. This is a point 
about the function of the language and not about its aesthetic quality as hymnic or 
poetic. 
However, even a brief review of the literature suggests that the form/content 
confusion reduces writers on the NTT hymns to such bland observations as 'hymns are 
more easily remembered than abstract statements of truth', 32 or, in one recent survey 
article, 'Since it is hymnic material, its message would make a greater impact upon 
31 the readers'. One has to say that the significance of confessional forms is here 
entirely eclipsed as a direct result of mistaking the hymnic form itself for evidence of 
self-involvement. If one eschews the reconstructionist path but stops short of a 
philosophy of self-involvement then it is not at all clear what point there is to the 
classification of hymns in the NT. 
The argument of this section may be viewed as a particular demonstration of my 
contention in chapter 3 above that speech acts cannot be demarcated reliably by 
vocabulary considerations and the like. Thus while a dictionary article on %Loxoyew 
is of definite use in locating confessional speech acts in the New Testament, " we 
shall find ourselves considering many other texts in the next sections which do not 
use the word. " 
§3 Confession as Self-Involvement: Stance and Entailment 
In the light of the above discussion, our chosen path must be to look at how the 
earliest Christian confessions, in the New Testament, are self-involving; that is, how 
they bring together both the content (what is confessed) and the force or stance with 
which it is confessed. Two books with the same title, Yhe Earliest Christian 
Confessions, present us with the various strands of historical evidence for how some 
32 rom Donald Cited with approval by Gloer, 'Homologies and Hymns', 121, n. 33 as coming f 
Guthrie, New Testament Introduction, Downers Grove, Ill: IvVT3 1970,5 5 1, but I can find no trace of 
this quotation in Guthrie's work or its later edition. 
33 Julie L. Wu in J. L. Wu and S. C. Pearson, 'Hymns, Songs', in DLNTD (1997), 520-27; here 
522; drawing on Eugene Nida et al, Style and Discourse, New York: United Bible Societies, 1983. 
34 For example, Otto Michel, '6ýLoXoy6w K-rX', in TDNTV (1967), 199-220. 
35 As noted similarly by Norman Shepherd, 'Scripture and Confession', 10. 
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of these credal affirmations were made, 36 and my thesis is that in so doing such 
investigations demonstrate precisely the speech act issues involved in 'the language 
game of confessing one's belief. "' 
Vernon Neufeld, in his study of the homologia, concludes that'The confession of 
Jesus as the Christ was in the first instance a personal declaration of faith', as with 
Peter in Mark 8: 29 and more widely in the early church (John 20: 3 1; 1 John 5: 1,5). 
More broadly, he highlights several likely functions of the confession of faith: 
promoting and preserving faithfulness in times of difficulty (Heb 4: 15; 10: 23) 
serving as the basis for the didache of the church (Col. 2: 6-7; 2 John 7-9) 
serving as a baptismal assent to faith (Acts 8: 37 ; 3' Romans 10: 9; 1 Tim 6: 12; 2 
Tim 2: 2; 1 Peter 3: 18-22) 
expressing worship in liturgy or hymnody (e. g. Phil. 2: 5-11) 
proclaiming the kerygma of the early church (Rom 10: 8-9; 2 Cor 4: 5; the 
Christos-homologia with its Jewish relevance in Acts 9: 20-22; and the 
kyrios-homologia with its Hellenistic applicability in Acts 11: 20) 
polemically combating false ideas (1 Cor 15: 3-5) 
responding to persecution (Matt 10: 32-33) 39 
In many cases, we may note, more than one of these speech acts may be performed at 
the same time (e. g. worship which is also proclamatory, or even polemical). In 
similar vein, Oscar Cullmann's discussion of the 'Circumstances of the Appearance 
and Employment of the Rules of Faith' argues that it is a mistake to isolate any one 
external cause as the explanation for particular confessional developments in the 
36 Vernon H. Neufeld, The Earliest Christian Confessions (New Testament Tools and Studies 
V), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1963; and Oscar Cullmann, The Earliest Christian Confessions, London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1949 (1943). 
37 To use the title of the study of Sr. Mary-John Mananzan, OSB, The "Language Game" of 
Confessing One's Belief. A Wittgensteinian-Austinian Approach to the Linguistic Analysis of Creedal 
Statements (Linguistische Arbeiten 16), Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1974; cf also Dallas M. 
High, Language, Persons, and Belief. Studies in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and 
Religious Uses ofLanguage, New York: Oxford UP, 1967, ch. 6 '"I Believe M... ": Creedal and 
Doctrinal Understanding', 164-84. 
38 We may say here with Kelly that for these purposes it does not matter whether this verse is 
original or an interpolation; J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, London: Longman, 3 1972 (1950), 
16. 
39 Neufeld, Earliest Christian Confessions, 144-46. 
Chapter 6- Page 199 
earliest days of the Church, but instead proposes 'five simultaneous causes' which 
'made necessary the use of a rule of faith': 
* baptism and catechumenism 
* regular worship (liturgy and preaching) 
* exorcism 
persecution 
polemic against heretics. 
Cullmann allows that while there is no simple link between particular instances of a 
confessional formula in the New Testament and one of these situations, it is still 
possible to demonstrate approximate correspondences. " 
The similarities in these findings match the identical titles of the two books. 
Neufeld's work is more detailed, in particular tracing the distinctive confessions in 
the Pauline and Johannine literature (Kyrios Jesus and Christos Jesus respectively), 
as well as providing comprehensive surveys of research into the creeds and of the 
various nuances and differing contexts of the use of the word homologia in ancient 
literature. " However his conclusions are strikingly close to Cullmann's, allowing that 
he criticises Cullmann for viewing Kyrios Christos as the primitive confession 
without noting the importance of Kyrios Jesus for Paul, and of Christos Jesus in 
general. " 
The key insight of both these studies is that performing an utterance such as 'Jesus is 
Lord', as it became a standardised formula, counted as the act of committing oneself 
both to a certain standard (or content) of belief, and also to certain future actions. In 
speech act terms: it counted as the illocutionary act of committing oneself to some 
future course of action (Searle's definition of a commissive). This self-involving 
dimension is precisely what is significant about confession. 
The variety of life-settings which these studies suggest for the homologia indicate a 
particular utterance serving to perform speech acts which are embedded in the 
40 Cullmann, Earliest Christian Confessions, 18-19. 
41 Neufeld, Earliest Christian Confessions, 13-33; cf Michel, '64oXoyiw K'rk, 200-7. 
42 Neufeld, Earliest Christian Confessions, 10. 
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non-linguistic world (be it a baptismal setting, or in the face of persecution, and so 
forth). Credal and confessional statements, therefore, which seem at first sight to be 
clear examples of statements of truth designed to uphold a particular theological 
standard, turn out to be prime examples of commissive speech acts. This contrast 
should not be misunderstood as a simple opposition: it does not indicate that such 
confessions lack cognitive content; that they are simply statements of existential 
conviction, for instance, about the value one places on Jesus. The question of 'truth' 
raised here is important (and we consider it in §5 below) but it should not be allowed 
to take precedence over the understanding of particular commissive speech acts in 
the New Testament, as if at the end of the day a speech act approach collapsed back 
into questions of truth and correspondence after all. 
§4 Specific Examples of Confession in Different Forms of Life 
In investigating specific examples of confessional affirmations in the New 
Testament, we must consider theforms of life within which these self-involving 
speech acts find their home. Two considerations urge caution here: the first is the 
observation of Cullmann's noted above that the causes of particular confessions did 
not operate in isolation. Secondly, it is worth noting that the majority of elements of 
the later creeds go back in oral tradition to before the production of most of the New 
Testament documents. As Cullmann has suggested, the creeds emerge out of a more 
general attempt to maintain coherence and integrity in the proclamation (in various 
contexts) of the Christian message (whether it be preaching the kerygma or any of 
the other considerations listed above), and hence it is appropriate that Cullmann's 
study begins by looking at the emergence of the 'rule of faith: 
The Church had not yet made a choice among Christian works; it 
had not yet accorded to a small number of them the dignity of 
Holy Scripture and set them beside the Old Testament. For this 
reason a summafidei was indispensable. " 
Of course the very notion of a 'canon' of Holy Scripture is precisely that of a 'rule' or 
way of measuring what is to be accorded status and what is not. The 'rule of faith' as 
it developed in the second and third centuries may thus be seen as a transition 
43 Cullmann, Earliest Christian Confessions, 11. 
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between the early confessional statements and the later creeds. 44In itself the rule of 
faith was never a fixed form of words, and indeed as one traces back the confessions 
to earlier times there is a clear absence of the characteristic fixed confessions of the 
later creeds 
. 
4' However, overly precise developmental hypotheses, such as the one 
proffered by Cullmann himself where a single Christological confession becomes 
bipartite and then tripartite in response to the particular exigencies of Gentile mission 
or baptismal formulae, tend to overlook the fact that all (or almost all) the elements 
of the loose oral tradition predate the production of any of the relevant New 
Testament texts. 46 
With these caveats in mind, we look briefly at some specific examples of 
confessional speech acts in the New Testament by taking in turn some of the 
different forms of life evident in the New Testament. 
§4.1 Responses to Persecution and Heterodoxy 
Adversarial contexts underline clearly the self-involving grammar of confession. -It is 
one thing to discuss what does and does not constitute orthodoxy, and quite another 
to offer one's personal backing to a statement which will incur consequences of 
suffering and perhaps even death. Cullmann notes that it is thus essential to consider 
how the context of persecution shaped the use of the homologia. " He cites I 
Timothy 6: 12 as an example of Timothy being commended for'making the good 
confession' in a judicial setting (perhaps even a court-room), although commentators 
are by no means agreed about the reference here. While v. 13 appears to compare 
Timothy's confession with that of Christ under Pilate, prompting Cullmann to 
support the judicial view, others have suggested that the reference is to Timothy's 
baptism or ordination vows. " 
44 Frances Young, The Making of the Creeds, London: SCM Press, 1991,8-9; cf the similar 
judgment of Graham Keith, 'The Formulation of Creeds M the Early Chur&, Themelios 24.1 (1998), 
13-35, here 19-21. 
45 See especially Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 1-29. 
46 Thus Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 23-29; in response to Cullmann, Earliest Christian 
Confessions, 35-47. 
47 Cullmann, Earliest Christian Confessions, 25-30; here 25. 
48 Cullmann, Earliest Christian Confessions, 26-27; cf J. N. D. Kelly, The Pastoral Epistles 
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Even if the Timothy reference does not refer to persecution, Cullmann does succeed 
in pointing out that 'Jesus Christ is Lord' represents a particularly bold stance in the 
context of the Roman state's demand for the civic confession 'KI) piog Kaiaap'. 
Perhaps, as he says, 'persecution fixed this confession in its stereotyped form': 
For the sake of this brief formula Christians suffered martyrdom. 
The heathen could not comprehend how Christians could show 
themselves so narrow-minded. " 
The obvious question, posed as far back as the Martyrdom ofPolycarp, was 'What 
harm is there to say 'Lord Caesar', and to offer incense and all that sort of thing, and 
to save yourself? "' But in performing the utterance required by the Romans one 
would in fact be performing the act of denying Christ's lordship, and not just uttering 
the words, i. e. performing an illocutionaiy act and not just a locutionary one. The 
speech act is not, as we have seen before, a report on an inner mental state which 
could simply be falsified to save one's skin, but rather the confession of 'Caesar is 
Lord' is, whether one intends it or not, a denial of the self-involving claim of 
Christian confession. The point is not, therefore, that one would be lying (reporting 
falsely on a mental state), but rather that one would be denying Christ simply by 
virtue of performing the speech act. It is precisely this absence of any'distance' 
between the locution and the illocution in confessional speech acts which also 
underlies the thinking of Romans 10: 9-10. 
In a recent brief study, Hugh Williamson has suggested that a wide variety of the NT 
uses of 'Jesus is Lord' are best understood in this polemical manner: Jesus' lordship is 
particularly to be understood as a response to a rival claim of lordship; whether it be 
of death (cf Acts 2: 36); of 'dumb idols' (I Cor. 12: 3); or of Caesar, or whatever is 
dominating the believer's life. " In all these various cases, the utterance 'Jesus is Lord' 
is a confessional speech act of self-involvement in response to a rival claim. 
(BNTQ, London: A. & C. Black, 1963,141-44 (arguing for baptism) and George W. Knight IH, The 
Pastoral Epistles (NIGTC), Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992,264-65 (arguing for ordination). 
49 Cullmann, Earliest Christian Confessions, 28. 
50 Mart. Pol. 8.2. (in LCC 1, Early Christian Fathers, 152. ) 
51 Hugh Williamson, Jesus is Lord A Personal Rediscovery, Nottingham: Crossway Books, 
1993. 
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Polemical confessions of orthodoxy noted by Cullmann include I Cor 15: 3-8 (which 
as he notes is thus a good example of a confession not occasioned by only one 
circumstance) and 1 John 4: 2: 'every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come 
in the flesh is from God. v52 
The confessions of 1 John have been studied from a speech act perspective by 
Dietmar Neufeld, who argues that the author is putting forward his christology in a 
climate of heterodoxy, and not against any particular (e. g. docetic) claim: 'The 
confessions function as tests by which to determine who is indwelt by the Spirit of 
deceit or the Spirit of truth or deemed worthy to have fellowship with the author, 
God, and his son Jesus Christ (1: 1-4). "' In particular he notes a large number of 
apparently unexplained christological statements (2: 22,2: 23,3: 23,4: 2,4: 14,4: 15, 
5: 1ý5: 5,5: 10,5: 6,5: 13) which 'function as catch slogans' to mark out those willing 
to count themselves as 'in' (in the Johannine world of two spheres, those who believe 
and those who do not): 
Sigruficantly, each of the christological slogans is prefaced by a 
verb which indicates the action of believing, confessing or 
denying. The focus is not on the content of what is believed, 
confessed or denied, although the substantive content of each 
statement is nonetheless significant. 54 
Although Neufeld himself is reluctant to draw conclusions about any speech acts 
performed in historical situations 'behind' the text, I have indicated earlier why such 
scepticism is not obligatory. Thus, in responses to heterodoxy as well as in responses 
to persecution, we may say that the early Christians confessed their faith with 
self-involving confessions both of content and commitment. We shall now explore 
the less adversarial nature of confession in various forms of life which may be 
gathered together under the rubric of 'worship. 
§4.2 Worship 
52 Cullmann, Earliest Christian Confessions, 30-32. 
53 Dietmar Neufeld, Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts. An Analysis of I John (Bib Int Ser 7), 
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994,119. See chapter 5 §4.2 above on Neufeld. 
54 Neufeld, Reconceiving Texts as SpeechActs, 126. 
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The context of the church as a worshipping body has been proposed as an obvious 
setting for the emergence of the New Testament documents, as well as being a major 
theme running through them, 55 and while it would be an over-simplification to 
suggest that worship as a form of life is the over-arching category within which 
confessional speech acts find their natural home, certainly various of the emphases of 
Cullmann's and Neufeld's work can be brought together under this heading. 
David Peterson suggests that the worship of God is best described as essentially 'an 
engagement with him on the terms that he proposes and in the way that he alone 
makes possible. "' At the end of his lengthy exegetical study he offers the following 
summary: 
Fundamentally, 
- 
worship in the New Testament means 
believing the gospel and responding with one's whole life and 
being to the person and work of God's Son, in the power of the 
Holy Spirit. 57 
Such a view balances the divine and human interaction involved in worship rather 
than focusing on worship simply as a response to God, even if it is the response 
which is our interest here. " 
Indeed 
, 
in Wittgensteinian terms, Christian worship as a form of life is perhaps best 
understood as a disposition to engage with God (or more narrowly to respond to 
God) characterised by such attitudes as praise and expectant trust. In his general 
study of the topic, Ninian Smart suggests that the truth 'a god is to be worshipped' is 
analytic in that the concepts of worship and of god are internally related. However, 
the concept of worship, understood as relational, ritualistic and itself sustaining (or a 
part of) the power of the worshipped god, becomes a helpful way of understanding 
55 Thus C. F. D. Moule, The Birth of the New Testament (BNTC), London: A. & C. Black'1981 
(1962), 19-43; and note the study of idem, Worship in the New Testament (Grove Liturgical Study 
12/13), Bramcote: Grove Books, 1983 (1961). 
56 David Peterson, Engaging with God A biblical theology of worship, Leicester: Apollos, 
1992,20. 
57 Peterson, Engaging with God, 286. cf also Geoffrey Wainwright, Doxology. The Praise of 
God in Worship, Doctrine and Life, London: Epworth Press, 1980. 
58 See also C. E. B. Cranfield, 'Divine and Human Action. The Biblical Concept of Worship', Int 
12 (1958), 387-98. A more 'responsive' definition characterises the various works of R. P. Martin (see 
below). 
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the purpose of language about God. " Smart follows Donald Evans in noting 'the 
centrally performative role of language in worship' and urges that self-involvement 
in religious worship may run deep in ethical and political areas owing to the strong 
ethical dimension of religious views. " In short, worship is a self-involving activity 
which, when expressed through language, is achieved by way of self-involving 
speech acts which represent personal engagement (of various illocutionary forms) 
with God and with facts about God. " 
Cullmann refers to Phil. 2: 6-11 as an example of the hymns used in early corporate 
worship, and notes also its inclusion of the confessional formula'Jesus Christ is 
Lord'. 62 For Cullmann, the development of fixed texts in worship arose from the 
desire for a corporate confession of what it was that united believers before God, but 
evidently there was no 'fixed and universal text for this christological confession. 61 
He suggests that the confession retained in 1 Cor. 15: 3-7 would have served well in 
worship and preaching. 
Two points may be made here. Firstly there is an appropriate hesitancy in Cullmann's 
discussion about delineating certain contexts as 'worship' over against other proposed 
settings. Thus baptismal and catechetic settings for confessional statements clearly 
overlap with settings of gathered worship. In general, while 'worship' serves as a 
useful term for uniting several important aspects of the forms of life of Christian 
confession, it remains limited. This tallies with the proposal of Ralph Martin to apply 
J-C. Beker's framework of 'coherence' and 'contingency' to the attempt to recover 
doxological and liturgical forms and settings in the New Testament documents. 64 
59 Ninian Smart, The Concept of Worship, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, St. Martin's 
Press, 1972,51-52. 
60 Smart, Concept of Worship, 3 1. 
61 Smart suggests, vis-ý-vis our own discussion, that Evans leaves the objective side of this 
performative account 'tenuous'; Smart, Concept of Worship, 3 1. 
62 Cullmann, Earliest Christian Confessions, 22-23. The status of the passage as a 'hymn', on 
which see §2 above, need not concern us here. 
63 Cullmann, Earliest Christian Confessions, 21-23. 
64 Ralph P. Martin, 'Patterns of Worship in New Testament Churches', JSNT 37 (1989), 59-85; 
here 64, referring to I C. Beker, 'Contingency and Coherence in the letters of Paul', USQR 33 (197 8), 
141-50; now expanded as a full thesis in idem, Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and 
Thought, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980. 
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Martin proposes that, among the stable 'coherent' features which we find in New 
Testament worship, we might include the focus on the risen and exalted Lord Jesus; 
the awareness of the role of the Spirit; and a concern for others and the upbuilding of 
the community. " Among the contingent factors he includes, for instance, the 
emphasis in the Pastorals on order and orthodoxy 
'66 which would lead us to consider 
Cullmann's category of 'polemic' perhaps more than 'worshipper se. 
A related second point is that the polarisation in views about the difference between 
the kerygma and the didache in early Christian church life again serves unhelpfully 
to over-demarcate proposed life-settings for confessional speech acts. In the tradition 
of Bultmann, it has been common to take some such line as that of C. H. Dodd in his 
study of apostolic preaching: 'The New Testament writers draw a clear distinction 
between preaching and teaching. 
... 
It was by kerygma, says Paul, not by didache, 
that it pleased God to save men. "' In fact the 'hymn' of Philippians 2 has been one 
battleground of this very debate, between so-called 'kerygmatic' and 'ethical' 
interpretations. 68 Phil. 2: 5 (literally: 'This think among you which also in Christ 
Jesus'), has been emended in a variety of ways, but the two major proposals have 
traditionally offered alternative characterisations of themselves: 
V xpl(jr(; ) the 'ethical' view: Tof)TO 4)poveiTe C, V 11ýliv 0 Kai 71 C 
IT100f)" 
0 at the 'kerygmatic' view: -rof), ro 4)povei-rc e'v ý[Av 6 r, I [(ýpovdrcl iv 
xpla-r(ý , 171000 
65 Martin, 'Patterns of Worship', 65-73. 
66 Martin, 'Patterns of Worship', 79-81. 
67 C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1936,7-8. 
68 The enonnous secondary literature on this passage is presented in the updated study of 
Martin, A Hymn of Christ. 
69 This, the 'traditional' view, is clearly defended by C. F. D. Moule, 'Further Reflexions, on 
Philippians 2: 5-1 V, in W. W. Gasque & R. P. Martin (eds. ), Apostolic History and the Gospel. Biblical 
and Historical Essays Presented to F. F Bruce, Exeter: Paternoster, 1970,264-76. 
70 See E. Kasemann, 'A Critical Analysis of Philippians 2: 5-11', JTC 5 (1968), 45-88. This is 
also the view of Martin. 
Chapter 6- Page 207 
Martin correctly notes that the labelling of these views has led to an unfortunate 
polarisation between the view that the example of Christ in the hymn is an ethical 
model for how we should treat one another, and the view that a pre-existent hymn 
focusing on the primitive kerygma is serving to remind the Philippians of their own 
attitude toward Christ so that they might adopt it among themselves. 71 
Regardless of the best solution to this particular exegetical issue, 72 one does suspect 
that at least part of the problem is an unwarranted opposition between the two views, 
rooted in a belief that the summoning power of the kerygma must be set against the 
content of the didache. However, such a polarisation has often been shown to be 
untenable, most comprehensively by James McDonald in his study entitled Kerygma 
and Didache, which notes the 'complementarity' and yet the 'peculiar 
interrelatedness' of the two terms. " McDonald traces the ways in which different 
forms of Christian utterance combine elements of both kerygma and didache, with 
studies ofpropheteia, paraclesis and homilia, paraenesis and catechesis, and 
paradosis, the tradition which he sees as informing them all but which, for example 
explicitly in I Cor 15: 1 
-11, combines expressly didactic functions with serving as 
the basis of the kerygma. To over-simplify: all teaching keeps summons in view; and 
all forms of summoning expect and hope to be explained and understood. " 
The speech act of confession, operative in the setting of worship in its various 
contingent forms, is concerned both with content (locution) and response to divine 
address (illocution and self-involvement). The logical gTa=ar of confession is the 
self-involving personal backing behind the truth confessed, and this link runs 
through all the various NT instances of homologia. " 
71 See Martin, carmen christi, xv, in the foreword to the second edition. 
72 For discussion see the essays collected in Ralph P. Martin and Brian J. Dodd (eds. ), Where 
Christology Began. Essays on Philippians 2, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998. On 
the confessional use of the passage note particularly the chapter therein by Colin Brown, 'Ernst 
Lohmeyer's Kyrios Jesus', 6-42, especially 23-25. 
73 James I. H. McDonald, Kerygma and Didache. The articulation and structure of the earliest 
Christian message (SNTSMS 37), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980,6. 
74 See the summary of his findings in McDonald, Kerygma and Didache, 126-27. 
75 In this regard one may note Paul's commendation of the Corinthians' generosity in the 
collection for Jerusalem, which represents 'obedience to the confession of the gospel of Christ' (2 Cor. 
9: 13). See also Hebrews 3: 1; 13: 15; John 12: 42 (and 1: 20) and, in the OT, I Kings 8: 33-35 and its 
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This study of the self-involving nature of confession has highlighted the importance 
of understanding it as a strong speech act, which therefore invites consideration of 
the issues of stance and entailment, while also making clear that the content of what 
is confessed remains important. It is appropriate, therefore, to conclude this study of 
confession by asking how such a speech-act approach bears on the question of the 
truth of what is confessed. 
§5 Confession and Truth: What Statements have to be Truejor a Performative 
Utterance to be Happy? 
This discussion of confession and truth is, I would suggest, at least in part 
necessitated by concerns drawn from elsewhere: concerns about truth and religious 
language rather than about the dynamics of speech acts as such. Nevertheless, I shall 
argue that speech act theory can address these concerns in a helpful manner. 
§5.1 A False Polarisation 
The debate about the truthfulness of Christian confessional claims is well-worn and 
over-familiar, although the topic of confession offers a particularly simple way into 
it. At the beginning of his 1935 book Creeds in the Making, Alan Richardson 
introduced the historical Christian faith as based upon 'certain key facts': 
It is the business of Christian doctrine to interpret these facts 
The Apostles' Creed, for example, strongly insists upon the 
historical facts. 
... 
The facts about the historical Jesus are 
therefore the data of theology. "' 
When invited to write a replacement book some fifty years later, Frances Young 
began with a conscious distancing of herself from this position, and suggested that 
'modem philosophies'no longer allowed this kind of approach, since all facts are 
accessible only through interpretation and narrative creates history (more or less 
responsibly), and hermeneutics (perhaps especially suspicious ones) invite us to a 
gentler view of doctrine as 'coping' with our historical narratives. 77 
parallel 2 Chronicles 6: 24-26. 
76 Alan Richardson, Creeds in the Making. A short introduction to the history of Christian 
doctrine, London: SCM Press, 1935,7,9. 
Young, The Making of the Creeds, ix-xii. 'Coping' is Rorty's word and not Young's, but in 
my view the notion of 'coping' is one of the great analytical tools Rorty has offered the contemporary 
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The appearance of opposition between these two views rests, as so often, on an 
unhelpful generalisation about the way that language works. Is there only one type of 
fact and does all confessional language approximate to it in the same way? By no 
means, on either count. But we must be cautious about an over-hasty appeal to 
speech act theory as a way out of this dilemma. 
§5.2 A Premature Resolution 
It was Austin himself who observed, crucially, that 'for a certain performative 
utterance to be happy, certain statements have to be true. 78 1 want to argue, however, 
that this does not allow one to reduce the analysis of performative utterances to an 
enumeration of facilitating truths behind eveiy felicitous performative. This would in 
79 fact lose sight of the very point of speech act theory. Yet it is a route which beckons 
to theologians concerned to explicate the meaningfulness of statements of Christian 
faith, perhaps mindful of the largely positivist attitude which remains prevalent today 
even after the demise of logical positivism. In my judgment, the analysis of 
perfortnatives along these lines would not allow one to proceed much beyond a 
phenomenalistic account of religious language. 
Consider, for example, a point made by Anthony Thiselton against Bultmann's 
demythologising language, appealing to precisely the words of Austin just quoted: 
But can these statements [e. g. 'Christ is Lord'] be translated in this 
way [i. e. in a demythologised way] withoutfactual remainder? In 
our example, the words 'this is poison' can function as a warning 
or plea only because (either in fact or in belief) the poison was 
poison. " 
academic, and modem theologians sometimes seem particularly capable of being characterised as 
'copers'. I should add that Young's book is a fine introduction to its chosen subject, viz'the making of 
the creeds'. I am simply interested in noting how she feels the need to locate her study away from 
Richardson's view of facts. 
78 J. L. Austin, HDTW, 45. 
79 1 am not just arguing against a straw man here. See some of the examples discussed 'in 
chapter 3, §4 above. 
80 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories in New Testament 
Hermeneutics', Churchman 87 (1973), 87- 100; here 96, and quoting Austin's maxim in the next 
sentence. The same Austinian sentence is also appealed to in idem, The Two Horizons. New 
Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans & Carlisle: 
Paternoster Press, 1980,269; 355 and 437, but the particular formulation of the 1973 article is not 
repeated, and thus the further issues are not raised. 
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This serves as part of a wider argument, critical even while sympathetic to Bultmann, 
that his existentialist conception of biblical language is reductive. " Here I wish only 
to point out that the success of this argument is not dependent on a simple appeal to 
the supporting truths of other statements which every performative requires, since as 
the above quote makes abundantly clear, there are in general two alternative ways in 
which Austin's 'maxim' might be fulfilled. On the one hand the poison may in fact be 
poison, but equally the performative succeeds (even if technically 'infelicitous' in 
Austin's terms) if it is simply believed to be poison. On its own, the point made by 
Austin is insufficient to ground the self-involving nature of such speech acts as 
confession in any particular state of affairs. 
Thus it would follow, for example, that in I Corinthians 15 (particularly v. 14) Austin 
would have us insist that either it is the case that the resurrection is a brute fact, or 
that it is the case that Christians believe that the resurrection is a brute fact, and if 
neither of these holds then the faith of the Corinthians is in vain. At first sight, 
however, there is little in the language, nor even in the philosophy of language, 
which will determine which of these two conditions might obtain. 
However 
, 
if one arrives on other grounds at the belief that the resurrection occurred 
(i. e. bodily in some sense) then speech act theory shows why this does not negate the 
existential dimension of uttering the creed, but that is to approach the problem from 
the other end. In general, it appears that the New Testament writers do approach the 
problem from the other end: Paul himself assumes that the fact backs up the credal 
affirmation in 1 Corinthians 15. However, as noted by Danker, Paul is 'utilizing 
established creedal affirmations as his indicative base, [and] is able to move forward 
in his favorite manner to the imperative: the practical concern. " In other words, 
Paul's argument about the significance of the resurrection presupposes the fact of the 
resurrection, and its status as fact is not at issue in the passage. 
Partial Resolution 
81 Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 205-92. 
82 F. W. Danker, Creeds in the Bible, St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1966,12. 
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This discussion should not be seen as the claim that, after all, speech act theory fails 
to offer substantive help in demarcating the truths which a successful performative 
utterance presupposes. I shall consider how to make positive progress with this 
question below. Firstly, I wish to underline that what I have termed here a 
1premature' resolution of this question does nevertheless make genuine if only partial 
progress towards looking at how facts are presupposed by performatives. 
The point I wish to make is that the logic of certain forms of speech presupposes 
certain general assumptions about reality and the reliability of historical 
reconstructions. Such an argument is indeed part of Searle's defence of (external 
world) realism, 83 and is easily adapted to a defence of the normal reliability of 
historical statements of external world occurrences where, as C. A. J. Coady has 
argued, speech acts such as testimony play a crucial but neglected role in our 
assumed epistemology. " 
In a related and somewhat celebrated argument, Terrence Tilley proposes that one 
need not believe in God in order to pray (and pray meaningfully) to him. " While he 
accepts that 'as a practice, petitionary prayer must presuppose that the intentional 
object to whom the prayer is directed is real, that is, that there is an addressee who 
can "answer" the prayer', he claims that the individual pray-er is required only to 
'believe, hope or wish' that the addressee can do what the pray-er asks. " In short, 
Tilley suggests that if there is ultimately no addressee, which might perhaps never be 
known, the speech act of prayer is still coherent. This is a particularly clear example 
of an argument which would still satisfy Austin's requirement that certain statements 
have to be true for the performative to succeed, but which has clearly travelled a long 
way from ensuring that any particular statements are true. 
Tilley's argument represents the most minimal position possible concerning how 
successful performatives presuppose truths, but he appears to underestimate the 
83 John R. Searle, The Construction ofSocial Reality, London: Penguin, 1995,177-97. 
84 C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
85 Terrence W. Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy, Washington DC: Georgetown UP, 1991,5 8-63 
cf also idem, "'Lord, I believe: help my unbelief': prayer without belief , MA 7 (1991), 239-47. 
86 Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy, 58,56. 
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extent to which individual self-involvement must be operative. Vincent BrUmmer) 
for instance, argues that the logic of address which necessarily characterises prayer is 
incoherent if the one praying actually believes there is no God. " The strength of 
Brummer's position is that he also argues forcefully for the importance of the 
self-involving ('affective') aspect of prayer too. As Mananzan has put it: 'Christian 
religious discourse does not depend on a proved existence of God but on a serious 
belief of God's reality. "' This 'serious belief must be held by the individual and not, 
contra Tilley, by the tradition. 
I suggest, then, that there are requirements in the philosophy of language which do 
prescribe to some extent the range of possible 'facilitating truths' for a felicitous 
performative. Even if such requirements may in some cases fall short of being 
sufficient for the purposes of making substantive theological points regarding 
exegetical issues in particular New Testament texts, they do, to return to our I 
Corinthians 15 example, demonstrate precisely that one cannot maintain convictional 
language about the resurrection entirely divorced from questions concerning certain 
presupposed facts. This is the 'partial resolution' which can be offered to the question 
of confession and truth by considering simply the dynamics of speech act theory. To 
make further progress, we must refine what we mean by'the question of truth'. 
§5.3 Refining the Question of Truth 
It is helpful to pursue the question of truth in the same manner as Austin, who noted 
that 'truth and falsity are 
... 
not names for relations, qualities, or what not, but for a 
dimension of assessment. "' The question thus arises: what is the most beneficial 
dimension of assessment for the particular confession(s) of the New Testament? To 
answer this one must consider the home language game of confession, or theform of 
life which supports confession, and in so doing we are drawn to the conclusions of 
Mananzan's study of this very topic. She argues that the key issue in analysing 
confessional utterances is to realise that they challenge the very framework of 
87 Vincent Brdrnrner, What Are We Doing nen We Pray? A Philosophical Inquiry, London: 
SCM Press, 1984,22-28. 
88 Mananzan, The Language Game of Confessing One's Belief, 146. 
89 Austin, HDTW 140-47; with this summary statement at 149. 
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non-perfonnative assessments of truth, and over-tum the dichotomy between 
cognitive and non-cognitive language; or between confirmable and non-confin-nable 
observation: 
Theistic propositions have essentially another function, namely, 
to articulate certain human experiences which are beyond the 
competence of empirical factual statements to express, because 
they involve those aspects of being human, which, although they 
manifest themselves within the concrete world, nevertheless 
escape an exact pinpointing within its coordinate system. 90 
Mananzan is avoiding a false polarising of alternatives here by noting that 
confessional statements relate to truths which are manifested in the 'concrete' world, 
but which are not reducible to such concretised manifestations. 
A similar,, briefer discussion by Dallas High draws comparable conclusions: 
There are good reasons why the traditional creeds (or even 
traditional doctrinal utterances) make use, in some way, of the I 
believe in" formula. 
By virtue of this antecedent, the utterances, including 
their attached phrases, are actions and linguistic performances of 
self-involvement. " 
High explores this in particular by looking at credal affirmations as responding to 
questions about the valuation of personhood in such contexts as promises, covenants 
and inter-personal loyalties. He notes that God's self-revelation in Exodus 3: 14 ('1 
AM WHO I AM') is in personal terms of a particular kind, i. e. not simply 
anthropomorphic concepts but a particular model of T as a self who acts as an 'other' 
with whom humans may have inter-personal dealings. Thus, 'like acts of 
self-involvement with another person, creedal and doctrinal expressions are acts of 
self-involvement with one who is like an "I" and whom I deem worthy of my trust 
and valuing. "' In short, we cannot identify ourselves except with reference to others, 
and God-talk works itself out within the framework of the logical grammar of God's 
being one of those others. Thus credal language is irreducibly self-involving. 
90 Mananzan, The Language Game of Confessing One's Belief, 145. 
91 High, Language, Persons, and Belief, 175. 
92 High, Language, Persons, and Belief, 18 1. 
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What, in these accounts, has happened to the question of truth? It has not been 
bracketed out, as irrelevant, but rather it has been positioned, as one component of a 
performative utterance. Indeed, later in his book High goes on to discuss the 
necessity of avoiding a mistaken appeal to the idea of 'language game' as a way of 
escaping the need for providing reasons to support one's religious truth claims. He is 
rightly critical of those aspects of the work of modem theologians such as Tillich and 
Bultmann (and arguably also Barth) which attempt to salvage the validity of 
religious confession by removing it from the court of cognitive judgment. 'Giving 
reasons' is itself a language game which requires an appropriate form of life, and 
therefore is not a matter of impersonal criteria: 
'justification' and 'reasons' are given by 'persons', not by rules, 
logical or otherwise, as if rules themselves derive the justification. 
'Persons, ' we must remember, are alone the ones who can and do 
fashion 'justifications, ''reasons, ' and 'rules, ' count something as a 
'justification' or 'reason' and make 'justifications' and 'reasons' 
count whether for or against some utterance or belief "' 
High is arguing here against another form of the same problem with which we 
started, which divided Young from Richardson: the modem theologians he opposes 
have begun from the assumption that there is only one form of justification; have 
found exceptions to or problems with this monolithic conception; and have therefore 
concluded that cognitive justification cannot be the appropriate way of arguing 
theologically. By following High and Mananzan, however, we should instead 
conclude that the multi-faceted nature of such terms as 'fact' and 'justification' calls 
for an altogether more cautious appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of our 
traditional terminology. Likewise, this time with Tilley, the question of 'the cognitive 
nature of religious language' sets itself up for confusion wherever it presumes that it 
is always and everywhere equally cognitive. Tilley's conclusion on this matter 
encapsulates the point we are also making with regard to truth, facts and all these 
other terms: 'there is no wholesale way to decide on the cognitivity of religious 
language because the speech acts performed in religious contexts are so varied. "' 
93 High, Language, Persons, and Belief, 206-7. 
94 Tilley, Evils of Theodicy, 79. 
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At the same time this cautious' approach should not be confused with the reduction 
of 'truth' to 'true for a community, as for example in the recent work of Richard 
Rorty. 95 Although one may wish to refine William Placher's formulation of the 
matter, he is right to say that 'The way we can go about justifying a belief is always 
v96 context dependent, but the truth claimed for that belief is not. As I have urged at 
length in earlier chapters, the apparatus of speech act theory allows us to adopt 
'constructionist' terminology without any necessary concomitant reductionist 
implications. 
§5.4 Truth and Fact 
My limited aim here (under such an all-encompassing title! ) is to apply the above 
argument to particular examples concerning Christian confession in order to try and 
clarify the point being made. We recall also our earlier argument concerning the 
spectrum of facts ranging from brute to institutional, as well as Searle's observation 
that one of the distinctive features of illocutionary acts is that their continued use 
sustains and strengthens the institutional facts which they create. " In general it seems 
most likely that any set of religious speech acts will both be founded upon certain 
brute facts and at the same time constitutive of certain institutional facts. If one may 
express it this way: there will always be a degree of social construction in religious 
faith, but one cannot tell in advance of the particularities of any situation what degree 
it will be. " Examples will clarify this important theoretical distinction between brute 
and institutional facts. 
95 For a recent clear statement of Rorty's position see his 'Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald 
Davidson versus Crispin Wright, in Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers 
Volume 3, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997,19-42 (originally 1995). 
96 William C. Placher, Unapologetic Theology. A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic 
Conversation, Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989,123, drawing in particular on 
Jeffrey Stout's distinction between truth (as a trans-communal property) and justification (as a 
community-relative one), in his Ethics After Babel. The Languages ofMorals and Their Discontents, 
Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 1988,21-28 and passim. Stout believes that after one follows Austin 
in exploring the uses of 'true', there is nothing further on a theoretical level which will be more 
interesting M understanding truth, (24) but he disputes Rorty's reductionist tendencies with regards to 
truth (especially ch. 11 'The Moral Consequences of Pragmatism', 243-65). 
97 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 34 (on creation) and 117-19 (on maintenance). 
98 One implication of this is that the adoption wholesale of any model whereby the sustaining 
power of illocutions is made to bear the whole weight of religious infrastructure is precisely the 
mistake of prejudging this variable. I have considered some aspects of such approaches in chapter I 
above. 
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It is, in the context of this discussion, significant that the basic Christian confession 
was 'Jesus is Lord' (for Paul) or 'Christ is Lord' (more generally), as well as the 
'primitive' confession of 'Christ Jesus'. " The words icupioq and, at least early on, 
Xpicy-rog are not straightforward names of objects, or in this case names for the 
person, Jesus of Nazareth. These words are not available to be used with 
word-to-world direction of fit in assertive speech acts, as was noted in essence by 
G. B. Caird with respect to such passages as Mark 8: 29. "' Rather these words 'imply 
a certainforce of commitment on the part of those who favor them' as Colin Brown 
expresses it in his study of confession as a speech act. "' The commissive confession 
operates with world-to-word direction of fit, 102 and thus following Searle we would 
want to say that confessional statements of the form 'Jesus is the Christ' create 
institutional facts. 
Even more so, 'Jesus is Lord' is anything but a 'flat constative'. It is, as we have seen, 
the personal confession of commitment and stance indicating a relationship to Jesus 
which is to be valued over and against, for example, commitment to Caesar. It is 
therefore significant that we do not in general find in the New Testament statements 
such as 'Jesus is Lord of all' which would indicate a non-self-involving use of the 
word. Romans 10: 12 and Acts 10: 36, describing Jesus as 'Lord of all' are at least to 
some degree more interested in the Jew-Gentile issue; and verses where Jesus' 
supremacy is in view (e. g. John 1: 1- 18; Colossians 1: 15 
-20) do not in general use 
KUPIOq language. Noting the absence of 'our' in the confessions of Romans 10: 9; 1 
Corinthians 12: 3 and Philippians 2: 11, which all have'Jesus is Lord'rather than 
99 Neufeld, Earliest Christian Confessions, 10. 
100 G. B. Caird, The Language and Imagery of the Bible, London: Duckworth, 1980,10; cf also 
G. B. Caird, New Testament Theology (ed. L. D. Hurst), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994,338-40. 
101 Brown, 'Hermeneutics of Confession', 463. 
102 Brown appears to take confession as an assertive speech act rather than a commissive one, 
with the result that he actually has the opposite view of the direction of fit in Mark 8: 29, although I 
find that his argument seems to support that of Caird and would therefore best be seen as 
world-to-word at this point; Brown, 'Hermeneutics of Confession', 460-64. The tenninology 
'word-to-world' and vice versa is confusing and evidently often confused, but as yet there is no agreed 
alternative. I am indebted here to the helpful discussion of V. Andres Synofzik, The Word of 
Reconciliation. Paul's Understanding ofReconciliation and Proclamation according to 2 Cor. 
5. 
-14-21 in the Light ofSpeech Act Exegesis (Unpublished London Bible College MA Dissertation, 
1995), 4-9. 
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'Jesus is our Lord, Werner Kramer suggests that'only in a later period does it 
become necessary, for polemical purposes, to reflect whether the Lord's dominion 
embraces the whole world or only the Church. "" 
To ask,, therefore, whether it is true that Jesus is Lord seems to be a poorly defined 
question. Further, since we have seen that Christian confession typically 
concentrated on just such convictional statements as 'Jesus is Lord' and 'Jesus is the 
Christ', the general question of the relationship between what is confessed and what 
is true must be judged, in these important examples, to be an insufficiently precise 
question. 104 
Nevertheless, the question which stands as the subtitle of this section remains: what 
statements have to be true for a performative utterance to be happy? Where Austin's 
words quoted earlier might have led us astray to look for 'supporting truths' for every 
confession, Searle offers a different image: 'In order that some facts be institutional, 
there must be some other facts that are brute. "" Thus while the standard Christian 
confessions do not, on our account, admit easily of true/false characterisation, there 
remain nevertheless certain facts which are presupposed by significant confessional 
statements. 
The longer creeds of later development include certain of these brute facts among 
their direct claims: that Jesus the Christ was in fact Jesus of Nazareth, and that he did 
in fact die (on the cross) and was buried. To follow High's analysis, the kind of 
justification to be made for offering such a confessional statement (such as the 
Apostles' Creed which includes these last two claims) must differ from that offered 
for confessing 'Jesus is Lord'. It is not my intention here to engage in a discussion 
about the truth-status of these claims, but I do wish to point out that the truth-issue at 
stake must necessarily be of a different order from that in the case of the earliest 
103 Werner Kramer, Christ, Lord, Son of God (SBT 50), London: SCM Press, 1966,219-22, 
here 22 1. 
104 For a similar approach to the logic (or grammar) of convictional and especially religious 
language, see McClendon and Smith, Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism, especially 47-109. 
I am however in some disagreement with their proposal, as indicated in chapter 1. 
105 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 56. See also 120-25 on'The Hierarchy of Facts: From 
Brute to Institutional. ' 
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Christian confessions. 106 To simplify: following Searle opens up a greater potential 
'distance' between the confession and any presupposed states of affairs, but as we 
examine various confessional statements down through the history of the church, 
some of these presupposed states of affairs do come into view, and thus the 
confession is tethered, if indirectly, to questions of truth. 
Romans 1: 34 may be an instructive example of the various levels of truth-claim 
involved in the case of Christian confession. Although there is general consensus that 
the verses are a pre-Pauline confession, "' it is as well to recall that they need not be 
in order to be used confessionally. Thus, where Poythress for example urges that 
there is insufficient evidence to claim more than that Romans 1: 3-4 'is a free 
composition using a number of traditional expressions and ideas, "' the passage may 
still be considered in confessional terms as a self-involving speech act. 
In making a specific claim about the inter-relationship of Jesus' earthly descent (from 
David, Ka-rd adpý) and his divine sonship, declared through the resurrection(KOCT(X 
7CVEf+a), this passage combines statements of brute fact with institutional claims of 
self-involving significance. "' Of particular note is the ascription of divine sonship 
with power to Jesus as attested in the resurrection. Although there is a debate as to 
whether 'in power' (e-' v UVa[LEI)modifies 'declared' (as with the NIV rendering 
'declared with power to be... ') or modifies 'Son of God', so that Jesus is declared to be 
'Son of God with power', this latter reading seems the preferred sense. "o The status 
of Jesus as 'Son of God with power' is an institutional fact, and to confess Jesus in 
106 Which again is why I disagree with McClendon and Smith's discussion (see n. 104 above). 
107 Thus Ernst Kdsemann, Commentary on Romans, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980,10-12; cf 
Paul Beasley-Murray, 'Romans 1: 3f. An Early Confession of Faith in the Lordship of Jesus', TynB 31 
(1980), 147-54. For a survey of views as well as a proposal of a three-stage redaction see R. Jewett, 
'The Redaction and Use of an Early Christian Confession in Romans 1: 34. in D. E. Groh and R. 
Jewett (eds. ), The Living Text. 
- 
Essays in Honor ofErnest W. Saunders, Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1985,99-122 
108 Vem S. Poythress, 'Is Romans V-4a Pauline Confession After All? ', Exp T 87 (1976), 
180-83,182. 
109 See J. D. G. Dunn, 'Jesus 
- 
Flesh and Spirit: An Exposition of Romans 1: 34, JTS 24 (1973), 
40-68, who sees Paul making a claim about two overlapping modes of existence in Jesus' earthly life 
(54). 
110 So Fitzmyer, Romans, 235; Douglas Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (NICNT), Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996,48. 
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this way is certainly to take a stance in the public domain. Yet the confession 
explicitly claims that this is the same Jesus who is descended from David, which is a 
brute fact. As a single confession, therefore, institutional and brute facts are brought 
together, and the self-involving speech act makes clear its claim to particular 
commitments to truthful statements. In short, one cannot reduce the confession of 
Jesus as 'the Son of God with power' to a question of fact, and yet one must insist 
also that the overall confession itself is explicitly linked to factual states of affairs. 
§5.5 Summary 
Searle's approach throws into precise relief the false polarisation of our opening 
discussion: to Richardson one wants to say'Not all facts are brute facts' and to 
Young: 'Not all facts are institutional facts. ' Similarly, truth is a concept with blurred 
edges which is operative in relation to Christian confession in the various contexts of 
the different forms of life which we examined in §4 above. Speech act theory does 
shift the overall discussion of the meaning of religious language into the public 
domain, by showing that confessional (commissive) language depends on states of 
affairs. But there is no simple correspondence between a successful commissive such 
as a credal statement presupposing the resurrection and the fact of the resurrection in 
the extra-linguistic world. Rather, each speech act must be examined on its own 
merits in its own relevant form of life. It is in this context that the researches of 
Neufeld and Cullmann and others are of such value. 
§6 Conclusions 
In our study of confessional speech acts in the New Testament we have found that it 
is the self-involving nature of confession which is most significant. Confessions are 
strong illocutions with commissive force but which are also declarative, and in 
particular in the New Testament they typically include a commitment to a certain 
definable content: 'Jesus is Lord' or 'Jesus is the Christ. Credal forms in the New 
Testament are indications of likely self-involvement, but confessions did not need to 
be (and in fact were not) always credal. We have seen that confessional speech acts 
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need to be understood in their particular forms of life, and that they do not negate, 
although they situate, the question of truth. 
We will find a similar mix of commissive and declarative elements in the speech act 
of forgiveness in the next chapter. Although the act of forgiveness does not raise the 
question of truth in quite the same way as that of confession, it does require the same 
focus on its self-involving nature, and will raise related questions about brute and 
institutional facts (as we should expect) by way of forcing us to consider the nature 
of sin and its status in brute and institutional terms. 
In this connection it is again appropriate to note, by way of a last word on 
confession, that to confess one's sins may also be seen as a self-involving speech act 
whereby the confessor asserts that he or she has committed particular acts (or 
perhaps has omitted to perform certain required acts) but, more significantly, 
performs the expressive act of distancing themselves from endorsing those acts. The 
clearest example of such a use in the New Testament is 1 John 1: 9: 'If we confess 
(4tO. oy6w) our sins, he who is faithful and just will forgive us our sins. ' Thus, this 
'negative' sense of 61io. Xoyew... might be seen as the public commitment not to take 
a stand behind a particular fact. The following discussion of forgiveness will bring us 
back to this idea of confession in due course. 
Only here with this sense in the NT; cf BAGD, 568. This sense is more normally . 
'dicated 
by ý&%toý, oygw, as at Matthew 3: 6; Mark 1: 5; James 5: 16, etc (cf BAGD, 277). 
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Chapter 7 
The Forgiveness of Sin 
§1 Introduction 
Forgiveness is a subject which, rather surprisingly, has suffered from considerable 
neglect in philosophical and theological reflection. In the former case discussion of 
forgiveness has tended to gravitate around such questions as 'Is forgiveness a virtueT 
and 'How do forgiveness and mercy interrelateT based on the assumption that 
forgiveness may be cashed out in some such terms as the forswearing of resentment. 
In the latter case, the tendency has been to subsume forgiveness under the wider 
rubric of Christology or atonement, but this is problematic as we shall see. 
Studies of forgiveness in theological terms have been few and far between. ' If one 
may gauge anything from its appearance in dictionary articles, it is that the topic is of 
minor theological significance, or in the case of one major recent explicitly ethical 
and theological dictionary, no significance at all. ' In a particularly interesting case, 
John McIntyre presents a thorough and penetrating study of atonement, concluding 
with a chapter on forgiveness in which he attempts to 'earth' the once-and-for-all 
crucifixion in our own lives in the practice of forgiveness. ' He concludes the book 
with a brief description of forgiveness as it 'emerges' out of the very nature of God, 
I Older studies include H. R. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience offorgiveness, London: 
Nisbet & Co, 1927, and Vincent Taylor, Forgiveness and Reconciliation. A Study in New Testament 
Theology, London: Macmillan & Co, 1946. For further post-War treatments see n. 78 below. 
2 There is no article on 'forgiveness' (i. e. the topic, let alone the word) in Paul Barry Clarke & 
Andrew Linzey (eds. ), Dictionary ofEthics, Theology and Society, London & New York: Routledge, 
1996. 
3 John McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology. Studies in the Doctrine of the Death of Christ, 
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1992,109,120. The last chapter (109-29) is entitled'T'he Nature of 
Forgiveness'. 
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noting various aspects such as the wiping out of sin and the restoring of fellowship 
with God. Then, in the very last paragraph of the book, he notes: 
What we have not so far taken account of, in all our deliberations, 
is the role which we as brothers and sisters play in the mediation 
of forgiveness to those about us. 
... 
No account of the shape of 
soteriology, however otherwise impeccable, can afford to ignore 
the final finishing touch thus given to it by human agency. ' 
McIntyre cites here various stringent requirements from the gospel of Matthew, such 
as that we shall not be forgiven if we do not forgive. However, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that in fact this 'final finishing touch' has been, if not ignored, then at 
least seriously underestimated. ' 
Forgiveness thus remains elusive in theological reflection. I suggest that one of the 
reasons for this is that some significant aspects of forgiveness are difficult to grasp 
without something approaching a speech-act view of forgiveness. 
In view of this, my discussion of forgiveness takes a slightly different course from 
that on confession in the previous chapter. Confession is often viewed as 
self-involving, with the result that the question of form and function could be 
addressed first before explicating the self-involving nature of the speech act and then 
pursuing the question of truth thus raised. In contrast, with forgiveness I judge that 
the primary need is to provide a speech-act account of forgiveness in the first place, 
and then to tum immediately to the question of 'truth' as it is raised in forgiveness in 
the New Testament, which, I shall argue, rests in tum on an understanding of the 'sin' 
which is to be forgiven. After this I shall conclude with a consideration of specific 
exegetical examples of texts concemed with forgiveness, where the issues of 
vocabulary markers and the link between form and function shall finally be 
examined. 
§2 Forgiveness and Self-Involvement: Stance and Entailment 
Forgiveness as a Speech Act 
McIntyre, Shape ofSoteriology, 129. 
1 am indebted to Sue Palmer for drawing my attention to this point. 
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It is clear that speech act theory has the potential to clarify certain aspects of 
forgiveness. Very simply: to forgive is to perform an act; to say 'I forgive you' is to 
6 perform a speech act. I should say immediately that it is equally clear that there are 
aspects of forgiveness which will elude any speech act analysis. How, for instance, 
shall we evaluate the various contested criteria which are offered as good grounds for 
forgiveness? This key question cannot be settled simply by appealing to the 
workings of language. I thus agree with Gregory Jones when he notes 'the significant 
yet limited relevance of performative declarations such as "I forgive you. "" In fact 
Jones' generally excellent theological discussion of forgiveness does not focus on 
this 'significant' area, in contrast to my own concerns. 
§2.1 What is it tofOrgive? 
Many modem discussions of forgiveness go back to Bishop Joseph Butler's early 
eighteenth century sermons on the themes of resentment and forgiveness! For 
Butler, forgiveness is the application of Jesus' command to love our enemies. Where 
'resentment is not inconsistent with good-will' since it may still co-exist with love for 
our enemy, it may grow into revenge (when resentment 'entirely destroys our natural 
benevolence towards [our enerny]'). ' Thus for Butler, forgiveness is the forswearing 
of revenge, or, in comparable words, the limiting of resentment to its helpful roles. 10 
Indeed one of the principal arguments of the first of Butler's two relevant sermons is 
that resentment, when held in check, serves valuable roles in society: it is an inward 
witness to virtue, and it is a'generous move of mind'which witnesses with 
6 In fact very few treatments of forgiveness consider its speech act dimension. The notable 
exception, considered below, is Joram Graf Haber, Forgiveness, Savage, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1991. 
7 L. Gregory Jones, Embodying Forgiveness. A Theological Analysis, Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1995,236. 
8 'Sermon VIII: Upon Resentment' and 'Sermon IX: Upon Forgiveness of Injuries', in W. E. 
Gladstone (ed. ), The Works ofJoseph Butler, in two volumes. Vol H. - Sermons, etc, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1896,136-49 and 150-67 respectively. 
9 Gladstone (ed. ), The Works ofJoseph Butler, 158. 
10 1 thus fmd it puzzling that Jeffrie Murphy, one of the most prolific of modem writers on 
forgiveness, charactenses Butler's view as 'the forswearing of resentment'; Jeffrie Murphy, 
'Forgiveness and Resentment', in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 
(Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988,14-34, here 15. The 
qualifications which Murphy then offers to this position are thus not, in my judgment, qualifications 
of Butler's position (15-16). 
Chapter 7- Page 224 
indignation against injury and wickedness. " With regard both to resentment and 
forgiveness we find in Butler particular examples of the over-arching theme of his 
moral thought: that humanity is possessed of an inherent benevolence which it is our 
duty to cultivate and extend; and that therefore the urge to do what is right is at 
bottom natural, and is mediated to us through our consciences, which are, in his 
view, rational, universal, and authoritative. 12 
In Butler's world all things, even resentment, work together for the good, and it is not 
surprising that subsequent thinkers, often operating outside Butler's Christian 
convictions, have begged to differ. Nevertheless, his treatment of forgiveness sets the 
subject squarely on the path of its relation to resentment; a path which has dominated 
discussion of the topic. " 
Joram Graf Haber's treatment of forgiveness as a speech act should thus be seen as 
something of a departure from the philosophical norm, one which in my view has a 
good deal to commend it in what he affirms, but which is perhaps overly dismissive 
of other emphases. " Haber offers us a model of 'I forgive you' as a performative 
utterance along the following lines. " 
§2.2 A Performative Model 
Haber begins by noting that, in line with one of Austin's major emphases, the 
locution 'I forgive you' does not primarily report on an inner mental or emotional 
state, such as the overcoming of resentment. If it did then one would be forced to 
introspect ever anew to discover if indeed there were no longer any resentment 
against the offending person. In fact to utter 'I forgive you' is to express the 
11 Gladstone (ed. ), The Works ofJoseph Butler, 148-49. 
12 See Terence Penelhum, Butler, London, Boston & Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985; 
T. A. Roberts, 'Editor's Introduction', 111 T. A. Roberts (ed. ), Butler's Fifteen Sermons Preached at the 
Rolls Chapel and A Dissertation of the Nature of Virtue, London: SPCK, 1970, ix-xxiv (especially 
xv). 
13 Cf P. F. Strawson's title essay in his Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, London: 
Methuen, 1974,1-25 (1962); and particularly the various treatments of Jeffrie Murphy. 
14 Haber traces other dissenting voices from the 'forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment' 
view; Haber, Forgiveness, 16-23. 
15 1 draw here from his account in Haber, Forgiveness, 29-57. 
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overcoming of resentment. Although Haber does not use these terms, it is a matter of 
sincerity and stance, by which the self is situated with respect to the other: e. g. 'I now 
make the (cognitive) decision not to count your offence against you in our continuing 
relationship, at this present time. ' 
The notion that an emotional issue (such as resentment) is nevertheless founded on 
cognitive states is implicit here: 'in [this] view, emotions involve specific attitudes 
and certain ways of looking at the world', and Haber appeals to various voices in the 
philosophical tradition who have defended this idea. " This is an important point, one 
on which the entire speech act analysis of forgiveness depends, but in my judgment it 
is well taken. Murphy, for instance, notes that emotions involve stances towards 
things, people or events and thus can be changed or at least influenced by rational 
persuasion" One can also appeal more widely than just the philosophical literature to 
defend the view that as well as obviously emotional or affective aspects, phenomena 
such as forgiveness and resentment have a definite cognitive component. Richard 
Fitzgibbons suggests that therapists rely precisely on the 'intellectual or emotional 
decision to part with anger' even while 'For most patients, forgiveness continues for 
some time as an intellectual process, assisted by the therapist, in which patients do 
not truly feel like forgiving'. 18 
Once freed from the model of seeing forgiveness as reporting on an inner mental 
state, Haber is able to propose the following model of the performative utterance of 
forgiveness, whereby a speaker S, expressing forgiveness of an agent X for his act A, 
represents as true all of the following: 
(1) X did A 
(2) A was wrong 
16 Haber, Forgiveness, 35, citing Bernard Williams, 'Morality and the Emotions', in his 
Problems of the Seýf Philosophical Papers 1956-1972, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1973,207-29; 
William Lyons, Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980; and Strawson, 'Freedom and 
Resentment', 6-8. 
17 Jeffrie Murphy, 'Introduction. I. The Retributive Emotions', in Murphy and Hampton, 
Forgiveness and Mercy, I- 10, here 5, n. 7. 
is Richard P. Fitzgibbons, 'The Cognitive and Emotive Uses of Forgiveness in the Treatment of 
Anger', Psychotherapy 23 (1986), 629-33, here 630. 
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(3) X was responsible for doing A 
(4) S was personally injured by X's doing A 
(5) S resented being injured by X's doing A 
(6) S has overcome his resentment for X's doing A, or is at least willing to try to overcome it. 19 
Three implications of this analysis are worth noting. Haber points out that 'for 
particular persons to be appropriate for the invocation of the procedure, they must 
have standing both to forgive and be forgiven. "0 Thus what he terms 'third-party 
forgiveness', whereby I may attempt to forgive A for a wrong committed against B, 
misfires, because I have not been wronged. The distinction here, if it can be 
sustained, is between the resentment which I feel in being wronged, and the 
indignation which I may feel when B is wronged. For Haber, there is a'non-arbitrary' 
distinction between the two, since the fon-ner is tied up with the maintenance of 
self-respect whereas the latter is not 
.2' The notion that resentment is a protection of 
self-respect and that its absence is indicative of defective self-esteem is prominent 
especially in the work of Murphy, whose main argument that forgiveness is not 
always a virtue is predicated precisely on the notion that it may undercut a 
responsible self-respect. 22 
Secondly, the particular issues surrounding condition (6) serve to clarify the way in 
which forgiveness may misfire. Haber proposes that'if S sincerely intends to will 
away his resentment, then he does succeed in expressing forgiveness. If he should 
give up his effort at a later time, then 
-and only then- can we say his forgiveness was 
infelicitous. "' This would seem to bear out my suggestion that Haber's view can be 
19 Haber, Forgiveness, 40. 
20 Haber, Forgiveness, 44. 
21 Thus Haber arrives at the same conclusion as Piers Benn, 'Forgiveness and Loyalty', 
Philosophy 71 (1996), 369-83, who rather than utilising speech act categories develops his own of 
'full' and 'quasi' forgiveness. What may be most interesting about this is that it demonstrates how 
speech act theory provides sharp analytical categories without which certain straightforward questions 
cannot be answered. For an opposite view of third-party forgiveness, drawing on psychological as 
well as philosophical insights, see Thomas Tryzna, 'Tbe Social Construction of Forgiveness', CSR 27 
(1997), 226-4 1. considered below. 
22 See especially Murphy, 'Forgiveness and Resentmenf, 16-19. 
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expressed as a matter of sincerity and stance in the public domain: I have forgiven A 
precisely where I am willing to overcome resentment owards A. This invites us to 
say that the act of forgiving may be felicitous to differing degrees at different 
moments in time. In my judgment this accords with our own experiences of the 
difficulties involved in overcoming resentment in many serious cases. 
Finally, Haber applies his model to the issues of overcoming resentment and 
addresses the question of when this overcoming is appropriate. He follows Murphy 
in arguing that forgiveness is appropriate only in cases where it preserves 
self-respect, but differs from him in maintaining that such cases are precisely those 
where the wrongdoer repents for the wrong done. " His analysis is Kantian: the 
repentant wrong-doer is in a sense reconstituted as a new person, and thus can be 
forgiven since there is no condoning of the offender as such (the offender now being 
'replaced' by the 'repenter'). Forgiveness, on this model, remains the prerogative of 
the forgiver, and cannot be eamed by repenting. Where Murphy allows five different 
types of situation where forgiveness may be offered, all loosely under the rubric of 
'preserving self-respect', Haber allows only this one: forgiving the repentant 
wrong-doer 
. 
2' Both writers are critical of Jesus' parable of the unforgiving servant 
(Matthew 18: 21-35) with its view that one should forgive because one is in turn in 
26 
need of forgiveness 
. 
§2.3 Evaluation of the Performative Model 
The performative model of forgiveness as articulated by Haber has both strengths 
and weaknesses. It is successful in separating the issue of forgiveness from a 
supposed introspective examination of feelings. Its speech act apparatus enables it to 
navigate these various problems concerning the 'self, what I would term the 
'non-referential "I" of self-involvement. ' Secondly it does indeed clarify why it is that 
23 Haber, Forgiveness, 5 1. 
24 Haber, Forgiveness, 90. 
25 Contrast Haber, Forgiveness, 103-9 with Murphy, 'Forgiveness and Resentment', 24-30. 
26 Murphy, 'Forgiveness and Resentment', 30-34; Haber, Forgiveness, 109. Haber is 
particularly curt: 'I do not think this is a good reason to forgive, if only because, in the forgiveness 
situation, our own moral history is not at issue. ' ( 109) 
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forgiveness in difficult situations seems to be elusive even in cases where resentment 
had apparently been overcome. The resurfacing of resentment, perhaps as the self is 
disrupted out of its normal mode of being in the world and past hurts are 
foregrounded again, causes the misfiring of the illocution which had heretofore been 
felicitous. " Thirdly, as Haber acknowledges, all the benefits of his analysis are 
predicated on this paradigm case of the particular first-person present tense utterance 
'I forgive you', but can mutatis mutandis be applied more generally. 
A fourth and significant benefit of this approach, in my view, is its particular focus 
on the nature of the institutional facts involved in forgiveness, although this is not 
discussed by the writers cited. We remember that, on Searle's account, institutional 
facts are created by illocutions of the form 'x counts as y in context c'. Under the 
terms of his Kantian analysis, Haber's condition (6) in cases of a repentant 
wrongdoer may be expressed as 
(6a) S is willing to count X as X'who did not perform A 
but this cannot be cashed out as a statement such as 
(6b) The offensive results of A are removed or destroyed 
precisely because of the distinction between brute and institutionalfacts. Thus if you 
have burned down my house, and the house no longer stands, this is a brute fact 
unaffected by my forgiveness, whereas the institutional fact that you owe me 
E50,000 to rebuild the house may be forgiven, and, indeed, 'removed' from our social 
reality. More generally, in forgiving we may say that the forgiver adjusts his or her 
stances towards the various brute facts involved, and thus changes the institutional 
facts involved. Indeed Murphy notes that this point is at the heart of the legal 
systems which attempt to regulate the social operations ofjustice and retribution: 
Speaking very generally, we may say that the criminal 
i 
law 
(among other things that it does) institutionalizes certain feelings 
of anger, resentment, and even hatred that we typically (and 
perhaps properly) direct toward wrongdoers, especially if we 
27 This notion, that forgiveness remains always contingent upon the future continuance of the 
overcoming of resentment, clearly lays a philosophical foundation for the claim that forgiveness may 
best be viewed as an eschatological category. 
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have been victims of those wrongdoers. 28 
One of the features of the book in which Murphy and Hampton go on to explore this 
institutionalisation is their engagement with the question of how our notions of 
'forgiveness' and 'mercy' differ from these notions as traditionally understood within 
a Christian theological framework. This is a key issue for my discussion, and raises 
the following challenge which must be addressed at this point: does an analytical 
approach such as that of Haber have significant things to say to theological questions 
concerning forgiveness as it has been viewed in Christian tradition and in 
interpretation of the New Testament? As well as meeting this challenge by way of 
exegetical examples later in the chapter, I propose the following response at this 
stage. 
First and foremost, I believe that we must lay to rest the persistent 
mischaracterisation of the analytical approach as working with a 'thin' conception of 
its key terms. The notion that moral and ethical categories are susceptible of 'thin' 
and 'thick' description may be useful in sorting out ways of evaluating discussions, 29 
but this is a separate and separable question from that of whether an approach such 
as speech act theory is one which does or does not do justice to the life setting of 
particular illocutionary acts. Indeed, there is a significant irony about the 
mischaracterisation of the analytical approach as 'thin', which is that the genesis of 
the whole idea of 'thick' and 'thin' description occurs in some of the last papers of 
that archetypal analytic philosopher, Gilbert Ryle, in his discussions of the nature of 
thinking. " Ryle's well known example is of two boys performing identical swift 
contractions of the eyelids, but only one of whom is winking: the 'thick' description 
operating on this more complex level than muscle-contraction description. But as 
28 Murphy, 'The Retributive Emotions', 2. 
29 It is certainly well-enough established in this context, as adopted by Clifford Geertz, 
The 
Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays, New York: Basic Books, 1973,3-30; and popularised 
by 
George A. Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine. Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, London: 
SPCK, 1984,112-38. See now also Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and 
Abroad, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994. 
30 Gilbert Ryle, 'Thinking and Reflecting' and 'The Thinking of Thoughts. What is Le Penseur 
Doing? % reprinted in idem, Collected Papers Vol. 2: Collected Essays 1929-68, London: 
Hutchinson 
& Co., 1971,465-79 and 480-96. Ryle is acknowledged as the source of the terminology by Geertz, 
Interpretation of Cultures, 6-7. 
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Ryle develops this view, it becomes apparent that he has in mind precisely the same 
multi-layered phenomenon as Austin's idea of locutions, illocutions and perlocutions: 
thus the utterance of syllables may at the same time be 'telling someone something' 
and 'imparting a piece of wanted information' and so forth. " To set what Ryle calls 
here these 'thicker descriptions' against an approach such as that of speech act theory 
seems to miss entirely the point of speech act theory. As we have been arguing 
throughout, performative speech acts are significant precisely in that they do imply 
and entail habituated stances and commitments. Thus while one should allow that the 
notions such as 'wrong', 'personal injury' and 'resentment' which operate in Haber's 
analysis do not always operate with the same strength or force, it does not follow that 
the speech act analysis is compromised in any way by this. 
Gregory Jones attacks modem philosophical (especially analytical) approaches on 
precisely these grounds: they fall short in abstracting the performative utterance from 
the on-going tradition. More specifically, 'they have tended to assume that a 
philosophical account of forgiveness can be offered independently of any theological 
convictions. "' For Jones, much of the significance of forgiveness derives not from 
the act but from the transformed practices which derive from it. He in turn develops a 
view of forgiveness as a craft which he sees as in line with an Aristotelian-Thomist 
view of the significance of the continuities of habits, crafts and tTaditions. It is thus 
, 33 particularly significant that his book is entitled 'Embodying Forgiveness. 
I suggest that Jones has not entirely succeeded in avoiding a false polarisation 
between an analytical approach and an 'embodied' approach. He criticises Haber for 
extracting incidents of forgiveness and treating them as concerned with 'isolated 
situations of wrongdoing or guilt', " but, although this may be a reasonable criticism 
of aspects of Haber's own presentation, two points may be made in response. Firstly, 
such acts are not simply an insignificant part of the overall topic of forgiveness, since 
Jones himself uses the same focus precisely at the point of summarising his 
31 Ryle, 'The Thinking of Thoughts', 484. 
w 
32 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 2 10; cf his general discussion of this point, 210-19. 
33 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 225-39. 
34 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 213. 
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'embodied' approach, where the performative utterance marks a particular point (not 
always the same point) in the on-going process of forgiveness. " Secondly, a speech 
act analysis must in any case locate the speech act in the context of a stance and its 
commitments and entailments, and therefore need not be seen as setting a study of 
particular acts against ongoing traditions. It is doubtless true that analytical 
approaches are used reductively, but in this case it would not appear to be so. In 
short 
, 
it is not apparent why Jones' own valuable emphasis on communities and 
traditions need foreclose analytical questions in any particular case. 
In general, then, there is no reason to rule out a priori that the restoration of a 
relationship may be a particularly powerful reason to forgive an offender in a certain 
case, such as in a marital relationship for example. Likewise, the parable of the 
unforgiving servant does offer insight into our attitudes to forgiveness which rely on 
deepening (or 'thickening') our conception of it in a way in which Haber's brief 
dismissal of the parable fails to acknowledge. However, in both these cases, the point 
is not that a speech-act approach falls short of elucidating the issues, but that Haber's 
own treatment has not taken sufficient account of the relevance of habituated stances 
and commitments to evaluating the felicity of self-involving speech acts. " 
Finally, Jones correctly locates a key issue in understanding forgiveness as being the 
confrontation which it invokes against sin and evil: 'In its broadest context, 
forgiveness is the way in which God's love moves to reconciliation in the face of 
sin. 07 Here, at least, there is force to his argument that a philosophical approach risks 
ignoring the overarching context within which stance and entailment can be 
evaluated, the context of 'culpable complicity' (sins) and 'a pervasive reality of 
always-already brokenness and diminution' (sin) which calls for the central role of 
forgiveness in Christian theology. " Certainly it is true that discussions of forgiveness 
divorced from any theological moorings have a propensity to drift into an 
35 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 236-38. 
36 This I would judge to be particularly true of his discussion of Matthew 18 (Haber, 
Forgiveness, 109), where Jones is right that Haber is wrong, but mistakenly concludes that it is his 
model which has led him astray. 
Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 5; cf 59-64; 83-91; andpassim. 
38 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 49. 
Chapter 7- Page 232 
unbalanced f 39 Ocus on psychological effects alone. Moreover, as we come to consider 
the New Testament, we shall have to look at the contrast which may be made 
between 'forgive' as an intransitive verb and 'forgive' as a transitive verb: how does a 
speech act approach relate to the specific context of forgiving sin? I suggest, in fact, 
that the conceptuality of speech act theory provides a very helpful way of 
understanding what it means to forgive sin because it allows us to understand what 
kind of reality is in view when we talk of 'sin'. This, once more, is the question of the 
link between successful performatives and truth, and hence our next section 
examines the question of truth, before proceeding to an analysis of specific New 
Testament instances of forgiveness. 
§3 Forgiveness and Truth: Sin as an Institutional Fact 
Again the question of truth is best approached via Searle's distinction between brute 
and institutional facts. I shall argue that a key question to ask in any particular 
situation is not 'Is such and such an attitude or action or disposition a sinT but 
'Which attitudes, actions or dispositions count as sinT (and, implicitly, in which 
contexts? ) 
§3.1 The Overcoming ofResentment and the Forgiveness ofSin 
Our performative account of forgiveness has led us to a view of forgiveness as the 
overcoming of resentment in certain types of situation. On turning to the theological 
literature from this perspective, one must immediately be struck by the regular 
assumption that the nature of forgiveness is unproblematic, and that it is inevitably 
focused on the question of sin: 
The existence of forgiveness takes for granted the fact of human 
sin as an offense against God's holy law or against another human 
being. 
... 
Forgiveness is not simply "the remission of penalties; 
what is remitted is sin. "' 
39 As, for example, in the 'therapeutic' notion of forgiveness evident in M. J. Kurzynski, 'The 
Virtue of Forgiveness as a Human Resource Management Strategy', Journal of Business Ethics 17 
(1998), 77-85. For an example of how psychological insights need not militate against theological 
categories see Jared P. Pingleton, 'Why We Don't Forgive: A Biblical and Object Relations 
Theoretical Model for Understanding Failures in the Forgiving Process', Journal of Psychology and 
Theology 25 (1997), 403-13. 
40 Gary S. Shogren, 'ForgiVeness (NT)', in ABD (1992), 11: 835-38; here 835, and citing Taylor, 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation, 3. 
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Thus the opening of the ABD article on New Testament forgiveness, possessed as it 
is of a somewhat forthright ontology. To complicate the picture yet ftirther, 'sin' in 
the language games of New Testament studies, particularly in the gospels, operates 
with still other nuances of logical grammar, as we shall see. Doubtless one could 
chart more than one path through this maze, but I propose to proceed by arguing that 
sin is an institutional fact created out of the act of counting acts or dispositions as 
evil. Evil, in turn, I take to be the mysterious brute fact the existence of which calls 
forth the vain task of theodicy: the attempt to explain evil. In a certain sense, evil 
impinges on the creation as brute facts which are the chaos from which we fashion 
our institutional facts, which are the sins. " 
§3.2 Sin as an Institutional Fact 
We start with the observation that almost any human action can be called a sin given 
the appropriate circumstances, and that equally almost anything that might easily be 
labelled as 'sin' can be condoned in other circumstances. Evidence for such a claim is 
to hand in the fon-n of the broad brush strokes of such sociologically orientated 
studies as Oliver Thomson's History of Sin, or Jeffrey Burton Russell's studies on the 
history of perceptions of the devil. " Thomson notes, as examples of the latter, the 
Nazi ethic which condoned mass-murder and torture; the fourteenth-century Catholic 
ethic which encouraged the slow burning of non-orthodox members of its own faith; 
the Puritans who regarded it as moral to drown muddled old women suspected of 
witchcraft; and, in the 1990's, the married women of Uzbekistan who felt impelled to 
set themselves on fire if accused of adultery. " His list deliberately ranges across the 
social and religious spectrum, without even including the obvious example of 'war', 
where the changed labelling of the social situation turns killing from morally bad to 
41 Although my account does not depend on this image, the notion of evil as 'brute chaos' finds, 
support in a certain tradition of readings of Genesis 1. See, for example, Walter Brueggemann, 
Theology of the Old Testament. Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997, 
15 8-5 9, drawing in particular on the account of Jon D. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of 
Evil. 
- 
the Jewish Drama ofDivine Omnipotence, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988. 
42 Oliver Thomson, A History ofSin, Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 1993; Jeffrey Burton 
Russell, The Devil. Perceptions ofEvilfrom Antiquity to Primitive Christianity, Ithaca & London: 
Cornell UP, 1977. See also, by the same author and publisher, the continuation of his survey M Satan. 
The Early Christian Tradition (198 1); Lucifer. The Devil in the Middle Ages (1984); and 
Mephistopheles. The Devil in the Modern World (1986). 
43 Thomson, History of Sin, 29-30. 
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morally sanctioned. 'Labelling is everything', as pacifist theorists are wont to say, 44 
but in the language of chapter 4 above, this trades implicitly on the presupposition of 
uniformly strong construal, and in what follows I shall seek a constructive but 
non-reductive way forward which nuances rather than abandons this judgment. 
We may note also here Russell's view on the 'social construction' of the devil: 'I 
assert the reality of the Devil, but by this I do not intend a judgment as to the 
metaphysical reality of such a being. ' Russell views the devil as 'the concept of the 
Devil'. and while he may or may not be more than this, we can never know. In short: 
'The Devil is a real phenomenon; therefore, the Devil is real. "' In a personal 
afterword at the end of the book, he says that he does believe in the existence of a 
personification and principle of evil, 'call it what you will'. " Within biblical studies it 
is well known that the figure of the devil undergoes development, and that in the Old 
Testament at least is not a personification of evil, but rather a messenger whose job it 
is to accuse; or an 'adversary', but that 'in any event, there is no single celestial 
satan. "' The development of the personal concept of 'devil' out of these disparate 
beginnings, without any necessarily reductive conclusions, has been traced in the 
recent study of Elaine Pagels. " 
Once again I propose to account for these understandings by appealing to the notion 
of an institutional fact. 'Sin' is a matter of naming, as is the choice to use the word 
'devil' to refer to a particular view of personified evil. What is more significant than 
locating metaphysical realities behind these ternis is to understand them 
dispositionally in relation to how they are experienced by human beings. As a potent 
example, Arthur Miller's The Crucible, his largely historical account of the 17th 
Century Salem witch-trials, demonstrates the complexities of trying to reduce the 
language of evil (in this case of the devil and witchcraft) to statements of brute fact. 
44 1 have misplaced the reference here, but I'm sure that Stanley Hauerwas would be proud to 
own it. 
45 Russell, The Devil, 43. 
46 Russell, The Devil, 258-60. Italics added. 
47 Peggy L. Day, An Adversary in Heaven: satan in the Hebrew Bible (HSM 43), Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1988,147; cf her surmnary of the evidence on 127-45. 
48 Elaine Pagels, The Origin ofSatan, London: Allen Lane, 1995. 
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Nevertheless, Miller draws out the genuine consequences of the effects of labelling 
certain people as witches, all the way to the ultimate brute fact of death. Not only so, 
but Miller's portrait of evil as it is characterised and institutionalised in the play was 
intended to demonstrate that the same processes were at work in his day in the 
McCarthylte desire to label and ostracise 'communists', again with real effects only 
made possible, and thus to some extent at least created, by the labelling. " 
It is in the context of just such a 'dispositional' account that the particularities of 
Thomson's investigation are useful as a reminder to expect that 'sin' will always be 
defined in particular situations with reference to particular concerns. Indeed one 
recent philosophical account notes the distinction between those deeds considered 
wrong because they are immoral, and those which are wrong because they offend 
against God, suggesting that one may adopt the terminology of 'objective' and 
'subjective' sin in this regard. 'O Rather than using these labels 'objective' and 
'subjective', I would say here that different institutional realities are in view. 
Needless to say, this contextual approach to defining 'sin' is often not what is in mind 
when Christian theologians use the word, with the aim of characterising something 
more general. Attempts have been made to generalise across the contingencies of 
sinful acts in different times and places, such as, for example, Oliver Thomson's own 
list of 'five main characteristics, varying substantially in intensity and emphasis' 
which are 'common to almost all moral codes: reciprocity, altruism, obedience, 
absolutes and manners. "' Such characteristics move the discussion to the level of 
disposition, which is where it is best considered as a theological issue. 
§3.3 Disposition to Sin 
This idea has been expounded most recently and clearly by Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
who takes up the theme as it has always been viewed in Christian theology, as a 
central part of understanding the human condition. " For Pannenberg, sin is best 
49 Arthur Miller, The Crucible: A Play in Four Acts, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968 (1953). 
so Philip L. Quinn, 'Sin', in REP (1998), 8: 791-96; here 792. 
51 Thomson, History of Sin, 6-11 and 3 5. 
in Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology (Vol. 2), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994 (199 1), 
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understood as an anthropological condition: 'the situation of the universal failure to 
achieve our human destiny that theology calls sin., " His historical treatment of the 
doctrines of 'Sin and Original Sin' attempts to navigate a difficult path. " On the one 
hand we have theology's self-conscious distancing of itself from a doctrine of 
original sin, the inevitable result of the assault on its presumed original 'act' (in 
Eden); its subsequent NT exegesis (in Romans 5); and its idea that one could be held 
responsible for the act of another (Adam), all of which have gradually fallen away. 
On the other hand, the resultant reduction of 'sin' language to an individual notion of 
sinful acts loses completely the idea of the universal dimension of sin, and leads 
irreversibly to a moralism which turns against those ensnared by evil, a moralism 
which is hypocritical in the extreme, for Pannenberg, since it cuts against the whole 
point of the gospel. This marginalisation of sin language is a problem since 'Christian 
faith does not create the fact of sin but presupposes it. "' 
In an effort to rehabilitate sin language in its universal dimension, Pannenberg 
returns to the Old Testament, and in particular to three of its words for'sin', which, 
A he suggests, emphasise different aspects of the NT use of 6ýLap-cf(x: 
hatta 't carelessness; missing the mark (possibly inadvertent) 
'awon willful and therefore culpable failure to hit the mark; or 
violation of a norm or standard 
pesha' intentional revolt against the norm (e. g. apostasy); moral guilt 
or iniquity before God" 
The first two of these words relate specifically to particular acts (while the third 
focuses more on one's state), but all highlight the intention or motivation of the doer. 
231-275. 
53 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 2: 239; 252. 
54 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 2: 231-65. 
55 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 2: 236. 
56 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 2: 239. In fact Pannenberg's rendering of these last two 
terms reverses the more common understanding, as found in R. Knierin-4 Die Hauptbegrifteftir Siinde 
im Alten Testament, Giitersloh, 1965, and surnmarised by Robin C. Cover, 'Sin, Sinners (OT)', in ABD 
(1992), V1: 31-40 (especially 32), but the details of the complex debate concerning hamartiology in 
the Old Testament need not concern us here. 
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One may say that they range from having virtually no institutional component (in the 
case of carelessness) through to strongly institutional characteristics depending on 
the nature of the violated norms, and that all of them are circumscribed within some 
institutional view of social reality. 
However, where Old Testament talk of sin always has transgression in view, with 
Paul, and particularly in Romans 7: 7-11, sin is seen as coming before the commands, 
and is discovered by law. In subsequent Western tradition, taking its lead from Paul 
and through Augustine, sin is viewed not in terms of sinful acts but as a result of the 
perverted will which is manifested in pride and (later) anxiety. This sense of sin is 
universal, although it can be known fully only as we know God (which thus 
identifies 'unbelief as a root of sin, rather than as sin), and can be perceived via 
(rather than identified with) anxiety and 'unbridled desire'. 57 
The doctrine of original sin has a profoundly anti-moralistic function: all are 
responsible for sin and there is therefore no ground for moral superiority over others. 
Pannenberg's particular contribution is to hold on to this anti-moralistic benefit of the 
doctrine without recourse to the actual doctrine itself, with its supposed universal 
human presence in the original Adam. Not all are persuaded by his account. 
Elsewhere Al McFadyen has argued that the doctrine itself is required, no matter 
how unfashionable (because anti-autonomous) it may be. " Nevertheless, 
Pannenberg's account adds a considered view of the development of Christian 
doctrine to those voices from other fields which argue that the Bible simply offers no 
explanation of sin, nor its provenance, but rather focuses on its universal corrupting 
power. For Pannenberg, the point of the Genesis 3 story is that sin increases even 
while God takes counter-measures. 59 
57 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 2: 252. 
58 Al McFadyen, 'Original Sin in Modem Theology', paper presented to the Nottingham 
Theological Society, Nottingham, 30 June 1998; and see Alistair I. McFadyen, Doctrine ofSin 
(Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, forthcoming. 
59 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 2: 262-3, where he offers his reading of the fall narrative 
of Genesis 3. This anti-theodicy view characterises the work in other areas of Terrence W. Tilley, Yhe 
Evils of Theodicy, Washington DC: Georgetown UP, 199 1, especially 221-5 5; and of Kenneth Surin, 
Theology and the Problem ofEvil, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, who prefers theodicies with a'practical' 
emphasis to those which he labels 'theoretical'; cf his remark 'The Christian who takes the atonement 
seriously has no real need for [theoretical] thinking' (142). See also the phenomenological account of 
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Thus while particular sins are varyingly characterised as brute or institutional facts, 
'sin' as it is often used in theological discourse is best understood as a dispositional 
phenomenon. In forgiving, therefore, I suggest that the forgiver's disposition is 
refigured through an act of self-involvement. At the same time, a new stance is taken 
toward brute facts, which is in accord with Haber's condition (6) on overcoming 
resentment. It is true that resentment is equally a disposition rather than a mental 
state, and thus that forgiveness might equally well be characterised as the refiguring 
of dispositions, but in what follows, I shall speak of the speech act itself refiguring 
the institutional realities concerned through an act of self-involvement. That brute 
facts are involved too highlights the non-reductive approach of speech act theory. 
§3.4 The Construction of Sin: Two Examples 
Specifically within this non-reductive framework, I propose that 'construction' is a 
helpful term for clarification when we use speech act theory to approach texts such 
as forgiveness texts. I discuss briefly two examples of particular relevance to our task 
of explicating New Testament texts of forgiveness in a speech act perspective; a third 
will occur in our actual exegesis itself with reference to understandings of 'sin' and 
'sinners' in New Testament times. 
Miroslav Volfs 'Exclusion and Embrace' 
The basic thesis of Miroslav Volf s 1996 work on reconciliation is that 'embrace' is a 
powerful metaphor for understanding how exclusion between oneself and another 
can be overcome in a way which acknowledges both otherness and sin. " 
Significantly, the background to his analysis is his own Croatian identity set against 
the Balkan conflict, and he mounts a compelling argument for seeing a four-stage 
'drama of embrace' (opening the arms; waiting; closing the arms; opening the arms 
again) as a model of the reconciliatory process which is required of those who would 
Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism ofEvil, New York: Harper & Row, 1967; idem, 'Evil', in Mircea. Eliade 
(ed. ), The Encyclopedia ofReligion (16 vols), New York: Macrnillan, 1987,5: 199-208; and idem, 
'Evil: A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology', JAAR 53 (1985), 635-48, now reprinted in his 
Figuring the Sacred. Religion, Narrative, and Imagination (ed. Mark I. Wallace), Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1995,249-61. 
60 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion & Embrace. A Theological Exploration ofIdentitY, Otherness, and 
Reconciliation, Nashville: Abmgdon, 1996. 
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overcome violence . 
61 
Of significance for my account is Volf s use of evil as the violent and real backdrop 
to all theonsing. Commenting on Rorty's ironic and contingent self, which weaves its 
identity in interaction with other beliefs and desires, Volf comes to the crux of the 
issue: 
"Weaving" would be a rather innocent way to describe this 
production, possibly a fitting image for how Rorty's books are 
written but not for how human selves are shaped. "Struggle" and 
"violence" come closer to being an adequate description. " 
The full sweep of Volf s argument is that non-violence is the Christian way, but not a 
non-violence predicated on a non-violent God, rather a non-violence which believes 
that justice is God's alone, and that it is therefore the divine prerogative to exact 
vengeance on evil. He explicitly suggests that the unpopularity of this thesis is 
because the theorist generally works against 'the quiet of a suburban home' rather 
than 'a scorched land, soaked in the blood of the innocent. ' Some things only God 
can do: extracting vengeance, according to the New Testament, is one of them. " 
I sketch out these broad contours of Volf s argument in order to demonstrate that it is 
within an entirely non-reductive framework that Volf does in fact adopt a 
construction-orientated approach concerning sin and evil. Arguing that sin is 
embodied in exclusionary practices (as a background to his 'embrace' metaphor for 
reconciliation), he notes that 
Most of the exclusionary practices would either not work at all or 
would work much less smoothly if it were not for the fact that 
they are supported by exclusionary language and cognition. 
Before excluding others from our social world, we drive them 
out, as it were, from our symbolic world. ' 
Volf shows how Jesus takes on social boundaries, typically of uncleanness, by a 
mission of're-naming': no foods are unclean (Mark 7: 14-23); the flow of blood from 
61 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 140-47. 
62 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 67. 
63 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 301-4. 
64 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 75. 
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a woman's body is not unclean (cf Mark 5: 25-34); and the 'mission of re-naming' 
abolishes the 'system of exclusion': i. e. it reconstitutes the institutional facts 
determinative of the social reality of the time. " Evil, referred to at times by Volf 
with the kind of 'chaotic land of exclusion' language I have used above, " is 
not ignorance, as if a corrected 'noetic stance'would overcome it. Rather, in a key 
image, Volf suggests that 
Symbolic exclusion is often a distortion of the other, not simply 
ignorance about the other; it is a willful misconstruction, not mere 
failure of knowledge. " 
Sin as willful misconstruction: Volf is sensitive to the reductive possibilities of such 
a formulation, but set against his unwavering insistence that inexplicable evil 
undergirds so much human endeavour he never does in fact collapse his account of 
forgiveness into a mutual re-weaving of noetic stances. " The strong illocution of 
forgiveness is irreducibly bound up with the brute facts of embrace; with the 'other' 
who remains a separate agent. It is only in such a context that we may use Volf s 
suggestion: forgiveness as wilful reconstrual. 
Thomas Tryzna's 'Social Construction of Forgiveness' 
Explicitly adopting the image of 'social construction', Thomas Tryma likewise 
shows how forgiveness must be set against the specifics of its socially-delineated 
situation in order to be understood as a boundary-establishing speech act. " The aim 
of Tryzna's study is to examine evidence for, and the coherence of, forgiveness as it 
occurs between groups, as well as the related issue of third-party forgiveness, but of 
interest to my own concerns are some of the uses he makes in the process of 
philosophical and psychological work on forgiveness. 
65 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 73. 
66 Cf Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 98. 
67 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 76. 
68 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 76, in the same paragraph as the previous quote. 
69 Thomas Tryzna, 'The Social Construction of Forgiveness', CSR 27 (1997), 226-41. In 
general, for reasons explored in chapter 4 above, I prefer 'construction' to 'social construction' as a 
tenn well-suited to a speech-act approach. 
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He situates his study in the particular social contexts of assembly-line work in 
military aircraft manufacture, and of surgeons training for medical school. What 
these studies suggest is that, for example, while trainee surgeons may make errors of 
medical judgment, 'the most serious kind of error is 
... 
the violation of the social 
code. 
... 
actions that threaten the "life" of the system. Y70 In these (social) 
circumstances, 'forgiveness is a mechanism for establishing boundaries that includes 
people, while punishment is a mechanism that excludes. v71 In other words, the social 
role of forgiveness is to enable offenders to maintain their role within the 
community, through a process of 'forgiving and remembering' which seeks to 
minimise social distance at the point of forgiveness rather than prefacing it with 
distancing judgment. " 
In conclusion, Tryzna suggests that forgiveness as a felicitous speech act 
presupposes social contexts of (group) membership, 73 where forgiving is limited not 
by philosophical restrictions on speech acts in dyadic relationships, but rather'by the 
capacity of particular individuals and groups to comprehend and to act morally 
within communities of different sizes. 7' Thus 'the limit on what is morally 
meaningful is socially constructed, not analytically determined by study of the 
meaning of forgiveness as a universal concept. ' In closing, Tryma notes some 
theological sides to his work, particularly in refusing to limit discussion of 
forgiveness to dyadic interpersonal relationships within the church. 75 
It must be noted that Tryzna's study focuses on situations where 'sin' occurs in a 
highly institutionalised manner owing to the particularly clearly defined heirarchical 
70 Tryzna, 'Social Construction of Forgiveness', 23 1. 
71 Tryzna, 'Social Construction of Forgiveness', 234. 
72 Tryzna, 'Social Construction of Forgiveness', 232-33; and drawing on the sociological work 
of Charles L. Bosk, Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979; and Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology ofApology and 
Reconciliation, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 199 1. Significantly, one of Tavuchis' most instructive 
examples of a delineated social system is a case of a church excluding one of its members; Tavuchis, 
Mea Culpa, 83-87. 
73 Tryzna draws on the speech act approach of Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 22-32 and passim. 
74 Tryzna, 'Social Construction of Forgiveness, 239. 
75 Tryzna, 'Social Construction of Forgiveness', 240. 
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and institutional structures of his test cases. This is both a strength and a weakness: a 
strength in that it foregrounds precisely the 'social construction' aspect of forgiveness 
and makes the workings of count-generated institutional facts perspicuous; and a 
weakness in that it might lead one to conclude that this is an exhaustive account of 
forgiveness. My own view is that his article is useful precisely for illuminating the 
social mechanisms of forgiveness and the presupposed social setting which enables 
the speech act to work, but that this clarity is achieved precisely because the setting 
is strongly institutional. I thus conclude that what Tryzna has achieved is an analysis 
of that aspect of forgiveness which is indeed socially constructed, while leaving 
untouched the setting of brute facts (particularly evil) which, as we saw with Volf s 
work, constitutes the background against which acts of forgiveness are performed. 
However, I shall argue below that when forgiveness is viewed in church-related 
terms, the significant aspects of Tryzna's study prove to be directly applicable. 
Thus equipped with a non-reductive view of forgiveness as a speech act concerned 
with refiguring institutional facts, we turn to particular texts of forgiveness in the 
New Testament. 
§4 Forgiveness in the New Testament 
Gregory Jones suggests that we need 'an eschatological understanding of Christian 
forgiveness. Christian forgiveness is not simply a word of acquittal; nor is it 
something that merely refers backward', and he goes on to note that once Protestants 
had takenjustification as the central theological category, forgiveness was too easily 
reduced to a subcategory of it which referred backward only, i. e. to acquittal. Not 
only was the eschatological aspect lost, but the 'personal' aspects of forgiveness were 
given undue prominence by being falsely detached from larger ecclesial, ethical and 
political issues. " Likewise Krister Stendahl, who also approaches the topic from 
outside that particular Protestant tradition, suggests that the priority of forgiveness is 
not compromised by Paul's particular need to focus on justification for his own 
reasons. " However, a survey of the literature quickly reveals that the idea of 
76 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 66, and 66 n. 38. A similar concern is expressed by Alan 
Torrance, 'Forgiveness. The essential Socio-political Structure of Personal Being', JTSA 56 (1986), 
47-59. 
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forgiveness within human relationships has not featured prominently in theological 
discussion, with only a handful of books addressed to the topiC, 78 and the majority of 
79 treatments not in any case focusing on the actual (speech) act of forgiveness. 
In locating the appropriate texts for our study we face again the issue of vocabulary 
markers for illocutionary acts, and with this caveat in mind it is appropriate to begin 
with the word &(ý111ýLi (forgiveness). The vast majority of uses of &. ýiTl[li in the NT 
are in the synoptics (Matthew 47x, Mark 34x, Luke 34x, John 14x and only 13 other 
uses in the whole NT) although many of these are not uses in the sense of 'forgive'. 'o 
In contrast, a'4)ECF1g, which occurs 17 times, means 'forgiveness' always except in its 
jubilary uses ('release from captivity') in Luke 4: 18. With the exception of Ephesians 
1: 7 and Colossians 1: 14 the word does not occur in the Pauline letters, which perhaps 
signifies that it becomes widespread only later in the apostolic age, for reasons we 
shall consider below concerning the early church practice of binding and loosing. It 
is of course the case that forgiveness is the topic when the specific vocabulary is 
absent, as for instance with the image of 'erasing the record that stood against us' in 
Colossians 2: 14. " 
77 Kxister Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and other essays, Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1976, 'Justification rather than Forgiveness' (23-40); as well as idem, Meanings. The Bible as 
Document and as Guide, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984, 'Sin, Guilt, and Forgiveness in the New 
Testament' (127-36). 
78 Between Taylor in 1946 (n. 1 above) and Jones in 1995, there were very few book length 
treatments of forgiveness. Most notable were W. Telfer's historical study, The Forgiveness of Sins. An 
Essay in the History of Christian Doctrine and Practice, London: SCM Press, 1959; Hartwig Thyen, 
Studien zur Siindenvergebung im Neuen Testament und seinen alttestamentlichen undjiidischen 
Voraussetzungen (FRLANT 96), G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1970, which explored the 
various settings of and influences on the notion of forgiveness, tracing in particular its eschatological 
dimension and early non-sacramental uses; and Christof Gestricht, The Return of Splendor in the 
World. 
- 
The Christian Doctrine ofSin and Forgiveness (trans. Daniel W. Bloesch), Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1997 (1989), which focused more on sin despite its dual title. 
79 Of particular note are Geiko Miiller-Fahrenholz, The Art offorgiveness. Theological 
Reflections on Healing and Reconciliation, Geneva: WCC Publications, 1996; issues of Concilium 
and dRE devoted to the topic: Casiano Florian & Christian Duquoc (eds. ), Forgiveness (Conciliurn 
184), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986; and articles by John P. Reeder, Jr, Paul Lauritzen and Louis E. 
Newman in dRE 15 (1987), 136-72; as well as John S. Kselman, James H. Charlesworth and Gary S. 
Shogren, 'Forgiveness', in ABD (1992), 11: 831-38; and Jonathan Baker, How Forgiveness 
Works (Grove Spirituality Series 53), Nottingham: Grove Books, 1995. 
so For details in this paragraph see H. Vorldnder, 'Forg, veness', NIDN. TT 1: 699-703 (1975). 
81 So Roy Yates, 'Colossians 2,14: Metaphor of Forgiveness', Biblica 71 (1990), 248-59. 
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Although statistics can be at best only a rough guide to significance, the gospels are 
indeed particularly relevant to our study. Texts of major importance include Matt 
6: 14-15 (and v. 12) on forgiving others and being forgiven by God; Matt 18 with its 
various discussions of community life, frequently on forgiving; and Matt 16: 18-19, 
and 28: 16-20 with their commissions to forgive. 
In my judgment, the major emphases which emerge from these various uses of 
a4wqIii and a'4)EGlqcan best be understood by organising our discussion around the 
speech act categories of stance and entailment. I shall argue that, in line with the 
expectations aroused by the foregoing analysis of constructed forgiveness and 
institutional and social facts, forgiveness in the New Testament is concerned above 
all with issues of reciprocity (stance) and membership (entailment). Since 
forgiveness as a speech act primarily concerns interpersonal human forgiveness, this 
will be my focus, although I shall suggest some ways in which divine forgiveness 
can also be considered under these categories. 
§4.1 Forgiveness and Stance: Reciprocity 
One of the major emphases of the New Testament discussion of forgiveness is what I 
shall term 'reciprocity'. Matt 6: 14-15 (cf also Mark 11: 25); Luke 6: 37; John 20: 23; 
Col. 3: 13; Eph. 4: 32, and also 2 Cor. 2: 10, all highlight this aspect of forgiveness: 
'forgive one another', urges the author of Ephesians; and 'Forgive, and you will be 
forgiven' records Luke. Key to understanding this idea, I suggest, is that we see it as 
using forgiveness in a dispositional sense. Matthew 6: 14-15, which follows the 
Lord's prayer in Matthew 6, may serve as a suitable representative formulation of 
this idea of reciprocity: 
For if you forgive others their trespasses, 
your heavenly Father will also forgive you; 
but if you do not forgive others, 
neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. 
(Matthew 6: 14-15, NRSV) 82 
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Significantly this passage comes soon after the line in the Lord's prayer'forgive us 
our debts as we also have forgiven our debtors. ' (v. 12). Davies and Allison note that 
in both cases 'The point has to do not with deserts but with desire: God's forgiveness, 
although it cannot be merited, must be received, and it cannot be received by those 
without the will to forgive others. "' This, to my mind, is a helpful comment in search 
of a framework for understanding its significance. 
If we recast the point as being concerned with stance rather than 'desire', then we 
may grasp the significance of this approach. In these verses it is 'debts' or 'trespasses' 
which are being forgiven, but perhaps it is significant that monetary debts, at least, 
often thought to be particularly in view in Luke's version of the Lord's prayer (Luke 
11: 4), are in many respects paradigm examples of institutional facts, forming a major 
test case of Searle's own analysis in Yhe Construction of Social Reality. Debts 
therefore are both count-generated, but also possess what we might term an 
'interpersonal solidity. ' This point may be extended, once we grant the fundamentally 
institutional nature of many of the most significant trespasses (as well as our 
preparatory discussion above of the institutional nature of sin). The legal profession 
today remains preoccupied with the kinds of reparation required when the trespass is 
precisely a reconstituting speech act which affects stance and standing. As two recent 
commentators have noted: 
while there are some injuries that cannot be repaired just by 
saying you are sorry, there are others that can only be repaired by 
an apology. Such injuries are the very ones that most trouble 
American law. They include defamation, insult, degradation, loss 
of status, and the emotional distress and dislocation that 
accompany conflict. " 
Seen in this light, one might say that'I forgive you your debt (to me)'is the speech 
act of 'overcoming resentment' in the particular sense that the expectation of 
repayment is abandoned: the speech act alters the institutional fact which is part of 
82 For a full treatment of historical and critical issues surrounding these verses see W. D. Davies 
& Dale C. Allison jr, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint 
Matthew (ICC), 3 vols, Edinburgh: T. &T. Clark, 1988,1991,1997; here 1: 615-17. 
83 Davis & Allison, Matthew, 1: 610-11. 
84 Hiroshi Wagatsuma and Arthur Rosett, 'The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in 
Japan and the United States', Law & Society Review, 20 (1986), 461-98, here 487-88; cited in 
Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 95. 
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the social reality of the forgiver and the forgiven. This ability to construe the world 
as a place where heretofore reasonable expectations of being repaid are waived is 
precisely what is at stake in the text. By learning this ability, the speaking agent is 
moved from a world ruled by repayment and invested instead, through this 
self-involving speech act of forgiveness, in a different world. This different world,, 
according to the text, is one in which one's heavenly Father will construe one's own 
deeds with the same reconfiguration of debt and pardon. 
The logical grammar of this passage is therefore not that God's forgiveness is offered 
after human forgiveness has taken place, from a divine person to a human person 
who has already forgiven another human person, in a succession of transactions 
between independent persons. Rather it is that the human person involved is 
re-constituted (or refigured, to use Ricoeur's word) through performing the act of 
human forgiveness in such a way that he or she becomes a recipient of God's 
forgiveness. " 
This emphasis fits with the idea that Matthew's gospel is written for Christians" and 
that as such it is indeed plausible that a verse such as 6: 14-15 is referring to practices 
known 'from the inside' as it were by the gospel's readers, rather than being a 
teaching concerning a new practice of forgiveness. 
One may read Matthew 18: 21-35 in a similar fashion, not least because of the 
obvious attention to the same subj ect-matter. As noted by I. H. Jones, 'It is clear that 
18: 30-35 was written under the influence of Mt 6: 14-15. "' Here the emphasis is on 
the non-practice of forgiveness: the failure of the forgiven slave to forgive his debtor 
85 There are similarities between this account and the view of prayer developed by D. Z. 
Phillips, The Concept ofPrayer, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965, in which he attempts to 
clarify the 'grammar of worship' (24). Phillips urges a similar link to mine, but perceives its 
significance the other way round: 'Being able to see that one is forgiven by God entails being able to 
live with oneself (63). His account has a different focus, namely that of exploring the ways in which 
prayer provides self-knowledge. 
86 Whether or not this might be a 'Matthean community', as recently contested in Richard 
Bauckham (ed. ), The Gospelsfor All Christians. 
- 
Rethinking the Gospel Audiences, Edinburgh: T. & 
T. Clark, 1998. 
87 Ivor Harold Jones, The Matthean Parables. A Literary & Historical Commentary (NovTSup 
LXY-X), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995,211-226; here 223. See also William G. Thompson, Matthew's 
Advice to a Divided Community. Mt. 17,22 
- 
18,35 (Analecta Biblica 44), Rome: Biblical Institute 
Press, 1970,203-37; especially the comparison of the two passages on 223-25. 
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evidences his inability (or at least his failure) to make the requisite construal of the 
world in terms of divine and human stances and relationships. Thompson's comment 
on this passage highlights the link suggested above between institutional issues such 
as debts and forgiveness: 'Matthew understood the forgiveness of a personal offense 
as analogous to releasing a man from a financial obligation. The evangelist himself 
has created this interpretation by framing the parable (vv. 23-34) with expressions 
about forgiving a fellow-disciple (w. 21.35). "' 1 thus demur from the judgment of 
Haber and of Murphy that Jesus is offering a ground for forgiveness in these verses. " 
Rather the point is that the practice of forgiveness is a work of self-involvement: to 
invest in forgiving is to be refigured as one who is forgiven. As the parable of Matt. 
18 serves, at least in its final context, as a response to the question of Matt. 18: 1 
(Who is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven? '), " it is noteworthy that the main 
thrust of its answer to this question is in terms of stance. The stance of a disciple is to 
be that of a willingness to forgive, which in turn is precisely what allows the disciple 
to receive God's forgiveness. This stance is what secures the successful performance 
of illocutionary acts of forgiveness. 
The issue of stance permeates Matthew 18. Richard Hays suggests that the chapter 
presents forgiveness as the mediation between rigour and mercy: the two poles of 
Matthew's ethical framework. " Even with the instruction to treat an offender who 
refuses to listen to correction 'as a Gentile and a tax collector' (18: 17), Hays notes 
that this still requires the stance of aiming to regain the lost brother or sister: to be 
treated as a Gentile or a tax-collector is to become a focus for the church's 
missionary efforts. Prominent in the background to the whole chapter is Leviticus 
19: 17, occurring in a passage which immediately went on to say 'you shall love your 
88 Thompson, Matthew's Advice, 225. 
89 See n. 26 above. 
90 Jones, Matthean Parables, 225-26. Thompson's view is that the unit of discourse begins with 
Jesus' prediction of the passion at 17: 22, which in his view lends an eschatological slant to the 
application of Matt 18, since it reflects on how the Christian community may await its final 
consummation and cope with internal dissension in the meantime. (Thompson, Matthew's Advice, 
267). Although this changes the context of the point made here about stance, it does not affect its 
content. 
91 Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament. A Contemporary Introduction to 
New Testament Ethics, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996,10 1. 
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neighbour as yourself (Lev. 19: 18). 92 Significantly, Lev. 19: 17 concerns itself with 
both heart attitudes and external actions. James Kugel suggests that Mat. 18: 15 is 
finally bringing together two divergent readings of the Leviticus passage: the 
lextemallsing' and the 'judicial' approaches; the former of which involves open 
reproach to prevent anger 'in the heart', and the latter of which focuses on the 
prevention of taking reproach into the legal system. 9' Here then is a good example of 
an inter-personal speech act in the public domain being dependent on stance while 
still at the same time admitting of inter-personal criteria to assess its suitability. 
Also helpful concerning stance is a 1978 article by C. F. D. Moule in which he 
contrasted the apparently conditional nature of forgiveness in the Lord's prayer (we 
are forgiven only as we forgive) with the more evidently unconditional forgiveness 
of both Paul and of Jewish liturgy. " Is there a conflict here? Moule responded: 
The key to an answer to this question lies M distinguishing 
between, on the one hand, earning or meriting forgiveness, and, 
on the other hand, adopting an attitude which makes forgiveness 
possible 
- 
the distinction, that is, between deserts and capacity. " 
Forgiveness cannot be earned, grants Moule. However, it does not follow that it is 
not conditional: 'forgiveness, though not conditional on merit, is nevertheless 
conditional 
- 
conditional on response to the gift, conditional on the capacity to 
receive it. "' Armed with this distinction, Moule presses on to make sense of Luke 
7: 3 6ff where the woman who falls at Jesus' feet with perfume is described as 
forgiven 'because' she has showed much love: or rather, as Moule has it, that her love 
is evidence of the capacity to receive forgiveness. He also uses it to clarify the 
parable in Matthew 18: the forgiven servant has demonstrated, by his failure to 
92 Hays, Moral Vision of the New Testament, 10 1-3. 
93 James L. Kugel, 'On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach: Early Exegesis of Leviticus 19: 17', 
HTR 80 (1987), 43-6 1. 
94 C. F. D. Moule, ",... As we forgive... ": a note on the distinction between deserts and capacity in 
the understanding of forgiveness', in C. F. D. Moule, Essays in New Testament Interpretation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982 (1978), 278-86; referring to the work of Israel Abrahams, Studies 
in Pharisaism and the Gospels, Cambridge, 1924,95-100, on Jewish liturgy. 
95 Moule, 'As we forgive', 281. 
96 Moule, 'As we forgive', 284. 
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forgive, not that he had not done enough to earn God's forgiveness, but that he did 
not have the capacity to receive it. 
Moule's exegetical approach here is in line with his own earlier work on'The 
Theology of Forgiveness, where he rejected the idea that forgiveness can be 
'measured' in credit/debit terms as if it were a transaction between persons, and 
suggested instead that in forgiveness both the offender and the offended are involved 
in satisfying the restoration of the personal relationship. " 
What Moule has termed 'capacity' is, I would suggest, approximately what a speech 
act analysis will prefer to call 'stance', and is certainly dispositional in nature. 
Moule's analysis makes sense of the various biblical texts in their context of first 
century Judaism. VvUle I will go on to argue below that a speech act approach 
requires us to consider further essential aspects beyond just stance/capacity, and that 
therefore there is more that must be said, I first address briefly the issue raised by 
Moule's first-century focus concerning how Jesus'talk of forgiveness might have 
been viewed in its historical context. 
The Forgiveness of Sin and the Forgiveness of Sinners: Forgiveness in the 
Context of Covenant 
WýE(Jlq in the New Testament is always used in the context of the forgiveness of 
sins, 98 and we must consider whether our discussion of the 'construction' of sin may 
be applicable here. In recent years there has been prominent debate, sparked by the 
work of E. P. Sanders, about the identity of 'sinners' in the gospels, and concerning in 
what ways exactly Jesus' offer of forgiveness may have been remarkable (or at least 
controversial) in first century Judaism. '9 
97 C. F. D. Moule, 'The theology of forgiveness', in idem, Essays in New Testament 
Interpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982 (1971), 250-60. See now also the essays collected in 
idem, Forgiveness and Reconciliation, London: SPCK, 1998, especially part one, 'The Theology of 
Forgiveness', 3-47. 
98 Allowing for the above noted exception of Luke 4: 18. Eph. 1: 7 has -cýv &. (ýEGIV T6V 
Trapa, nTw[L&T(ov and Mk. 3: 29 clearly implies that sins are at issue. Elsewhere the phrase is always 
&ýECFIV &ýMPT16V. 
99 Arising particularly from the work of E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, London: SCM Press, 
1985,174-211; idem, 'Jesus and the Sinners', JSNT 19 (1983), 5-36 (an earlier version of his 1985 
material); and idem, 'Sin, Sinners (NT)', ABD (1992), VIAO-47 for a summary of his views. Cf 
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The precise details of this debate need not concern us here. What is relevant is the 
question of how far the various constructions of 'sinners' may be understood in the 
constructed but non-reductive terms I have proposed above. Sanders' basic point, in 
line with his earlier revisionist work on the nature of the Palestinian Judaism 
opposed by Paul, 100 is that the issue in the gospels is not one of legalistic 
works-righteousness being confronted by an anachronistic Lutheran (whether Paul or 
Jesus). Jesus, rather, is a prophet of Jewish restoration, working within an accepted 
framework of covenantal nomism, whereby obedience to the Jewish law was a 
mechanism for remaining in the covenant community, wherein salvation was 
understood to be entirely a matter of grace. In particular, for our purposes, it follows 
that it is mistaken to argue that Jesus' offer of forgiveness to sinners would, by itself, 
have been remarkable, since forgiveness was available within the parameters of the 
law already. "' 
What was offensive to normal piety about Jesus, in Sanders' view, was not the offer 
of forgiveness, but his willingness to embrace complete outsiders (e. g. tax collectors) 
without the stringent requirements of admission to Judaism. The 'sinners', in the 
synoptic gospels, are the reshaim, 'virtually a technical term. It is best translated 'the 
wicked', and it refers to those who sinned wilfully and heinously and who did not 
repent. "" The reshaim were not the'common people'(the 'amme ha-arets, orpeople 
of the land'), and Jesus' association with 'sinners' thus does not offend against narrow 
religious sensibilities, but rather threatens to undermine the very infrastructure of 
Judaism. 
While the details of Sanders' claims remain debated, there is a general agreement that 
he has successfully altered the shape of the discipline of New Testament study with 
Charlesworth, 'ForgiVeness (Early Judaism), ABD (1992), 11: 833-35; and N. T. Wright, Jesus and the 
Victory of God, London: SPCK, 1996,264-78. 
100 E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism. A Comparison ofPatterns ofReligion, London: 
SCM Press, 1977. 
101 From among the immense secondary literature see the overview of Calvin J. Roetzel, 'Paul 
and the Law: Whence and WhitherT, CR: BS 3 (1995), 249-75, who discusses the responses of, 
amongst others, Neusner, Rdisdnen, Westerholm and Dunn. 
102 Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, 177. 
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his focus on the historical Jesus within Judaism. "' In my view, Sanders'focus on 
what 'sinners' would mean in the context of first century Judaism provides a 
particularly clear example of how 'sin' must be understood in self-involving terms. 
To label something as 'sin', or a person as a'sinner', is a self-involving act indicative 
of one's stance towards that sin or person. In Sanders' account, 'sinners' functions 
almost as a technical term, and forgiveness operates as part of the eschatological 
progTam of Jewish restoration in Jesus' ministry: Jesus grounds his words of 
forgiveness in the lifestyle of eating with 'sinners'. I suggest that this account 
provides a particularly clear, and evidently non-reductive, example of the 
'construction' of forgiveness. 
Agreeing with Sanders on covenantal nomism, Roger Mohrlang notes that one finds 
in Matthew particularly: 
a strong demand for obedience to the law, set within the context 
of an underlying structure of grace and the framework of the new 
covenant of God's salvation and forgiveness in Jesus. " 
The demand for human acts of forgiveness, relatively prominent in Matthew 
compared to the rest of the New Testament, is always grounded first in God's 
forgiveness, but, suggests Mohrlang, the theme of grace is generally presupposed 
rather than a subject in its own right. "' 
That forgiveness operates in the gospels within a presupposed framework of 
covenant and grace leads us on to consider the second major aspect of a speech act 
analysis of forgiveness: that of entailment. In this respect we might cast Sanders' 
discussion in terms of membership: does one stand with the Pharisees, or with Jesus 
and his restorationist eschatology? This, I suggest, is again a particular example of 
the speech-act dynamic of forgiveness. Where the stance of forgiveness is marked in 
103 Bruce D. Chilton, 'Jesus and the Repentance of E. P. Sanders', TynB 39 (1988), 1-18; here 
1-2. On the so-called 'third quest' of the historical Jesus see Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, 
83-124. 
104 Roger Mohrlang, Matthew and Paul. A comparison of ethical perspectives (SNTSMS 48), 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984,17, referring m particular to Matthew 1: 21 and 26: 28 
105 Mohrlang, Matthew and Paul, 80. He goes on to suggest that Paul evinces a greater 
eschatological confidence and hence focuses more quickly on the salvific aspects of the cross, 
whereas Matthew does not draw out this angle (9 1). 
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the New Testament by reciprocity, its entailment is primarily an issue of 
membership, whether this be understood in terms of some specifically religious 
grouping ('church' membership, as it might be today) or, more broadly, any socially 
delimited grouping. 
§4.2 Forgiveness and Entailment: Membership 
The primary implication of forgiveness is, in individual terms, a restored 
relationship. The second major aspect of forgiveness in the New Testament is indeed 
that of membership, which in theological terms I suggest means fellowship, and is 
rooted in seeing forgiveness as operative with respect to one's social location in or 
out of the church (or perhaps, putatively, the Matthean community, as the case may 
be). In other words, the speech act of forgiveness is felicitous where it leads to the 
restoration of fellowship. 
This is clearly the emphasis of the parable in Matthew 18 considered above, and is 
equally the point at issue in Luke 15 with its famous parable of the two sons, where, 
we might note, the speech act of forgiveness is achieved by the father without using 
the particular words for forgiveness at all: Luke 15: 22-24 has the father forgiving his 
returned son with words such as 'put a ring on his finger 
... 
let us eat and celebrate. ' 
This is a particularly clear example of an illocution without a clear vocabulary 
marker. 
I propose, therefore, that an adequate analysis of forgiveness as an illocutionary act 
in the New Testament must involve an analysis of its entailment in terms of 
admitting or re-admitting the forgiven 'sinner' into fellowship. As Tavuchis has noted 
in the related case of apology as a speech act, 'the offender's group membership is at 
stake or called into question' and the offender, socially or morally demoted, now 
requires a'means for his return to institutional grace'which the apology provides. 
"' 
Put simply: it is not possible to forgive felicitously and still exclude from fellowship, 
and conversely, it is not possible to maintain fellowship unless sin is forgiven. The 
106 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 73,76. Note again Tavuchis' example of church exclusion, cf n. 72 
above. 
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particular passages which discuss this very aspect of forgiveness are the 'binding' and 
'loosing' verses in Matthew 16 and 18. 
Binding and Loosing 
In Gregory Jones' words, the practice of binding and loosing is the 'sustaining of 
permeable boundaries. "" My limited concern here is to substantiate the claim that in 
this practice, the speech act of binding (or loosing) serves to include or exclude one 
judged to be a sinner, precisely because the illocution involved is a self-involving 
one of community delineation: boundaries are sustained but the boundaries are 
permeable. In other words, the speech act of binding and loosing serves to mark the 
scope of the entailments of forgiveness by regulating community membership. 
The secondary literature on binding and loosing is disproportionately vast, simply 
because of the Protestant-Catholic divide over the interpretation of Jesus' 
commission to Peter in Matthew 16: 18. "' Even amongst those works more inclined 
to commentary than to treatment of the partisan issue per se, there is a wide variety 
of proposals about the meaning and significance of binding and loosing. Davies and 
Allison list thirteen different approaches to the terms, while Jones (referring to Matt 
18: 18) suggests that there 'are eight possible interpretations' of binding and 
loosing. "' Despite this variety, however, the essential ftinctions with respect to 
which 'binding' and 'loosing' are appropriate terms may reasonably be reduced to 
two: 
(1) forgiveness: to bind is to withhold fellowship and to loose is to forgive 
107 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 182-97. 
108 For helpful summaries see the ecumenical treatment of Raymond E. Brown, Karl P. 
Donfried & John Reurnann (eds. ), Peter in the New Testament, Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1973, 
83 
-10 1; the study of the debate as it occurred in Reformation times in Gillian R. Evans, Problems of 
Authority in the Reformation Debates, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992,147-66; and the study of the 
history of effects (Wirkungsgeschichte) of Matthew 16 by Ulrich Luz in his Matthew in History. 
Interpretation. Influence, and Effects, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994,57-74. More thoroughly see 
Joseph A. Burgess, A History of the Exegesis ofMatthew 16: 17-19from 1781 to 1965, Ann Arbor: 
Edwards Brothers, 1976. 
109 Davies & Allison, Matthew, 1: 635-39; Jones, Matthean Parables, 216, n. 140. 
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(2) moral discernment/teaching authority: to bind is to determine one way or the other (i. e. to either forbid or to en oin) while to loose is to leave free. 0 
I take this particular formulation of the terms from a widely cited article by 
Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder, and indeed it is significant that this 
penetrating study of the issue comes from such a thinker, in the anabaptist radition 
which has self-consciously had to wrestle with these issues of community 
self-definition and membership. As Yoder reflects on 'the centrality of binding and 
loosing in the life of free-church Protestantism', he comments that the juxtaposition 
of the binding and loosing passages in Matthew with Jesus' only attributed use of 
I ercrO., qui a suggests that 'the church is, therefore, most centrally defined as the place 
where "binding and loosing" takes place. "" 
In fact Yoder does not use the particular formulation 'teaching authority' and prefers 
'moral discernment',, a point which again may reflect ecclesiological commitments, 
although in his discussion he clearly talks about 'moral teachings and decision 
making' as practised by the rabbis. "' However, both these two major emphases are 
fundamentally linked, precisely because the standard of 'truth' against which the 
sinner must be measured as requiring forgiveness (in sense (1)) is a standard 
determined by the one 'binding' or 'loosing' in sense (2). In Yoder's words, 'Forgiving 
presupposes prior discernment. " " 'Binding' in this constructive sense of declaring 
truth is well-expressed by Gestrich as follows: 
Whenever representatives of the church say in binding terms what 
is true and what is not true, they are not making statements about 
110 John Howard Yoder, 'Binding and Loosing', m his The Royal Priesthood Essays 
Ecclesiological and Ecumenical (ed. Michael G. Cartwright), Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994, 
323-58. 
III Yoder, 'Binding and Loosing', 336-37. Revealing also in this regard is the historical 
overview of W. Telfer, who discusses the practice of 'loosing' as it develops in the third century as 
part of the response to the problem of post-baptismal sin and the failure of believers to maintain their 
confession under persecution. What is significant is that binding and loosing is a prominent issue at 
this point in time, and largely fades from prominence with the conversion of Constantine as the 
problems involved in 'maintaining traditional standards of Christian initiation' (75) change in nature 
completely; cf Telfer, Forgiveness ofSins, 61-74. 
112 Yoder, 'Binding and Loosing', 327-28. 
113 Yoder, 'Binding and LoosMig', 328. 
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factual issues as defined by natural science; rather, they are interpreting the gospel and applying its contents ad hominem. ' 14 
In Matthew 16: 19 the authority to bind and loose is given by Jesus to Peter. In 
Matthew 18: 18 it is broadened to the whole group of disciples. "' On an exegetical 
level considerable (perhaps disproportionate) attention has been given to the 
clarification of the tenses used in these verses in order to assess whether the human 
act of binding forces God's hand in heaven, or whether it is consequent on a binding 
already achieved in heaven. "' Protestants, in particular, have been nervous in this 
area. Nevertheless, the dominant rabbinic usage behind the image supports the notion 
of real teaching authority being operative here, even if interpreters have had differing 
opinions about the relevance of rabbinic parallels owing to disputes about relative 
dating. "' 
I suggest that a speech-act approach helps here by clarifying the question of what it 
can mean to have teaching authority. We have seen that forgiveness involves the 
stance of reciprocity and the resultant ability to construe the world as a place where 
God forgives sin, and thus allows for the restoration of a relationship between 
reconciled parties. Evidently the speech act of forgiveness is felicitous (i. e. it secures 
illocutionary uptake) where the stance of resentment is overcome, and the 
institutional fact of sin is successfully removed. As an illocutionary act, this need not 
114 Gestrich, Return ofSplendor in the World, 312. 
115 A third relevant reference is John 20: 23, where the emphasis appears to be more on 
forgiveness than on teaching authority; cf Steven E. Hansen, 'Forgiving and Retaining Sin: A Study 
of the Text and Context of John 20: 23', HBYh 19 (1997), 24-32. 
116 See J. R. Mantey, 'The Mistranslation of the Perfect Tense in John 20: 23, Mt. 16: 19, and Mt. 
18: 18', JBL 58 (193 9), 243-49; idem, 'Evidence That the Perfect Tense in John 20: 23 and Matthew 
16: 19 Is Mistranslated', JETS 16 (1973), 129-38; and the helpful response to Mantey's first article: 
Henry J. Cadbury, 'The Meaning of John 20: 23, Matthew 16: 19 and Matthew 18: 18', JBL 58 (193 9), 
251-54. See now also S. E. Porter, 'Vague Verbs, Periphrastics, and Matt 16: 19', FNT 1 (1988), 
155-73. 
117 Davies & Allison, Matthew, 639, citing Str-B 1: 738-41 for the rabbinic texts, see the rabbinic 
images of 'prohibiting' or 'permitting' entry into the kingdom through Torah- interpretation as relevant 
here, with J. D. M. Derrett, 'Binding and Loosing', JBL 102 (1983), 112-17. In contrast, those who see 
the rabbinic parallels as too late focus instead on the general 'key' imagery of verses like Isaiah 22: 22 
and take the binding and loosing to refer to the way in which Christians' witness, preaching and 
ministry make it either possible or impossible for people to enter into the kingdom; thus G. Korting, 
'Binden oder Ibsen: Zu Verstockungs- und Befreiungstheologie in Mt 16,19; 18,18.21-35 und Joh 
15,1-17; 20,23)', SNTU 14 (1989), 39-91. 
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imply perlocutionary successý i.e. that the relationship be successfully restored, or 
that the community membership be successfully re-established. 
It is important therefore to clarify that the authority at issue here to bind and loose is 
illocutionary and not perlocutionary. Indeed, if exegetical ingenuity has been 
expended on trying to demonstrate how verb tenses and so forth do not force God's 
hand in conforming to human decisions, it might have been better deployed in 
reflecting on the nature of the speech act concerned. Peter receives authority from 
Jesus not because he is persuaded by Jesus, or because Jesus is particularly assertive 
on this occasion, but because Jesus' commission in Matt. 16: 17-19 is an illocution, 
and thus it brings into being the state of affairs it describes. The church, in this 
technical speech-act sense, is therefore an institution, and hence the authority which 
Peter (and then in Matt 18 the disciples) may utilise is an institutional authority, i. e. 
it is the accreditation to perform the speech acts of forgiveness and teaching which 
are circumscribed by the institutional facts of their setting, viz. the church as a 
constructed reality with'permeable boundaries'. Elocutionary authority, one would 
have to insist, is not authoritarian, in contrast to perlocutionary authority, and 
perhaps the nervousness in the ecumenical debate concerning these verses may be 
thus addressed. On this account, forgiveness is a self-involving speech act not least 
because it requires the forgiver to embrace (in Volf s image, used here 
metaphorically) the forgiven in the same institutional reality. In my view, 
'membership' is the appropriate description of this entailment of the successful 
illocution. 
The important consequence of this analysis is that it clarifies the worried questions of 
'But am I really forgivenT or'Does Peter (or today's church) really have authority to 
make this pronouncement? '. The answer is yes on both counts, because the question 
is in fact concerned with institutional facts and not brute facts. These are created by 
the relevant illocutions when successfully performed, and the requirement for 
successful performance simply is the appropriate setting of speaker's role combined 
with the appropriate stances as delineated above. 
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I suggest, briefly, that a similar analysis will reveal a comparable understanding of 
two related issues concerning forgiveness and sin in the New Testament, as found in 
Mark 3: 29 and 1 John 5: 16. 
The Unforgivable Sin and the Sin that Leads to Death 
The unforgivable sin, 'blasphemy against the Holy Spirit', which is referred to by 
Jesus in Mark 3: 29 (and parallels: Matt. 12: 3 1 and Luke 12: 10) has raised various 
problematic issues in the history of interpretation, although these have not been 
predominantly exegetical since in fact the passages concerned are relatively 
straightforward. Taken on its own, for instance, Mark 3: 28-29 clearly suggests that 
blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, which can never be forgiven, is simply the 
persistent refusal to accept God's redemptive work, and thus is 'an eternal sin' 
(at'G)viou aýLaprtjýj(xToq). However, placed as it is within the larger story of the 
confrontation between Jesus and the scribes over attributing Jesus' work to 
Beelzebul, which concludes in v. 30 with'for they said, "He has an unclean spirit", ' 
Mark appears to present the 'unforgivable sin' as the attribution of God's work to 
satan. 118 
More ambitious redaction-critical studies separate out two different sayings: the 
original preserved in Mark (on being forgiven every sin except blasphemy against 
the Holy Spirit); which is then conflated in Matthew with a secondary one, also 
recorded by Luke, which contrasts sinning against the Son of Man with this 
unforgivable sin. "' O'Neill, taking such a line, suggests that the secondary saying is 
a corruption of the first, and that the 'spirit' referred to in the original saying is 
basically an 'attitude of mind'; in fact precisely the attitude of being willing to forgive 
which does indeed stand as a prerequisite to receiving forgiveness, as we have seen 
above. "' If this is right then the saying about the unforgivable sin is indeed a matter 
of stance and disposition. 
118 So R. A. Guelich, Mark 1: 8. 
-26 (WBC 34a), Waco: Word, 1989,180. 
119 E. g. J. C. ONeill, 'The UnforgIvable Sm', JSNT 19 (1983), 37-42; cf Robert H. Gundry, 
Matthew. A Commentary on His Handbookfor a Mixed Church under Persecution, Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 21994 (1982), 237-39. 
120 O'Neill, 'Unforgivable SM', 41. 
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However, even if such a redaction-critical approach should be mistaken, I suggest 
that the speech act categories of stance and entailment clarify what is at stake here. 
One must ask, first, what it could mean to call a sin unforgivable? While it is 
apparent that in any particular case forgiveness may misfire as an illocution, this is 
generally because the conditions for it are not met in the particularities concerned: 
e. g. I am unable to bring myself to overcome resentment, or I fail to adopt the 
'reciprocal' stance characterised above. But to say that a sin is unforgivable is prima 
facie to preclude such an illocution from taking place, and must therefore suggest 
that the required stance is not just unattained, but unattainable. It would appear, 
therefore, that some such solution as O'Neill's must be correct in its analysis of what 
unforgivability entails, regardless of the particular redaction one proposes about the 
saying: to commit the unforgivable sin is to maintain a stance irreconcilable with 
reciprocity, and hence to force the misfiring of any attempted illocution of 
forgiveness. 
If stance is at issue with respect to the unforgivable sin, then it is membership that is 
to the fore in the case of 1 John 5: 16-17 concerning the sin that leads to death (Tupo'q 
OdvaTov). In this somewhat under-defined phrase, doubtless left unclear because it 
needed no clarification in the original context, either John is suggesting that there is 
sin that can lead to expulsion from the community (the church) or that sin committed 
by those outside the church is sin that leads to death. A variety of approaches have 
been proposed here. Historically the most influential view, deriving from Tertullian, 
is that certain sins are worse than others, leading directly to a classification of 
'mortal' and 'venial' sins. "' Raymond Brown argues that the difference in view is not 
between different types of penalties or sins, but between different types of sinners, 
those within the community and the 'secessionists'. "' In all probability, one need not 
circumscribe 'those outside the community' as narrowly as the 'secessionists, 123 since 
121 On the history of the interpretation of this passage see D. M. Scholer, 'Sins Within and Sins 
Without: An Interpretation of 1 John 5: 16-17', in G. F. Hawthorne (ed. ), Current Issues in Biblical 
and Patristic Interpretation, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975,230-46, especially 236-38. 
122 Raymond E. Brown, S. S., The Epistles ofJohn (AB 30), London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1982, 
612-19. 
123 See Dieftnar Neufeld, Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts. An Analysis of I John (Bib Int Ser 
7), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994,105, for the (disputable) view that a historical secession need not be M 
view here. 
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if we grant the foregoing speech act account of forgiveness then expulsion from the 
community is nothing less than the decision to disable the possibility of extending 
forgiveness to the offender. Thus the sin leads to death, and 'death' in this context 
is exclusion from the community of forgiveness. 
§5 Conclusions: The Community of Forgiveness 
I have suggested that, as with confession, forgiveness is a speech act which can be 
understood more precisely by recognising it as a strongly self-involving illocutionary 
act. I have developed a performative model of forgiveness as a speech act, and as a 
part of analysing this model for strengths and weaknesses have been drawn to 
explore further the relationship between brute and institutional levels of fact and the 
successful performance of speech acts of forgiveness. I have defended the view that 
forgiveness works within the context of a non-reductive view of sin as (socially) 
constructed, serving as an illocutionary act which (re-)constitutes the institutional 
facts concerned. In my judgment, organising one's approach around the speech act 
categories of stance and entailment successfully highlights two of the prominent 
concerns of the various New Testament texts which concern forgiveness: those of 
reciprocity and membership. 
My discussion is intended to highlight the speech act dynamics of self-involving 
speech acts. It is not intended, in its analysis of requirements and entailments, to 
suggest that by virtue of analysing the particular mechanisms of the speech act one 
has made the practice of forgiveness any more straightforward or easy to accomplish. 
Indeed, I hope that one of the benefits of this analysis is to lay to rest the 
misapprehension that an analytic approach such as this should in any way be offered 
as a counter to analyses which focus on emotional or embodied aspects of 
forgiveness. Rather, as I have argued, speech acts occur within habituated stances 
with entailments concerning future embodied commitments. Highlighting these 
does 
not simplify them. Nor, in my discussion of 'construction', is the analysis 
intended to 
suggest that recognising a fact as an institutional fact is a reductive move. 
In the case 
of forgiveness, recognising that God is one of the members of the 
Christian 
community of forgiveness is just one way of marking out this understanding of 
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(socially) constructed community as non-reductive in the particular case of the 
church. 
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Chapter 8 
Teaching 
§1 Introduction 
Our third and final study of a speech act found in the New Testament is a study of 
teaching. I choose this because, since it is a different kind of speech act from 
confessing or forgiving, it draws out different aspects of speech act theory. In 
particular 
, 
it lends itself to an exploration of the relationship between brute and 
institutional facts: facts 'external' or prior to the speech act and facts created by the 
speech act. Although I do not claim that the nature of teaching cannot be understood 
without such a conceptual framework, I do argue that some aspects of the function of 
teaching in the New Testament are liable to be overlooked. 
On the one hand, teaching is more obviously a speech act than forgiving: it is clearly 
an act achieved by speaking. On the other hand, it is less obviously interesting since 
at first glance it appears that 'to teach' is simply a variation of 'to assert'. My 
argument will be, however, that one cannot fully understand teaching without 
looking at its directive and declarative aspects as well as its content. In his survey of 
performative verbs, Vanderveken does not include 'teach. ' However, it is instructive 
that several performatives which touch on aspects of teaching are included, and that 
they are distributed across a variety of classifications: assert and tell as assertives; 
assure and certify as commissives; tell, instruct and prescribe as directives; declare, 
approve, stipulate, define and so forth as declaratives; and perhaps even acclaim and 
disapprove as expressives. To teach, therefore, is to operate across a whole range of 
illocutionary acts. 
I Daniel Vanderveken, Meaning and Speech Acts, Vol. I, Principles ofLanguage Use, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990,166-219. 
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We recall that in the first half of his developing argument about the possibility or 
otherwise of distinguishing performatives from statements (constatives), Austin 
paused to consider whether there might be a linguistic criterion of performativity 
such as the use of the word 'hereby': '"Hereby" is a useful criterion that the utterance 
is performative' although only in 'highly formalized' utterances; and in any case one 
2 
may go on to sayI hereby state... ' without intending a'performative'. The ensuing 
failure to demarcate performatives linguistically or grammatically leaves us with 
performative statements ofjust such a kind: 'I hereby state that x. " Thus, 'to say' or 
'to state' have their performative aspects: Austin succeeds in getting them on the 
illocutionary map, as it were, without clarifying what might be interesting about 
them as illocutions. 
Likewise, when Jesus says, 'dýLflv Xeyw D'4iVin prefacing some remark, 'it is 
something of an equivalent case. One could almost describe this phrase as a 
vocabulary marker for the illocutionary act of teaching, albeit not a necessary one. 
What this alerts us to is that in investigating a subject such as the teaching of Jesus, 
one is investigating an illocutionary act. This will also allow us to ask to what extent 
such teaching is self-involving. 
After a characterisation of teaching as a speech act, I investigate in this chapter a 
spectrum of cases of teaching in the New Testament which demonstrate its 
self-involving character as it ranges from weak to strong cases. In particular, I 
conclude with a discussion of Jesus'teaching about the kingdom of God, where I 
suggest that the strength of illocution is one variable which it is helpful to bear in 
mind in considering the various contested interpretive issues. 
§2 Teaching as a Speech Act: Then and Now 
J. L. Austin, HDTW, 57-58; 61. 
3 For a clear and wide-ranging discussion of just such performatives in legal theory, see 
Dennis Kurzon, It Is Hereby Perfor7ned.. Explorations in Legal Speech Acts (Pragmatics & Beyond 
VII: 6), Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1986, especially 5-8. 
4 E. g. Matthew 5: 18; 6: 2,5,16, and many times through the synoptics. In John it is prefaced 
with a double 6: [Lýv (John 1: 51; 3: 3,5,11 etc. ). 
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Teaching may be more than a speech act, but it is at least a speech act. ' Once one has 
observed this basic fact, it is striking how many books occupy themselves with such 
topics as The Kingdom of God in the Teaching ofdesus, for example, without any 
discussion of what kind of an activity teaching is, and thus what implications this 
would have for the kinds of illocution being performed by Jesus in such cases. ' 
By way of contrast, modem discussions of the philosophy of education evince 
considerable attention being given to the nature of teaching. Clearly it will not be 
appropriate to assimilate the oral teaching of the gospel traditions to contemporary 
practice in the classroom, but certain aspects of the discussion may prove helpful in 
clarifying the issues. I thus pursue this topic from both ends: investigating what sort 
of activity teaching was in the time of Jesus, but first pausing to see whether useful 
categories may arise from a look at the contemporary philosophy of education. 
The Act of Teaching Today 
Thomas Green, in his book The Activities q Teaching, highlights the different types 
of act performed by a teacher: logical acts; strategic acts and institutional acts. ' In 
this way he intends to separate out the basic teaching activities into three kinds: those 
relating primarily to thinking and reasoning; those concerning the organisation of 
material and the direction of students; and those which arise as a function of the 
teacher's membership in an educational institution rather than their particular role of 
teaching. 
This distinction between what teaching is and what teachers do leads Green to 
propose that teaching itself can be understood as two different kinds of activity: 
teaching someone how to do something, and teaching someone that something is the 
case; or respectively: 'shaping behavior' and 'shaping belief " The first of these he 
But see n. 13 below. 
6 This particular title has heralded books by Norman Perrin (London: SCM, 1963); G6sta 
Lundstr6m (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1963) and Bruce Chilton (ed. ) (Issues in Religion and 
Theology 5; London: SPCK, 1984); cf Bruce Chilton, 'The Kingdom of God in Recent Discussion', in 
Bruce Chilton & Craig A. Evans (eds. ), Studying the Historical Jesus. Evaluations of the Current 
State ofResearch (New Testament Tools and Studies XIX), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994,255-80; 255 n. I. 
Thomas F. Green, The Activities of Teaching, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971,4-9. 
Green, Activities of Teaching, 21-23. 
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develops along WittgensteiMan lines as an account of 'training': learning, for 
instance, a series of numbers until one says Now I know how to go on. ' 
Wittgenstein's work has been a key resource in the philosophy of education. ' 
Green's second distinction leads us in the direction of 'teaching as teaching that': the 
imparting of information. Teaching in perhaps its most mundane sense might well 
include teaching someone that something is the case. The speech act here is 
assertion: the teacher tells the class that '2+2=4'. This is a truth and the teacher is 
asserting it. In line with our proposal concerning strong and weak illocutions, this is 
a weak illocutionary act. Indeed, one has to postulate basic situations in which the 
rehearsal of facts is the issue in order to discover such weak illocutions as the vehicle 
of teaching. 
What is far more common is that even 'teaching that' is fundamentally a 
self-involving exercise in training someone to think in a certain way; to apprehend a 
situation with a certain construal; or to develop an ability to understand in a certain 
way. " In fact, as Gabriel Moran argues, Green has rightly posed the question of what 
teaching consists in over and above its institutional trappings, but then restricted his 
answer to the kinds of situation still constrained by a teacher-student classroom 
situation. " 
Moran's contention is that the essence of teaching is in'showing how'; indeed, that 
the idea of teaching is parasitic on a background of wider ethical and moral 
judgments which necessarily underwrite the practice. Thus: 'Teaching is showing 
someone how to live and how to die. "' His argument cuts across some of the 
9 Green, Activities of Teaching, 23-27; cf Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 3 1967 (1953), § 151 (and §§5-6). On the so-called 'analytic revolution' in the 
philosophy of education, see S. J. B. Magee, Philosophical Analysis in Education, New York: Harper 
& Row, 1971,3-18. For the influence of Wittgenstein see, most notably, P. Smeyers and J. D. 
Marshall, Philosophy and Education. - Accepting Wittgenstein's Challenge, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995. 
I am indebted here to Hong-Hsin Lm, The Relevance ofHermeneutical Theory in Heidegger, 
Gadamer, Wittgenstein and Ricoeurfor the Concept ofSeýf in Adult Education, unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Nottingham, 1998,2-19, and 154-88 (especially 157). 
10 See Lin, Relevance ofHermeneutical Theory, 222-29, on'ways of ffiffiking. ' 
11 Gabriel Moran, Showing How. The Act of Teaching, Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press 
International, 1997,31-33. 
12 Moran, Showing How, 4 1. 
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traditional debates about whether teaching is necessarily a human activity (can the 
sea teach? "); as well as the distinction developed by Ryle, and much appealed to, 
between the'task verb'of teaching and the'achievement verb'of leaming. " For 
Moran, teaching and learning interact in a variety of more or less formal situations. 
It is important not to downplay the significance of teaching content: 'The world 
remains in need of occasions when someone who knows something stands up and 
says, "So and so is the case. ""' On the other hand, this must always be held in 
balance with the all-pervasive activity of showing people how to live. 16 What follows 
from this analysis of the teaching act is that, in all but the most elementary cases, the 
teaching-learning complex can only be understood by participation in the activity of 
'showing how-learning how. 'When we thus confine our interest to speech acts of 
teaching, we will find them generally to be self-involving, and hence if we wish to 
interpret texts of teaching acts, we will be looking at self-involving illocutions. 
Elocutionary teaching acts might range from the evaluative judgment which dictates 
an enquiry (the most important event in the lead up to the first world war was the 
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand) to the authoritative illocution which 
establishes and thus determines the issue at hand ('It is wrong to tell lies'). In 
practice, as we would expect, most speech acts used in the process of teaching are 
declarative to some greater or lesser degTee. As we saw in part I, this is a different 
claim from the postmodern one that all speech acts are essentially rhetorical acts and 
that constructed reality is simply whatever we say it is. Rather, speech act theory 
suggests that a typical teaching speech act will be a multi-dimensional speech act 
which draws upon and interacts with non-linguistic states of affairs: asserting; 
13 Moran, Showing How, 43-46. See n. 5 above, where, technically, we should say that the 
teaching performed by a person who teaches, using words, is at least a speech act. Philosophy of 
education spent much of the 1960's and 1970's discussing the meaning of 'to teach' and debating 
whether the sea, or a mountain, for example, could teach. This is not my concern here. Moran follows 
broadly this approach. It is probably fair to say that, in the wake of Alasdair McIntyre's work on 
moral traditions, the focus in philosophy of education has shifted to the contested nature of education 
rather than attempts to capture its commonly agreed essence by linguistic precision. I am indebted to 
David Smith for helpful clarification in this area. 
14 Moran, Showing How, 40; cf Gilbert Ryle, The Concept ofMind, London: Hutchinson, 1949, 
149-52. 
15 Moran, Showing How, 33. 
16 Moran, Showing How, 219. A Wlttgenstemlan vIew of training js clearly at work here. 
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declaring; and perhaps at other times also being directive or commissive. In short, 
the speech act of teaching can rarely be reduced to simply informing someone that 
something is the case. 
Teaching in the Time of Jesus 
Having now established the various illocutionary dimensions of teaching, we must 
also prepare the ground historically. As Pheme Perkins notes at the beginning of her 
helpful survey of Jesus as a teacher, 'In order to understand what the people who 
heard Jesus expected from his teaching, we need to know about the different types of 
teachers in the first century. 17 Discussing those teachers who might have had adult 
followers, Perkins conveniently summarises the relevant evidence by noting that 
there were four basic different types of teacher: 
(1) Philosopher-teachers 
Sages and teachers of wisdom 
(3) Teachers of the law: Scribes, Pharisees and Rabbis 
(4) Prophets and visionaries 18 
She uses all of these to varying degrees to highlight different types of teaching given 
by Jesus in the gospels, although her presentation falls short of suggesting that Jesus, 
either consciously or unconsciously, sought to combine them all. " Certainly, in the 
wider literature, these models of Jesus have had their champions, all seeking to show 
how 
, 
in on' entating one's view of Jesus around a particular dimension of his teaching, 
17 Pheme Perkins, Jesus as Teacher (Understanding Jesus Today), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1990,2. Perkins' survey, as I shall note, places the emphasis on categories of teaching. The more 
familiar emphasis in the literature is on Jesus' pedagogy (and/or psychology) itself; notably in the 
extensive study of Riesner, who focuses on the various aspects of oral tradition in Jesus' time in and 
behind the gospel accounts: Rainer Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer: Eine Untersuchung zum Ursprung der 
Evangelien-aberlieferung (WUNT 11/7), TUbingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 198 1; cf idem, 'Jesus 
as Preacher and Teacher', in Henry Wansbrough (ed. ), Jesus and the Oral Gospel Tradition (JSNTS 
64), Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991,185-210, especially 201-8. 
18 Perkins, Jesus as Teacher, 1-22. She is drawing here on H. I. Marrou, A History of Education 
in Antiquity, New York: New American Library, 1964. 
19 For the four emphases see, respectively, Perkins, Jesus as Teacher, 6 (sayings characteristic 
of Cynic philosophy); 42-51 ('Jesus and the Wisdom tradition'); 51-54 ('Legal sayings') and 54-61 
('prophetic sayings and apocalyptic images', discussing the kingdom of God). 
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one may correctly locate him in his first century milieu. 20 
My point here is not to engage in the endless debates concerning the relative merits 
of these different emphases, which are too easily played off against each other in 
mutually exclusive ways, as is noted by Rainer Riesner when he comments that 'the 
example of Qumran shows how little an end-times orientation excludes methodical 
handling of Scripture'. " Rather I simply wish to put forward a somewhat 
straightforward corollary, suggested by the foregoing speech act analysis, that it is 
the illocutionary act and not just the content of Jesus' teaching which should occupy 
the interpreter, and which perhaps provides a useful step forward in understanding 
what Jesus is trying to do in any particular case. Again, I propose that this speech act 
approach is a more fruitfal way into situating the content (i. e. locution) of a biblical 
text than the various 'social construction' models which have often characterised 
attempts to view teaching as more than informing. " 
As a further hypothesis it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that each of the 
various aspects of Jesus' role as teacher lends itself to a different characteristic type 
of illocution: the apocalyptic declarative-commissive; the philosophical expressive; 
the wise directive; the legal assertive becoming declarative as issues of authority 
concerning the Torah are broached. I intend this characterisation as illustrative only: 
the categories will not be unvarying. 
20 Thus we have F. Gerald Downing, Christ and the Cynics: Jesus and Other Radical 
Preachers in First-Century Tradition, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988 (and idem, Cynics 
and Christian Origins, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1992); Ben Witherington IH, Jesus the Sage. The 
Pilgrimage of Wisdom, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994 (which includes a critical appraisal of the 
'Cynic'view, 117-45); S. Westerholm, Jesus and Scribal Authority (Coniectanea Biblica NT 10), 
Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1978, especially 53-132; and what is perhaps the predominant view from 
Schweitzer onward: the apocalyptic preacher announcing the end. These authors are sympathetic to 
considerably varying extents of other emphases. 
21 Rainer Riesner, 'Teacher' in DJG, 807-11, here 8 10. 
22 One locates this view particularly, and perhaps inevitably, in the literature of historical 
critics writing on the Didache, faced as they are with their perceived task of reconstructing social 
roles and community advocacy behind a document which proclaims itself as the teaching operative in 
the early church. Thus, for example, Jonathan A. Draper, 'Social Ambiguity and the Production of 
Text: Prophets, Teachers, Bishops, and Deacons and the Development of the Jesus Tradition Mi the 
Community of the Didache', in Clayton N. Jefford (ed. ), The 'Didache'in Context. Essqys on Its Text, 
History and Transmission (NovTSup LXXVII), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995,284-312. 
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It may be the case that speech act theory offers a way beyond the impasse of 
contrasting Jesus as a disembodied teacher on the one hand with Jesus as the 
embodied enactment of some symbolic or theological destiny. 2' To call Jesus a 
teacher is to open up a link between these two characterisations, not to foreclose it. 
N. T. Wright, for example, writes of one commentator that he'asks what the parable 
of the prodigal son is "intended to teach", and is surprised at how difficult this is to 
establish. Perhaps this is because the better question would be: what is the parable 
intended to doT Indeed, but this does not demonstrate that it was a mistake 'to 
assume 
... 
that Jesus was basically a teacher. Rather it shows that taking a teacher 
seriously involves asking what speech acts he/she was trying to perform. " 
My discussion here has focused upon Jesus as a teacher, but with appropriate 
modifications it may be seen to apply to any teaching which can be read out of the 
New Testament text. An utterance of Paul, or one of the evangelists, or indeed an 
utterance placed on the lips of Jesus by one of the evangelists, may still be viewed as 
a speech act with similar interpretive possibilities concerning its assertive or 
declarative nature. Some of the examples considered in the next section will thus be 
drawn from the sayings of Jesus; others from the New Testament writers. The speech 
act issues raised are the same, even if the theological debates thus joined have tended 
to exist in their own separate worlds. 
§3 Degrees ofSelf-Involvement in New Testament Teaching Acts 
In this section I consider some New Testament examples of the speech act of 
teaching, whether cases of reported direct speech acts, or cases where the illocution 
in the text is a teaching one, across the spectrum of strengths from weak to strong 
speech acts. After commenting on the usual issue of vocabulary markers for 
23 Note the Jesus Seminar's move on from the sayings of Jesus to the acts of Jesus in their 
forthcoming work; and the two volume work of C. A. Evans & B. D. Chilton (eds. ), Authenticating the 
Words ofJesus and Authenticating the Activities ofJesus (New Testament Tools and Studies 28/1 and 
28/2), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999. 
24 N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, London: SPCK, 1996,101, n. 63, and referring in 
the quote to Christopher F. Evans, Saint Luke, London: SCM, 1990,589. To be fair to Wright, 
he 
often does work successfully with the notion of speech as act; e. g. 85 (and 85 n. 11), and indeed he is 
making this point precisely in the context of the predisposition of the 'Old Quest [for the Historical 
Jesus]' to fall to look for the acts performed by the words of Jesus. Nevertheless, the wording seems 
unfortunate. 
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illocutionary acts, I shall take, in turn, weakly self-involving speech acts such as 
assertions; strongly self-involving speech acts which focus our attention on issues 
such as construal; and finally a topic of Jesus' teaching where perhaps it is helpful to 
realise that the degree of self-involvement varies, as we look at the types of speech 
act at work in the 'kingdom of God' sayings in the gospels. 
The Vocabulary of Teaching 
It is obvious that in terms of vocabulary, teaching acts may range over ahnost any 
form of language at all. The word'teach'will occur only in the most formal of cases: 
'I hereby teach... ' springs to mind. In terms of biblical texts, as suggested at the 
beginning of this chapter, it is Jesus''aýn'jv Xeyw uýtiv'which comes closest to 
such a fonnal device. Perhaps one may generalise and say that there are two basic 
types of sentence which lend themselves for consideration. 
Firstly, we have first person present tense address, such as 'If the son makes you free, 
you will be free indeed'; reported direct speech from Jesus, in John 6: 36. Secondly, 
there will be cases of third person texts not In direct speech, but presented from the 
point of view of the author or narrator, as, for instance, almost all of an epistle would 
be, except for those parts of it which consciously engage other speech acts such as 
greeting or thanking. Even here Paul is not averse to teaching too: witness the 
theological content of the opening greeting in Romans 1: 1-6.1 shall draw on both 
these types of text in what follows. 
§3.1 Teaching as an Assertive Speech Act 
As suggested above it is teaching as the rehearsal of certain basic facts which is in 
view here. To some extent, it is when the facts in question are brute facts that we will 
be considering teaching as an assertive speech act: this is teaching as primarily the ltý 
imparting of information. Zý' 
One knows instinctively where to turn for a consideration of this emphasis: to that 
stream of theologically conservative literature which has always wished to underline 
the propositional content of biblical texts, and in particular of the New Testament 
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message. " This emphasis has been observed by Nancey Murphy in terms relevant to 
our discussion: 
In more conservative branches of the Christian tradition, 
propositional (referential) views of religious language abound. 
These views have their own problems, one of which is to counter 
the charge that they overlook the element of self- involvement 
appropriate to all religious discourse. " 
It is of course too easy to over-react against this relentlessly referential view of 
language which restricts teaching to the speech act of assertion, as the constant 
championing of 'rhetorical' approaches to biblical texts demonstrates. 
Acknowledging teaching as a speech act seems to me to offer the obvious solution: 
teaching is a performative action which is irreducibly involved with the assertion of 
states of affairs, while in the process capable of creating new states of affairs; or 
indeed acting in a variety of performative ways. " 
A full study of this topic would be as broad as the Bible itself (since it is, in a sense, 
the question of the status of biblical language in general), but one aspect of it is 
worthy of particular exploration here. I have suggested that it is in fact difficult to 
observe cases where teaching is simply assertive: where the rehearsal of facts is all 
that is at issue. In fact, it is debatable whether an assertive, especially one which is 
passed down as a part of the biblical text, can ever be just an assertive. 
A variety of passages are candidates for the role of 'rehearsing the facts'. I 
Corinthians 15: 3-8 makes precisely this claim for itself ('I handed on to you as of 
first importance what I in turn had received') and yet, as we saw in considering this 
passage in chapter 6 above, this statement of faith is best classified as a confessional 
25 In the interests of completeness, and lest straw men are suspected, one may point to Wayne 
Grudem, 'Scripture's Self-Attestation and the Problem of Formulating a Doctrine of Scripture, in 
D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge (eds. ), Scripture and Truth, Leicester: IVP, 1983,19-59 and 
359-68; or indeed to most of the essays contained in this volume. 
26 Nancey Murphy, 'Textual Relativism, Philosophy of Language, and the baptist Vision', in 
Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy & Mark Nation (eds. ), Theology Without Foundations. Religious 
Practice & the Future of Theological Truth, Nashville: Abingdon, 1994,245-70, 
here 248. 
27 For a similar view which still remains sympathetic to 'propositional' concerns, see 
Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer, 'The Semantics of Biblical Literature: Truth and Scripture's Diverse Literary 
Forms', in 
D. A. Carson & John D. Woodbridge (eds. ) Her? neneutics, Authority and Canon, Leicester: IVP. 
1986,53-104. 
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speech act which stakes one's stance in the public domain. Without in the least 
denying its assertive character, it is much more than assertive. The same 
consideration must apply to other similarly credal utterances, as well as to any 
passages where the facts are rehearsed with some further illocution in view (e. g. the 
list of Titus 3: 3-7 which is followed by'I desire that you insist on these things... ). 
A second type of candidate for this role, although this will require us to understand 
'teaching' with some latitude, is a text which 'simply' reports the facts, such as the 
mundane elements of those narrative sections of various New Testament books; or 
on occasion the historical narratives alluded to in the epistles. Even here, however, 
one must question the extent to which any assertive is an assertive pure and simple. 
A narrative such as Paul's narration of his travels in Galatians 1: 13-24 is clearly a 
multiple speech act. His catalogue of places visited and not visited is part report and 
part commissive-declaration: he swears that his gospel is of God and not learned at 
the feet of Peter and the Jerusalem apostles. Rhetorical studies of Galatians have 
little difficulty making this point, even if they do appear willing to sit lightly to the 
assertive role of a speech act in any particular case. In characterising Galatians 
1: 11-2: 14 as the narratio of the letter, Ben Witherington observes that 
thefunction of the narrative material we find in Gal. 1-2 is to 
provide examples for the audience of what sort of behaviour to 
adopt or shun 
... 
Paul is providing exempli in his narratio. " 
Nevertheless, Witherington, with his comment that 'the marshalling of facts could 
serve to correct mistaken impressions about the speaker', '9 keeps a stronger balance 
between declaration and assertion than does Hans Dieter Betz, whose approach 
indicates the key difference between a rhetorical approach and a speech act approach 
when he writes 
the facts themselves, as well as their delivery, are subjected to 
partisan interest 
... 
whether the "facts" are true or fictitious, the 
effort required to make them believeable is the same. 'O 
28 Ben Witherington III, Grace in Galatia. A Commentary on St. Paul's Letter to the Galatians, 
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1998,29. 
29 Witherington, Grace in Galatia, 95; cf 94-164. 
30 Hans Dieter Betz, Galatians. A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in 
Galatia (Hermenela), Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979,60. In fact Betz does credit Paul here ('it 
would seem he follows the natural order of events in 1: 13 -2: 14, since there is no 
indication that he 
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However, might it still be the case that less controversial, less significant texts, such 
as the background narrative which links episodes in the gospels or Acts, can be 
viewed as straightforward assertion? In such cases is a writer such as Luke 
performing the speech act of assertion: simply telling us what happened? This 
question, while to some extent tangential to our particular concerns with 'teaching' 
(except that teaching be taken broadly), nevertheless enables us to clarify the speech 
act workings of biblical language in a way which does, I believe, address some 
general concerns about speech act theory and biblical interpretation. I discuss this 
question with reference to the recent work of Francis Watson, whose appeal to 
speech act theory concerns itself precisely with a verse such as Mark 1: 9 (In those 
days Jesus came from Nazareth in Galilee and was baptized by John in the Jordan'). " 
Watson, as the polemical title of his chapter indicates, is concerned to defend some 
definite and singular concepts against the encroaching tide of pervasive metaphor; 
textual autonomy and (radically) subjective interpretation, and he fastens upon this 
apparently unpromising narrative text in Mark in order to show that 'to be understood 
at all, a series of words must be construed as a communicative action which intends a 
determinate meaning together with its particular illocutionary and perlocutionary 
force. 32 Watson asks, quite rightly, 'what takes place when a sentence such as [Mark 
1: 9] is understoodT and explores various conventions by/through which the author 
situates his narrative within a broader 'institutional context' (such as the time; the 
place; the person of Jesus as defined in the whole gospel). He touches on precisely 
our issue when he addresses the nature of Mark's illocution at this point: 
If we ask what Mark is doing in writing as he does, the initial 
answer is that he is informing or reminding his readers of 
something... one does not inform or remind one's addressee of 
just anything at all, but of that which one takes to be significant 
within the context of utterance. 
... 
What Mark is doing is not 
simply telling a story but proclaiming the gospel. " I 
does not', 61), but the tone of the approach is certainly different. 
31 Francis Watson, Text and Truth. Redefining Biblical Theology, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1997,103-6. The title of the relevant chapter of this book is'Literal Sense, Authorial Intention, 
Objective Interpretation: In Defence of Some Unfashionable Concepts' (95-126). 
32 Watson, Text and Truth, 103. 
33 Watson, Text and Truth, 105. 
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In this I think Watson is correct. He has perhaps chosen a relatively insignificant 
verse from Mark's narrative precisely to show how the informative function of any, 
text must be seen as an aspect of its performative role in a wider institutional 
context: literal meaning inheres in the illocution which remains operative wherever 
the institutional context is preserved. 34 From this he concludes that a Christian 
reading of this text (and thus any gospel text) is not justified by appealing to the 
partisan nature of all interpretation, which he would regard as a pyrrhic victory 
indeed, but is warranted objectively by its subject matter. This thesis is obviously 
more controversial than his basic speech act claims, and its precise fit with his 
broader advocacy of theological hermeneutics (or aredefined biblical theology' as 
the subtitle of the book has it) leads me to wonder whether his appeal to speech act 
theory here is more a matter of its perceived congruence with his wider aims than a 
result of any conviction about the irreducible speech act dynamic of all (textual) 
communication. Certainly he does not appeal to it elsewhere even when discussing 
'the gospels as narrated history'. " 
In my judgment, Watson's use of speech act theory here must be adjudged only 
partially successful, but in fact successful in precisely the area germane to my own 
enquiry at this point, that of the performative nature of assertion in even the most 
apparently unpromising of biblical texts. In other words: assertion can hardly be 
'mere assertion'. unless perhaps we were discussing some idling form of language; 
utterances 'said for no conceivable reason. 36 
On the broader front, and although I am in sympathy with his desire to elaborate a 
non-partisan theological hermeneutic, I am unpersuaded that speech act theory does 
in fact guarantee a literal sense for a text, except that literal sense be defined as 
'illocution construed in a fixed institutional context'. Watson does not quite say this; 
for him it is 'the sense intended by the author in so far as this authorial intention 
is 
17 
objectively embodied in the words of the text'. However he does go on to add that 
34 Watson, Text and Truth, 106. 
35 Watson, Text and Truth, 33-69. 
36 These fundamental qualifications are from Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
§ 132; 
and Austin, HDTW, 146; and cannot be stressed too often. 
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'If speech-acts are embodied in written texts, their intended illocutionary and 
perlocutionary force as communicative actions requires institutional continuities 
extended through the space and time that they traverse' and he contends for'the 
reality of institutional continuities that guarantee the identity of the God referred to 
[in the biblical text] with the God who is still the object of worship. "' As far as I can 
see, Watson has correctly laid bare the requirement of institutional continuity, and 
one must say that this is an important and all too rare achievement, but he has not 
demonstrated that this is guaranteed in a way that transcends precisely the 
community-relative partisan advocacy which he is seeking to avoid. He avers that 'to 
read a text is to construe it', " and thus seeks to orient the interpretive act towards the 
communicating agent. However, as I have suggested in part I of this thesis, while the 
communicating agent is indeed introduced by such a construal, against any textual 
autonomy view, the point of fixing on the mechanism of construal is that it mediates 
between the communicator and the reader, rather than handing over the final word to 
the communicator. Thus appealing here to speech act theory does not in itself 
demonstrate that 'reading communities' do not validate their own construals. Even if 
one hedges this conclusion about with phrases such as 'within limits', or 'as 
constrained by the meaning of the text', I suspect that the 'objectivity' to which 
Watson aspires here is intended as something more than the 'interpersonal 
objectivity' which I suggested in earlier chapters is actually what follows from this 
line of argument. I judge that in fact Watson has further good theological reasons for 
making his case, 'O but that speech act theory itself does not do quite the work he asks 
of it. 
Nevertheless, on the more specific level of demonstrating that even the flattest of flat 
assertions, to develop Donald Evans'terminology, is more than an assertion,, 
Watson's account is convincing. For the purposes of this section, therefore, we are 
justified in affirming that teaching as an assertive speech act is best viewed as a 
37 Watson, Text and Truth, 115. 
38 Watson, Text and Truth, 117-18. 
39 Watson, Text and Truth, 97; In fact suggesting that thjs Is 'overwhelmingly plausible'. 
40 See his trinitarian'mtratextual realist' account, most powerfully articulated in Francis 
Watson, Text, Church and World. Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective, Edinburgh: 
T. &T. Clark, 1994,221-93. 
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limiting case rarely if ever attained in practice 
. 
4' Rather, the speech act of teaching is 
always operative in other illocutionary dimensions at the same time. 
It is perhaps helpful to draw attention here to the related speech act of preaching. I 
would suggest that this could also be explored under some such rubric as the 
interpretation of brute fact and the resulting advocacy of institutional fact. The only 
speech act account of preaching which I have discovered, that of Michael McNulty, 
charts a helpful speech act path between 'academic' and 'emotivist' approaches to 
preaching, and uses it, for example, to explore the familiar contrast between Paul's 
Athens sen-non in Acts 17 and his 'performative approach' at Corinth. McNulty is 
particularly clear about the role of self-involvement in grounding performativity in 
extra-linguistic fact, although he does not specifically consider the categories of 
brute and institutional faCt. 42 
Before going on to attempt a study of a particular teaching theme where the variable 
nature of the speech act may help us, I first clarify the other end of the spectrum, 
where the teaching act is so strongly self-involving that the facts concemed are 
institutional, i. e. created by the performance of the illocution. 
§3.2 Teaching as a Declarative Speech Act: The Grammar of '17r. 601jai' 
In this section we look at the teaching of institutional facts: creating a fact by the 
successful performance of an illocutionary act. In chapter 41 discussed the 
significance of construal in speech act theory, and its relevance to some theological 
aspects of interpretation, noting also that it is the key notion in the construction of 
social reality. Here I want to propose that close to the heart of the grammar of 
Christian belief is the notion of reconstrual, and that this grammar is inscribed in 
some of the main ways in which the New Testament sets about teaching. 
Christian belief takes its stand on the advocacy of particular construals, on a variety 
of grounds (ethical and historical grounds; theological and faith commitments, in an 
41 Cf Austin, HDTW, 146. 
42 T. Michael McNulty, 'Pauline Preaching: A Speech-Act Analysis', Worship 53 (1979), 
207-14; comparing Acts 17 with Acts 18 in the light of I CorMthians 
1-4. 
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interlocking variety of approaches). One of the clearest examples of reconstrual in 
the New Testament is the opening exhortation of James: 'My brothers and sisters, 
whenever you face trials of any kind, consider it nothing but joy'. (James 1: 2, NRSV) 
Luke Timothy Johnson notes that at the beginning of this letter, 'The theme is faith 
and its reaching a fullness or perfection through a variety of "testings" presented by 
an alternative understanding of the world. "' In the face of these possibilities, James 
advocates a particular conception of reality as the appropriate one for a Christian: a 
construal where God gives gifts to humanity and thus breaks open what might seem 
to be the closed system of trial and tribulation: 'This theological construal of reality 
is what makes the turn to prayer something other than an arbitrary piece of pious 
advice. 44 
I suggest that re-construal captures what is at issue here better than 'construal'. James 
advocates wilful reconstrual, presupposing that construal may in such a case be a 
cognitive endeavour. Indeed in terms of our earlier discussion, it is also a 
non-mentalistic endeavour: reconstrual occurs in the public domain and the reality 
concerned is a social reality available only to those whose engagement with it is 
self-involving. This, then, is teaching of the most strongly self-involving type. 
The word used in James 1: 2 is ýye'%tai (in fact the imperative here, ýY1jCF(XCFOE, 
which indicates the cognitive nature of reconstrual)., q'ye%tai plays a significant 
role in the logic of Christian belief. It is used some 20 times in the New Testament, 
and is perhaps the key term for capturing the link between the X and the 'Y' in 
Searle's 'X counts as Y' formula: thus the grammar of construing, considering, 
regarding, judging, counting, treating, esteeming or thinking of X as Y is particularly 
clear where ilyeo[Lat is used. See, for example: 
Acts 26: 2 1 consider myself [as] fortunate 
2 Cor. 9: 5 1 thought it necessary [=Ijudge it as necessary] 
Phil. 2: 3 regard others as better than yourselves 
43 Luke Timothy Johnson, The Letter ofJames (AB 37A), Doubleday: Anchor, 1995,182. 
44 Johnson, James, 184. 
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Phil. 2: 6 did not regard equality with God as something to be... 
Phil. 3: 7 whatever gain I had, 
... 
I have come to regard as loss 
1 Thess. 5: 13 esteem [those who labour arnong you] very highly 
I Tim. 6: 1 [Let slaves] regard their masters as worthy of all honour 
Heb 11: 11 [Abraham] considered him faithful who had promised 
2 Peter 3: 15 regard the patience of our Lord as salvation. 45 
Faith as the advocacy of a particular construal is also a prominent theme in the NT, 
as with Heb. 11: 1: 'Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of 
things not seen. ' This conviction, or faith, must be mediated through the mechanism 
of self-involvement: without the act of construal the 'reality' which is germane to 
faith is simply not there to be considered. Clearly there is a reality, an'X term'which 
is there to be construed as a Y. " and it is in this well-defined and non-reductive 
sense that it is appropriate to pursue 'constructive' models of the world for 
theological purposes. 
The grammar of 'ijye%L(xV as sketched out here provides a particularly clear example 
of the logic of Christian belief. clear for our purposes because it is fitted precisely to 
the logic of illocutionary acts. I would go further and argue that the notion of 
construal underwrites the idea of the Bible as Christian scripture: what Moule calls 
the Bible's 'one proper and distinctive function 
... 
of confronting the readers with a 
portrait of Jesus Christ and with the events that show that he lives and is with 
them. 47 That portrait is a construal of a reality which, while it cannot be accessed 
except by way of construal, can nevertheless be accessed by a variety of construals. 
Christian faith assumes the advocacy of a particular (range of) construal(s), and it is 
in this context that the Bible serves as Christian Scripture: 'A canon is a canon only 
45 ,III, Tlyr-%tai, is used 20x in this sense: I in Acts, 8 in Paul (including 6 in Philippians); 3 Mi the 
deutero-Paulines; 3 in Hebrews; I in James and 4 in 2 Peter. It is also used 4x (I in Acts, 3 in 
Hebrews) in the associated sense of 'leaders', which might (optimistically! ) be taken in the sense of 
'those whose construals are authoritative'. Obviously this grammar may be at work without the use of 
'ýygojiat'itself, as the next examples above indicate. 
46 An X-term which may be something as objectively identifiable as John-the-Baptist, as for 
instance with Matthew 11: 14, 'if you are willing to accept it, he [John] is the Elijah who is to come. ' 
47 C. F. D. Moule, Forgiveness and Reconciliation, London: SPCK, 1998,221-22. 
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in use; and it must be construed in a certain way before it can be used' as Charles 
Wood has It. 48 It is also I suggest in this connection that one may properly develop 
the irreducibly theological hermeneutic of Francis Watson mentioned above, whose 
avowed 'intratextual realism' suggests that the key issue is indeed construal, although 
he terms it 'mediation': 'it is necessary to speak of the text as mediating the reality of 
Jesus rather than as constructing it. "' 
We have isolated, in this section, a certain kind of subject matter which renders the 
speech act of teaching involved necessarily a strongly self-involving one. Accounts 
of a verse such as James 1: 2 will typically acknowledge this without pausing to 
consider the idea of self-involvement to which they appeal, and in one sense all my 
own account does is demonstrate that what there is to be explained here is an 
illocutionary act at work. In our final example, we shall attempt to examine a topic 
where the type of illocution is not predetermined by the subject matter at hand. 
§3.3 Teaching as a Multi-Dimensional Speech Act: The Kingdom of God in the 
Speech Acts of Jesus 
It is not my intention here, even if it were possible, to provide a full study of the 
much discussed topic of the kingdom of God; and neither am I particularly 
concerned to trace the various strands of scholarship on the subject. " My aim is 
rather to clarify the kinds of distinction which can usefully be drawn by approaching 
a topic such as the kingdom of God by way of looking at the speech act of teaching" 
with which it is typically introduced into public discourse. Unlike the two examples 
considered above, I judge that the illocution involved varies across a range of strong 
and weak speech acts when teaching about the kingdom of God is in view. As a 
48 Charles M. Wood, The Formation of Christian Understanding. Theological Hermeneutics, 
Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, '1993 (1981), 93. 
49 Watson, Text, Church and World, 225. 
50 For overall background and orientation I have drawn upon Norman Perrm, The Kingdom of 
God in the Teaching ofJesus, London: SCM Press, 1963; idem, Jesus and the Language of the 
Kingdom. Symbol and Metaphor in New Testament Interpretation, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976 
(a very different work from his 1963 study); G. R. Beasley-Murray, Jesus and the Kingdom of God, 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986; Bruce Chilton (ed. ), The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of 
Jesus (Issues in Religion and Theology 5), London: SPCK, 1984; and idem, 'The Kingdom of God in ID 
Recent Discussion. 
51 Or preaching. See n. 42 above. 
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result the institutional reality of the kingdom of God is constituted differently for 
different purposes: it is an inter-personal reality neither reducible to nor separable 
from the self-involvement of those who receive the teaching of Jesus on this topic. 
Speech act theory has not been generally considered in connection with this kind of 
question. For my discussion of the kingdom of God I shall be drawing to some 
extent on the various exegetical studies of Bruce Chilton, and therefore it is perhaps 
appropriate to preface this section with a brief discussion of Chilton's own brisk 
reference to speech act theory and its applicability to kingdom language which, 
despite its brevity, is still more than most exegetes have attempted. 52 
Chilton develops a theory of 'performance' for understanding Jesus' teaching, by 
which he 'refers both to the activity which results in the telling of a parable, and to 
the activity which may attend the hearing of a parable. ' The Kingdom is performed, 
parabolically, in both word and deed. " Analysing 'Jesus' construal of the kingdom', 
Chilton warns that the notion of performance should not be taken existentially, and 
in a lengthy footnote he tries to show that his notion of performance is simply a way 
of speaking, and not one which 'determines or describes what is true. "' In so doing 
he suggests that Searle and to some measure Austin support the view that'nothing is 
performed by speech except a manipulation of language', and he cites Anthony 
Thiselton in support of an existential grounding for'performative utterance. '55 I
suggest however that he has joined here precisely what Thiselton, in this reference, 
was trying to rend asunder: the 'language event' approach of Fuchs and Ebeling, and 
56 
the Austin-Searle stress on states of affairs underwriting speech acts. In conclusion, 
Chilton writes that 
52 The reference occurs in Bruce Chilton and II. H. McDonald, Jesus and the Ethics of the 
Kingdom (Biblical Foundations in Theology), London: SPCK, 1987. The relevant sections are written 
by Chilton (see xi). 
53 Chilton and McDonald, Jesus and the Ethics of the Kingdom, 16,3 1. 
54 Chilton and McDonald, Jesus and the Ethics of the Kingdom, 110, cf 131-32, n. 2. All 
subsequent quotations in this paragraph are from this footnote. 
55 Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons. New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical 
Description, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans & Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1980,336-37. 
56 See also Thiselton, Two Horizons, 354-55. 
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The philosophy of language can, and has, contributed to 
... 
the literary study of the New Testament. But linguistic philosophy has not produced a sufficiently coherent account of how words 
convey meaning to enable us to employ it directly as a description 
of how the preaching of the kingdom functions. " 
With our view of 'performative' suitably disentangled from existentialist concerns, I 
propose to attempt to utilise speech act theory for precisely this function (although 
with regard to teaching) in what follows. 
It is all too easy for an analysis of synoptic 'kingdom' language not even to get off 
the ground. The interested interpreter is waylaid immediately by questions of the 
appropriate translation of ý PCtG1XE1(X TOý OEo, 6, and the apparently 
self-sustaining momentum of the debate about when the kingdom was expected to 
come, with its well known positions of realised eschatology (C. H. Dodd"); 
consistent/futurist eschatology with its imminent but mistaken expectation (Albert 
Schweitzer"), and all inaugurated stations in between. " Fortunately it seems that 
many writers today are willing to allow that such a focus risks missing the more 
fundamental question of the nature of'il PaGUEUX TOý OEOVin the first place, 
which must be assumed in some sense for the temporal debate even to get under 
way. " Four brief observations will have to suffice here. 
Firstly, one clearly needs a refined use of language to address the question of what 
sort of thing the kingdom of God is. It is not, to use the language of Arbib and Hesse, 
a spatio-temporal reality. Thus, to ask 'Is it real? ' forces us to draw on the 
conceptuality of institutional reality, in its speech act sense. The alternative, to 
suggest that it is not a 'thing' at all, is perhaps more common in the literature, and 
57 Chilton and McDonald, Jesus and the Ethics of the Kingdom, 132, n. 2. 
58 C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom, London: Nisbet, 1935. 
59 Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of its Progressfrom 
Reimarus to Wrede, London: A. & C. Black, 1954 (1906); cf also Johannes Weiss, Jesus' 
Proclamation of the Kingdom of God, London: SCM, 1971 (1892). 
60 E. g. G. E. Ladd, The Presence of the Future. The Eschatology ofBiblical Realism, Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974; and W. G. Kfirnmel, Promise and Fulfilment. The Eschatological Message 
ofJesus (SBT 1/23), London: SCM, '1957. All the positions of these last three notes are reviewed 111 
Wendell Willis (ed. ), The Kingdom of God in 20th-Century Interpretation, Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 1987. 
61 A significant move in this direction is Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom; see 
especially 197-99. 
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need not pose any problems in itself, but I suggest that it does not solve the problems 
of how to discuss the kingdom as something experienced within spatio-temporal 
reality. Kingdom language operates at the Kantian divide between experience and 
transcendence, not least because 'the conviction that God is transcendent, beyond the 
terms of reference of what people see and imagine, is basic within the biblical 
tradition. 62 
Secondly, the translation of ý PaO1, W(X TOf) eEOI-) may of course be partly a 
function of context in any particular case, but, as is widely noted, its standard 
translation as 'kingdom of God' certainly risks putting the emphasis in the wrong 
place by focusing on the rule rather than the one doing the ruling. Various recent 
suggestions try and redress the balance: God's imperial rule; the 'coming of God' and 
the saving sovereignty; divine government; even 'The revolution is here! '. " Perhaps 
the most significant proposal is that of Bruce Chilton, who draws on first century 
targurnic literature (particularly the Isaiah targums) in an effort to find linguistic 
evidence from a similar time to the gospels, and demonstrates that 'the kingdom of 
God' appears as almost a circumlocution for God himself acting in power. Hence the 
title of his published thesis: God in Strength, or as his summary article of the same 
time puts it, 'regnum dei deus est' (the reign of God is God (himself)). " Chilton's 
work has met with criticism, for instance concerning the precise applicability of his 
suggested linguistic evidence, " but certainly his proposal appears to be the obvious 
way of making sense of at least some of the kingdom parables, such as the parable of 
the wedding banquet (Matthew 22: 1-14) where the kingdom'may be compared to the 
king' (NRSV) whose actions are described in the parable. In any case, whether or not 
62 Bruce Chilton, Pure Kingdom. Jesus' Vision of God (Studying the Historical Jesus), London: 
SPCK & Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996,23. 
63 Offered respectively by Robert W. Funk, Roy W. Hoover et al, The Five Gospels: The 
Search for the Authentic Words ofJesus, New York: Macmillan, 1993; Beasley-Murray, Jesus and 
the Kingdom of God, passim and cf 339; R. T. France, Divine Government. God's Kingship in the 
Gospel ofMark, London: SPCK, 1990,13; David Wenharn, The Parables ofiesus, London: Hodder 
& Stoughton, 1989,20-25. 
64 Bruce Chilton, God in Strength. Jesus'Announcement of the Kingdom (SNTU 1) Freistadt: 
P16chl, 1979, reprinted in the Biblical Seminar Series, Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987, especially 
277-98; idem, 'Regnum Dei Deus Est', SJT 31 (1978), 261-70. 
65 E. g. the caveats of John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus. Vol. 2: 
Mentor, Message and Miracles, New York: Doubleday, 1994,264; 287 n. 113. Meier is also 
concerned about Chilton's non-apocalyptic claims for kingdom language. 
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one accepts the details of his position, Chilton's case is the starkest of reminders that 
ý PaGUE104 TOf) OEOf) is about the spatio-temporal world being God's theatre 
where his glory is staged. 
Such a perspective also seems, thirdly, to bypass the debates about realised or 
imminent eschatology, since God's activity amongst human beings is not, on this 
account, something which begins at a definite time either in the first century or at the 
end of the eschaton. The declaration of the kingdom, whether as 1'j'YYUcEV or as 
6"4)0a(JEV, is fundamentally about a new orientation rather than a new epoch, on 
which more in a moment. 
And fourthly, the recognition that Tj P(WIXEla TOf) OEOf) is God at work in power, 
perceived upon the earth, explains its multidimensional nature in the sense described 
by Chilton in his study of the background to the term in the language of kingship in 
the Psalms. " Chilton identifies a five-fold polarity in this background: 
1. temporal/ultimate (the eschatological dimension, cf Psalms 44,47,96,98) 
2. dynamic/immanent (the dimension of transcendence, cf. Psalms 22,93, 
145) 
3. nghteous/perfected (the dimension ofjudgment, cf. Psalms 10,97,103) 
4. clean/holy (the dimension of purity, cf. Psalms 5,24,149) 
5. local 
, 
in Zion and in heaven/onmipresent (the dimension of radiation, cf. 
Psalms 29,47,489 114ý 145). 67 
The kingdom operates along these various spectra, and it follows that on different 
occasions or in different situations the language of the kingdom will operate in 
different ways. In relation to our own concern with the nature of institutional facts 
which help to construct models of the transcendent, we shall be considering in 
particular the second of these five dimensions below. " 
66 Chilton, Pure Kingdom, 23-44; cf 146-63. 
67 As surnmarised in Chilton, 'The Kingdom of God in Recent Discussion, 273-74. 
68 Cf Chilton, Pure Kingdom, 66-73. 
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Valid as such an approach undoubtedly is, however, it seems preferable to articulate 
it in terms of the multi-valency of speech act illocutions which characterise the 
kingdom, '9 rather than saying that the concept of 'kingdom' itself is flexibly adapted 
to its different uses, which is the well-known position adopted by Norman Perrin in 
his last work on the parables. Perrin, drawing particularly on the work of Philip 
Wheelwright (as well as Paul Ricoeur) suggests a contrast between a'steno-symbol' 
which has a fixed reference, and a'tensive' symbol. A tensive symbol has 'a set of 
meanings that can neither be exhausted nor adequately expressed by any one 
referent', or, put more simply, its reference varies according to context 
. 
70 However, 
Dale Allison correctly points out that Perrin's two types of symbol are made to be 
artificially mutually exclusive, and that the thesis that Jesus' use of kingdom 
language operates tensively in contrast to standard Jewish steno-uses is sustained 
only by limiting the accepted dominical sayings to those which do in fact work most 
flexibly. " It is perhaps fairest to see Perrin's proposal as a step on the way towards a 
projected hermeneutic of the New Testament which he did not live long enough to 
see through; a hermeneutic which would have attempted to take seriously the 
multiple appropriation of a text traditionally exegeted in univocal. fashion. " 
Certainly, as it stands, his proposal has generally met with a negative response from 
critics. " I shall suggest that we need neither a theory of 'tensive language' nor of 
multi-referentiality to account for the ways in which kingdom language is used in the 
gospels. 
69 For this point in relation to parables generally see T. Aurelio, Disclosures in den Gleichnisse 
Jesu. 
- 
Eine Anwendung der Disclosure-Theorie von LT Ramsey, der modernen Metaphorik und der 
Sprechakte auf die Gleichnisse Jesu, (Regensburger Studien zur Tbeologie 8), Frankfurt a/M: Lang, 
1977. 
70 Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, 29-32, here 30; cf Philip Wheelwright, 
Metaphor and Reality, Bloomington, Ind: Indiana UP, 1962; Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism ofEvil, 
New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 
71 Dale C. Allison, Jr, The End of the Ages has Come. An Early Interpretation of the Passion 
and Resurrection ofJesus (SNTW), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1987 (1985), 107-12. 
72 Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom was published in the year of Pen-in's death, 1976. 
His 'pilgrimage' towards this more hermeneutical work is the subject of Calvin R. Mercer, Norman 
Perrin's Interpretation of the New Testament. - From 'Exegetical Method'to 'Hermeneutical 
Process'(StABH 2), Macon, GA: Mercer UP, 1986. 
73 E. g. Chrys C. Caragounis, 'Kingdom of God/Kingdom of Heaven, DJG, 417-30, who wastes 
no time describing Perrin's view as self-contradictory and plainly inapplicable to the Gospel texts! 
(422) 
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Construing the Kingdom 
The foregoing remarks are plainly inadequate for addressing all the various 
interpretive issues raised by this topic, but they are sufficient for the specific task in 
hand, which is the exploration of 'kingdom' language as it is introduced in the speech 
act of teaching, with its apparatus of construal. What we require, therefore, are 
examples of biblical language where construal will be an interesting category, and as 
mentioned above, this seems primafacie most likely in those sayings where the 
transcendence of the kingdom is, to some extent at least, at issue. 
Chilton's discussion of the 'transcendent co-ordinate' of the kingdom focuses on the 
following Lucan verses: 11: 20 and 13: 20-21 (with parallels) and 17: 2 1.74 Indeed, 
concerns about the presence of the kingdom in Jesus'ministry often start with an 
examination of his saying that 'if it is by the Spirit//finger of God that I cast out 
demons, then the kingdom of God has come to you' (Matt 12: 28 H Luke 11.20). Here 
the act of exorcism indicates that the kingdom has come (&ýOacjEv). However, wary 
lest this line of enquiry should lead us straight into the quagmire of debate about 
temporal issues in relation to the kingdom, I choose to focus instead on Luke 17: 21, 
a verse unique to Luke and one which, though often assimilated to the temporal 
debate 
, 
is I suggest best viewed as an entree to the issue of self-involvement in 
kingdom language. 
The Pharisees question Jesus about when the kingdom will come, and he replies 
Ol')K EPKETCCI ý POXYIXEfOC TOý OEOI-) [LET(X TCC4paTTjP1jGE(Jq, 
16E ', 'EKEi, i5Ob Y&P OýU iP06(ylv, lbob (1) 71 
PaGlXda T06 OE06 iVT6q ý[L6)v kqTiv (Luke 17: 20b-2 1) 
This much debated verse clearly presupposes some form of 'present' kingdom, but it 
is cryptic; hidden in some way. " The major interpretive debate concerns ývTo'q 
76 
ibýt6v, and the three main options are clearly set out by Beasley-Murray in his 
74 Chilton, Pure Kingdom, 66-73. 
75 So Wnght, Jesus and the Victory of God, 469. 
76 ýIET& 7rapa-cTIpýcYEG)q also attracts its fair share of attention: most straightforwardly it is 
with observation'; cf 'so that it's approach can be observed, BAGD, 622. 
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study of this verse under the heading 'the incalculable kingdom'. " The translation 
'within you' is 'the common interpretation of the church'; a view which has 
overwhelming linguistic support, but which poses for Beasley-Murray the 
insuperable problem that such an immanent conception of the kingdom cannot be 
allowed in Jesus'teaching: 'No interpretation of a saying of Jesus on the kingdom of 
God can be right that diminishes its strictly eschatological content. "' The standard 
alternative, to render it 'among you' on the grounds that this fits better theologically, 
he shows to be untenable, since this reduces the verse to arguing the platitude that 
'when the kingdom comes it will be among you' (unless one introduces some such 
notion as its sudden future appearance, but this is clearly not at issue in Jesus' 
words). " 
The untenability of this alternative leaves Chrys Caragounis arguing that'within you' 
must be the right translation. Not only does this fit the available evidence concerning 
ev'roq, but it takes into account parallels in the Gospel of Thomas (to which we must 
return below); the consistent Lukan usage of FIv [i6cyq) U[i6v to indicate 'among'; 
and the parallel point of Luke 17: 20 where the kingdom is said not to be coming 
with 'signs that can be observed', leading Caragounis to conclude that 
"Within you, " therefore, seems to be Luke's way of expressing the 
inward nature and dynamic of the kingdom of God, rather than 
refer to any actual presence in or among the Pharisees. " 
Caragounis thus also wishes to defend the view that the kingdom is never already 
present in the synoptics, but finds an alternative way to Beasley-Murray to uphold 
this view. In fact, Beasley-Murray finds a third line of interpretation, traced back to 
Cyril of Alexandria and revived by various modem scholars as strands of linguistic 
evidence have been unearthed, which leads him to favour some such translation as 
77 Beasley-Murray, Jesus and the Kingdom of God, 97-103. He draws on the major study of B. 
Noack, Das Gottesreich bei Lukas: Eine Studie zu Luk. 17.20-24 (Symbolae Biblicae Uppsalienses 
10), Lund: Gleerup, 1948, who demonstrates that all the major options predate modem biblical 
criticism. 
78 Beasley-Murray, Jesus and the Kingdom of God, 10 1. 
79 Would that exegesis were this simple... For a recent commentator who finds that this 
I somewhat vulnerable' view 'does best justice to the content of v. 2 1' see John Nolland, Luke 
9: 21-18: 34 (WBC 35B), Waco: Word, 1993,853-54. 
80 Caragounis, 'Kingdom of God/Heaven', DJG, 423-24. 
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'within your grasp' or 'it lies in your power to receive W. " Linguistically possible, 
and consonant with the overall thrust of Jesus' teaching, this view addresses neither 
the when nor the where of the kingdom, but rather focuses on the ensuing 
implication that Jesus' hearers must avail themselves of the opportunity to enter 
which is thus presented. " 
While these various interpretations all seem to be making good points, it is notable 
that there is no clear correlation between exegetical position and views on the 
presence or otherwise of the kingdom. " Rather it is theological agendas, either 
explicit or implicit, which drive the discussion. My concern is to ask what 
contribution may be made by enquiring after the nature of the illocution performed 
by Jesus in this verse. 
The key contribution of a speech act approach, I suggest, is that it enables us to focus 
on Jesus' own concern with construal on the part of those who grasp the kingdom, 
without prejudging the question of how far this correlates with any inter-personal or 
objective criteria for saying that the kingdom is present. At stake in Luke 17: 21 is a 
strongly self-involving declaration: the kingdom cannot be observed objectively; it 
does not come with outward sips. What is needed is eyes to see, or in other words, 
the ability to construe the perceived phenomena in such a way that God's activity is 
understood through them. If one can perform such a construal, then the grammar of 
the illocution involved indicates that the kingdom of God is present, since the 
institutional state of affairs which 'the kingdom of God' refers to is created by the 
successful perfonnance of the illocution. 
81 Beasley-Murray, Jesus and the Kingdom of God, 102-3. 
82 Beasley-Murray, Jesus and the Kingdom of God, 103, citing R. Otto, The Kingdom of God 
and the Son ofMan (trans F. V. Filson and B. L. Woolf), London: Lutterworth, 1938 (1934), 136. 
Significant defences of the'within your graspview have included C. H. Roberts, 'Ibe Kingdom of 
Heaven (Lk. xvii. 2 1)', HTR 41 (1948), 1-8; and A. Riistow, 'Entos hymon estin: Zur Deutung von 
Lukas 17.20-2 F, ZNW 51 (1960), 197-224. 
83 Note, for example, Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, 469, who follows Beasley-Murray 
in translation, but who does see the kingdom as present in Jesus'ministry, contra Beasley-Murray. 
We should note, for completeness, that Chilton favours 'in your midst' for 6vTo'q ýýL6v (Chilton, 
Pure Kingdom, 73), but his discussion is brief 
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This is the by-now familiar logical grammar which accompanies strong 
self-involvement. However, what I believe makes this case Particularly of interest is 
that the institutional state of affairs constituted by the illocutionary act, and labelled 
as 'the kingdom of God', is constituted in different ways by different speech acts, " 
with the unifying feature that all these constructions relate in some way to the 
activity of God as perceived within the spatio-temporal realm. " Jesus performs a 
strongly self-involving declarative speech act and the direction of fit is 
world-to-word: the kingdom is right here if you have but eyes to see it. However, 
elsewhere his illocutions work with word-to-world direction of fit: the kingdom of 
heaven is like a merchant in search of fine pearls (Matthew 13: 45) where the issue at 
hand is one's attitude to everything else in comparison to one's estimation of the 
value of God's personal involvement in one's world. In our terms, this is not a 
strongly self-involving speech act. Clearly it concerns itself with the topic of one's 
attitude, but rather as an 'external' feature to be considered whatever one's attitude is, 
not as a grammatical feature of that attitude itself. In such a case, the illocution is a 
weak one, and the kingdom is being discussed in terms directly relatable to brute 
facts. It may be that they are potential and not actual brute facts (there need be no 
merchant or pearl; and neither need specific 'acts of God' be in view), but the point is 
that the teaching act concerned is primarily descriptive-assertive, and only 
declarative in a weak sense. 
When Jesus teaches about the kingdom of God, therefore, and especially in relation 
to its transcendence, he performs declarative and strongly self-involving speech acts 
which focus on the ability of the hearer to construe God's activity. He also performs 
assertive and weakly self-involving speech acts which discuss one's stance toward 
brute facts as characteristic of the kingdom. Across the spectrum of strength of such 
speech acts, inward transformation is thus inextricably linked with external states of 
84 In Chilton's terms: 'One advantage of seeing the distinct coordinates of the kingdom in Jesus' 
theology is that we can easily explain why in one aspect (eshatology) the kingdom is near, while in 
another aspect (transcendence) the kingdom has arrived. ' Chilton, Pure Kingdom, 68. 
85 1 am following Arbib and Hesse here in using construction non-reductively for God-related 
language located in but pointing beyond the spatio-temporal realm; cf Michael A. Arbib and Mary B. 
Hesse, The Construction ofReality, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986, passim; and my discussion in 
chapter 4 above. 
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affairs. In the kingdom of God, one might say, there are not only new eyes to see 
with, but also new things to see with them. 
The Constructed Kingdom 
N. T. Wright is wise to caution against trying to comprehend the kingdom by starting 
from isolated verses and their possible linguistic ranges; indeed Luke 17: 21 is a 
particular instance he uses to make this point since he notes that in a sense the 
translation is underdetermined by linguistic evidence. He argues that instead we need 
a broader view which does justice to the gospels as a whole and into which difficult 
verses can then be fitted in whatever manner seems most plausible. 'This would 
follow also from my own observation above that one's view of ev-Co'q Uýt6v does not 
apparently correlate with a particular view of the 'presence of the kingdom' or 
otherwise. 
In the light of this, I should say that I arn not trying to develop a view of the 
kingdom based on this one verse, or on the possible translations of JYY1rEV in Mark T1 
1: 15. " Rather I am pursuing a four-step argument. Firstly I am assuming that the 
kingdom of God is an institutional reality constructed by the performance of 
illocutionary acts within a particular context, which in this case must be something 
like the community of those whose discourse is informed by the biblical text. 
Secondly, the speech act of teaching introduces this institutional reality under a 
variety of types of illocution. Here is where I suggest the variable element of 
kingdom language is most profitably located. It follows, thirdly, that as such 
illocutions vary over the assertive-declarative range, so language about the 'kingdom 
of God' is to be understood as on the one hand weakly self-involving, addressing 
itself to states of affairs which hold independently of one's own perspective (thus 
objective; or better, 'inter-personal'); and on the other hand as strongly 
self-involving, and dependent upon one's construal. for its existence. Finally, we 
come to a verse such as Luke 17: 21 
, 
and find that it is describing the activity of 
86 Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, 225, n. 100. 
81 The dangers are not all one way however. For a well-known case of a broader view 
over-riding exegetical considerations, in particular with T'jYYII(EV, see C. H. Dodd, 'The Kingdom of 
God Has Come', ExpT48 (1936-37), 138-42. 
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construal, and thus we can understand it in speech act terms without having to 
prejudge in this case what sort of imminence or presence the kingdom may have in 
other respects. " 
Wright himself, without using the language of speech act theory, focuses on the way 
in which Jesus in his teaching redefines the kingdom, which is certainly an 
illocutionary act. " A new construal is placed on familiar events; new institutional 
facts are created out of the redefinition. However, it is important to balance this 
emphasis with the observation that not all such teaching is strongly self-involving. 
We can detect a spectrum of different strength illocutions which present the kingdom 
in the teaching of Jesus as both self-involving and yet also anchored in the world of 
extra-linguistic fact. 
We may, for instance, return to a verse such as the aforementioned Luke 11: 20, and 
note that it combines both fact and stance: Jesus performs exorcism, although even 
this fact must be considered an institutional fact since it relies on contested practices 
of naming the demonic and characterising it, and where this is done among his 
hearers then the kingdom has come (illocution) even if it is not recognised 
(perlocution). In contrast to Luke 17: 21, there is a specific fact around which the 
focus on stance is organised, but the emphasis still falls on one's willingness or 
ability to make the requisite construal. " Luke 13: 20-21 (// Matthew 13: 33; Gos. 
Thom. 96), the saying about a woman who takes yeast or leaven and mixes it into the 
dough, also focuses on ways in which the transcendence of the kingdom may be 
88 This conclusion is compatible with that of Chilton, Pure Kingdom, 68, as quoted above, 
although clearly it rests on a different conceptual model. 
89 Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, 226-42 and throughout; e. g. 'Jesus spent his whole 
mi i ing thi th Mistry redefin ing what the kingdom meant' (47 1) or 'he was retell familiar story [of e 
kingdom] in such a way as to subvert and redirect its normal plot. ' (199) 
90 Chilton speaks here of an 'implicit christology' which requires a certain construal to be 
grasped; Pure Kingdom, 68. Although writing about Luke 17: 2 1, Norman Perrin's comments on that 
verse seem better suited to the verse here discussed: 'One could have photographed an exorcism, ... 
but the kingly activity of God would not be manifest on the photograph. ... To experience the 
kingly 
activity of God one must havejaith, i. e. one must interpret the event aright and commit oneself 
without reservation to the God revealed in the event properly interpreted. ' Perrin, 
The Kingdom of 
God in the Teaching ofJesus, 187. These comments, from his earlier, more exegetical and 
less 
self-consciously hermeneutical work on the parables, draw out both the issue of stance and 
the 
institutional nature of a fact such as 'exorcism. 
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construed: 'the kingdom is hidden in gestures as common as the woman's', 91 and 
since no specific evidence such as an exorcism is noted the accent falls again on the 
stance rather than any fact. 
Moving more widely than the particular verses introduced by Chilton under the 
rubric of 'transcendence', we find again the spectrum of strengths of illocution 
characterising the kingdom logia. In Jesus'response to those from John asking 
whether he was the one to come or not, the emphasis is on the fact rather than the 
stance (although stance remains implicit): 'Go and tell John what you have seen and 
heard: the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed... And 
blessed is anyone who takes no offense at me. ' (Luke 7: 22-23) In contrast, stance is 
preeminent, although irreducibly related to assumed states of affairs, in a parable 
such as Matthew 25: 14-30, the parable of the talents. 
In sum, different teaching speech acts highlight different combinations of stance and 
states of affairs. Speech act theory facilitates a discussion of the constructed nature 
of the kingdom of God without reducing the kingdom to stance alone. Finally, it 
accounts for the variable emphases of kingdom language by way of the inherent 
flexibility of illocutionary acts, rather than by postulating some ad hoc view of 
tensive language or multiple referentiality. 
Implications: Authority and Secrecy in the Public Domain 
There are two or three interesting issues which arise from the speech act 
considerations developed thus far, and which are worth developing briefly. I consider 
in particular the issues of authority and of gnostic interpretation, both germane to any 
interpretation of the verses we have discussed. 
Firstly, this approach highlights the role of the speaker as an authoritative voice in 
the community or context in which the illocutionary construal takes place. The 
question of the authority to perform speech acts is a multi-faceted one which we 
have considered from various angles in this thesis. Here it must suffice merely to 
draw attention to its part in the argument: the very fact that Jesus' teaching is 
91 Chilton, Pure Kingdom, 7 1. 
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preserved as part of the gospels, to whatever extent historically speaking, provides at 
least one context in which his words are counted as decisive in the construction of 
'kingdom reality'. On a speech act account, teaching authority is the authorisation to 
construct, with a construal which has a modelling or normative role in some 
community, but, most significantly, which is predicated on illocutions which address 
stance towards brute facts and which are therefore open to review and evaluation by 
other members of the community. In other words, it is the illocutionary link between 
states of affairs and stance which anchors the authority in a world which extends 
beyond community-relativity; and which does not leave it at the subjective mercy of 
such perlocutionary effects as powerful, forceful or rhetorically sophisticated speech. 
We have suggested in §3.2 above that construal, or reconstrual, lies near the heart of 
the grammar of Christian belief. Such construals establish certain institutional 
frameworks which depend both on foundational brute fact and on continued 
inter-personal accreditation for their ongoing existence. 92 Certain types of speech act, 
in drawing their currency precisely from such frameworks, may thus only take place 
within them. Authoritative pronouncements are one such type of speech act: 
inseparable from but not reducible to community accreditation. It is in this carefully 
constructed sense that it seems appropriate to say that Jesus speaks with authority, 
and thus that his teaching illocutions are felicitous. 9' 
Secondly, although it would take us too far afield, it seems to me that this is also a 
fruitful direction in which to address the prominent and vexed question of the 
relationship between the Jesus of the text and the Jesus of history. This is not entirely 
Martin Kdhler's Christ of faith against the Jesus of history: if anything it is a more 
92 Expressed this way, the account of John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 
London: Penguin, 1995, clearly offers something of a speech act rendering of Peter Berger's 
'plausibility structures'; cf Peter L. Berger, The Social Reality of Religion, London: Penguin, 1973, 
The Sacred Canopy, New York: Doubleday, 1967), 38-60. 
93 Relatively few accounts of speech act theory take up the authority question. For an argument 
that Jesus' teaching authority is drawn from the non-linguistic backing of states of affairs see Anthony 
C. Thiselton, 'Christology in Luke, Speech-Act Theory, and the Problem of Dualism in Christology 
after Kant', in Joel B. Green & Max Turner (eds. ), Jesus ofNazareth. Lord and Christ, Carlisle: 
Paternoster & Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994,453-472. He also provides some helpful reflections on 
the illocutionary as against perlocutionary nature of authority inAuthority and Hermeneutics: 
Some 
Proposals for a More Creative Agenda', in Philip E. Satterthwaite & David F. Wright 
(eds. ), A 
Pathway into the Holy Scripture, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994,107-41. 
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subtle version of it, memorably contrasted by some recent Catholic writers as the real 
Jesus as against the historical (i. e. historically-critically constructed) Jesus. 94 
Sympathetic to such an approach as I am, it does seem to suppose that a constructed 
reality must necessarily be entirely separated from brute fact, which as we have seen 
is not the case. 9' 
A final observation concerning this way of addressing the language of Jesus' 
teaching in the gospels is that it provides a framework within which construal is 
given an appropriate but not an exclusive place as a key to understanding the 
kingdom of God. This is particularly relevant by way of contrast to the widespread 
tendency to trace certain synoptic sayings back to parallels in the Gospel of Thomas, 
thereby raising the question as to whether my own approach in this chapter might 
lend support to a kind of proto-postic view of Jesus as a teacher of inner 
transformation. " 
However 
, 
it would be a mistake to suppose that gnostic sympathies are a corollary of 
a speech act view. There is no denying the substantive similarities in content 
between Luke 17: 21 and Gos. Thom. 3, but I contend that the simplest explanation 
for this is the correct one, that Thomas does not, by and large, maintain an 
independent tradition going back to the historical Jesus, but represents a 
development of the canonical gospel tradition. 97 The key question, therefore, is what 
Thomas does with this perspective. Even a cursory acquaintance with the kind of 
sayings predominant in Thomas bears out Valantasis' description of Thomas' 
94 Thus John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew. Rethinking the Historical Jesus. Vol. 1: The Roots of 
the Problem and the Person, New York: Doubleday, 1991,196-20 1; Luke Timothy Johnson, The 
Real Jesus. The Misguided Questfor the Historical Jesus and the Truth of the Traditional Gospels, 
San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996, especially 133-66. 
95 An indication of how an account of Jesus might be developed from the text in terms of 
construal is given by Robert Morgan, 'The Hermeneutical Significance of Four Gospels', Int 33 
(1979), 376-88. 
96 In particular one notes the parallels between Luke 17: 21 and Gos. Thom. 3 (and 113,5 1, and 
P. Oxy 654: 9-16), cf Richard Valantasis, The Gospel of Thomas (New Testament Readings), London 
and New York: Routledge, 1997, for discussion of the relevant texts (33-34; 58-59; 129-30; 193-94). 
A recent review of relevant issues, from a somewhat 'pro-Thomas' perspective, is G. J. Riley, 'The 
Gospel of Thomas 111 Recent Scholarship', CR: BS 2 (1994), 227-52. 
97 Space precludes discussion of this most central and contested issue in Gos. Thom. studies. 
See Christopher Tuckett, 'Thomas and the Synoptics', NovT 30 (1988), 132-57. 
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theology: 'a performative theology whose mode of discourse and whose method of 
theology revolves about effecting a change in thought and understanding in the 
readers and hearers (both ancient and modem). ' The 'central performance' is 
encapsulated in Gos. Thom. 1: 'Whoever discovers the interpretation of these sayings 
will not taste death. '9' The general subject matter concerns itself with the issues of 
construal which we have considered. As is well known, the sayings of Thomas 
appear with almost no narrative context, and rarely do they address themselves to 
historical events and facts. When they do it is generally to urge that this is the wrong 
way to look. 9' It thus seems fair to conclude that brute fact has largely dropped out of 
the picture here, and the thrust of the gospel is the attempt to turn construal into an 
end in itself rather than a mediation between the construer and what is construed. 
There thus seems no reason to suppose that the significant overlap between the 
institutional nature of facts created by illocutions in the canonical gospels and those 
in the Gospel of Thomas should lead us to reduce the one to the other. In the 
canonical kingdom logia the illocutions vary across the whole spectrum of 
assertive-declarative speech acts. In Thomas the illocution is almost uniformly 
strongly declarative. My defence of the important role of construal in teaching about 
the kingdom does not, therefore, imply anything like a gnostic approach to the 
subject. While performative language draws its currency from events in the public 
domain, the language of inner transformation as an end in itself withdraws from 
precisely this arena. 
§4 Conclusions 
This chapter has broadened the investigation of speech acts in the New Testament 
beyond that of previous chapters by focusing attention on a more general speech act 
than confessing or forgiving: that of teaching. I have argued that the speech act of 
teaching, because it is so wide-ranging and flexible, offers insights into the speech 
act dynamics of biblical language in general, particularly in the way in which it 
98 Valantasis, Gospel of Thomas, 7,10. Valantasis' reading of Thomas is concerned to explicate 
the text in its own right rather than use it in constant comparison with the canonical gospels, and he 
even eschews the label 'gnostic' in order to avoid importing what he sees as inappropriate resonances 
into his investigation. (24-27) 
99 Note, almost at random, Gos. Thom. 51-53. 
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highlights the creation of institutional facts in the process of teaching. After 
developing speech act categories for teaching from a comparison of discussions in 
the philosophy of education and in studies of teaching in the time of Jesus, I have 
suggested that a spectrum ranging from assertive to declarative speech acts can be 
discerned in New Testament teaching, and in particular in the teaching of Jesus. 
I have discussed cases at either end of this spectrum: teaching as the assertion of 
facts, which was found to be always bound up with other performative dynamics; 
and teaching as the illocutionary creation of states of affairs in strong declarations. 
This latter type of speech act focuses attention on the important issue of construal in 
the logic of Christian belief, but does so as part of a balanced account of one aspect 
only of a hermeneutic of self-involvement. 
Finally, I have considered the case of Jesus' teaching about the kingdom of God, 
which ranges over strong and weak construal by way of the fall range of strengths of 
illocution. This part of the study is envisaged as a contribution towards elucidating 
the kinds of role played by institutional facts in reading the New Testament. Related 
issues of the authority of the speaker (to create institutional facts by the accredited 
performance of the speech act of teaching) and the similarities between strong 
construal and gnostic emphases on inner transformation have been addressed briefly 
in order to show how this account may or may not be developed in other directions. 
As suggested at the beginning of the chapter, the fact that teaching is such a different 
kind of speech act from forgiving has meant that it has raised a different set of issues 
in developing a hermeneutic of self-involvement compared to our earlier 
investigations. It is thus hoped that the more specific studies of chapters 6 and 7 have 
been rounded out in certain ways toward a more comprehensive articulation of some 
of the possible roles of speech act theory in New Testament interpretation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Chapter 9 
Some Hermeneutical Implications 
If it is true that speech act theory has, as Anthony Thiselton suggests, suffered 
undeserved neglect in the disciplines of biblical studies and systematic theology, ' 
then this thesis has sought to redress the balance by proposing some ways in which 
the subject offers hermeneutical resources for the various interpretive tasks of 
biblical and theological studies. With respect to discussions of religious language 
and its varying functions, David Hilborn notes that speech act studies have been few 
and far between, and that the theory 'has been appropriated only sporadically by 
those working on such discourse, and even then, there has been very little dialogue 
between those concerned. " In the biblical field, even when speech act theory would 
appear to be a ready resource, it remains largely untapped. ' 
In tenns of theological enquiry, it must be noted that as long ago as 1932 Karl Barth 
was writing of 'The Speech of God as the Act of God. ' Barth's concerns of course 
I Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Speech-Act Theory and the Claim that God Speaks: Nicholas 
Wolterstorff s Divine Discourse', SJT 50 (1997), 97-110, here 97. 
2 David Hilborn, 'From Performativity to Pedagogy: Jean Ladri6re and the Pragmatics of 
Reformed Worship Discourse', in Stanley E. Porter (ed. ), The Nature ofReligious Language. A 
Colloquium (Roehampton Institute London Papers, 1), Sheffield: Sheffield Acadermic Press, 1996, 
170-200, here 173. 
3 E. g.: William Baker's discussion of speech-ethics in the epistle of James surveys aspects of 
personal speech in a variety of inter-personal (including divine) contexts, and includes an analysis of 
the role of truthftilness in speech-ethics, but contains only one indifferent reference to the work of JI 
Austin; William R. Baker, Personal Speech-Ethics in the Epistle ofJames (WUNT 2/68), Tiibingen: 
J. C. B. Mohr, 1995. 
Chapter 9- Page 296 
were not those of speech act theory, but it is perhaps fair to say that Wolterstorff s 
treatment of 'divine discourse' with the aid of the categories of speech acts represents 
a long overdue attempt to explore the dynamics of such a central theological topic 
from a speech-act perspective. ' 
It seems, then, that theologians and biblical critics have not always known what to 
make of speech act theory. Appeals to it reflect more or less directly the limited 
extent to which it is understood on its own terms. If Austin's particular emphasis on 
convention-govemed performatives such as 'I name this ship' is taken as the essence 
of speech act theory, then theologians are content to leave it to its obvious relevance 
to liturgical considerations, where it has indeed proved fruitful. ' Similarly, if it is 
thought that Austin essentially proposes a 'performative use of language' to set 
alongside more familiar language-related concerns, then 'performative utterances' are 
duly noted, but the purpose of such an exercise is not always clear. ' 
In contrast I have proposed that a thorough understanding of speech act theory 
invites us to take seriously a hermeneutical category of seýf-involvement. As a result, 
one does not 'apply' speech act theory to biblical texts, and neither does one restrict 
its scope to certain prominently Austinian types of conventional utterance. Since the 
work of Donald Evans, self-involvement has not been a widely utilised category. 
Reader-orientated hermeneutical models have given a certain pre-eminence to the 
role of the reader's self in contributing to ways of understanding meaning and texts, 
but often appear to have struggled to articulate criteria for interpretive controls. 
4 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics. Volume 1, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part One, trans 
G. W. Bromiley, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975 (1932), 143-62. 
5 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse. Philosophical reflections on the claim that God 
speaks, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995; especially 63-74; cf Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty 
Speech-Acts: The Doctrine of Scripture Today', in Philip E. Satterthwaite & David F. Wright (eds. ), A 
Pathway into the Holy Scripture, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994,143-8 1, especially 172. 
6 E. g. Jean Ladri6re, 'The Performativity of Liturgical Language', Concilium Vol 2 No 9 
(1973), 5 0-62; David Crystal, 'Liturgical Language in a Sociolinguistic Perspective, in David Jasper 
& R. C. D. Jasper (eds. ), Language and the Worship of the Church, London: Macmillan, 1990,120-46; 
Geoffrey Wainwnght, 'The Language of Worship', in Cheslyn Jones, Geoffrey Wainwrightý Edward 
Yarnold SJ & Paul Bradshaw (eds. ), The Study ofLiturgy, London: SPCK & New York: Oxford UP. 
2 1992 (1978), 519-28; and Hilborn, 'From Performativity to Pedagogy'. 
7 See for example Stephen Breck Reid, 'Psahn 50: Prophetic Speech and God's Performative 
Utterances', in Stephen Breck Reid (ed. ), Prophets and Paradigms. Essays in Honor of Gene M. 
Tucker (JSOTS 229), Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996,217-30. 
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Other theological traditions have welcomed the idea of the constructed self, or the 
self who is constituted by or in the reading process! I have suggested that a 
hermeneutic of self-involvement incorporates many of the most helpful insights of 
such approaches while still navigating between complete independence from the text 
and complete constitution by it. ' 
The development of such a hermeneutic relies, as I have attempted to show, on the 
more nuanced and cautious claims of a full understanding of the various categories 
of speech act theory. In so far as such a philosophy of language does justice to the 
workings of language, then one may be justified in offering a hermeneutic of 
self-involvement as something of an advance on other models which have sought, 
rightly, to move away from the notion of an objectively independent text which 
stands outside the hermeneutical process. It remains the case, however, that in 
seeking to articulate precisely the extent to which speech act theory does succeed in 
this way, I have been drawn to a variety of proposals which refine the scope of its 
primary relevance to certain 'strong' categories: strong illocutions; strong construal; 
and finally strong self-involvement. 
Such a hermeneutic also sheds new light on familiar and currently prominent 
questions concerned with realism and non-realism. " As ever, such an easy 
polarisation fails to do justice to the complexities of the world in which we live, with 
all its irreducibly social and inter-personal constituents. In this thesis I have 
attempted to demonstrate that the concepts of brute and institutional fact, and their 
speech act construction mechanisms, are subtle enough to offer appropriately refined 
formulations concerning what is and is not real, and thus also what is and is not true. 
See chapter 5 above. 
9A rare theological use of the category of 'self-involvement' is George Hunsinger, 'Truth as 
Self-Involving. Barth and Lindbeck on the Cognitive and Performative Aspects of Truth in 
Theological Discourse', JAAR 61 (1993), 41-56. Despite the title, however, this article makes only 
minimal and perhaps unduly vague use of the category of 'performative'. 
10 See the recent collection of diverse viewpoints represented in Colin Crowder (ed. ), God and 
Realhýv. Essays on Christian Non-Realism, London: Mowbray, 1997, especially the cautious defence 
of realism therein by Fergus Kerr, 'What's wrong with realism anyway? ', 128-43. 
. 
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Speech act theory itself is evidently not a theological enterprise, but many significant 
theological categories are carried by, or in Recanatils terms 'staged' by, speech acts. 
Confession, forgiveness and teaching are just three particular examples of (speech) 
acts which occupy prominent places in Christian traditions. My studies of these 
speech acts have highlighted the interdisciplinary nature of asking questions about 
these kinds of phenomena. Speech act theory has proved helpful in demarcating 
criteria for construing divine activity, for example where forgiveness relates such 
activity to inter-personal construals. Again one must stress that such a hermeneutic 
of self-involvement is precisely fitted only to certain kinds of cases, but in such 
cases, I suggest that it represents a model well suited to highlighting theological 
concerns in biblical interpretation. In so far as the conclusions of chapters 6,7 and 8 
support such a claim, then this kind of 'theological interpretation of scripture' may be 
offered as a contrasting alternative to other current endeavours with similar 
concerns. 
12 
Finally, I propose that this study should issue in a call for the necessary role of a 
theology of the imagination in the activity of biblical interpretation. This I see as a 
direct corollary of the argument that the world envisaged, created and sustained by 
self-involving biblical texts, and thus accessed in particular via a hermeneutic of 
self-involvement, is in fact the world in which we live, construed theologically. 
However, to dwell in such a world is not to sever one's links with physical or social 
reality, but rather it is to be drawn in by self-involvement to a world whose grammar 
is that of the theology of the imagination. In chapter four I have mentioned various 
studies which provide useful points of contact with a speech act approach. " in the 
hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, and in the biblical work of those such as Walter 
Brueggemann who follow him, we find further congruences. " Nevertheless, while I 
11 Frangois Recanati, Meaning and Force. The Pragmatics ofPerfonnative Utterances, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987,258-66. 
12 See the survey of Stephen E. Fowl, 'Introduction', in Stephen E. Fowl (ed. ), The Theological 
Interpretation ofScripture. Classic and Contemporary Readings (Blackwell Readings 'in Modem 
Theology), Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, xii-xxx. Of course, I do not suggest that a speech act approach 
could ever represent the theological interpretation of scripture. 
13 In addition one should now note Garrett Green, Theology, Hermeneutics and Imagination. 
The Crisis ofInterpretation at the End ofModernity, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. 
14 See especially the essays collected in Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred Religion, 
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remain heavily indebted to their ways of articulating the issues, I propose that once 
again a hermeneutic of self involvement offers resources for appropriating the best of 
such approaches while offering a more helpful way of anchoring imaginative 
construals in the inter-personal objectivity of social reality. In the spirit of Fergus 
Kerr's work on Wittgenstein, this may best be seen as a desire to continue the 
exploration of 'biblical interpretation after Wittgenstein. " 
This was to have been a simple thesis: appropriate the development of speech act 
theory in biblical interpretation and then apply it to some suitable New Testament 
text, discovering in the process various hitherto unsuspected interpretive nuggets. 
Instead I have been forced to reconsiderjust what it is that the development of 
speech act theory amounts to, and in what ways it could prove relevant to the task of 
interpreting texts. 
In part I of this thesis I therefore attempted to guide the discussion toward certain 
key issues which needed to be in place for the biblical explorations of part II. I have 
proposed that 'speech act criticism' cannot be the way forward, and that the refined 
criteria of strong and weak illocutions, and strong and weak construals, lead us 
instead to an eclectic engagement with the biblical text. In the process, the possibility 
of a radically subject-orientated approach to speech acts presented itself. the 
reduction of interpretation to the construal of the text by the subject, or as I have 
termed it, the 'neopragmatist' challenge. My preferred response was to explore the 
notion of construal from a speech act perspective. The validity or otherwise of 
Narrative, and Imagination (ed. Mark I. Wallace), Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995. Brueggemann's 
actual uses of such an approach (e. g. the essays collected in Walter Brueggemann, Interpretation and 
Obedience. From Faithful Reading to Faithful Living, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 199 1) offer more 
support for my thesis than do his rarer attempts to explore the workings of it as a hermeneutic (Walter 
Brueggemann, Texts Under Negotiation. The Bible and Postmodern Imagination, Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1993). 
15 Ferg 
.,, 
us Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, London: SPCK, '1997 (1986). A recent and 
illuminating proposal which brings together such an 'after Wittgenstein' approach with the work of 
writers like Garrett Green mentioned above, alongside a concern to move beyond a simple 
polansation between realism and non-realism, is Sue Patterson, Realist Christian Theology in a 
Postmodern Age (Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. She 
focuses more on the connections between imagination and the 'language-ndden' nature of the world 
rather than exploring construction per se (see especially 73-93). 
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neopragmatist forms of textual non-realism is not perhaps an issue which one needs 
to settle before appealing to speech act theory in biblical interpretation, but one's 
view of it certainly affects the point of any such appeal. 
Part II of the thesis then made the anticipated turn towards the biblical text. I began 
by exploring the 'logic of self-involvement' of Donald Evans. In many ways I regard 
this thesis as something of a vindication of Evans' approach, an approach largely 
overlooked in the intervening years for the various reasons which I have discussed. 
With a careful reading of Evans in hand, I have gone on to studies of confession, 
forgiveness and teaching as examples of strong (or at least potentially strong) speech 
acts. I have not sought to explain these practices, but rather to elucidate them and lay 
bare their various speech act mechanisms. Again, non-realism in varying degrees lies 
either side of this path, and I have attempted to clarify the ways in which I dine at its 
(socially constructed) table with rather a long spoon. 
If there is any merit in the resultant hermeneutic of self-involvement, then I would 
judge that all manner of acts represented in and effected by the New Testament text 
need to be addressed from this speech act perspective. Such a perspective may enable 
us to articulate how it is that the New Testament text, as a vehicle for divine 
discourse, remains effective among us, for as long as we have eyes and ears, and the 
wit and the wisdom, so to construe it. 
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